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Abstract 
 
 
How do humans and chimpanzees set and blur boundaries between species when 
interacting with each other? This is the leitmotif of this etho-ethnography at the 
intersection of social anthropology, social studies of science and primatology. 
This endeavor is based on long-term fieldwork conducted in a cognitive sciences 
laboratory in Japan, which teaches chimpanzees language-like skills as means 
to understand their perceptual world. However, in this laboratory setting, the 
human-chimpanzee relationship is a vital part of the research philosophy and 
both species constitute a hybrid community of affections, social relationships, 
and scientific partnering. As a comparative effort, a short-term multi-sited 
ethnography was conducted following the theme across institutions in Japan of 
zoo, sanctuary and field-site type, in addition to the Japanese field station for 
the study of chimpanzee culture, in Bossou, Africa. Moreover, this work draws 
on the experience of becoming, at the same time, an experimenter in the targeted 
laboratory. The result is multifold. We shall explore first, the history as well as 
the caretaking and research practices in chimpanzee studies at the Primate 
Research Institute of Kyoto University (KUPRI). Then, we shall investigate the 
dynamics of physical boundaries in dangerous interspecies social interactions; 
the experimental boundaries of testing and being tested by chimpanzees; and the 
symbolic boundaries concerning human and nonhuman personhood. As a result, 
four major points are brought to light in a renewed perspective, namely (a) 
interspecies socialization (b) the embodiment of interspecies social relations in 
space (c) interspecies social relations in scientific settings (d) animalcentric 
perspectives on personhood. We conclude with the hopes and prospects for a 
fruitful dialogue across disciplines. Overall, the differential endeavor of this 
work consists in mobilizing concepts and tools from both primatology and social 
sciences to propose a more symmetric analysis of the human-animal 
relationship.  
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Résumé 
 
Comment humains et chimpanzés définissent et brouillent les frontières entre leurs 
espèces lors de leurs interactions ? Tel sera le leitmotiv de notre étho-ethnographie, à 
l’intersection de l’anthropologie sociale, des études des sciences, et de la 
primatologie. Au fondement de cette recherche se trouve un travail de terrain de 
longue durée mené dans un laboratoire de sciences cognitives situé au Japon, au sein 
duquel sont enseignées aux chimpanzés des compétences langagières dans le but de 
caractériser leur monde perceptuel. Cependant, au cœur même du contexte de ce 
laboratoire, la nature des relations entre humains et chimpanzés est un aspect crucial 
de ce type de recherche ; les deux espèces y forment une communauté hybride faite 
d’affects, de relations sociales et de collaboration scientifique. Afin de fournir une 
étude comparative, nous avons également mené une série d’ethnographies plus brèves 
– sur le modèle de la méthodologie multi-site – en observant cette même 
problématique à l’œuvre au sein de diverses institutions au Japon - zoo, sanctuaires et 
réserves - ainsi qu’au sein de la station japonaise pour l’étude de la culture des 
chimpanzés qui se trouve à Bossou, en République de Guinée. En outre, ce travail 
narre l’expérience que nous avons faite de devenir expérimentatrice au sein du 
laboratoire étudié. Le résultat en est multiple. Nous commencerons par explorer 
l’histoire des études sur les chimpanzés menées à l’Institut de Recherche sur les 
Primates de l’Université de Kyoto (KUPRI) ainsi que les pratiques de soin et de 
recherche qui s’y sont mises en place. Ensuite, nous étudierons les dynamiques qui 
caractérisent (1) les frontières physiques, lors d’interactions sociales entre deux 
espèces qui peuvent s’avérer dangereuses, (2) les frontières expérimentales, lorsque 
le chimpanzé n’est pas seulement celui qui fait l’objet d’une expérience mais qui met 
également à l’épreuve son expérimentateur, (3) et les frontières symboliques, 
lorsqu’est interrogée la définition de la « personne » humaine et non humaine. Ainsi, 
quatre points principaux sont examinés à nouveaux frais, en particulier (a) la 
socialisation interspécifique (b) l’incarnation des relations inter-espèces dans un 
espace donné (c) les relations inter-espèces dans un contexte scientifique (d) l’examen 
de perspectives zoocentrées sur la « personne ». Nous conclurons avec l’évocation de 
nos espoirs et de nos attentes quant à un dialogue fructueux entre les différentes 
disciplines en jeu. L’apport de ce travail consistera en effet à mobiliser des concepts 
et des outils de la primatologie et des sciences sociales afin de proposer une analyse 
plus symétrique des relations entre humains et animaux. 
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Prefatory Note 
 
 
JAPANESE LANGUAGE: This manuscript employs modified Hepburn romanization style for 
Japanese. Macrons indicate elongated vowels (e.g., ē or ō). As it is standard in Japanese studies, 
Japanese names to refer to interlocutors appear in the native order with the surname preceding the 
first name, however, when referencing, name order appears as standard Chicago full note and APA 
style.  
 
CITATION STYLE: This manuscript follows Chicago style full note as it is standard in 
humanities. However, the extended report of quantitative studies follows APA style due to its 
better adequacy and precision for numerical information. The citation for photographic and 
audiovisual material has been adapted based on Chicago style. As it is standard in linguistics, 
double quotes (“ ”) indicate direct quote regardless of whether the original is in English or in 
another language whereas single quotes (‘ ’) indicate translation. Block citations are always direct 
quotes. Moreover, double quotes might be used to emphasize words or terms, or when a word is 
not being used in its original sense.    
 
AUDIOVISUAL MATERIAL: This manuscript accompanies a DVD/USB with videos and 
audio material. All videos cited were subjected to a systematic frame capture referred to as 
“videoframe”. Videoframes summarize important pieces of information in a video for the purpose 
of description and analysis. However, some specific analyses, such as gestural communication, are 
better visualized through videos. Thus, although videos are not required for the understanding of 
the ideas discussed in this manuscript, they provide detailed information of case studies. Videos 
are signaled by the clapperboard symbol ( ).  
 
ETHICS STATEMENT: The experiment conducted by the author with chimpanzees has been 
approved by the Animal Welfare and Animal Care Committee of the Primate Research Institute, 
Kyoto University. Observational studies in Bossou, the Republic of Guinea, have been approved 
by the Direction Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique et de l’Innovation Technologique. Videos 
of human-chimpanzee interaction at KUPRI were recorded after interlocutors’ consent.   
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Introduction 
 
 
 
How do humans and chimpanzees set and blur boundaries between species when 
interacting with each other? This is the leitmotif of this etho-ethnography at the intersection of 
social anthropology, social studies of science and primatology (Figure 1). The question of 
boundaries is crucial because the frontiers between human and nonhuman do not stop at the species 
level, as comparative social anthropology emphasizes.1 The demarcation and trespassing of such 
boundaries, that is, the “boundary work” 2  between species, reveals how parties make sense of the 
radical otherness in a flexible manner and how they constitute the realm of a plural “us”; an 
anthropological object per se. In particular, this movement is notorious in societies in which the 
traditional divide between nature/culture and humans/nonhumans does not hold ground, like the 
Japanese.3  
Japanese relations to nonhuman primates are, therefore, comparatively much more 
contextual than a priori sets of rules for interactions. Therefore, Japanese primatology becomes a 
privileged object in this query. In addition, chimpanzees, as our closest evolutionary relatives, 
become of special interest given this species can be considered to be at the very borders of 
humanity. Finally, since captive settings require enhance human-chimpanzee contact, this is where 
such boundary work is likely to be observed in its most extreme expression. Yet, here a challenge 
must be added. Instead of focusing on how keepers and chimpanzees build relationships, we 
redirect the attention to how scientists and chimpanzees sustain interactions and relationships in a 
scientific setting. Now, not only are we able to address human-chimpanzee relationship, but we 
are able to inspect the makings of science about chimpanzees and with them, thus, hitting the core 
of hegemonic and epistemic discourses.  In sum, in this work intends to address the utmost liminal 
cases. 
Currently, humanities have witnessed the 
wake of the “animal turn” in which disciplines have 
re-conceptualized the place of nonhuman animals in 
their scholarship. 4  Conversely, primatology has 
increasingly addressed topics that traditionally fell 
in the realm of social sciences, in particular, ever 
since the co-joint effort of primatologists to make a 
strong case for chimpanzee cultures.5,6  Therefore, 
 
Figure 1 Fields of interdisciplinary research 
Social
Anthropology
Primatology  
Social 
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disciplines are leaning toward the creation of “boundary objects”, that is, objects adaptable to 
disciplinary nuances but robust enough to maintain identity across them.7 However, if boundary 
work between species is a delicate practice as we shall see in this work, so is the creation of such 
boundary objects because each disciplinary view has claims on how they object should be 
structured, and on how practices are best standardized or whether they should be at any rate. 
Therefore, if at the empirical level, this work deals with the movement of setting and blurring 
boundaries between species, at an epistemological and methodological level it addresses, in a very 
concrete manner, boundaries between disciplines.  
Before addressing the existing literature on the topic, we shall first make clear issues that 
belong to a conceptual treatment of the object rather than a methodological one, which is explored 
in a separate section. The first point refers to the concept of etho-ethnography. Etho-ethnography 
is a term used in the context of the complementarity of etho-ethnology and the ethno-ethology 
advanced by Lestel, Brunois and Gaunet.8 Whereas the ethno-ethology focuses on how human 
phenomena are used in our interaction with animals, the etho-ethnography intends to problematize 
the traditional mechanicist view of animals in cognitive ethology, which explicitly or implicitly 
conceives animals as computing machines. 9  Along with ethno-ethology, both put forward 
relationships as the center of the analysis. Yet, the etho-ethnographical approach draws more 
heavily on how humans and other species create shared meanings, affections and interests, in other 
words, how they form “hybrid communities”.10  
There is, however, a subtler nuance to the concept of etho-ethnography. Ultimately, to the 
social scientist conducting it, the concept invites researchers to consider, in practice, not only 
humans but also other species as “natives”. In sociocultural anthropology, natives are no one other 
than the population, the community or the group of people whose perceptions, beliefs, modes of 
living (so on and so forth) the anthropologist strives to understand in a particular manner. This 
effort is guided by the ideal of understanding natives “in their own terms”, meaning that even 
though each ethnographic research is an intersubjective practice, the ethnographer strives to 
understand what are the lenses through which the natives make sense of the world, instead of 
privileging the ethnographer’s departure points to make sense of the natives’ world.  
Nonetheless, when nonhuman animals become natives, social scientists are kept at bay, 
because traditional conceptual and methodological tools in humanities rely on resources more 
adapted to investigate our species, or as a primatologist puts it, how do we study meaning if one 
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cannot even interview the monkey?11 Thus, this endeavor requires social scientists to venture into 
other conceptual and, surtout, other methodological tools to move beyond human representations 
of animals and “nativize” animals. While, in a statement about primatologists, an anthropologist 
of science may boldly affirm that “my monkeys are you”,12 a symmetrical endeavor should aim at 
making all primates, humans and nonhumans, subjects of attention; along with the participant 
observer’s inclusion in this relationship. As Descola identifies, anthropology is “all too human 
(still)”.13  
Now, when analyzing the status that captive settings possess in terms of which type of 
knowledge they can provide, we must point out another nuance, that is, their re-signification. 
Whereas primatologists consider captive settings as a locale for conducting either laboratory or 
observational studies of primates, anthropologists of primatology and researchers in social studies 
of science grant such environments another status, namely, they are considered as a place in which 
one is able to study how interspecies relations unfold. Perhaps, the picture that comes to mind to 
primatologists is “naturalistic observations” in the laboratory, except that the “naturalistic” here 
fully conceptualizes human presence. Alternatively, we can say etho-ethnographers study the 
laboratory “in the wild”, borrowing Hutchins’ connotation of the term.14 Claiming the wilderness 
of the laboratory is key to understand how we make science of primates and with primates, and 
how both us and them emerge profoundly changed from these relationships.  
At last, a quick remark should be made regarding the use of the words “relationship” and 
“interaction”. Here, we understand the first in a broader sense of a history of interactions, affections 
and other relevant social features, while the term interaction per se more closely describes a micro 
level of analysis in which social relations unfold in minutes, seconds, or even microseconds. The 
same can be applied to the word “activity” (sensu macro) and “behavior” (sensu interactional 
instances), although it should be noted that in primatology the term behavior may connote patterns 
of activity.  
Now, we shall address the specificity of the object based on the existing literature and the 
ways in which it can be addressed. On the most macro level, Japanese society is considered to have 
entertained other forms of relationship with what in the West has been defined as culture and as 
nature. In fact, Berque remarks how, historically speaking, Japanese language did not even possess 
a word for nature in general, which nowadays is conveyed by the word shizen (自然); nature and 
culture have always defined themselves reciprocally and a nature which is independent of human 
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beings and bastion of causal laws has been, instead, conceived as a constructed nature where 
humans play an important role.15  
Furthermore, the structure of Japanese language is revealing; Japanese put emphasis on the 
predicate and, unlike Indo-European languages, it does not require a definition of the subject.16 An 
interlocutor may utter a verb without any subject, for example, “eat”; but then, who eats? One must 
turn to the concrete situation to sort this information out.  Another point interesting point is the 
clear importance given to nonverbal communication.17 In sum, Japanese language and society give 
considerable attention to the context, a fact that complexifies greatly any boundary work. As 
Kalland and Asquith stress there is “an absence of clear boundaries between the ‘natural’ and the 
‘artificial’”.18  
Yet, the fluidity of boundaries may pose some risks in the eyes of Western observers, as in 
the case of anthropomorphism, a vital problem in primatology. Indeed, regarding Japanese 
primatology of monkeys, the most seminal work in anthropology of scientific practices is 
Asquith’s research on the differential role that anthropomorphism gains in this national tradition.19 
Anthropomorphism is conventionally regarded as the ascription of human mental experiences to 
animals, however, as Asquith’s argue, Japanese have used anthropomorphism strategically in order 
to recognize similarities between humans and nonhuman primates and gain a contextual 
understanding of their lives.20 ,21  Thus, far from a hindrance, strategic anthropomorphism re-
signifies the reading of animal behavior. According to Asquith, traditionally, Japanese primatology 
(a) puts forward the explanation of behavior and social structure as sets of interacting factors (b) 
places considerable importance on the context of behaviors and (c) is committed to a holistic 
view.22 
It is under this framework that this 
tradition is regarded as having been the first 
to be able to conceptualize cultural 
behaviors in monkeys. The journey of 
Japanese primatology would start in 
December 1948 when Imanishi Kinji, 
Kawamura Shunzo and Jun’ichiro Itani 
visited Koshima island to envisage a field 
study of the Japanese macaques.23,24 After 
 
Photo  1 Kawamura, Imanishi and Itani (From left to right), 
Tokuda (top). © Itani Junichiro Archives. 
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having provisioned the site, in September 1953, one individual, a female called Imo (i.e., sweet 
potato in Japanese) was first observed to process food by washing the sand off with water, what 
became iconically referred to as sweet potato washing.25 Over two years, the behavior had spread 
to nearly 73% of the population, and due to its social learning origins, researchers employed the 
terms “preculture”, “prehuman culture” and “subculture” to label the novelty.26,27 Variations of 
sweet potato washing (e.g., washing in salty sea water) and other food processing forms were also 
observed, such as wheat placer mining, which makes grains float in order to separate them from 
the sand.28 Yet, as Hirata and colleagues emphasize, authors refrained from the full use of the word 
culture as to avoid its connotation of non-comparable features such as poetry, literature and so 
on.29 
In 1996, McGrew would fully claim the word culture in the book “Chimpanzee material 
culture”. 30  Nonetheless, the adjective “material” somehow delimited the aspects of culture 
scrutinized and, perhaps, softened backlashes from the sociocultural anthropological community, 
which seems to have initially received the idea with skepticism.31,32 In 1999, a consortium of 
researchers would publish in the journal Nature, an article entitled “Cultures in chimpanzees”, 
reporting thirty-nine different behavior patterns present in some sites but absent in others.33  From 
then on, models under which culture is conceptualized in primatology have changed and been 
enriched over time, an example of this being an increment to the group contrast model through a 
redirected attention to social learning.34,35   
Indeed, cultural primatology has increasingly complexified the way it approaches culture, 
including mobilizing gene-culture coevolution frameworks which move beyond the genetic-
environmental determinism of nature and the cultural relativism of nurture.36,37  Nonetheless, the 
challenge of a fruitful dialogue across disciplines is real, or as McGrew puts it: “[i]t might seem 
obvious to say that cultural primatologists have more to learn from cultural anthropologists than 
from anyone else. However, one suspects that most sociocultural anthropologists are not only 
uninterested in primatology, but also are resistant actively to such engagement”. 38 
Still, primatology has increasingly addressed topics considered crucial to humanities, 
which have become a constant source of criticism for being perceived as marginalized in 
primatology, such as the role researchers play for their object (or subjects). More recently, in this 
regard, while investigating hunting preferences of two adjacent chimpanzee communities in the 
wild, Hobaiter and colleagues found that habituation to researchers has likely impacted and 
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produced behavioral differences in these communities.39  If it exists an increased attention of 
primatology toward anthropological sensibilities, the reverse holds true as well.  
As a general movement in the re-evaluation of the epistemological status of animals in 
humanities, we may point out the framework of anthropology of nature, which has brought to light 
plural modes of conceptualizing our relationship to nonhuman entities.40,41 In a relatable effort, 
anthropology of life has dealt with the human understanding of life processes, and the process of 
bringing entities to life, by considering human interconnectedness with the nonhuman world.42,43  
When turning to social studies of science (or STS, i.e., science and technology studies), the 
symmetric anthropology inscribed in this tradition has sought to shed light on how hybrid networks 
are created and purified into distinct poles of explanation and how asymmetries emerge.44,45 In 
other words, it refrains from privileging social explanations of nature, which is best exemplified 
by radical constructivism, and it rejects the authority of natural explanations of the social, which 
appears as a naïve objectivism. In such way, this endeavor opens up the possibility of addressing 
both humans and nonhuman primates in a symmetric fashion, in order to uncover similarities and 
differences, and of being mindful of conflicting disciplinary worldviews.  
In addition, one of the main contributions of STS, which are relevant to the object of this 
work is the fact that STS carries out research in sites of production of scientific knowledge, in 
particular, in laboratories. Such studies unfold the existence of different epistemic cultures (or true 
laboratory cultures) which vary across major disciplines, as Knorr-Cetina’s investigation of a 
biology and a physics laboratory supports. 46  In the same tradition, Houdart conducted an 
ethnography of a Japanese laboratory in biology, contrasting it to a French partner.47 However, its 
ethnological analysis highlights an important point; it dismisses the culturalist reading of Japanese 
scientific practices and focuses, instead, on how actors mobilize culture in locu.48  Here, too, we 
are invited to borrow such perspectives and understand the relationship between humans and 
nonhuman primates as part of an underlying and unfolding laboratory culture (or rather nature-
culture!).  
Next, when exploring philosophies and anthropologies of primatology, Haraway’s seminal 
work “Primate visions” provides a highly critical approach regarding the dangers of using primates 
as mirrors for discourses on human nature, especially masculinized ones.49 Moreover, although 
less common, collaborations between anthropologists and primatologists (or biological 
anthropologists working in primatology) can be observed, such as Latour and Strum’s work.50,51 
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Nonetheless, the grand majority of emerging anthropologies of primatology consists of individual 
efforts, employing paradigms and methodological tools of humanities.  
This is the case for Langlitz’ short-term investigation in Matsuzawa’s laboratory on the 
history of the Ai Project, which explored the intellectual heritages of chimpanzee research in the 
broader context of Japanese primatology. 52  Mutatis mutandis, Stevens investigated human-
chimpanzee entanglements in a Catalonian sanctuary, how keepers make “selves out of others”,53 
and, in addition, she explored researchers’ sensory experiences in the wild.54 In fact, such works 
are in consonance with multispecies ethnography put forward by Kirksey and Helmreich.55  
Notwithstanding, whereas these studies are enlightening, much is still left to discover 
regarding chimpanzees’ perspectives in these relationships. From a different methodological 
perspective, for instance, Palmer and colleagues tackle the issue of how to assess orangutans’ 
perspective in a zoo, by confronting keepers’ view about these animals and orangutan-orangutan 
interaction through short-term ethnographic fieldwork and ethological observations (cf. Louchart’s 
approach on orangutans). 56 , 57 , 58   Here is when we make the move from anthropologies of 
primatology to ethno-primatological endeavors per se. Ethnoprimatology as a movement in 
primatology, puts humans and nonhuman primates as the unit of analysis, and, as Fuentes points 
out it emerges as “a hybrid field of study and is influenced via at least four lineages: field 
primatology and primate conservation, animal studies in sociocultural anthropology, 
anthrozoology and aspects of the animal welfare movement’s critique and engagement with 
primatology”.59 
The first point of “the ethnoprimatological manifesto” states that “[m]uch of what we 
consider “normative” behaviors for primates may be stimulated by specific anthropogenic 
contexts”, 60  which is in alignment with critiques of primatology from humanities. Indeed, 
ethnoprimatology draws heavily on multispecies ethnography.61 While relying on traditional tools 
from humanities but approaching the problems of interdisciplinarity between anthropology and 
field primatology, Leblan considers the ethnoprimatological approach to be unsatisfactory, in the 
sense that ethnology seems to be mobilized mainly as a means to argue for primate conservation, 
being imbued by simplistic culturalist approaches.62  
While disagreeing with this least charitable reading of the ethnoprimatological endeavor, 
it should be noticed that most ethnoprimatologists do seem to have a stronger background in 
biology-oriented sciences than in humanities. Moreover, captivity is still hardly ever 
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conceptualized in ethnoprimatology and a much smoother conceptual work could be achieved. 
This last remark, however, stands for both sides of the spectrum, which still seem to remain 
somewhat polarized, likely as a symptom of the worldwide lack of common institutional programs 
to groom researchers in two different traditions at the same time.63  
At last, we may not depart without a word on how primate cognition is studied in 
laboratories in the context of ape research. In the aftermath of the mostly abandoned ape language 
programs of the seventies,64 which will be addressed later on, some observational studies have 
made use of the microanalysis of interactions in order to take into account for how cognition unfold 
in social interactions, as for instance, King’s,65 and Johnson’s approach,66 to name just a few. Yet, 
such studies focus on intraspecific interactions in captivity but outside the laboratory world. 
Moreover, research on human-chimpanzee interaction in captivity is mostly concerned with 
welfare issues of how human rearing history affects chimpanzee behaviors toward conspecifics,67 
or interaction with zoo visitors.68  Even the creation of a “Chimpanzee-Human Interaction Index” 
is intended primarily for welfare studies,  aiming to measure the exposure to humans in comparison 
to time spent with conspecifics.69 Despite being an important field of investigation, this is but one 
among many other potential topics in this area.  
With modesty, some experimental studies use humans as stimuli; for instance, to test 
through video presentations contagious yawning as a measure of empathy with familiar and 
unfamiliar human and conspecifics. 70  Yet, overall, when looking at human-chimpanzee 
interactions, the status of laboratories as places for producing knowledge on chimpanzee cognition 
remains restricted to experimental research only. In cognitive studies, the laboratory is not 
conceived as an ecological setting in which both human and chimpanzee cognition unfold. A 
notorious exception is Takada’s treatment of human-chimpanzee interaction, which draws on tools 
from conversation analysis to make sense of interactions as they occur without experimental 
manipulation in a Japanese institution.71  
 At this point, a word of caution should be added. Cognitive anthropology in the vein of 
Hutchins’ tradition of distributed cognition attributes knowledge not to individuals but the 
coordination of individuals and media of several types, such as apparatuses and so on, so that, here, 
distribution means interaction.72 Although it seems reasonable that the entourage of the world may 
functionally act as an extension of the mind (e.g., cognitive artifacts for remembering),73 which is 
a claim of the extended mind approach,74 it might be perhaps too hasty to undermine the notion of 
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internal representations altogether, thus, underplaying the epistemic agency of individuals; a 
position shared by Giere.75  
 This issue leads Hutchins to conclude, apropos of chimpanzees’ symbolic learning, that 
“[t]he cognitive outcome, performing conceptual match-to-sample, is still not a capacity that 
belongs to the chimpanzee. If conceptual match- to-sample exists in this case, it belongs to the 
experiment as a complex system of cultural practices”.76 True, to the author, the same applies to 
humans; however, we must not ignore the fact that experiments foresee the testing of several 
conditions in such way that if one reasons with apparatuses and objects, one may well reason 
beyond. The point here is that, as we shall see, chimpanzees flexibly learn beyond the item-
specificity of experimental settings, the reason why we must infer that the material world serves 
as scaffolding for cognition to unfold, yet, it does not seem to be a prison outside which an agent 
cannot “think”.  
 Along the lines of comparative efforts, this time, from within primatology, very recently 
in an article entitled “The mismeasure of ape social cognition”, Leavens and colleagues addressed 
how comparative experimental research designs have systematically privileged humans, in 
particular, human children, and how such settings presuppose considerable exposure to Western 
and industrialized patterns of education.77 Yet, instead of throwing the baby with the bathwater 
and conclude the inutility of experimental research, the authors call for a reconceptualization in 
the ways experimental research is conducted, to account for the unequal conditions to which apes 
are subjected when being compared to humans.78  
 From within philosophy of animal experimentation, this point has been insisted upon by 
Despret, who advances the idea that researchers might not have been posing the right questions to 
animals all along.79 In this sense, she contends, how can an experiment be of interest to the animal? 
If the animal responds according to his or her own usages, this is categorized as trickery, and 
instead of denoting an animal’s talent, the result becomes largely ignored because of a greater 
issue, namely, that the animal needs to solve problems in terms of what is of interest to 
researchers.80 The ways other in which an animal is interested at solving a problem become 
meaningless.81  This brings us to the fundamental problem of how truly capturing an animal point 
of view. Nonetheless, Despret has pointed out that there are, indeed, cases in which an animal’s 
perspective takes center stage for researchers.82 As we shall see, researchers’ and chimpanzees’ 
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crossed perspectives take a center stage in the human-chimpanzee community at the Primate 
Research Institute.  
As it has been argued, there is currently a research desideratum not only on human-
chimpanzee interaction at a microlevel, but also on a macro aspect, that is, of how we bring to light 
in a more symmetric fashion, the interspecies dynamics of building up shared affections and 
meanings. In order to address both interspecies and disciplinary boundary work, we investigate the 
liminal case of chimpanzee research in Japanese primatology. As a result, we will encounter four 
major topics dealt across chapter, namely, interspecies socialization, the embodiment of 
interspecies relations in space, interspecies social relations in scientific settings and animalcentric 
perspectives on personhood.  
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Study Site and Methodology  
 
 
The present work was based on a fourteen-month long-term fieldwork at the Primate 
Research Institute of Kyoto University (KUPRI), which spanned from October 1st, 2014 until 
December 15th, 2015.I KUPRI is located in the city of Inuyama in Aichi prefecture. The study 
focuses on the daily life of the laboratory led by professor Matsuzawa Tetsurō, key figure for 
chimpanzee research in Japan and worldwide. Moreover, as a comparative endeavor, the study 
relies on multi-sited ethnography, in which specific issues are followed through several sites on 
the basis of varying short-term visits. First, all other active laboratories of PRI’s chimpanzee 
research have been visited during this ethnography.  
Secondly, other sites for chimpanzee and monkey research have been visited (see Figure 
1), namely: KUPRI’s Onobora breeding center and semi-free ranging area for Japanese macaques; 
KUPRI’s horse stable for cognitive research; Kumamoto Sanctuary in Kumamoto prefecture 
(chimpanzees and bonobos); Japan Monkey Centre in Inuyama, Aichi prefecture (several species); 
Kyoto City Zoo, in Kyoto prefecture (several species); Higashiyama Zoo in Nagoya, Aichi 
prefecture (several species); Kōjima/Koshima island in Miyazaki prefecture (Japanese macaques); 
Cape Toi  in Miyazaki prefecture (free ranging horses); Shōdoshima  in Kagawa prefecture 
(provisioned Japanese macaques); Yakushima  in Kagoshima prefecture (Japanese macaques and 
sika deer). In Kyoto and Higashiyama Zoos, the same automated computer setting existing in PRI 
was replicated in order to test chimpanzees and other primate species. This is also valid for 
KUPRI’s stable and computer experiments with horses.  
At last, a three-week short-term fieldwork in the Republic of Guinea, Africa, was 
conducted during June/July 2016. The Japanese field station in Bossou has been one of the 
traditional sites for the study of chimpanzee culture in the wild. Its long-term activities initiated 
with professor Sugiyama Yukimaru and were continued by professor Matsuzawa, reason why this 
site was chosen as part of the multi-sited ethnographic endeavor.  In addition, highly enriching of 
the ethnographic experience were the attendance to the decennial gathering “Chimpanzees in 
Context” (Understanding Chimpanzees IV) and the participation in the biannual meeting of the 
International Primatological Society in 2016, in the United States. In particular, the host institution, 
                                                 
I There has been a thirteen-day interruption abroad Japan in this period. 
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Lincoln Park Zoo, holds a computer automated setting akin to PRI’s to test great apes as well as 
Japanese macaques, providing experimental sessions open to the public.  
 
Figure 1 Visited research sites in Japan.II  
 
Standard practice in ethnology, this work made use of questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews, personal communications and long-term participant observation in a single research 
site. This has been coupled with the more recent approach of multi-sited ethnography in various 
fields, which applies similar methods but with the goal of grounding an in-depth analysis of how 
selected topics emerging from the long-term ethnography appear in other field sites. Another 
methodological resource that enriched this work was the use of some elements of actor-network 
theory of science and technology studies (STS) such as the mapping of controversies.   
In addition, consonant with standard practices in conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodological studies, as well as with ethological studies, microanalysis of behavior based 
on videos was employed as means to analyze interactions either frame by frame (30 frames per 
                                                 
II Map adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prefectures_of_Japan. Retrieved, October 8, 2017.  
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second) or every two seconds (© Solomon Coder; © ImageGrab). Regarding the description of 
interactions, the time-length has been adjusted in order not to burden readers and only a summary 
of important points was discussed. In the case of video coding, where categories are assigned to a 
full video, the time scale is adjusted for two seconds. In the rare cases necessary to discuss action 
on a millisecond level, the frame system is used.  
The notation of conversation analysis has not been employed due to the significant amount 
of training it requires to be read, which would prevent readers to easily understand what occurs in 
interactions. Regarding ethological practices, a compromise was found among three traditional 
types of description, namely, in terms of structure (i.e., posture and movements), of consequences 
(outcomes in categories) and of spatial relation (orientation to something or someone). Whenever 
the meaning of a behavior was unclear, a structural or spatial description was privileged. However, 
the videos provided along with the manuscript open up the possibility for readers’ supplementary 
or contrasting readings of behavior.    
Furthermore, all the studies to which the design allowed statistical treatment were analyzed 
with ©SPSS 24. Given that this manuscript is composed not only of ethnographical writings and 
analyses but also of several subsets of quantitative studies, their design and data collection methods 
are described in detail when these studies are introduced. Thus, here, we address only general 
methodological remarks.  
At last, a final methodological tool employed throughout the manuscript was first-person 
based accounts of the particular experience of becoming an experimenter where the anthropologist 
would carry out the study of human-chimpanzee relations. In other words, “becoming a native” 
has been mobilized as a fruitful methodological tool. As consequence, it not only allowed full 
immersion in a field where security level is high and requires training to trespass, but it also 
provoked a reflection on the commonalities and idiosyncrasies of different disciplines involved 
and a possible common research program.   
As concluding a remark, it should be noted that this manuscript strived for clarity and 
simplicity in its language and has avoided, as much as possible, the use of jargon-loaded writing. 
This is due to the fact that the target readers belong to several disciplines and do not share the same 
academic background. Thus, for specialists, some passages might appear repetitive, overexplained 
or simplified, while perhaps others might require more attentive reading. Bridging academic styles 
from literary to scientific has also been a major tool in the effort of achieving a more pedagogical 
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reading for practitioners of all disciplines concerned. Moreover, this manuscript privileged, as 
much as possible, the space for fresh etho-ethnographic material in contrast to weaving elongated 
theoretical considerations. In other words, the theoretical level has been mobilized in an 
instrumental way in order to open up the debate to wider issues; not as end per se.  
Because the goal of this work was, at a larger scale, to discuss ideas that can circulate 
across disciplines in contrast to discussing authors, readers should expect that some disciplinary 
canons might be given less attention than deserved. However, if true bridges between disciplines 
are to be construed to address issues that fall outside the realm of what a discipline is willing or 
capable to assess, then, we must find mechanisms that reveal a robust concept or core idea in a 
plurality of ways; a task curiously akin to how multimodality in communication scaffolds meaning 
for idiosyncratic minds (or disciplines!).   
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Chapter 1  
Chimpanzee Studies  
at the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University 
 
 
1.1 The “Prehistory” of the Ai Project 
A Comparison of Husbandry Practices and Research Philosophy 
 
At Kyoto University, 
studies using chimpanzees as a 
model to understand biological 
phenomena start with PRI’s first 
chimpanzee, a female named 
Reiko. Her name is rather 
revealing, as it was composed of 
the phonetic units in the words 
‘primate’ (reichōrui霊長類）and 
‘child’ (ko 子 ). Matsuzawa 
Tetsurō, founder of the Ai Project, remarks the isolated kanji 霊 “rei” means spirit, 
departed soul, so it seems unusual to name someone after it.1 Yet, for him, this somehow 
relates to the meaning of the word primate, because the character 長 “chō” indicates 
superiority. In fact, primates, including humans, would be perceived as “the spiritually 
highest” of the animal kingdom. 
 Matsuzawa reminisces about Reiko’s arrival during his last teachings as a Kyoto 
University professor.2 Reiko was brought to the Institute by morphologists to be a subject 
in studies on the evolution of bipedal locomotion, which mainly required her to walk on 
a treadmill; thus, unlike latter chimpanzees, she did not initially come to PRI for cognitive 
studies, and the famous Ai Project had yet to begin. Her arrival in 1968 coincides with 
the construction of the Institute, which was founded in the previous year (Photo 1 and  
Photo 2), and it marks what Matsuzawa characterizes as the “prehistory of PRI”, which 
spans from 1968 to 1976. Only with the arrival of three other chimpanzees in 1977 to 
1978 would the Ai Project be set in motion. 
 
 
Photo 1 Reiko and the view of Inuyama. Courtesy of 
Sakuraba Yoko. Credit: Kumazaki Kiyonori. 
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At only one year and seven months old, Reiko was the Institute’s firstcomer; she 
was also the first fully grown chimpanzee to pass away in the PRI community.I At the 
estimated age of forty-seven years old in 2013, she left behind a son, Reo, and a 
granddaughter, Cleo.3 Although by the time of this ethnography Reiko had already passed 
away, her life continues to be fondly celebrated. This can be witnessed through an 
informal memorial on a board next to the chimpanzee section’s mandatory passage to the 
testing area. A four-page document retraces Reiko’s life, a handful of pictures depict her 
early and late life in company of her group and offspring, and an illustrated sheet reads 
“arigatou Reiko-san”, or ‘thank you, Ms. Reiko’. 
 
Reiko’s public profile in 
the Japanese ape-database 
introduces her character: “Reiko is 
gentle and she likes children. She 
is strict about the rules of the 
group and she gets angry when 
anyone doesn’t follow the rules”.4 
These features can be seen 
condensed into a short clip of 
footage in which the older Reiko 
seems to comfort the five-year-old 
juvenile Pal after Pal’s half-brother, Ayumu, who is the same age, hits her (Video Frame 
1; Audiovisual Material 1): With Ayumu to the left and Pal sitting behind Reiko (1s), 
Ayumu hits his sister (2s). Next, Reiko vocalizes in the direction Ayumu took off, and 
extends her hand to Pal (6s). In chimpanzee communication, this gesture (“extend hand, 
palm sideways”) can function as reassurance or appeasement after retrieving an infant 
from rough social play.5 Surprisingly however, even if fully integrated into the PRI group, 
Reiko’s start as PRI’s first chimpanzee was quite peculiar.  
 
 
 
                                                 
I As of July 2017, PRI-born infant Pico (2 y/o), and the elder Puchi (≅ 51 y/o) were the Institute’s other 
losses. 
 
 
Photo 2 Reiko and PRI building site. Courtesy of Sakuraba 
Yoko. Credit: Kumazaki Kiyonori. 
39
 
 
   
1s 2s (hit) 3s 
   
6s (EXS gesture) 7s04frames 7s21frames 
 
8s  
Video Frame 1 Reiko extends her hand to Pal after Ayumu hits Pal. From Audiovisual Material 1. 
Audiovisual Material 1 Reiko extends hand to Pal after Ayumu hits Pal, 11s. From KUPRI 2005.6 
 
 In Reiko’s early life, for about a decade she lived without any conspecifics, that 
is, without members of her species. On the other hand, she enjoyed a close relationship 
with her caretaker, Kumazaki Kiyonori, described by a student as probably “her best 
friend” (Photo 3). When she first arrived, Reiko was inadequately housed in a small room 
in the basement, but during the daytime, she appeared to join other primate species 
outdoors.7  
Commenting on an old photo of Reiko in the company of monkeys, Matsuzawa 
explains she interacted with a mix of sympatric and allopatric primates, as the photo 
depicted a sympatric patas monkey (Erythrocebus patas), whose distribution in the wild 
overlaps with chimpanzees, and  an allopatric rhesus (Macaca mulatta), indigenous to 
Asia.8 Furthermore, Kumazaki specifies her group also included the following primates: 
baboon (Papio spp), green monkey (Chlorocebus sabaeus) and spider monkey (Ateles 
Ayumu 
Pal 
Reiko  
Reiko  
Pal  
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spp), which she joined from age five until she was almost ten or eleven years old.9,II 
Whereas patas, baboons and green monkeys are sympatric in some locations chimpanzee 
currently occupy in Africa, the Asian rhesus and the American spider monkeys are 
allopatric. 
 
           Reiko’s former caretaker 
reveals there were occasional 
fights, but as they all grew bigger 
things ‘turned awkward’ 
(“kimazukunatte…”).III, 
Note 10 It seems the word was used 
not only to denote an increase in 
aggressive episodes, which he 
mentioned right after, but also to 
refer to the fact that Reiko and a 
male baboon mated (it was later 
discovered by microscopic analysis 
that she carried sperm). Given there 
were also female baboons, 
Kumazaki said he did not 
understand the situation at all, nor, 
when asked, could he determine who the alpha was. Increase in “agonistic behavior”,11 
that is, fighting-related activities, and mating between species were hinted the causes 
for the dissolution of the group. Reiko’s first conspecific group would be formed in 
1979 during the Ai Project period, and it would be composed of subadults her age - in 
other words, other teenagers. These were Puchi, a female named after the Japanese 
pronunciation for petit, and Gon, who became the Institute’s first alpha male. Both 
wild-born in about 1966, they were kept as pets in private households, but as they grew 
bigger and stronger, they were sent to PRI, 12  a pattern quite common among 
chimpanzee pets.13  
 
 
Photo 3 Kumazaki and Reiko. Courtesy of Sakuraba 
Yoko. 
 
                                                 
II Vernacular designations for animals may refer to a specific species, or to a genus comprising several 
species. In Japanese, Kumazaki’s description is hihi (baboon/genus), kumozaru (spider monkey/genus) and 
midorizaru (green monkey/species). 
III  “kimazukunatte” from kimazui (気まずい ), also in the sense of uncomfortable (Minamide and 
Nakamura 2012).   
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 Concerning Reiko’s interactions with non-primate species, Kumazaki graciously 
adds she enjoyed having pets (petto ペット). Carvalho and colleagues explain that based 
on the literature, chimpanzees in the wild and in captivity seldom capture animals without 
eating them, but this behavior is mostly seen in youngsters.14  Moreover, among younger 
chimpanzees, “animal toying” 15 has even been observed to occur with species previously 
consumed in the same community (e.g., West African wood-owl, Ciccaba woodfordi 16) 
and elsewhere (e.g., western tree hyraxes, Dendrohyrax dorsalis 17). In these cases, 
behavior associated with toying was multifold and included not only raising the animal 
into the air, poking and grooming, but also hitting it while still alive (in the case of the 
hyrax). In both case studies, toying happened after the animals’ death as well, possibly 
indicating play in a more tool-like manner, as with a non-living entity. 
 To the best of my knowledge, there are no reports characterized by primatologists 
as “pet-keeping” by wild chimpanzees. Note, though, that for wild capuchin monkeys 
(Cebus libidinosus) with access to a provision site, Izar and colleagues described the 
cross-genus adoption of a marmoset (Callithrix jacchus). 18  The adoptive mothers’ 
nurturing behavior and the marmoset’s social integration strongly favored the label 
“adoption”, although, co-author Eduardo Ottoni adds that they have considered the 
hypotheses of the animal being kept as “pet” or even as  “Christmas turkey”.19 In captivity, 
Ross and colleagues’ study  of interactions between zoo-housed great apes and local 
wildlife found that of 71 surveyed institutions, about 40% reported having seen 
chimpanzees initiate play with vertebrates, including light touching (31.43%), while 
adults were significantly more likely to engage in aggressive interactions than youngsters 
(age six or younger).20   
 Occurring in the context of play, though not exclusively, is chimpanzees’ curious 
habit of carrying things in the area between the thigh and the abdomen, the so-called 
“groin pocket”.21,22 Reiko was no exception, performing it even with a “pet”. According 
to Kumazaki, after catching a mouse and playing with it, she stored it in her “pocket”, but 
her apparent pet did not survive, be it from the handling or the groin pocket. Could the 
mouse have been more of a toy than a pet? Curiously, the above-mentioned animal-toying 
cases include placing and transporting animals in the groin pocket, but the use of groin 
pocket is not limited to probable toys or pets; in fact, Biro reports that this technique has 
been used by chimpanzee mothers to carry their dead infants in the wild.23 Yet, this seems 
rather tough handling for living beings. 
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 The owl and hyrax apparently died just prior to the chimpanzees’ use of the 
“pocket”. 24 , 25  Nonetheless, given that at least in the context of the carrying of the 
chimpanzee corpses, these were consistently handled gently,26  this suggests that the groin 
pocket technique might not necessarily be equated with a general lack of care. In Reiko’s 
case, besides the mouse, she also took interest in a kitten that fortunately lived on, 
indicating her interaction with a non-primate species might have been less like using an 
object than the word “toy” would imply. Koko, the gorilla trained in sign-language, 
certainly hit the news with the story of her relationship with her first kitten, whom she 
named “All Ball”,27 sometimes referred to in the media as a pet or as adopted. It remains 
contentious whether nonhuman animals would be able to understand a relationship in 
terms of “pet-keeping” or any imaginable functionally similar category. Yet, humans 
certainly attribute pet-keeping to nonhumans, as seen in Kumazaki’s speech.   
 
Another noteworthy point 
when reconstituting “PRI prehistory” 
lies in the way Reiko was represented, 
which is observed in Photo 3 and Photo 
4, where she is seen dressed as a 
human, generally considered kawaī, or 
‘cute’. “Costumes” are common place 
not only in the early history of captive 
chimpanzees (Photo 5) but also in 
monkey performances in Asia28 (Photo 
6 and Photo 7), in “exotic” - read wild 
- pet ownership (Photo 8), and in some 
TV shows worldwide.IV It is unlikely 
that Reiko was dressed most of the 
time and the clothes per se are of less 
importance. Rather, it is the strong 
message it triggers among consumers of these visual materials that worries contemporary 
primatologists. 
                                                 
IV
 E.g., the Japanese shows Tensai! Shimura Dōbutsuen and Dōbutsu Kisōtengai! (Photo 9) and the 1970’s 
show Lancelot Link in the Unites States, (Photo 10 ). 
 
 
Photo 4 Reiko dressed as a toddler. Courtesy of 
Sakuraba Yoko. Credit: Kumazaki Kiyonori. 
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 The practice of dressing primates in costumes strongly discouraged for several 
reasons, the most pertinent being that it may contribute to the public perception of 
primates and, critically, of endangered species as being good pets to keep.29  Thus, the 
World Association of Zoos and Aquariums make the following recommendation: “Do not 
present animals in a way that the visitors could perceive them as exotic pets or 
‘performers’”. 30  Currently, this is followed both by laboratories where nonhuman 
primates are not subject to media exposure and by research facilities where they may 
figure as ambassadors for their species; for instance, Ai in PRI under Matsuzawa,31 the 
gorilla Koko under Patterson, 32  and the bonobo Kanzi, formerly under Savage-
Rumbaugh. 33  In this context, the portrayal of Reiko in clothes is in conflict with 
contemporary views in chimpanzee research.   
 
  
 
Photo 5 Chimp Rita in a gas mask to raise war 
morale among civilians, 1941, Japan. Source: 
Ochiai et al. (2015).34 Credit: Tennoji Zoo. 
Photo 6 Monkeys dressed for monkey performance 
in China. Credit: Reuters (Mauldin 2016).35 
 
  
Photo 7 Monkey dressed for monkey performance 
in Shōdoshima, Japan, 2015. By Daly. 
Photo 8 Exotic pet ownership by a celebrity. 
Chimp Bubbles and Michael Jackson. Credit: 
AP/AP (Nocera 2009).36 
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Photo 9 Japanese TV star, Pan-kun, dressed as a 
human, and his dog James. Source: Nyūsunodepāto 
(2012).37  
Photo 10 American TV star, chimp Tonga, 
dressed as detective. Credit: Allan Sandler, 
SBM Productions (Jones 2012).38 
  
Overall, Reiko’s initial environment could be characterized in two ways: on the 
one hand, by absent interaction with conspecifics and inappropriate housing conditions 
in comparison to current PRI guidelines39 and, on the other, by interaction with other 
primates, including allopatric ones, and face-to-face caretaking spanning beyond infancy. 
Apropos of Reiko’s group, Matsuzawa concludes: “For me it is acceptable, or… even 
more, good idea to keep single chimpanzee with other primate friends, so this is very 
good idea… in 1972”.40   Indeed, PRI would go through a major change in housing 
infrastructure and in husbandry philosophy while keeping some elements of its past.   
 Primate husbandry is understood as the management and care of primates, as well 
as their planned breeding and, more specifically, the type of training aimed at facilitating 
care.41 Present husbandry subjects to intense scrutiny conditions like those exemplified 
by Reiko’s case, and considerable research is devoted to assessing animals’ wellbeing. 
Yet, although there are many similarities, practices observed in Japanese chimpanzee 
research and broader worldwide husbandry practices differ in the way these points are 
weighted and pondered, particularly when considering the role of humans in chimpanzees’ 
social lives. These idiosyncrasies shall become clearer as the ethnographic descriptions 
of PRI practices progress, and caution is needed since these particularities reflect more 
the institutional, overarching disposition of those involved in Japanese chimpanzee 
research, rather than an “ethnic” way of doing things.  
 In primatology, because nonhuman primates should be able to express their 
species-specific social repertoires, the International Primatological Society, or IPS, notes 
in its guidelines that “[h]uman interaction, even where it is welcomed by the animal, 
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should never be seen as a substitute for conspecifics and does not meet the social needs 
of a nonhuman primate”.42 Further, to compose a conspecific group, “[t]he natural social 
grouping in the wild can be used as a guide when creating a captive group with respect to 
reproductive strategy (i.e., monogamous, harems, promiscuous or multi-male/multi-
female) and kinship ties (i.e., family group, female-bonded or male-bonded group)”.43 
Yet, IPS also advises “the main considerations should be that the animals show positive 
social interactions and a minimum of overt aggression”.44 More precisely, they need to 
be compatible on an individual level as well.  
 Contemporary husbandry prioritizes conspecific groupings and puts together age-
sex compositions of compatible individuals.45,46,47 Furthermore, it is advisable to maintain 
physical separation not only by species, but also broader sympatric groupings (i.e., New 
World monkeys, Old World African, and Old World Asian primates) to avoid disease 
transmission with serious clinical consequences for primates of other regions.48 In zoos, 
mixed exhibits composed of more than one species also take into account transmissible 
diseases and potential interspecies and hierarchy-related aggression,49 but these exhibits 
are still rare for great apes.50  
 At the same time, genetic management that guides husbandry of endangered 
species proceeds under careful consideration. It avoids inbreeding, that is, procreation 
between related individuals, but it also attends to hybridization;  preferably, it refrains 
from assembling geographically separated populations, species, or even subspecies that 
would potentially mate, V ,Note 51 , 52  or as Williams-Blangero and VandeBerg affirm, 
“[i]deally, nonhuman primate colonies should be composed of a single subspecies”.53  
Moreover, “it is important to consider between-population genetic differences even when 
subspecies are not formally recognized”.54 A classic example of geographical separation 
cited by the authors is Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulata) of Chinese and Indian origins, 
which may present differences in several aspects, ranging from behavior to morphology 
and immunology.55 Therefore, these factors should be carefully scrutinized depending on 
the type of research conducted.  Whereas the subspecies level may not pose a major 
problem to, for example, testing chimpanzees’ cognitive abilities in general, other types 
                                                 
V In contrast to closely-related species, sexual behavior among phylogenetically distant species in the wild 
is rare but documented, as in the case of a male Japanese macaque (Macaca fuscata yakui) toward female 
sika deer (Cervus nippon yakushimae) in Yakushima, Japan (Pelé et al. 2017), and the case of male fur 
seals (Archtocephalus gazella) toward king penguins (Aptenodytes patagonicus), the latter including 
coercive penetration (Haddad et al. 2015).  
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of investigation may call for a more fine-grained approach and a more stringent selection 
of participants.VI, Note 56  
 Despite its importance, the concept of species and subspecies is a contentious 
issue both in general and in the particular case of chimpanzees,57 who are so far currently 
attributed the status of two species, namely, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and common 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), with the latter being subdivided into four subspecies 
capable of generating fertile descendants across subspecies: the western P.t. verus, the 
Nigerian-Cameroonian P.t. ellioti, the central P.t. troglodytes, and the eastern P.t. 
schweinfurthii (Figure 1). Hybridization in the wild may occur in bordering areas of two 
populations.58  Whereas morphological differences between bonobos and chimpanzees 
are more easily distinguished, this is not the case for chimpanzee subspecies.59 Although 
in some cases the locale of capture or dealers’ activity range could be used as rough 
estimations for chimpanzees imported from Africa, conducting controlled breeding at the 
subspecies level is indeed difficult without genetic information on the individuals and 
without institutional effort, and as a consequence, hybrid individuals have been bred in 
captivity as well. 
 
 
Figure 1 “Distribution and current taxonomy of Pan” (Gonder et al. 2011, 4767).60 
 
 The import of chimpanzees from Africa has been controlled by the CITES 
Convention, an international agreement entered in force in 1975 to regulate the 
international trade of wild specimens,61,62 meaning, in practice, virtually all imports have 
                                                 
VI
 For instance, Hayakawa and collaborators (2012) identified diverse bitter taste receptor genes that 
depend on chimpanzees’ subspecies; this is of ecological importance for chimpanzees’ discrimination of 
poisonous compounds in the wild. Thus, in such cases, subspecies level matters when selecting subjects. 
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legally ceased among its signatories.VII,Note 63 CITES  has 183 members and in 1980, Japan 
entered the “Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora”,64 therefore, wild-born chimpanzees like Reiko and Ai were imported into 
Japan before that date, as stressed by Matsuzawa.65  
 There are currently 316 chimpanzees in Japan spread across 50 institutions of zoo, 
sanctuary, and research-facility types. 66  In an effort to monitor this population, the 
Japanese Great Ape Information Network, or GAIN,67 provides breeding facilities and 
researchers with a detailed database of apes living in Japan, including personality 
assessment of individuals and genetic information collected during a nationwide 
subspecies identification initiative. According to Shinoda and colleagues’  comprehensive 
study published in 2003, hybrids constituted nearly 30% of the captive chimpanzees born 
in Japan; nonetheless, around 60% of the total individuals, including those born in Japan 
and abroad, were Pan troglodytes verus.68 
 To an extent, these results mirror those found elsewhere; in a recent study by 
Hvilson and colleagues covering 20% of the European zoo population, almost 40% of the 
chimpanzees were of mixed ancestry, while among the nearly 60% non-hybrid remainder, 
the most represented subspecies  was western chimpanzees, in other words, P.t. verus 
(40%).69  As for the United States, in an assessment investigating about 50% of the 
African founders in this country, Ely and colleagues reported that 95% of these were P.t. 
verus. 70   Furthermore, the largest breeding program managing chimpanzees, the 
European Endangered Species Programme (EEP), held by the European Association of 
Zoo and Aquariums (EAZA), so far covers only the verus subspeciesVIII, Note 71 due to its 
taxonomic consensus 72  and habitat fragmentation. 73  In summary, considering these 
samples, captive chimpanzees are overall skewed toward the western variant and since 
hybrids and different subspecies exist in facilities worldwide, this requires effort to 
preserve chimpanzees at a subspecies level.  
 Whereas several guidelines orient husbandry and more specifically, breeding, in 
practice, the management of nonhuman animals involves considering and identifying the 
best possible situations given physical, institutional, and research-related constraints 
while simultaneously bearing in mind the animals’ health and psychological well-being. 
                                                 
VII However, note that because of CITES’ paper-based system, fake CITES permits are more easily created 
(Schukman and Piranty 2017). I thank Cécile Sarabian for bringing this point to my attention.  
VIII “Once a new test for a more precise identification of chimpanzee subspecies is developed and can be 
applied, additional specimens that are tested as pure P. t. verus can be ‘upgraded’ to the EEP. Also, the 
potential for an additional EEP for any of the other subspecies can be evaluated” (Becker et al. 2007, 19).  
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Suppose that when compatibility between individuals is assessed, it does not resemble 
the wild social structure. Should nonhuman primates be kept alone or should an 
“unnatural social group” be formed? The International Primatological Society suggests 
the following: “The formation of same-sex peer groups for holding stock primates, and 
to prevent breeding, is common in many laboratories. Despite it being an unnatural social 
grouping for many species, it allows socialization and is certainly a better alternative to 
keeping animals individually housed”.74  Here, it is possible to observe how the reasoning 
behind husbandry of social primates puts more weight on socialization than on the 
naturalness of the social grouping - except; many cases are not so clear-cut. For instance, 
what does one do with closely related social species that are nonetheless housed alone?    
 A case at the Japan Monkey Center concretely illustrates this issue. At JMC, they 
have recently formed a pair for the welfare of two gibbons of different species.75 A 
research fellow at PRI involved in this activity, Uchikoshi Makiko, reported the case.76,77  
Gibbons are apes that belong to the family Hylobatidae and are called lesser apes in 
contrast to the Hominidae family, or great apes. 78   They are territorial and live in 
monogamous family groups with the offspring leaving the group in adulthood, at around 
age ten.79 Uchikoshi explains that it is not an easy task to adequately house and match 
gibbons due to lack of space in most zoos, species differences, hybridization, and 
unknown social histories. In addition, some gibbon species are rarer, making it even more 
of a challenge. Now, who was the gibbon pair? 
 The gibbons in question are Cricket and Jas.80,81 Cricket is a Mueller’s Bornean 
gibbon, also known as a gray gibbon (Hylobates muelleri), and according to Uchikoshi, 
she is a very old lady who has probably been living alone for more than twenty years (the 
typical lifespan of H.muelleri life span is forty seven years 82). Given she is an infertile, 
non-cycling female, JMC staff decided to pair her with Jas, a white-handed gibbon 
(Hylobates lar). Because JMC is a zoo as well, Uchikoshi pondered the effect that such 
an “unnatural combination”, as she called it, would have, particularly as a non-ideal 
educational message for the public. In spite of that and other difficulties, the gibbons were 
matched favoring socialization; they first met through a mesh barrier and about one month 
later, they had a full contact meeting. As observed, the stakes of “unnatural combinations” 
between related species seem much higher than those among conspecifics, and it should 
be noted this case represents no rule.  
 Also challenging is the choice between environmental and social factors. In a 
hypothetical situation, if funding is scarce and one can allocate resources to either 
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improving and enriching the housing facility of an individual living alone, or one can 
devote resources to match this animal with other(s), how does one decide how to allocate 
funds? Citing works by Schapiro and colleagues, 83  Lutz and Novak, 84  Rennie and 
Buchanan-Smith,85 and Smith and colleagues,86 the International Primatological Society 
reasons that “[a] compatible conspecific probably provides more appropriate stimulation 
to a captive primate than any other potential environmental enrichment factor […] The 
presence of a conspecific enables the primate to utilize its repertoire of social behavior, 
which can occupy a considerable proportion of the daytime activity budget in captivity 
and provide a social buffer to stress […]”.87 In other words, provided the housing facility 
does not fall within any extreme case, socialization is likely to be more enriching than 
improvements in nonhuman primates’ living environment.IX,Note 88  
 Lastly, one must consider the place of humans in social interactions. It has already 
been noted that humans are no replacement for conspecifics.89 Yet, consider what should 
happen if no conspecific or other type of grouping is possible for various reasons. Is it 
better for a nonhuman primate to be alone or to have a human as a social partner? Noting 
a study by Heath,90 the International Primatological Society concedes that “[w]here the 
experimental protocol makes it difficult to provide the animals with a sufficiently rich 
social environment, a good repertoire with human caretakers can be valuable […] Even a 
few minutes a day spent interacting with the animal and allowing it to groom oneself can 
make a significant difference to the quality of its life”. 91  Simply stated, regarding 
nonhuman primates’ social world, even humans seem to be better than nothing. However, 
when most standards are met, it is the extent to which humans should interact and relate 
to nonhuman primates that is controversial.  
 Overall, husbandry involves many challenges on multiple levels and there might 
not be a consensus involving exactly what to do in each concrete case. Based on the 
literature discussed above, the strongest principle to guide decision-making is 
“compatible conspecific grouping”, which allows for conspecific socialization. To 
generalize, in captivity, compatibility takes priority over natural grouping, conspecific 
socialization over environment, and human interaction over no social interaction at all. In 
any case, the acceptable levels of human-animal contact are disputed depending on the 
                                                 
IX Social housing might be viewed as stressful or dangerous for chimpanzees with severe disabilities, such 
as the paraplegic Reo at PRI or the blind Kanako at Kumamoto sanctuary. Yet, amputated at the forearm, 
the female Akiko was able to be socially reintegrated with success at Higashiyama zoo (see Sakuraba 2014). 
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cultural, institutional, and individual views of the human actors. The ideal might range 
from absent/minimal interaction to full-blown reciprocal social learning between species.  
 In the context of current husbandry recommendations, Reiko’s early life was far 
from ideal, especially due to lack of conspecifics and appropriate indoor housing. 
Nevertheless, outdoor excursions and socialization with other primates, even if allopatric, 
perhaps acted to counterbalance these effects to some extent, with incompatibility being 
assessed in terms of agonistic and mating behavior. On the one hand, human caretaking 
must also be understood in this context, as another venue for socialization. On the other, 
human representations of Reiko and how she was perceived in research as a test subject 
depart considerably from current representations in primatology and from present 
Japanese chimpanzee research. In fairness, at that time, much was yet unknown about 
chimpanzees, and the building blocks of our current scientific views were just being laid.X, 
Note 92  
 Prior to Reiko, early Japanese psychologists made the initial effort to study 
chimpanzee cognition in Japan. Starting in 1961, for research purposes, the pioneer 
Okano family raised an infant chimpanzee, Sachiko, together with their own child for 
approximately 18 months, with the Okanos tracking similarities in the cognitive 
development of both species, after being inspired by psychologists in the United States 
who raised chimpanzees at home.93,94At PRI, according to Matsuzawa and colleagues, the 
first psychological experiment with Reiko was conducted by Asano Toshio and 
Kumazaki Kiyonori,95 who investigated Reiko’s light control of the room where she was 
housed.96 They intended to better understand the relationship between illumination and 
circadian rhythm by means of her “operant behavior”, 97 that is, her self-initiated turning 
on and off of the light.  
 Operant behavior is understood behavior that is freely emitted and that is capable 
of augmenting or diminishing in frequency by reinforcement or punishment; however, 
this notion is, in fact, closely associated with another concept, that of operant 
conditioning.98  For now, consider that operant conditioning regulates the appearance of 
a behavior as a function of a stimulus that works as a reinforcement (for instance, a 
reward) so that when an individual gives the correct response and receives a positive 
stimulus (e.g., a treat), the targeted behavior is likely to increase in frequency. 99 
                                                 
X For instance, it was not until the 1960s that the effects of social isolation in primates were the subject of 
considerable interest (Rennie and Buchanan-Smith 2006).  
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Contemporarily, operant conditioning is widely used in an enormous array of situations, 
ranging from experiments to husbandry training, although only one variety is most highly 
recommended - the use of positive reinforcement (i.e., rewards after correct behavior) 
rather than punishment.100,101 
 Even if broadly used nowadays, the roots of operant conditioning can be traced to 
a particular moment in the history of psychology in which the scientifically accepted 
attitudes toward nonhuman animals differed from most contemporary chimpanzee 
research. To be precise, operant conditioning is a product of an approach in psychology 
called behaviorism. Flourishing in the first half of the twentieth century, behaviorism   
focused on observable behavior solely in terms of antecedents and consequences and 
rejected the study of mental events, consciousness, or mind,102 concepts that would be 
vital to the famous “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s.103  
 The type of experiment conducted by Asano and Kumazaki 104 owes more to the 
sort of studies carried out by early twentieth-century behaviorists than to cognitive views 
on chimpanzees. There is a subtle line to be noted, though. It is indeed possible to resort 
to behavioral training techniques that make use of operant conditioning and to interpret 
the results of an experiment as a matter of stimulus-response-reinforcement while 
simultaneously not adhering to a behaviorist philosophy rejecting the notion of animal 
mind. Protocols and explanations drawn from behaviorism can coexist with those 
supported by cognitive views.  
 An illustration of this point can be found in Reiko’s case. According to Matsuzawa, 
the classic study by Wolfgang Köhler on chimpanzee tool use was replicated in the 
basement of PRI during the early days of the Institute.105 Köhler’s work involved posing 
chimpanzees a set of problems which seemed difficult enough, but not impossible to 
solve.106 In its accomplished and most famous form, a variety of solutions were observed; 
in order to obtain bananas that were purposefully hung from the ceiling, chimpanzees 
used joint sticks, propelled themselves with them, and stacked crates, sometimes combing 
these options. Originally published in 1917, a great deal of Köhler’s research was actually 
intended to undermine the underlying assumptions of behaviorism.107 In PRI “prehistory”, 
these two forms of theoretical backgrounds were present. Nevertheless, to a contemporary 
observer, the perception of chimpanzees likely tended toward behaviorist philosophy.  
 This is hinted at by Matsuzawa, who reveals that even though Asano, a leading 
researcher during Reiko’s early lifetime, was a good teacher, he was very “conservative”, 
and one could not talk about “mind” or “cognition” with him.108  Matsuzawa however, 
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admired Kumazaki’s careful observations of Reiko, as for instance, when the caretaker 
documented Reiko playing in her room with the shadow of her own hand in the context 
of the light control experiment.109   Then, commenting on the above-mentioned study by 
Asano and Kumazaki, Matsuzawa concluded, “[a]gain, I want to say I have no intention 
to blame those things of 40 years ago, but for them, a chimpanzee is… a big black 
monkey… who is intelligent”. 110  
 From the Ai Project on, except for face-to-face caretaking practices (Photo 11), 
there would be drastic changes regarding the assumptions behind how research is best 
conducted and how chimpanzees are represented. Scientific paradigms, as conceptualized 
by the physicist and historian of sciences Thomas Kuhn, describe a set of theories, 
methods, and standards but also norms and values that can indeed act as 
worldviews. 111 This is why Matsuzawa’s use of the word “prehistory” should be 
understood not only in the sense of the period that precedes the Ai Project but as a real 
paradigm shift. So, how did the chimpanzee turn into something more than a “big black 
monkey”? We shall see in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 11 Puchi, Kumazaki, Reiko, and infant Reo. Courtesy of Sakuraba Yoko. 
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 1.2 The Ai Project 
Teaching Chimpanzees Language-like Skills 
 
Audio Material 1 Matsuzawa meets Ai 
(4m51s). Credit: Matsuzawa (2015).2 
 
 I clearly remember the very first day 
of meeting Ai chimpanzee. It was a very 
cold day in November and it was, again, 
the basement, no windows, nothing. And 
I was… just a 27-year-old assistant 
professor, and I was asked to be the 
person to study this particular 
chimpanzee, Ai. And I ha[d] no 
knowledge at all, no preparations, I just - 
I w[ore] a lab coat and went to the 
basement to say hello to the chimpanzee. 
And it was a tiny chimpanzee […] I was 
so surprised! The first thing I was so 
surprised is; she was looking me into my 
eyes!  When I look into her eyes, she was 
looking me. I got my position in 
December 1976, so one full year I had the 
experience of watching monkeys. 
Suppose that you are facing to the 
monkey, if you do the direct gaze to the monkey, the monkey is very uncomfortable.  So, 
making grimace, is showing the teeth, show the fear or…. aggression to you, because 
direct gaze means mild threat in the case of monkeys, so you are not recommended to see 
directly the eyes of monkeys. I was so surprised, a chimpanzee, baby, infant, a year old, 
looking me into my eyes! […] Then I had nothing to give to her, no food, no gift, nothing. 
But I have - wear the lab coat, white lab coat […]. This cloth [an arm warmer] I take it 
off from my arm and give it to her. Again, I was so surprised. Give it to a monkey, just… 
sniffing, or may bite and understand this is not edible one, they throw it away, that’s all. 
But Ai chimpanzee receive[d] the cloth looking into my eyes, receive[d] the cloth, and 
immediately put into her arm, and fly it up and fly it down and fly it up and fly it down. 
And take it out and put it back to me. Wow! I did not expect such a kind of interaction 
with the chimpanzee, so right from the beginning, right from the very first day, I was so 
much fascinated by the mutual gaze and this kind of “imitation” and motivation to 
communicate, to interact. And I immediately recognized this is not a big black monkey, 
this is something else.  So, from then on, every day was new, every day I learned a lot 
from the chimpanzee.  
 
Ai’s origins can be traced back to West Africa. She was brought to Japan by a 
dealer who had business with the United States, Europe, and Japan, and because of her 
teeth eruption it is estimated she must have been born in October 1976.3 Matsuzawa  
explains that in the 1970s, before Japan signed the CITES Convention, the international 
agreement regulating the imports of endangered species, the nation “imported more than 
 
 
Figure 2 Ai uses lexigrams. Credit: Matsuzawa and 
Yabuuchi (1985, 22).1 By Yabuuchi Masayuki. 
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100 wild-born chimpanzees, mainly for biomedical research of hepatitis B”.4,I,Note 5  He 
continues: “This infant chimpanzee was one of them. However, instead of being sent to a 
biomedical facility, she was sent to KUPRI where she was to become the first subject of 
an ape-language research project in the country” (Figure 2). Her name, which reads “eye” 
in English, means ‘love’; it is a common name for girls in Japan, but it seems to have 
been loosely inspired by the protagonist of the romantic manga series Ai to Makoto (愛
と誠).6 Ai arrived on November 30, 1977, and was later followed by the nearly 1.5-year-
old infants Mari and Akira, who were brought at the end of January 1978.7,8  
By the end of the 1970s, three approaches that sought to investigate linguistic 
skills in chimpanzees inspired Japanese researchers:9 the approach by the Gardners, who 
taught American Sign Language to the female chimpanzee Washoe in a complete human-
rearing environment (Photo 12);10,II, Note 11, 12, 13 the work of the Premacks, who used 
plastic symbols with chimpanzee Sarah in a laboratory setting with human social contact 
(Photo 13);14 and the research conducted by the Rumbaughs, who studied chimpanzee 
Lana using a computer-controlled lexigram system with human tutoring in the laboratory 
(Photo 14).15 Intending to implement this line of investigation in Japan, the Ai project 
would end up being, as Matsuzawa  puts it, “at the tail-end of ape language studies carried 
out in the second half of the twentieth century, and a front runner of studies of 
comparative cognition in chimpanzees”.16   
The research team was formed by Murofushi Kiyoko, head of the psychology 
section at that time, and by two assistant professors, Asano Toshio, who had conducted 
the first psychological experiment with Reiko,17 and Kojima Shozo; however, since both 
of them were about to take two years of sabbatical leave, Matsuzawa Tetsurō was left to 
“face the three chimpanzees by [himself]” as the main trainer and researcher under 
Murofushi’s supervision. 18   Among other collaborators, the project counted on the 
counsel of  specialists in neurophysiology (Kubota Kisou), computer technology (Nagao 
Makoto), and the linguistics of generative grammar (Kamio Akio and Kuno Susumu), 
with Nagumu Sumiharu helping to build the experimental system.19, 20  Even though 
                                                 
I For detailed records of early captive chimpanzees in Japan, see Ochiai et al. (2015; in Japanese with 
abstract in English).  
II An attempt to replicate the Washoe Project was conducted by Herbert Terrace with Nim Chimpsky (a pun 
on linguist Noam Chomsky). Terrace and colleagues (1979) concluded ape sentences were explained by 
nonlinguistic processes; however, an opposing view from ape language research points out that the use of 
operant procedures in a restricted environment hindered Nim’s abilities (Hillix and Rumbaugh 2004). For 
a powerful narrative on ape language research, see the documentary “Project Nim”, which retraces Nim’s 
life (Marsh 2011).  
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Murofushi had experience in split-brain research in monkeys, performing invasive 
experiments with chimpanzees was rejected by all involved.21 It should be noted that 
Japan lacks laws banning invasive experiments in apes,22 so its actual absence depends 
on “people’s mentality”.23  
 
 
 
 
Photo 12 Washoe, taught ASL. Credit: NhRP 
(2012). 24   
Photo 13 Sarah, taught plastic symbols. Credit: 
Premack and Premack (1983, 16).25   
 
 
 
Photo 14 Lana, taught lexigrams. Credit: Hillix and Rumbaugh (2004, 128).26 By 
Frankly Kiernan. 
 
The project leader, Murofushi, gave Matsuzawa freedom in terms of the research 
plan as long as it related to language. Consequently, Matsuzawa’s interest in philosophy 
during his bachelor’s degree and his later training in psychophysics shaped the goals of 
the Ai Project. In his words: 27  
 
  [Q]uestions along the lines of “Can apes acquire human language?” seemed too 
vague to me. I was interested in the perceptual world, neither in communication nor 
language itself. Therefore, I decided to teach chimpanzees language-like skills only as 
a medium to gain access to their mind. I did not care whether the skills themselves 
qualified as language or not: I wanted to learn what chimpanzees saw, what they knew, 
what they thought, etc., all through a sound, scientific method. I tried to gain access to 
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the perceptual world of Ai with the help of symbolic media such as numerals, 
lexigrams, Kanji characters, and letters of the alphabet.  
 
Matsuzawa alludes to biologist and ethologist Jakob von Uexküll as the original 
proponent of this set of questions that opens up the unique world of each species, or their 
“Umwelt”. 28 , 29  If, in general, the German Umwelt is translated as ‘environment’, 
Uexküll’s use of the word is so distinctive that it has been maintained in many texts in its 
original form. Conceptually, Umwelt evokes the ‘the animals’ point of view’ (or 
“Standpunkt des Tieres”). 30 For instance, only superficially do animals living in the sea 
inhabit a common homogeneous ‘world’ (Welt), and this is because the structure of their 
bodies and the relationship between their bodies and the surroundings differ.31Uexküll 
asserts the experimenter has to try to determine which parts of an animal’s surroundings 
influence it and in which form that happens.III, Note 32 
Matsuzawa, who defines himself as a “psychophysicist”,33 explains Uexküll’s 
topic was picked up by the discipline called “animal psychophysics”, 34   which the 
professor linked mainly to Donald Blough and William Stebbins as early references.35,36 
In Stebbins’ words,  the field “can be defined as an area of research in which the primary 
concern is with the behavioral analysis of sensory function”.37 It is noteworthy, however, 
that even though some overlap in interests exists between Uexküll and later animal 
psychophysicists, their approaches are very unalike, and neither Blough’s nor Stebbins’ 
above-mentioned works pay homage to the early biologist. In fact, Uexküll would become 
a foundational author in the field of semiotics, which investigates signs in terms of 
meaning-making activities, 38 whereas animal psychophysics owes much to behaviorist 
techniques, and, above all, operant conditioning.39  
The fact that Matsuzawa 40, 41 alludes to both traditions to substantiate the original 
goals of the Ai Project is subtly revealing and it indicates multiple heritages and disparate 
philosophical influences regarding how nonhuman animals are to be studied in the course 
of their research. These points reflect a facet of opposites well accommodated in the 
history of the Ai Project up to the present: high-tech procedures with milliseconds 
precision à la animal psychophysics with an overarching disposition to understand and 
treat chimpanzees according to their own “point of view” via a more philosophical 
manner. In fact, starting with the perceptual world of chimpanzees, the Ai Project would 
                                                 
III In the original: “Der Experimentator muβ festzustellen suchen, welche Teile dieser Umgebung auf das 
Tier einwirken und in welcher Form das geschieht.” (Uexküll 1921, 5) 
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later cover many other areas, and in several studies, it would compare humans, 
chimpanzees, and other species in the same experimental settings, an approach best 
exemplifying the so-called “comparative cognitive science”.42  
Comparative cognitive science(s), as summarized by Matsuzawa, is “a discipline 
that compares cognitive functions in living species”.43 The main logic behind it is that by 
comparing how other species and humans process the world, we can illuminate our 
differences and similarities. Frequently, the notion of “out-group” is evoked. As 
Matsuzawa elaborates:44 “[W]e have to know ourselves, so that is my main motivation 
[for studying chimpanzees]. As a tiny, tiny seed of philosopher, I wanted to know who I 
am, where did we come from, what is uniquely nature of human beings? And in my case, 
I have been focusing on chimpanzees. The logic is explained by the keyword out-group 
[…] [or] outside member. So, who are the out-group of humans? That is chimpanzees, 
gorillas, and orangutans. Biological classification: That is called family hominidae. 
Family hominidae consists of four genera: humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, and 
orangutans”. 
Chimpanzees (Pan spp.) are considered the closest species to humans in terms of 
our evolutionary history; in other words, our “phylogeny” 45  shows the divergence 
between the ensemble of our genes, or our genomes, is only about 1.1 to 1.4%.46, 47 The 
time at which human and chimpanzee lineages became separated is still controversial, 
especially due to a lack of reliable paleontological records, but estimates usually range 
from nine to five million years ago.48  Our shared ancestor is named “last common 
ancestor” (LCA), a link whose evolutionary path would lead to humans (Homo genus) 
and chimpanzees (Pan genus).49 Then, approximately two million years ago, the bonobo-
chimpanzee common ancestor speciated into common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 
and pigmy chimpanzees, that is, bonobos (Pan paniscus).50,51   
Due to shared ancestry, the logic of comparative cognition follows: if a feature is 
observed in both chimpanzees and humans, it is likely to have been present in our 
common ancestor, the LCA (Figure 3). If it is absent in chimpanzees and present in 
humans, the feature is expected to be evolutionarily more recent in our history. 
Nonetheless, sorting out a clear reconstruction is usually not straightforward. The 
umbrella term “cognition”, as it was first conceived, refers to how beings, be they humans, 
nonhuman animals, or machines, process the world around them.52  Still, there are many 
ways one can solve a puzzle. From this perspective, are humans, nonhuman animals, and 
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critically, robots solving problems in the same way? Are the same cognitive processes 
being used? 
 
This leads us to the debate of 
homology versus analogy. 
“Homology” refers to features 
inherited from a common ancestor, 
whereas “analogy” points to 
characteristics that appeared 
independently in separate lineages.53 
Complex concepts requiring the use of 
cognitive abilities, such as culture, 
generate heated debates among 
researchers and different disciplines. 
Grosso modo, the discussions ponder, on one hand, whether certain cognitive processes 
considered to be vital properties of a concept are observed when nonhuman animals solve 
problems and, on the other, what exactly these vital properties should be.54 In other words, 
what does the checklist consist of and should the items all be ticked off? In the Pan-Homo 
case, there is evidence of homology if what is observed in chimpanzees matches 
previously debated prerequisites. IV, Note 55, 56, 57  
However, here again the comparative endeavor is complexified, this time by the 
fact that observing common cognitive processes in humans and chimpanzees is a 
challenge on its own. Ideally, comparative cognitive sciences put special effort into 
testing subjects in a comparable manner. Sometimes what has already been tested in 
humans is imported into research with other species, or certain procedures are proposed 
for cross-species comparisons that include humans.58 To be able to assess abilities under 
fairly equal conditions the setting, or how subjects will concretely be tested, is important.  
This is well summarized by a discussion among professors during a presentation 
at PRI on cognitive development.59 The presenter and the participants pondered that while 
object manipulation could be used as a valid measure in manually dexterous species like 
humans and chimpanzees, the same measure might not be appropriate to species with 
                                                 
IV The best example of this type of debate is the one surrounding the question of “culture”, which is 
addressed in detail in McGrew’s (2004) “The Cultured Chimpanzee” and in Laland and Galef’s (2009) 
edited book “The Question of Animal Culture”. I have also discussed the subject elsewhere (Daly 2012).    
 
 
Figure 3 The logic of comparison between chimpanzees 
and humans. Adapted from a video project by Daly, 
Eder, Fluijt, and Nignon. 
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fundamentally different morphologies, like birds. Then in this case, a professor argued, it 
should, in theory, be better to “cut apart” the cognitive function one wants to assess and 
create settings adapted to each species.  
In fact, both methods have pros and cons. While in terms of setting an exact match 
is directly comparable, concern arises depending on the species. Conversely, taking 
species-specific features into account may be a solution. Yet, there is a cost to introducing 
uncertainty about whether different apparatuses and/or procedures are capable of 
mobilizing the same cognitive strategies from subjects of all species. Mutatis mutandis, 
when referring to shared ancestry, a debate exists over whether bonobos or chimpanzees 
constitute the best model for the LCA.60 Due to our phylogenetic proximity, chimpanzees 
have received considerable attention compared to other great apes, but this has consisted 
mostly of Pan troglodytes, since bonobos’ relatively small habitat south of the Congo 
River hindered their study and made them the rarest ape in captivity.61  
Chimpanzees and bonobos differ greatly in terms of social and sexual behaviors. 
As de Waal phrases it, there is a contrast between chimpanzees’ “male bonding”, 
“warfare”, “hunting” and “meat eating”; and bonobos’ “relative peacefulness”, “female 
dominance” and “sex rather than power-oriented” society. 62  Refining the comparison, he 
states that “a coherent picture of human social evolution has arisen around the chimpanzee 
as close relative, one emphasizing meat, violence, and male superiority. This picture fit 
well with post World War II developments […]”.63   
Notwithstanding, Prüfer and colleagues’ study on the bonobo genome brings to 
attention that “chimpanzees and bonobos each possess certain characteristics that are 
more similar to human traits than they are to one another’s”.64 Furthermore, they note that 
our last common ancestor “may in fact have possessed a mosaic of features, including 
those now seen in bonobo, chimpanzee and human”. 65 A noteworthy point is that features 
observed in all three genera would therefore make an even stronger case for homology. 
Yet, from within cognitive ethology and philosophy of biology comes a disclaimer by 
Bekoff and Allen, who emphasize the importance of studies that complement the 
“primatocentric” perspective on cognition. 66   
All things considered, at this point, a note of caution is in order. Much controversy 
among sociocultural anthropologists and biology-oriented disciplines has arisen due to 
misinterpretations and misuses of the described comparative rationale, as I have discussed 
elsewhere. 67  From within social anthropology, Descola pinpoints a major concern: 
“[E]ven if no scientist would these days dare to claim that peoples once called “primitive” 
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represent an intermediary stage in between the great apes and ourselves, one cannot but 
be disturbed by the interest that evolutionary psychologists take―from afar, admittedly
― in the present-day mental functions of hunter-gatherers, whom they implicitly 
assimilate to our Pleistocene ancestors and who, we are led to believe, must therefore be 
closer to nonhuman primates than any Stanford professor”.68  In any case, comparative 
endeavors will profit from more explicit underlying assumptions in order to speak to 
multiple disciplines anchored in the humanities.   
To a greater or lesser extent, chimpanzee studies at PRI and elsewhere aim to 
tackle questions along the lines of “What makes us humans?” and “What is uniquely 
human?”. This ultimately anthropocentric concern might be deceiving though. 
Considering primatologists may come from different disciplines such as veterinary 
medicine, biological anthropology, biology, cognitive psychology and so on, what holds 
the area together in terms of common values is intriguing. Despite idiosyncrasies in 
answers, it appears primatologists are deeply committed to understanding primates “in 
their own terms” - contrary to studies that use primates only as a proxy for understanding 
human biology, such as much research in the neurosciences.   
This is made clearer by a primatologist’s opinion on the subject. When asked 
whether neuroscientists could be considered primatologists, a professor involved in 
chimpanzee research at PRI was inclined to answer “no”, pondering that neuroscientists 
may simply turn to monkeys as a substitute for the human brain, or as a “tool”.V Likewise, 
an American intern and experimenter at PRI gave a revealing answer when asked why 
she would not join the conference of the International Primatological Society: she stated 
it was because she is a psychologist not a primatologist, emphasizing it twice. This can 
be read in the sense that she was only interested in the psychological mechanisms 
regardless of the “medium”. In contrast, Professor Matsuzawa is indeed a primatologist 
with a background in psychology, who conducts studies in comparative cognitive 
sciences.  
Primatologists’ apparent commitment to understanding primates in their own 
terms somehow runs parallel to sociocultural anthropology in regard to its natives (i.e., 
its studied populations), even though what is meant by a group’s “own terms” may vary 
in approach for both areas. In a similar fashion, to a greater or lesser extent, primatologists 
                                                 
V I did not succeed in having clear access to neuroscientists to ask the same questions, perhaps because I 
was also a chimpanzee experimenter at KUPRI, a category of researchers that usually opposes invasive 
experiments.   
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and ethnologists are dedicated to conservation and to the rights of indigenous peoples 
respectively, but not exclusively. Along these lines, whereas comparative cognitive 
sciences may abstract processes independent of their embodiment by humans, nonhuman 
animals or robots, a primatological disposition seems to strive for grasping how these 
processes are embedded in individuals’ and species’ specificities, be it in physiological, 
ecological or social contexts. These poles are not mutually exclusive but are instead 
complementary. Moreover, they are not a simple juxtaposition of “abstract” and 
“particular”.  
First, not only because generalizations exist in both comparative cognitive 
sciences and primatology but also, and more critically, because the idea of “in someone’s 
own terms” involves changing the perspective under which we would formulate and 
answer a problem to take upon the other’s perspective, that is, to understand how the other 
would frame or phrase a problem. Arguing from within social anthropology, Viveiros de 
Castro considers that the distinctive problem of anthropology consists less in determining 
‘What are the constitutive social relations of anthropology’s object?’ and much more in 
asking ‘What does the object make of social relation?’ or ‘What is a social relation in the 
terms of its object?’.VI,Note 69  
As sociocultural anthropology is able to resort to complex verbal communication 
to investigate subjective meaning, it possesses methods unavailable to the study of 
nonverbal animals. Even if we consider that primatologists’ skills in primate 
communication might alleviate this issue, it cannot be denied that a barrier exists. Yet, if 
the barrier is there it is not insurmountable, to a certain extent. In the context of primate 
cognition, how does one access the mind of nonverbal creatures, or at least, parts of it?! 
How do we know how they process the world? Now, once again, in terms of laboratory 
studies, this brings us to the question of experimental settings.  
To conduct their experiments, the group involved in the Ai Project chose the 
computerized system used by the LANA Project (Language Analogue Project).70 In the 
American setting (Photo 14), Lana used lexigrams, or artificially created geometric 
symbols, with each one corresponding to a word. Whenever she pressed a lexigram key, 
the chosen lexigram appeared on the apparatus’ upper part as a lighted display unit for 
the visualization of sentences. The order of the lexigrams was randomized so that she 
                                                 
VI In the original: “[S]eu problema característico consiste menos em determinar quais são as relações sociais 
que constituem seu objeto, e muito mais em se perguntar o que seu objeto constitui como relação social, o 
que é uma relação social nos termos de seu objeto [...]”  (Castro, 2002,122) 
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would learn not by memorizing the position of the keys, but by attending to the actual 
words represented on it. The LANA Project made use of Yerkish grammar, a special set 
of rules for connecting types of items (e.g., actors and actions) that could be checked by 
the computer for grammaticality.VII, Note 71  The name “Yerkish” honored Robert Yerkes, 
pioneer primatologist and founder of the first primate field station in the United States.72  
Three factors contributed to the choice of the LANA apparatus over American 
Sign Language 73 or over plastic symbols attached to a metallic board.74 As Matsuzawa 
specifies, first, computer-controlled experiments had already been introduced at PRI to 
test monkeys for visual discrimination tasks, which bore some similarities to the LANA 
procedure. 75  Then, “objective, precise, and detailed records” were needed for the 
psychophysics of the processes underlying both the participants’ perceptual capabilities 
and their acquisition, in contrast to interpreting and tracking gestural communication or 
symbol exchange. At last, seeking future non-invasive applications for brain sciences, 
they hoped chimpanzees “would sit quietly on a bench facing the computer system”.  
 
Since the Ai Project at that 
time had no contact with the LANA 
Project, they replicated the setup 
solely based on existing LANA 
publications, except, as already 
seen, their aim was directed toward 
perceptual studies:77 By the means 
of a keyboard in an experimental 
booth (2x2x2m), Ai would respond 
to Matsuzawa’s display of an object 
through a window (20x30cm), so, in 
fact, both were physically separated 
during the tests (Photo 15). The keyboard consisted of three panels, each with 35 keys. 
                                                 
VII Here is an example of an actual conversation in Yerkish grammar between Lana and her trainer on May 
6, 1974 (Hillix and Rumbaugh 2004, 133-134). Lana wished for a box of M&Ms, but she did not know the 
name for “box” at the time: “?TIM GIVE LANA THIS CAN”. Tim gave her an empty can. “?TIM GIVE 
LANA THIS CAN”. Tim replies he has no can. “TIM GIVE LANA THIS BOWL”. Tim gave her an 
empty bowl. Lana asked for another person “?SHELLY”. Tim replied “NO SHELLY”.  Then, Lana wrote 
“?TIM GIVE LANA THIS BOWL”, but before his response, she erased the sentence and asked “TIM 
GIVE LANA NAME-OF-THIS [Lexigram to ask for names]”. Tim wrote “BOX NAME-OF-THIS”. 
Lana pressed “YES”, then continued, “?TIM GIVE LANA THIS BOX”. As a result, she finally got her 
M&Ms and managed to learn a new word. 
 
 
Photo 15 The original setting of the Ai Project, 1983. Credit: 
Matsuzawa (2003, 204).76 By Matsuzawa. 
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Special lexigrams designed by KUPRI were inserted over the keys, allowing 
randomization. Then, the lexigrams available for each task would be lit. When a lighted 
key was chosen, a feedback sound (a click) would be produced, and as its light faded, the 
chosen lexigram would appear on the projectors above the keyboard.78 When touch-panel 
technology became available around 1984-1985, it was readily introduced and it 
substituted the original apparatus.79  
Beyond acting as a simple machine or interface, the experimental apparatus must 
be conceived as part of an architecture of objectivity on a very concrete level. It should 
enable the correct implementation of the experimental procedure (i.e., how the 
experiment is carried out), but even more critically, an experimental apparatus should act 
as the physical medium to eliminate confounding factors that could influence the results, 
like position cues. For example, are the choices randomized or not? If so, the apparatus 
design should allow for the modification of the keys. Are chimpanzees tested one at a 
time or in groups? If in groups, perhaps more than one apparatus is needed. How are 
instructions given? If by reinforcement, speakers and a food dispenser should be attached. 
Is the subject allowed to change her mind and choose another key? If yes, there must be 
a button to signal her answer is complete. And so on and so forth.  
It is worth mentioning that sometimes embodying a procedure into an apparatus 
is one of the main challenges of an experiment. In sum, as observed above, the setup for 
the Ai Project framed the human-chimpanzee interactions to be physically separated, it 
excluded the possibility of the chimpanzee responding to cues in position order, it reduced 
the possibility of human error through the use of automated records of responses, and it 
made univocal the reading of chimpanzees’ responses (output of a pressed key vs analyses 
of gestural communication). In other words, the Ai Project’s setup controlled the 
conditions.  
Now, we shall inspect the symbolic media used. In the context of ape language 
research, a symbol operates “on the conceptual level and without reference to a particular 
perceptual or behavioral instance of the item they signify”, 80 that is, symbols are not 
icons in the sense that they do not represent pictorially what they stand for, even though 
some might be pictorial in origin. In total, there were four groups of symbols employed 
in the Ai Project (Figure 4): (a) The Kyoto University Lexigram System (KUL) recently 
invented by the team (b) kanji or Sino-Japanese characters used in the current Japanese 
writing system (c) Arabic numerals conveying quantities in their cardinal aspect (d) letters 
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of the Roman alphabet, which stood for living beings. Furthermore, the ampersand (&) 
expressed addition.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 “Characters remembered by Ai”. Adapted from Matsuzawa (1995, 33).81  
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A single meaning could sometimes be conveyed by more than one symbol type: 
Lexigrams represented objects (14x), body parts (4x), colors (11x), personal pronouns 
(4x), food (6x), a verb (1x), and collective nouns (2x); kanji represented colors (11x), 
adjectives (2x), and numbers (from zero to nine, e.g., 六 roku = six); VIII number concept 
was covered by kanji and Arabic numerals (from zero to ten); and the Roman alphabet 
referred to humans (6x), chimpanzees (6x), and orangutans that used to live in the institute 
at that time (2x).  
Perceptually, not all symbols are processed equally because the visual complexity 
of their elements differs. The artificially-made KUL lexigrams are designed for symmetry, 
whereas kanji may induce more error in chimpanzees’ performance, just like humans 
learning Japanese may fail to identify subtle differences in stroke compositions.82 In 
particular, this issue may play a role when the number of options that can be matched to 
a sample are increased. Even when symbols of different groups share the same meaning 
(the signified), the form of the symbol (the signifier) may impose a differential load on 
the discrimination of meaning, which is why psychophysics plays a role in concept 
learning for chimpanzees (cf. 零 and 0).  
Regarding procedures, teaching chimpanzees to be “computer literate” 83 requires 
consistent training sessions. Depending on the situation, succeeding in novel tasks can 
take persistence, both on the part of humans to come up with good experimental design 
and procedures and on the part of chimpanzees to not be discouraged by errors. Unlike 
adult humans, who can receive extended verbal instructions, chimpanzees need to learn 
step-by-step, or more aptly put, experimenters must carefully consider the path required 
to make subjects understand (a) how things should be answered (i.e., the procedure) and 
then (b) what should be answered (i.e., the content of the task). Although Ai arrived in 
late 1977 and many preparations were needed before the first experimental session, 
Matsuzawa judges April 15, 1978 - the date when Ai first touched a keyboard connected 
to a computer - as the official start of the Ai Project. 84, 85, 86    
To begin with, consider that the steps toward the final outcome of an experiment 
are smaller than most would imagine and as humble as learning to touch a lit key. This 
was Ai’s first task (Video Frame 2, 1m51s; Audiovisual Material 2).87 Now, recollect the 
experimenter and the participant were physically separated and imagine that the panel so 
                                                 
VIII Note that for zero, one, two, and three, instead of regular kanji characters, which are visually very simple 
(respectively: o, 一, 二, 三), daiji was used (大字), or the alternative and more complex kanji for legal 
writing (see Figure 4).   
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far bears no meaning as a differential space in the booth. So, how does one instruct a 
naïve infant chimpanzee to simply touch a key? The answer is; one associates the 
proximity to the apparatus as a positive stimulus. Whenever Ai got near the panel, a chime 
was produced, and a piece of apple was delivered to a cup attached to the apparatus.88 
Gradually, the criterion for delivery would change from approaching the panel to getting 
close to a key and then, finally, to pressing it. This method is called “successive 
approximation”.89 Step by step, the apparatus, the key, and then the action of pressing 
were linked and perceived as desired behavior.   
This method is part of a procedure described by the behaviorist Frederic Skinner 
as “shaping”, wherein if the probability of a certain outcome is very low, the result 
becomes feasible by rewarding each step required for its accomplishment or, in his words, 
“[o]perant conditioning shapes behavior as a sculptor shapes a lump of clay.90  Although 
at some point the sculptor seems to have produced an entirely novel object, we can always 
follow the process back to the original undifferentiated lump […]”. A full understanding 
of how to use the keyboard and how to relate it to a task also progressed in incremental 
stages. But now, after learning how to use the keyboard, how did Ai learn what each 
lexigram meant, that is, the content of the task per se?  
 
   
1s 13s11 34s24  
   
1m51s 3m 3m56s  
 
Video Frame 2 How Ai learned symbols. From Audiovisual Material 2.  
Audiovisual Material 2 How Ai learned symbols, 4m37s. Excerpt from Nakamura (1997).91 Courtesy of 
Nakamura Miho. 
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For learning purposes, the Japanese researchers used a versatile experimental 
paradigm. As explained in the first section, the full concept of “paradigm” stems from 
Thomas Kuhn,92 but even though this is formally referred to in psychology, 93 in practice, 
experimenters use this word in a much narrower sense, perhaps closer to its ancient 
meaning of ‘pattern’ or ‘model’ (paradeigma, παράδειγμα).94  The paradigm employed 
for Ai is called “matching to sample” (MTS).95 MTS allows learning in a variety of ways, 
depending on how it is implemented, which is why this procedure is considered to be “at 
the forefront of psychological research”.96 MTS tasks are used to explore responses that 
may require complex information processing (e.g., categorization) rather than the simple 
associative learning implied in behaviorist learning theories (e.g., item specificity). In its 
simplest form, the subject is presented with a stimulus called “sample” and then two 
choices of stimuli after that. Commonly, the individual must choose the one equal to the 
sample for a reward to follow.  
Suppose the sample is 白 (shiro, white) and your choices are 白 (shiro) and 黒 
(kuro, black). The correct answer is therefore to match 白 to the sample. In a more 
complex version, if the sample is “ABCD” and if stimulus one is “ZZZZ” and stimulus 
two is “IJKL”, then stimulus two is the correct answer because the sample “ABCD” is 
composed of different letters. Even though neither stimulus one nor stimulus two entail 
any letter of the sample, “ZZZZ” is a series of equal letters and “IJKL” is a series of 
distinct ones, just like the sample. Because the sample and stimulus two bear no 
perceptual resemblance, it is the relationship among relations that is assessed in this 
variant.  
The matching-to-sample procedure helped Ai learn the meaning of symbols.97  
The logic is broken down here: The first task was to perceptually match a color sample 
and the corresponding color in a series of colors. The same was done for lexigrams 
(Figure 5). This method ensures that chimpanzees are able to identify equal colors and 
equal shapes and that they know they must match equal things in the task. Remember, 
“correct” responses - in this case, equal relationships - are rewarded. In a third step, a 
color sample was shown, and Ai had to choose among a series of lexigrams that were 
potentially symbols for this color (Figure 6). At first, it was expected that she would 
choose randomly because she had not learned yet the symbol name of the color; however, 
as she happened to choose the correct lexigram, she was rewarded. By repeating this 
procedure over and over, she came to link the symbol with the referent, and because the 
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position of the lexigrams was randomized, it was not to the position on the keyboard that 
she attended but to the lexigram itself. The same procedure was followed for object 
naming (Video Frame 2, 3m; 3m56s).   
 
 
green (sample) 
 
     
pink green blue red orange 
 
Figure 5 Matching-to-sample, KUL perceptual matching. Stimuli courtesy of Muramatsu Akiho. 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 6 Matching-to-sample, KUL meaning. Stimuli courtesy of Muramatsu Akiho. 
 
Furthermore, one vital point about chimpanzee use of experimental settings is that 
not only do they solve tasks, but in many cases, they generalize and learn how to learn. 
Chimpanzees may show “transfer” abilities in complex contexts, meaning that previous 
learning influences later learning.98 In its simplest form, chimpanzees may generalize 
what they learn with specific items to novel ones, realizing the structural relationship 
between stimuli. Additionally, depending on the setting, “learning by eliminating” might 
also be employed,99  which is especially useful given the impossibility of extended verbal 
instructions. An example in Ai’s learning history graciously makes this point.  
When Ai knew well how to count up to four, she was introduced to number five 
(Video Frame 3; Audiovisual Material 3). On the keyboard, numbers one to five were 
displayed randomly. Matsuzawa showed her five pencils; however, Ai repeatedly 
responded with number four and a buzzer rang to indicate an incorrect choice (Video 
Frame 3, 1m8s). Aware of the cardinal aspect of one, two, three, and four, it seems it 
became clear to her that the largest number she knew was not the solution. At last, three 
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minutes later, Ai presses the only numeral she did not know - five - therefore succeeding 
in the trial (Video Frame 3, 1m48s). In a real tour de force, Ai would become the first 
chimpanzee to master the use of Arabic numerals to convey numbers, having learned both 
their cardinal (i.e., quantity) and ordinal (i.e., sequence) aspects, including the notion of 
zero.100   
 
   
6s 1m8s 1m48s 
 
Video Frame 3 Ai learning how to learn. From Audiovisual Material 3. 
Audiovisual Material 3 Ai learning how to learn, 1m50s. Excerpt from Nakamura (1997).101 Courtesy 
of Nakamura Miho. 
 
It must have become increasingly clear how the paradigm, the training, the 
implementation, and the execution of an experiment are driven by an amalgam of 
procedures. In the bigger picture, these originate from distinct ways to approach 
nonhuman animals. Skinnerian shaping works well for habituation and training, though 
its behaviorist philosophy concedes them only very minimal “intellectual” complexity. 
Conversely, the match-to-sample paradigm is used to assess symbol learning, an 
audacious hypothesis in terms of how far nonhuman animal cognition reaches. The 
instrumental use of behaviorism, that is, rather as means to an end, dissolves the apparent 
contradiction in these scientific practices. Yet, the methods per se are not sufficient to 
explain how learning takes place. Even further, what needs to be acknowledged is the 
strong sense of “individuality” expressed by individuals’ idiosyncrasies, not to mention 
subjectivity, which will be saved for a later discussion in this manuscript.  
Regarding chimpanzees’ individuality, Jane Goodall expresses very well Ai’s 
attitude to most experiments:102  “[She is] a remarkably intelligent chimpanzee. One of 
the reasons she is able to master very complex tasks is because she has an incredible 
power of concentration, and because she truly wants to succeed. Indeed, if she gets a bad 
score after one 20-minute test session, she may actually ask for another session so that 
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she can try to do better”.  
During his last teachings as a Kyoto University professor, Matsuzawa discussed 
his lifetime work in a three-day workshop. 103 After he spoke passionately about the 
beginning of the Ai Project, I grew curious to know in detail his first-person account of 
the two other infants, Ai’s comrades, so I brought up the subject during the event.  
 
GABRIELA B. M. DALY. So, after Reiko, the chimpanzees that came were Ai, Mari, 
and Akira, correct? So you described how it was your first experience with Ai, 
and I was wondering about Akira and Mari.   
 
MATSUZAWA TETSURŌ. [Laughs] Suppose that you have three kids. You have the 
very clear memory about the first kid, but I’m terribly sorry for the second kid and 
third kid [audience laughs]. That is one. Hum… the second point is; very clear 
difference of personality that I did not mention. I was so impressed by the 
difference […]. 
 
In explaining these differences, Matsuzawa points out the setup was identical for 
the three, and then he describes the method: 
 
MATSUZAWA. [W]hen I show the “cup”, she may choose the visual symbol “rope”, 
then I repeat again “cup”, she may choose the wrong visual symbol “paper”, so 
the third trial again – no, no, no, this is it, look at this one. So, this is called 
correction method; up until the time the chimpanzee touches the correct 
corresponding visual symbol, we continue. So that was the method, and we 
believed this is the good way of correcting the response. And eight objects: cup, 
paper, pencil, toothbrush, and so forth. Ai chimpanzee, in my recollection, in 59 
days or something, she learned to do the symbolic matching. It’s symbolic, the 
visual symbol, geometric figure, has no similarity to the real object, but Ai 
chimpanzee learned this one in 59 days, and Akira chimpanzee 90 days, and Mari 
chimpanzee 120 days. Huge difference, because I adopted the same method […].  
 
He goes on to explain how chimpanzees reacted to error: 
 
MATSUZAWA. Her [Ai’s] spontaneous behavior is looking at the sample, looking 
at the keyboard, looking at the sample, looking at the keyboard, and take her time 
to try to touch the different key […] to reach to the correct answer. But in the case 
of Akira - a boy - there is a “cup”, and he did touch a wrong key, and the next trial 
again “cup”, but he touches the same key but hit strongly or hit quickly […] so, 
power solution, solving the problem by the power. It may be effective in the forest 
living creature, hum… the prey is passing in front of you, it’s better to quick or 
grasp strongly, but it doesn’t work in this cognitive task. And he is so strong, he 
is so tough about the correction, because correction means no food reward, and 
the feedback sound of buzzer “boo boo”. Correct answer is signaled by the chime: 
“yes yes yes”, “rol rol rol rol rol” chiming. But error is “boo boo”. The next trial, 
“boo boo”. The next trial, “boo boo”. The next trial, “boo boo”. He is so tough, 
and touching strongly or quickly or whatever and then finally, he switches and 
again and again and again…. but he learned.  
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But in the case of the third chimpanzee Mari… happens to touch the wrong key 
“boo boo”; she shows the grimace. Second wrong “boo boo”; almost screaming. 
The third time “boo boo”; “huu”.[IX, Note 104] I do not hit, I do not scold, I do nothing. 
My way is the same, the computer is doing the same, but the personality is 
different. So, Ai is very patient and paying attention to the task, but Akira is so 
easy-going, and he doesn’t care about anything at all. But Mari is very much 
caring about the feedback sound, so that is the reason why so long time for Mari 
to acquire a skill. So suppose that this is a more practical clinical situation like 
school. The teacher should take a different way of teaching. For Mari, the so-
called errorless learning. No error, no error feedback. When I present “cup”, 
always only one key “cup”. So she touches “cup” and the computer say “rol rol 
rol rol rol rol”, chime, or I say “good, good job, very good girl” and she got the 
result […] so this kind of training […] still you can learn the things. Like nine 
times one choice, but one out of ten times, now you add the incorrect alternative,[X] 
so gradually introduce the discriminations, Mari may have had a different result.  
 
 NICOLAS LANGLITZ. So, did you actually do this, or….? 
 
MATSUZAWA. No, sorry. Hum… I think I was - it’s not the school, classroom 
situation. So, I was rigorous scientist keeping the same method to get the data of 
three chimpanzees, so that is one reason. And the second reason is I’m only one 
researcher who is doing the research. [S]o in that sense I really regret - I feel very 
sorry for Mari, because people’s perception to Mari is very much skewed by this 
result. People believe Ai is very smart chimpanzee, Mari is not smart. But I know 
it completely depends on the teacher and teaching methods. […] Suppose that we 
are allowed to do a different teaching method to different chimpanzees, I think the 
result is different.[XI]  
 
This lengthy passage evokes the dynamics of standardization in science and 
individual differences in performance. Whenever the tests directly involve learning, the 
topic plays an especially important role. Note, though, that not all tasks require previous 
training, including, for example, many studies in visual recognition, such as those 
conducted by Professor Tomonaga Masaki at PRI.105  To refine the topic precisely, there 
is a subtle line between asking “Can they do it?” and “Do they do it?”. The standardization 
of procedures is important to provide parameters to replicate results; thus, it is not a 
concept that can be easily abandoned to pursue completely tailor-made experiments. 
                                                 
IX Matsuzawa makes a moderately high-pitched sound, which likely translates to the category of a “scream” 
(Nishida et al. 2010, 163), but an alternative interpretation is “huu” (ibid., 98), indicating a chimpanzee 
response to a strange sound or object. I have reproduced the vocalization as “huu”, since the category 
“scream” is not coded onomatopoeically.   
X Note, this is the opposite of learning by eliminating; an incorrect choice is added, not the correct one.  
XI Matsuzawa then cites PRI’s personalized skylab system, designed for this intent. It tests chimpanzees 
semi-automatically by facial recognition, adapting tasks accordingly. It is used less than regular laboratory 
rooms due to the difficulty of coordinating between researchers’ and chimpanzees’ schedules.  
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Nonetheless, there are a few ways to take this issue into account, such as maintaining 
equal conditions but adapting consecutive tasks or criteria. Even if nourished by scientific 
criteria, these decisions are also of contextual and pragmatic orders, many times without 
straight-forward answers.  
 
At this point, one may ask whether 
the laboratory can be considered as school.  
To which extent testing chimpanzees 
resembles a school situation is a 
multifaceted issue. In the media, the school 
setting is mentioned on purpose: 
Chimpanzees go to the laboratory ‘to 
study’ (benkyōsuru 勉 強 す る ), and 
researchers themselves insist upon this 
wording for the general public due to 
clarity and to the invasive connotation the 
term ‘experiment’ carries (jikken 実験).106 This is also the case for TV, including the 
regular documentaries on chimpanzee research by the local Chūbu-Nippon Broadcasting, 
107 and for Japanese zoos that imported the PRI apparatus and conduct experiments in 
public, such as the Higashiyama Zoo in Nagoya (Photo 16). In addition, in his book for 
children, Matsuzawa employs the words ‘study’ (benkyō 勉強) and ‘pupil’ (sēto 生徒), 
and although “experiment” is mentioned when referring to a certain means of 
understanding, chimpanzee Ai goes to a ‘room’ (heya 部屋 ) - not an experimental 
room.108  At most, she goes voluntarily to a ‘room to study’ (benkyōsuru heya 勉強する
部屋). Furthermore, PRI experimenters and technicians are asked to take theirs masks 
and caps off when TV crews visit the facilities, although it should be added that the more 
exposed basement is off-limits to outsiders.  
At times, this analogy seems real even among researchers. On a regular basis, 
master’s and PhD students eagerly share chimpanzees’ accomplishments and difficulties 
in the experiments: what their learning curves are, if they passed to the next experimental 
condition, the best and worst learners, and so on. Of course, as difficult to disentangle 
interests as it is, it seems that beyond just hoping for a positive result to publish, laboratory 
members are truly invested in chimpanzees’ progress. While I was working as an 
 
 
Photo 16 “Now, who is studying is Chārī”. 
Higashiyama Zoo, 2015. By Daly. 
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experimenter, one of the usually quiet technicians frequently asked me whether 
chimpanzees had passed their sessions that day. Notably, she was not participating in any 
publication “ambition”, and their results would not make a difference to her work.  
Whether we are able to tackle the full potential of nonhuman animal cognition is 
a preoccupation among researchers, who also seem to have high expectations for the 
species they work with. For example, a professor at PRI gave in during a presentation that 
“it’s a little bit sad” to discover the species with which he works might not differentiate 
the faces of their keepers - as his research suggested. Along the same lines, according to 
rumors, a Japanese professor even performed a “happy dance” when a naïve subject hit a 
correct answer… Clearly showing a great enthusiasm for an animal’s performance in 
experiments. 
On the other hand, the “teacher-student” analogy might not quite apply. This is 
due to the fact that researchers are there mainly to investigate the participants’ cognitive 
functions, even when their experiments involve animal learning. Chimpanzees are the 
ones that, by their results, inform us. In this sense, researchers only teach to learn, rather 
than to pass on knowledge primarily for the benefit of the “students”. Alluding to Ai, 
Matsuzawa109 confirms: “I actually learned more from her than she from me”, and in fact, 
he refers to Ai as his “research partner”. But how was this partnership between humans 
and laboratory chimpanzees built over time? We shall see next by retracing how the PRI 
community grew and produced their first institute-born offspring.  
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1.3 The Ai Project 
 Building a Community 
 
Nowadays, PRI has twelve 
living members, and the youngest 
generation was born in the year 2000 
(Photo 17). Around the time the Ai 
Project was set on motion in 1977-78, 
three infant chimpanzees regularly 
participated in experiments: Ai, Akira, 
and Mari. The sub-adults Reiko, who 
was PRI’s first chimpanzee, along with 
Puchi and Gon, who were brought in 
from private households, composed 
another group starting in 1979. Also 
arriving in 1979 was the three-year-old 
Pendesa, born almost next door to PRI 
at the Japan Monkey Centre. Through 
artificial insemination, new babies 
were expected.2 The female Popo was 
born to Puchi and Gon in March 1982, and immediately following this, in May the same 
year, the male Reo was born to Reiko and Gon. Popo would get a sister from the same 
parents in December 1983, when Pan arrived.I In 1985, Chloe (Kuroe) was brought from 
Paris, being integrated into the PRI community at the age of four.3 As for the infants born 
in PRI, sadly, while Reiko accepted rearing her son Reo (Photo 18), this was not the case 
for Popo and Pan, who were rejected by Puchi.  
Puchi’s reaction to giving birth to Popo and Pan was virtually the same: she 
screamed and ran away. During his last teachings at Kyoto University, Matsuzawa 
elaborated on PRI’s first experiences in breeding by comparing Puchi and Reiko’s 
attitudes:4   
                                                 
I In English, Pan’s name is pronounced like the word “pun”, whereas Pendesa’s name is pronounced like 
the word “pen”.  Their names are usually abbreviated to “Pan” and “Pen”.  
 
 
Photo 17 PRI’s youngest: Ayumu, Pal, and Cleo (from 
top to bottom). Credit: KUPRI (2002).1 By Hirata 
Akiho.  
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MATSUZAWA TETSURŌ. [A]t that 
point, for the first time, we 
recognized the problem of 
chimpanzee mother cannot 
become a good mother in 
captivity. Human rearing is not 
good.Human-raised chimpanzee 
[Puchi] failed to nurse the baby.  
[…] We naïvely believed the 
maternal behavior must be 
instinctive because it’s so 
important for the survival of the 
species, so everything must be 
innate, within, so the mother 
turns to become mother, but 
not… what I learned is; mother 
turns to become mother through learning, through experience. Suppose that a 
chimpanzee was completely isolated from her conspecifics, she cannot become 
the mother. She can be pregnant, she can be giving the birth, but she cannot show 
the maternal [side]… So that is what I learned from this incident.  
 
CATHERINE HOBAITER [PRIMATOLOGIST]. Do you think that it would be enough 
for a chimpanzee who was human-reared, who then lived socially with other 
females and watched them raise their babies - so do you think it is important that 
they themselves experienced being raised by a chimpanzee?  
 
MATSUZAWA. Good point, and I think the short answer is yes. Whenever it is, 
once the chimpanzee is socialized, they learn a lot from the social interaction with 
the conspecific and [how] to become more and more close to the natural 
chimpanzee. But another point; there must be a critical period, and the critical 
period is the first one year old of life. […] We should carefully look at zoos’ data 
[about maternal deprivation].    
 
Matsuzawa continues his argument but then, at some point, he concedes that 
certain factors are difficult to determine:  
 
MATSUZAWA. Reiko successfully kept Reo chimpanzee. Well… so interaction 
with patas monkey, rhesus monkey, spider monkey… it may have helped, or… I 
don’t know! Both Puchi and Reiko should have the - coming from the wild means 
[they] should have the short period with the mother, but I think Puchi was raised 
by home, home-reared chimpanzee. Reiko was institute-reared chimpanzee, and 
[had] a lot of interaction with the other nonhuman primates. I don’t know. I cannot 
tell the reason. But anyway, what I learned is; the chimpanzee must give the birth 
and rear the baby by herself.  
 
Indeed, Puchi was kept as a pet for twelve years.5 Her third child, a girl named 
Pico born in 2003, was reared by humans for ten days due to Puchi’s neglect and Pico’s 
health condition, but was successfully returned to her mother afterwards.6, 7 Yet, the 
 
 
Photo 18 Mother and son: Reiko and Reo. Courtesy of 
Sakuraba Yoko. By Kumazaki Kiyonori 
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process was not without challenges for Puchi. In a short video extract (Audiovisual 
Material 4; Video Frame 4) it is possible to observe her reaction to the only offspring she 
would manage to bring up. The recording is summarized here: In the first scene, keeper 
Kumazaki holds baby Pico, while Puchi observes in close range (4s). The camera cuts to 
the next scene, which depicts Pico on the floor vocalizing. Puchi approaches while 
showing signs of piloerection. She smells the infant, backs off, and sits on the bench. 
Then, she moves to the other side of the booth. With her arms tight to her body, Puchi 
lies flat with her chest down looking at Pico (34s). She stretches her arms to her front, 
rocks her body twice, gets up, and approaches the baby, leaning over (44s). The video 
ends.   
 
   
4s 9s 14s 
   
18s 26s 29s 
   
34s 41s 44s 
 
Video Frame 4 Puchi’s reaction to newborn Pico. From Audiovisual Material 4. 
Audiovisual Material 4 Puchi’s reaction to newborn Pico, 46s. Excerpt from KUPRI (2015).8 
 
Her overall behavior seems to indicate anxiety since, by and large, her hair is 
erect,9 and she goes back and forth around the booth toward the infant as if agitated. 
Finally, the prone posture she adopts seems to indicate a sort of “handicap self” whereby 
an older individual shows gentle restraint during play.10 Matsuzawa considers lying prone 
to be a way of her signaling Pico that she is not a threat.11 Observers’ general impression 
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is that Puchi simply does not know what to do, and this is the case for many captive 
chimpanzee mothers. Unfortunately, even if Puchi had managed to keep Pico, the baby 
had paralysis in the lower limbs and a malformation of the thoracic vertebrae and did not 
survive, passing away at the age of two.12 Before her death, Pico was taken for a health 
inspection while Puchi was asleep, and as she did not return, it is said Puchi continuously 
searched for the infant.13  
The abandonment of infants among captive chimpanzees is a very complex issue. 
In Japan, nearly one third of captive chimpanzees face problems raising offspring.14,15 In 
many monkey species, as long as the mother does not actively reject the newborns, they 
are physically capable of surviving (e.g., clinging, climbing on the mother’s body and 
suckling); on the other hand, just like humans, chimpanzees need cradling and nurturing 
and are helpless without support.16 Maternal behaviors in chimpanzees include cradling, 
grooming, playing, gazing, assessing the baby’s behavioral and physical state, and 
performing physical exercises to encourage motor development.17  
In a long literature review, Bard analyzed studies according to their support - or 
lack thereof - of multiple hypotheses raised around the maternal competence of nonhuman 
primates and, more specifically, chimpanzee mothers. 18  Besides species-specific 
differences and the fact that each developmental phase mobilizes different skills in 
parenting, she argues there is no support for a single explanatory factor. “Early experience” 
(i.e., having been raised by the biological mother) and “observational learning” (i.e., 
watching others caring for offspring) facilitate but are not sufficient conditions for raising 
offspring without the need of human intervention, whereas “direct hands-on interaction” 
with an infant seems to be a much more crucial factor.19  
Some multiparous females do not necessarily improve their skills, suggesting 
familiarity does not follow from mere observation. Moreover, in the wild, these skills are 
usually acquired while chimpanzees are juveniles or adolescents, be it for related or 
unrelated females.20 The care of infants by one other than the mother is an important 
phenomenon, and is labeled “alloparenting”.21 Even though touching a newborn is rarely 
allowed by the mother before two months old, and even if alloparenting does not explain 
all interactions with infants (cf. female-female competition), social groups of mixed ages 
and genders as found in nature are of great importance for successfully raising offspring.22  
In Bard’s words, “[t]here is not a maternal instinct for warm and caring attention 
to infants; that is, there is not an instinct to provide care to infants that is always responsive 
to their needs. […] Moreover, there is not a single theoretical account that explains or 
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predicts the diversity of patterns of infant interactions with individuals other than the 
mother”. 23 Still, citing Fairbanks, Bard argues that the mother balances care in relation 
to her own reproductive success whenever conditions are poor or the likelihood of infant 
survival is low, in other words, providing a support to “parental investment theory”.24,25  
Here, however, the picture is again not so straightforward. Peculiar case studies in the 
wild have illuminated that mothers might continue to hold on to their infants even at some 
cost to their reproductive success.  
This was the case for Jire, in Bossou, Guinea, who carried the mummified body 
of her daughter Jokro for a month of observations despite resuming estrus twenty-one 
days after the infant’s death, a fact well emphasized by Matsuzawa.26, 27 True, cycling 
may have contributed to the “gradual ‘letting go’” in Jire’s case and in that of other 
Bossou mothers with the same fate; nonetheless, this was not immediate.28 Likewise, in 
Mahale, Tanzania, chimpanzee Christina showed “compensatory care”, altering even her 
feeding behavior (arboreal ant fishing) to deal with the constraints imposed by her infant’s 
severe disability.29 The extra care and the alloparenting provided by Christina’s elder 
daughter, Xantip, may have helped the infant to survive for twenty-three months; yet, the 
exclusiveness of the allowed alloparenting and the fact that Xantip ceased this activity 
after giving birth herself might have increased the burden of parenting and the likelihood 
of death.30  
It is likely that in the bigger picture, to explain attachment between chimpanzees 
and offspring, reproductive success and chances of survival will not always be good 
predictors - just as for humans. At the least, the importance of mother-infant relationship 
in chimpanzees and the strong bonds formed during infancy seem undisputed.31, 32, 33, 34 
After addressing the relationship between mother, infant, and other conspecifics, we shall 
return to the PRI cases and examine the place humans occupy in chimpanzee development 
in captivity.  
As observed, rejection by the mother is quite a common phenomenon in captivity, 
which puts the lives of newborns in danger and, therefore, requires human intervention. 
Puchi’s second daughter, Pan, was an extreme case when she fell to the ground after 
birth.35 Matsuzawa took Pan home, raising her with his daughter (Photo 19). He described 
the experience as follows:36 
 
 The experiences of a chimpanzee infant reared in a human environment may have 
little in common with a chimpanzee's natural upbringing. Human caretakers will 
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do their best to frequently hold the infant, but they cannot embrace them all day 
long like a chimpanzee mother would. Instead of such constant care, we often 
have to resort to alternative measures, such as providing them with, for instance, 
a towel to cling to. Chimpanzee infants become very nervous when they do not 
have anything to hold on to. At night, I did not hold Pan. We slept side by side; I 
watched her resting next to me. She was reared just like a human infant”.  
 
After acknowledging the importance of past hand-rearing studies, Matsuzawa 
elaborates on raising Pan: 37    
 
 [T]he experience of raising infant chimpanzees has taught me another key lesson: 
the importance of the mother–infant bond. I recognized that comparisons of home-
reared chimpanzees and home-reared humans were not fair because these 
chimpanzees were not being raised by their own parents. I noticed that most of 
our knowledge of the cognitive development of infant chimpanzees came from 
artificially-reared chimpanzees isolated from their conspecific community. One 
must not forget that there are aspects of chimpanzee intelligence that can only be 
explored among members of their own species.  
 
 
In the year 2000, three new 
babies arrived, marking the 
beginning of a paradigm shift in 
chimpanzee research at PRI. On 
April 24, Ai gave birth to Ayumu, 
Akira’s son. Cleo (Kureo) was born 
on June 19 to Chloe and Reo. Last but 
not least, on August 9, Pal (Paru), 
daughter of Pan and Akira, made her 
appearance.39 While Ayumu and Pal 
were conceived by artificial insemination, Cleo was conceived by natural means. 40  
During the years accompanying their development, the project’s aim “has been to clarify 
aspects of the chimpanzee mind within social contexts, focusing specifically on the 
emergence, modification, and cross-generational transfer of cultural traditions in 
chimpanzee communities”.41  
From then on, a team of researchers started to perform daily face-to-face 
experiments with the mother-infant pairs. This new type of research on chimpanzees was 
considered “a sort of “participant observation” […] [T]he close bond established between 
the human experimenter and the mother – based on years of experience and daily 
interaction – allows us to test the infant chimpanzees in much the same context as that in 
 
 
Photo 19 Pan (2 months) and Matsuzawa's daughter (9 
months) in 1984. Credit: Matsuzawa (2001).38 By 
Matsuzawa. 
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which human infant developmental tests are conducted. In a face-to-face situation and 
with the mothers’ cooperation, we are able to closely replicate many such tests, as well 
as design our own for illuminating developmental changes in the chimpanzee infants”.42 
Three teams were created: “Team Matsuzawa” studying Ai and Ayumu, “Team 
Tomonaga” with Tomonaga Masaki in charge of Chloe and Cleo, and “Team Tanaka” 
with Tanaka Masayuki as main tester of Pan and Pal.  
Much of what is known about cognitive development in chimpanzees in terms of 
laboratory studies owes to research accompanying these infants’ growth. In this sense, 
the human-chimpanzee relationship that enabled these studies is key.  Even more, our 
knowledge of the topic greatly owes to Ayumu, Cleo, Pal, and their mothers - on a 
personal level. A good compilation, though not comprehensive, of the works conducted 
during this phase can be found in “Cognitive development in chimpanzees”, edited by 
Matsuzawa, Tomonaga, and Tanaka.43  At any rate, save for prenatal studies,44  even 
before the research program could be set in motion, Ai, Chloe, and Pan first had to learn 
how to become mothers.  
Ai was born in the wild (ergo mother-reared to some extent) and arrived at PRI at 
around one year old.45 Chloe, zoo-born, was rejected and had to be human-reared.46 Then 
Pan, as seen, was raised by Matsuzawa during her first year of life. In 2000 when their 
offspring arrived, Ai was twenty-four years old, Chloe nineteen, and Pan sixteen, thus all 
adults. Pan was at that moment the youngest mother of the PRI community, and Chloe, 
from her arrival at four years old on, would be older only to Popo (fifteen months), Reo 
(seventeen months) and Pan (three years old). The age difference from Ai to Pan, the 
youngest, is about seven years. In the bigger picture, it seems Ai was provided greater 
social complexity and more opportunities to engage in a “hands on approach” with 
youngsters than Chloe and Pan were. Nonetheless, becoming a mother was not a 
completely natural act for Ai.  
Two and a half years before Ayumu, Ai gave birth to her first baby, Atom. Very 
unfortunately, he was still-born. As Matsuzawa recollects: “Ai screamed and run from 
her infant the moment he appeared. She screamed and screamed, and would not approach 
the infant. It was a sad moment for Ai and for me”. 47 As we shall see, even Ayumu’s 
birth was surrounded by uncertainty, but luckily he grew to step forward firmly, living up 
to his name, ‘to walk’ (歩む). The three mothers-to-be went on a sort of training program.  
Matsuzawa describes his thinking at the time as following: 48 
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If a chimpanzee can acquire the knowledge and skills of child-rearing through 
learning and practice, I might be able to teach her how to bring up her own infant 
even in a captive situation. So I started training Ai how to take care of a baby. I 
showed her video footage of wild chimpanzee mothers breast-feeding and taking 
care of infants. Around the same time, we also happened to have infant gibbons 
at the institute, reared by humans. We demonstrated to Ai how we humans look 
after a gibbon baby. We provided Ai not only with the opportunity for 
observational learning but also with a chance for her to learn by herself. I thought 
it would make a difference if she could practice things that she had learned from 
observing others’ behavior. For this purpose, I gave Ai a stuffed toy - a 
chimpanzee baby, similar in size to a real infant. At the beginning, she would 
press the toy against her forehead or put it on the floor. When I showed her how I 
embraced the toy, she began holding it following my verbal direction and 
encouragement. Although early on she would often hold the toy upside down, she 
eventually learned to hold it the right way up.   
 
This passage alludes to a vital point about raising a chimpanzee baby, which is 
having the appropriate body technique toward the infant. In terms of the mother-infant 
relationship, clinging to the mother is one of primates’ traits (see moro and grasp 
reflexes)49. On the other hand, clinging with an embrace is more restricted to simians; 
some prosimians cling without embracing (e.g., ring-tailed lemur, lemur catta) or 
transport infants orally and leave them in nests (e.g., aye-aye, Daubentonia 
madagascariensis).50 Yet, unlike many monkey species, newborn chimpanzees do not 
possess the strength to hold on for more than a few seconds at a time, and thus, they need 
to be actively cradled.51   
For a new mother, the basic actions to learn are picking up, embracing, putting the 
infant in the correct position (not upside-down!), and allowing suckling.  None of these 
are evident even despite a mother’s best intentions. When the mother does not approach 
the baby, humans must intervene in at least one of these steps but, more commonly, in all. 
A palette of examples is provided:  Kumazaki teaches Puchi to hold Pico (Video Frame 
5); Tomonaga teaches Chloe to correctly position Cleo (Video Frame 6, cf. 07m44s); 
Tomonaga bottle-feeds the infant (Video Frame 7) after Chloe refuses Cleo’s suckling (in 
fact, the adult seemed more interested in drinking the milk herself [Video Frame 7, cf. 
11m27s]).  
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1m55s 1m56s 1m57s12frames 
   
1m57s27frames 2m5s 2m11s 
 
Video Frame 5 Kumazaki teaching Puchi to pick up Pico. Excerpt from KUPRI (2015).52  
 
   
7m44s 7m53s 7m55s14 
   
7m59s 8m 8m17s 
 
Video Frame 6 Tomonaga teaching Chloe to position Cleo correctly. Excerpt from CBC (2013).53  
 
   
11m9s 11m14s 11m27s 
 
Video Frame 7 Tomonaga bottle-feeds Cleo while Chloe holds her. Excerpt from CBC (2013).54 
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Ayumu, Cleo, and Pal’s births demonstrate precisely the emotional component of 
human-chimpanzee relationship in PRI. Concerning Ai, Ayumu’s birth had quite tense 
moments. As Matsuzawa recalls:55   
 
On the night of April 24th 2000, Ai successfully delivered her infant. She stood 
quad-pedally to receive the body of the infant with her hand at the moment of 
delivery. Then, she started licking the infant’s whole body. However, the baby did 
not move, nor was he breathing. My heart sank - the scene was so reminiscent of 
our previous sad experience [the stillborn, Atom]. But then Ai put her index finger 
into the mouth of the infant as if to prompt his breathing, and began to lick his 
face. Soon, Ayumu coughed and moved for the first time within his mother’s arms. 
It was incredible: Ai’s treatment had worked. We never taught Ai such behaviors. 
Nevertheless, she did all she could - and saved the life of the infant.  
 
Ayumu’s birth can be seen in Audiovisual Material 5 which powerfully presents 
the elements discussed so far (Video Frame 8):  Students and staff gather at night to view 
the birth through a TV screen (6s), and the atmosphere is cheerful when Ai starts giving 
birth, with applauses and exclamations like “sugoi!” (amazing!). However, when the 
baby is born, he does not move; amniotic fluid prevents him from breathing. Ai cleans 
Ayumu’s face and mouth, and he finally responds (1m54s). Despite Ai’s remarkable 
reaction to this dangerous situation, and despite having embraced Ayumu at first, next, 
Ai is not holding the baby in the correct position (2m34s), prompting Matsuzawa to go 
into the room and show her how to embrace the newborn by mimicking cradling and by 
emphatically encouraging her with “sō sō sō” (yes yes yes), “sō da!” (it is correct) and 
“subarashī!” (wonderful), words commonly used in husbandry. It is not until twenty 
hours after birth, that Ayumu finally starts suckling (3m14s). 
 
 
 
   
6s 1m54s 2m34s 
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2m44s 2m51s 3m14s 
 
Video Frame 8 Ayumu's birth. From Audiovisual Material 5.  
Audiovisual Material 5 Ayumu's birth, 3m18s. Excerpt from Nakamura (2001).56 Courtesy of Nakamura 
Miho. 
 
Chloe’s case was not straightforward either. Tomonaga comments that from the 
three mothers-to-be, Chloe was the one that had the strongest response to the stuffed toy.57  
She was very attached to the fake chimpanzee baby and would not give up on it, and she 
even harshly refused a teddy bear that was later presented to her. Tomonaga believes 
Chloe showed signs of understanding the plush as both a representation of a ‘living thing’ 
(“ikimono”  生き物) and as an ‘object’ (“mono” 物) due to ‘pretense-play’ (“furiasobi”
ふり遊び).58  Yet, learning-to-mother or just simply interacting with a real newborn - in 
this case, Ayumu - would prove to be difficult, as seen in Audiovisual Material 6.  
Important moments of the extract are summarized (Video Frame 9): In the 
possession of her plush toy, the lower ranking mother-to-be, Chloe, solicits Ai’s newborn. 
This is observed at 12s4frames by her gesture “extend hand palm upward”.59 Ai reaches 
for Chloe’s hand (12s19frames). The subordinate retreats (12s29frames). Attentively, 
Chloe has been looking to the infant. She creates distance and extends her hand to Ai 
(31s), who grasps it without a shaking motion (33s). Markedly, the last behavior, “grasp 
hand”, is performed by a dominant individual in response to a subordinate’s request for 
reassurance.60  Recall that it is usual for mothers not to allow others to have contact with 
their newborns until approximately two months old, 61  and in this sense, Ai seems 
reluctant to meet Chloe’s request. For instance, instead of passing Ayumu on to Chloe, 
Ai tries to reach for Chloe’s hand. Given that approaching an infant, especially one born 
to a dominant individual, is a very delicate situation, Chloe and Ai engage in mutual 
reassurance after this series of interactions, which is a way to say “we are fine”.    
 
 
85
 
 
   
00s28frames 12s4frames 12s19frames 
   
12s29frames 19s 31s 
  
33s 35s 
 
Video Frame 9 Chloe tries to interact with newborn Ayumu. From Audiovisual Material 6 
Audiovisual Material 6 Chloe tries to interact with newborn Ayumu, 39s. Excerpt from CBC (2013).62  
 
On the day of Cleo’s birth, Chloe would only release the stuffed toy moments 
before labor.63 In fact, Chloe did not come to the newborn and screamed. Unbelievable 
to Tomonaga was that her next step was actually to go to the stuffed chimpanzee, not the 
real one! Due to health concerns, Cleo spent the night in an incubator. The next day, when 
the plush had already been taken away, Tomonaga sat down, held the baby, and observed 
the adult’s reaction (Video Frame 10, 21s). Then he left Cleo on the floor wrapped in a 
towel. To Tomonaga, Chloe seemed concerned.64  She approached a few times. At a 
certain point, Cleo’s hand grasped her mother’s hair (1m52s), and finally, Chloe picked 
her up (1m57s).  Just as in Ayumu’s case, students and staff were following the process 
through a monitor and cheered this moment. Details of the mother-infant reunion can be 
seen in Audiovisual Material 7.  
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21s 1m27s 
  
1m52s 1m57s 
 
Video Frame 10 Cleo’s birth. From Audiovisual Material 7. 
Audiovisual Material 7 Cleo’s birth, 2m9s. Excerpt from CBC (2013).65  
 
The next difficulty was breastfeeding; Chloe held the baby low on her abdomen, 
a non-functional position. A strategy was invented to remedy the problem. Separated by 
bars, Tomonaga tried to make Chloe crouch multiple times by spoon-feeding her honey 
from a lower position. Like this, Chloe’s nipples would be closer to the baby, who 
eventually discovered them. 66  There was one last problem though; 67  Chloe was 
displeased by Cleo’s suckling for some reason - perhaps discomfort. She even started to 
suck her own nipple, seemingly whenever the sensation of the child suckling hers was 
unpleasant. At first, she would only allow breastfeeding when her mood was “calm” and 
when she was in a “gentle” situation; luckily, though, she gradually came to accept Cleo’s 
suckling. Apropos of “intuitive parenting”, Tomonaga believes parenting might be 
genetically programmed to some extent, but in order to push that ‘switch’ (“suicchi” ス
イッチ), support from society is needed in various forms.68  
The last mother-to-be, Pan, reacted very curiously to giving birth to little Pal. As 
Matsuzawa recalls: 69  
 
Pan delivered her infant without any problems - there was no sign of fear or 
screaming like at her own birth [by Puchi]. However, she did not pick the infant 
up off the floor. The baby was left gently lying on the floor while Pan crouched 
over her and looked on. She seemed to have been at a loss as to what to do at this 
point. She lay down, side by side with the infant. She reminded me more of a 
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human mother than a chimpanzee. Pan's behavior toward her infant was much 
like the way human caretakers brought her up. To try and ease the situation, 
Masayuki Tanaka, who was in charge of taking care of Pan and her infant, now 
entered the room. He softly pushed the infant toward the mother. However, Pan 
moved away from the baby, always keeping a small distance between herself and 
the infant. The movements were repeated several times. Finally, the infant's 
extended arms happened to touch Pan's hair. Her fingers closed - once the grasp 
was successful, the infant would not let go. She clung to her mother who in return 
finally embraced her.  
 
Contrary to humans, chimpanzee newborns are always in ventral-ventral contact 
with the mother during the first month,70 therefore, side-by-side positioning resembles 
more the context of a human upbringing. Indeed, recall that this is how Pan was brought 
up in Matsuzawa’s house.71 Matsuzawa goes further; he considers that human’s “stable 
supine posture”, which allows our babies to safely stay put horizontally, encourages vocal 
exchange and manual gestures in humans.72 One thing is clear though, the basic steps 
required for the care and nurturing of a newborn chimpanzee do not appear independently 
of a social context, making a strong case for social learning.  
Regarding the forms of social transmission between humans and chimpanzees, 
first, consider humans’ active teaching role for chimpanzees in captivity. Humans 
actively engage in a program to foster learning. This, in turn, may elicit in chimpanzees 
observational learning (e.g., by watching videos of wild chimpanzees or by observing a 
baby gibbon being taken care of), learning by doing (e.g., plush toy strategy and 
reenactment of body postures), or facilitation of a certain positioning (e.g., spoon-feeding 
strategy for Chloe). The fact that after the researcher’s “program”, Ai, Chloe, and Pan 
managed to keep their babies indicates that social learning likely took place. On the top 
of that, consider differences in rearing history, whereby a hand-reared chimpanzee may 
reenact the conditions of her own upbringing (e.g., Pan’s reaction to Pal). As observed, 
most of these first and crucial steps involve not only accepting certain conditions but also 
learning the body positioning that enables the chimpanzee to nurture the infant.  
This discussion naturally evokes the issues raised Marcel Mauss, in his famous 
article Les techniques du corps.73 By ‘techniques of the body’, he means the way humans 
make use of their bodies in each society, while under a framework that is at the same time 
biological, psychological, and social.  His paper presents techniques that vary according 
to societies. Among these, he points out differences in the upbringing and feeding of 
infants or “techniques de l’enfance”,74  that is, ‘techniques of childhood’. He mostly 
discusses ingrained traditions that feel rather mechanical to their agents, rather than 
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exploring the techniques’ inventions. His argument remains within one species though; 
humans. Mutatis mutandis, when comparing chimpanzee-chimpanzee interaction in 
captivity, there are differences in mother-infant interactions that might be attributable to 
social learning, as for instance, sustained gaze by PRI mothers, whereas Yerkes mothers 
look away from infants within seconds.75  Yet, the cases presented in this manuscript go 
beyond forms of social learning by a single species.   
This brings us to the second point: What is being taught may be shared between 
our species or be species-specific to chimpanzees. For instance, humans need to insist the 
chimpanzee remains in constant contact with the baby, not leaving the newborn 
unattended at the mercy of the bare supine posture, despite the fact that human babies do 
not require the same type of care. On the other hand, humans also teach cradling and both 
sapiens and troglodytes need to fully support the baby for breastfeeding - not necessarily 
a requirement for monkeys. 76  Therefore, the “message”, content, or techniques 
transmitted at once comprised and surpassed species boundaries. In sum, in terms of the 
basic steps for nurturing a newborn, after having alienated chimpanzees in captivity, 
humans are obliged to teach chimpanzees how to be both great apes and chimpanzees.   
Again, these “techniques of the body” are ape and chimpanzee. True, a culturalist 
approach prompts us to interrogate how humans from a specific culture pass on certain 
specific techniques, whereas humans from other cultures might do things differently. This 
is appropriate, especially considering that face-to-face husbandry of laboratory 
chimpanzees is markedly a characteristic found in Japanese institutions, which shall be 
discussed at length. Yet, ignoring species-typical patterns and how they are subject to 
social learning within a species and across species simultaneously is to cast aside a full 
understanding of the phenomenon. We should be aware that first, species-typical 
behaviors are not necessarily automatic - to shortly avoid the conundrum of the word 
“instinct”. Secondly, species-typical behaviors can be learned from a conspecific group 
with certain tradition forms, and they can be learned from an allospecific group, who also 
bear particular tradition forms. In addition, as we shall see, the modes of transmission 
may be characteristic of one species and/or another. But first, we should go over the most 
important social role for the survival of an infant chimpanzee - the role of the mother.  
Hand-rearing means humans also mother chimpanzees, especially if a person is 
mainly in charge of care duties (ergo, spending increased time together) and if both 
develop close ties. However, what is meant by the word “mother” is clearly difficult to 
ascertain. The Premacks, who raised chimpanzee Sarah and other infants, believe that 
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“[w]hen removed from the wild and brought to the laboratory, the chimpanzee transfers 
its maternal ties to the human trainer”.77 In the absence of complex verbal language, it is 
difficult to clearly assess how chimpanzees perceive humans who somehow serve an 
equivalent social role to their mothers in the wild. The challenge remains to create good 
research paradigms to investigate these intricate, culturally-laden issues without resorting 
to language. Nonetheless, if trusted, ape language might prove useful for insights into the 
matter. Michael, a wild-born language-trained gorilla, was reported  to have had this 
conversation about his gorilla mother in 1981: 78 
 
 [BARBARA WELLER]: Who is your mother? (no response).  
 BW: Who is your mother?  
 MIKE: Gorilla lip [Gorilla-adapted Sign Language for “woman”]. 
 BW: Yes! You so smart. Who is your father?  
 M: Foot gorilla good. (“Foot” is GSL for “man.”).  
 BW: I see. Do you know your mother’s name. Did your mother have a name?  
 M: Good nice gorilla. (Good with a capital “G” signifies gorilla mother in  what 
follows.)  
 BW: Mother takes care of you when you a baby. Do you remember when you a baby?  
 M: Baby know Good gorilla Good.  
 BW: Remember when you a baby gorilla?  
 M: Big-trouble do.  
 BW: Why big trouble when you a baby?  
 M: Chase chase gorilla do red do.  
 BW: Who chase gorilla baby?  
 M: Visit foot [man]. (Mike then hits his foot with his fist.)  
 BW: Foot chased you when you a baby? 
 M: Foot (emphatically) Good. [Translation: man, mother]  
 BW: What did foot do to you and your gorilla mother?  
 M: Do out gorilla big-trouble.  
 BW: What happened to your mother?  
 M: Eat. 
 BW: Eat?  
 M: Squash gorilla.  
 BW: What happened to your mother?  
 M: Sorry do Good [mother] do rock.  
 BW: Rock? What happened with rock?  
 M: Do rock gorilla sorry.  
 BW: Rock squash your mother?  
 M: More hit do neck neck bite.  
 BW: Bite?  
 M: Bite bite.  
 BW: Who bite?  
 M: More gorilla chase. (Mike rests on floor.)  
 BW: Tell me more please. Did foot hurt your mother? (Mike ignores her.)  
 BW: Tell me more about your mother.  
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 M: Mother Ann you. (Michael called Barbara Weller “Ann” to distinguish her from 
Barbara Hiller.)”  
 
Perhaps, for apes who have established close ties to a certain human, this person 
might bear some resemblance to the wild counterpart or might become the main person 
of attachment for those who had no exposure to the biological mother’s care. In 
institutional settings where chores are distributed and contact with infants is limited, 
attachment patterns in baby chimpanzees were found to show some similarities to 
children in orphanages.79 In the case of hand-rearing, however, the picture seems much 
more complicated. It might be simplistic to label the phenomenon “alloparenting”, 
because humans indeed become the main providers, as in an adoption case.  
Furthermore, in the multi-male, multi female chimpanzee society, it is with the 
mother that the offspring create the strongest bond; as for the solitary orangutans, fathers 
usually do not stay close to mother-infant pairs while, for gorillas, paternal care takes 
place but in a harem-based society.80 Anyhow, humans do find analogies between their 
biological offspring and nonhuman animals. In modern societies, the emphasis is put on 
the social role of parents rather than on the birth-act; unlike the hand-reared Pan, Ai ended 
up to be the at the center of Matsuzawa’s investment of time and in extreme cases, he 
could be heard saying that Ai is like a daughter to him.  
Now, one may ask whether being tested with the chimpanzee mother makes a 
difference. Indeed, the way in which Ayumu, Cleo, and Pal learn how to perform in 
computer experiments differs from the original setting of the Ai project, which used 
operant conditioning techniques to give meaning to the experimental apparatus. In the 
new setting, infants always go to the experiments with their mothers; a human would be 
present in the booth with the adult and infant, or a younger researcher would stay with 
the infant in a separate booth while the adult chimpanzee interacts with a senior researcher. 
Alternatively, a mother-infant pair is tested without humans inside, and more than one 
pair might even be tested at the same time. Certainly, face-to-face testing with Ai is 
documented at early age, but the way the main studies were conducted, followed a 
protocol by which chimpanzees remained alone in the booth. In this sense, the know-how 
of experimental procedures seems to have been learned in a qualitatively different manner 
by infants Ai, Akira, and Mari back in 1978 than by little Ayumu, Cleo, and Pal in 2000. 
The first case is shaped (sensu Skinner)81, and the second, as we shall see, is socially 
scaffolded. 
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Although there are a few reports of active teaching in the wild, this is not a 
cognitive strategy commonly used by chimpanzees. 82 , 83 Based on field studies, 
Matsuzawa and colleagues conceptualize chimpanzees’ observational learning as 
“master-apprenticeship”, whereby juveniles are mostly careful observers, mother-models 
display high level of tolerance, and learners acquire and hone skills by practicing (Photo 
20 and Photo 21).84 How Ayumu learned the protocol of a token experiment is noteworthy 
for Matsuzawa,85,86 because the first outcome of the task was not a food reward but 
Japanese yen, that is, tokens that later could be exchanged for food items. Thus, the 
motivation should lie elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
Photo 20 Cleo watches Chloe cracking nuts, PRI. 
Credit: KUPRI (2002).87 By Hirata. 
Photo 21 Joya watches Jire cracking nuts, Bossou. 
Credit: Nogami (2011). By Nogami.88 
 
Important moments are summarized in Video Frame 11 and Audiovisual Material 
8: Ever since Ai returned to computerized tasks after giving birth, two-week-old Ayumu 
has shown interest in the activities his mother undertakes. At four months, able to stand 
while holding onto surfaces, Ayumu looks at the screen often, sustaining this disposition 
through eight months old (43s). His first attempt to touch the screen in the token task 
would be at nine-and-a-half months (1m7s). It is important to note that although 
Matsuzawa previously presented a laptop to Ayumu so he could become familiar with the 
touch panel, this is the first time Ayumu takes steps to solve his mother’s tasks. The infant 
understands that first, the initial circle needs to be touched for the stimuli to be presented, 
then the kanji character, and subsequently, one of the two colors (3m55s).  
However, at that moment, he does not have an understanding of the content of the 
matching-to-sample, that is, what the symbols mean. His choices are random. Eventually 
a coin drops, but he does not associate it with a food reward and plays with it instead. In 
92
 
his learning process of accompanying his mother to the laboratory every day, at last, he 
grasps that the coin is actually exchanged for food (04m0s14), and afterward, that he must 
choose only one of the two food options. In this manner, Ayumu succeeds in 
understanding the full experimental procedure, or the “know-how”, although it would 
take him longer to grasp the symbols’ meanings, that is, the “know-what”. Truth be told, 
the token concept was an integral part of the experiment, so to some extent, a form of 
“know-what” was also learned, but detailed data of his behavior are not available.  
 
  
43s 1m7s 
  
3m55s 4m 
 
Video Frame 11 Ayumu learns his mother’s computerized task for the first time. From Audiovisual 
Material 8. 
Audiovisual Material 8 Ayumu learns his mother’s computerized task for the first time, 5m23s. 
Compilation from Nakamura and Aso (2003).89 Courtesy of Nakamura Miho.  
 
In Ai’s first years, she pressed buttons on an apparatus, whereas Ayumu used a 
touch-screen, so the technical settings bear resemblances. Ai’s task was a matching-to-
sample, and so was the first part of Sousa and Matsuzawa’s procedure, up to token 
exchange. 90  Nonetheless, the experimental know-how was acquired by successive 
approximation method in the mother’s case, with positive reinforcement (i.e., food 
rewards) in each accomplished new step. Ayumu learned in more naturalistic conditions, 
despite the fact that the place was actually a laboratory. What is meant by this is that 
Ayumu was able to resort to the same type of learning that chimpanzees use in the wild. 
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This does not mean Ai had no motivation besides food rewards; in reality, food plays a 
minor role in her motivation for tasks, as we shall see later. However, these are two 
qualitatively different forms of learning a procedure during an experiment, and in 
Ayumu’s case, there is a clear social value attached to these activities.  
Now, after having seen how an infant learns an experimental procedure, we tackle 
how the solution to an experiment may emerge in a social context.  In an experiment 
modeled after ant fishing in the wild, chimpanzees were tested in two mother-infant pairs 
at a time in order to assess horizontal (i.e., same age) and vertical transmission of 
knowledge (i.e., across ages) in tool use (Audiovisual Material 9; Video Frame 12).91   
The experiment starts with several objects spread on the floor. They range from more to 
less efficient in retrieving honey from a small hole in a plastic tube. After trial and error, 
Ai adopted a knobbly plastic string, and Chloe, a rubber tube. Both were the best tools in 
the setting.  
Across trials, the infants show interest in the objects and carefully watch not only 
their own mothers (0s24frames) but also the other adult. Each infant picks up their 
mother’s tool choice as well as the other mother’s. Likewise, the children observe each 
other (1m26s and 2m6s). As their developmental stages progress, they are more and more 
able to manipulate tools. They eventually succeed and even develop individual strategies, 
like Cleo, who skillfully uses her mouth to manipulate the rubber tube (1m26s), a 
technique Ayumu finds difficult. Finally, despite succeeding, infants try other tools, a 
behavior not observed in adults once they have adopted a successful strategy.92,93 All in 
all, the solution to a tool-use task was supported by how other chimpanzees do it.  
 
   
0s24frames 1m26s 2m6s 
 
Video Frame 12  Knowledge transmission during an experiment. From Audiovisual Material 9 
Audiovisual Material 9 Knowledge transmission during an experiment, 2m10s. Compilation from 
Nakamura and Aso (2003).94 Courtesy of Nakamura Miho.  
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Several types of experiments test chimpanzees in either groups or pairs, providing 
social context within the setting per se, although it should be noted that the context must 
occur under controlled conditions. Many of these studies address chimpanzees’ 
cooperation, social learning, and so on. The point here, however, is at another level: When 
conducted within a social context for infants (i.e., mother and/or peer presence) the 
experiment itself enables a more naturalistic socialization into an “experimental culture”. 
This does not mean infant chimpanzees who studied under single-testing protocols (e.g., 
little Ai, Akira, and Mari) were tested a-socially. Nonetheless, in the kinds of experiments 
they engaged in, once the infants are in the booth and the experiment starts, the way 
procedures are learned is not supported by conspecific presence, and testers, who could 
in theory provide this sort of scaffolding, refrain from it for the sake of the protocol.  
Regarding the settings in which little Ayumu, Cleo, and Pal were tested, the subtle 
point is this: not only do we deal with the fact that the experimental results indicate 
horizontal and vertical transmission of knowledge; but we also deal with the matter that 
the experimental activity itself acquires meaning in a fairly more complex social 
environment. In this sense, what chimpanzees are learning from their mothers and 
community - in human terms - is how to be test subjects. Ultimately, infants learn how to 
be “laboratory chimpanzees” from their own community. Yet, not all chimpanzees, for 
some reason or another, become fully integrated into the experimental culture, and 
mutatis mutandis, there are chimpanzees who sociologically speaking could be 
considered “outsiders”. The three chimpanzees who grew up being tested with their 
mothers became standard test subjects. Nonetheless, for numerous reasons, we should be 
cautious in inferring chimpanzees in this condition will necessarily grow up to be skilled 
subjects, especially considering the observed human efforts undertaken to ensure these 
chimpanzees continue to be standard subjects. 
What can be affirmed, though, is that performing laboratory tasks becomes a part 
of infants’ social lives with conspecifics. The coupling of conspecific social activity with 
the learning of experimental procedures implies the know-how of a setting introduced by 
humans is to a great extent transferred into the next generation by the chimpanzees 
themselves. Still, as already hinted at, there are experiments in which, indeed, humans are 
present in the booth. Note though, that even in these situations, the human may ask the 
chimpanzee herself to demonstrate the task to the offspring, as for example, when 
Matsuzawa asks Ai to do a task with which Ayumu is having difficulty.95  
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After having seen the role that other chimpanzees play, we shall explore whether 
being tested with humans makes a difference.  Recall PRI’s new testing paradigm from 
2000 was based on the triadic relationship between mother, infant, and human tester. In 
concrete terms, this means humans get inside the booth with the pair, an activity requiring 
a long-term relationship with the adult, as chimpanzees can be fairly dangerous to work 
with face-to-face. Ai was not completely relaxed with Matsuzawa interacting with 
Ayumu until he was two months old.96  The tolerance the mothers show to their respective 
researchers is remarkable. How laboratory chimpanzees react to humans and differentiate 
them shall be discussed at length. For now, the crucial point to bring to attention is how 
in a non-automated setting (i.e., no computer and automatic feeder), testers may include 
social praise in the protocol. When systematically used after a certain desired behavior, 
social praise functions as positive reinforcement. This means for instance, right after the 
chimpanzee performs well, the human says ‘Great! Good job!’.  
Some remarks on this are necessary. First, this mode of interaction is fairly human, 
since it is linked to active feedback in teaching. Not only do chimpanzees use their typical 
learning strategies like master-apprenticeship, but they respond to and benefit from 
human strategies as well. Protocols that include social praise are likely to add social 
support in the process of becoming a skilled “laboratory chimpanzee”. If the setting is 
face-to-face, this is even more the case. Again, there is a qualitative difference between 
the asocial feedback of receiving a food reward from an automatic feeder and being in a 
face-to-face situation where the “correct” behavior is signaled by a human’s positive 
feedback. This brings us to the second point. Why would human praise act as 
reinforcement in the first place, particularly for a species that has not been purposely 
selected to interact with humans, that is, which is not domesticated?  
It might be that features of praise such as tone of voice are naturally perceived as 
pleasant stimuli, but to the best of my knowledge, so far this has only been tested in 
domestic dogs.97 For social praise alone to act as reinforcement, humans must likely bear 
a social value for infants. It is in hand-rearing studies and face-to-face experimental 
settings that the strongest bonds between humans and chimpanzees are observed. Face-
to-face settings test the strength of the social relationships, and it is probable that physical 
contact plays an important role in attachment. Moreover, the relationship between the 
mother and the tester is likely to aid in how far an infant is open to social interaction with 
a human.  
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Thus, face-to-face testing may create an environment in which human social 
praise acquires a positive meaning, or further, in which even being observed by a 
“meaningful” human may alter an infant’s reaction to a testing situation. This seems to 
be the case for experiments conducted by a collaborator at Matsuzawa’s laboratory, who 
admitted having to ask the professor to leave the laboratory while testing Ayumu, given 
he would become more agitated when he made errors if Matsuzawa was present. 
Considering Matsuzawa does not use negative reinforcement (e.g., scolding), it is 
reasonable to speculate that this professor’s presence bears a social significance for 
Ayumu.  
This point is well illustrated during PRI studies of smiling in chimpanzees.98, 99 
These have shown chimpanzees, like humans, exhibit neonatal smiling, or spontaneous 
smiling not directed to agents, which occurs during sleep. From one to two months old, 
developmental changes take place whereby smiling is elicited less as a reflex-like 
response and more in social contexts - in other words, “social smiling”. 100  The 
“participant observation” setting is clear in Audiovisual Material 10 and Video Frame 
13:101  Ai rests in the booth while Matsuzawa tests Ayumu’s response to hand movements 
at the age of two-and-a-half months (5s). At three months, Ayumu is tested for human 
face recognition, and Matsuzawa presents a picture of himself attached to a handycamera 
(32s). Ayumu responds with a clear social smile to Matsuzawa’s photo (35s and 41s). In 
this context, face-to-face experiments with praise add another social layer to the learning 
involved in experimental procedures, this time, one between species. 
 
   
5s 32s 34s 
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35s 41s 
Video Frame 13 Ayumu's social smile to Matsuzawa. From Audiovisual Material 10. 
Audiovisual Material 10 Ayumu's social smile to Matsuzawa, 45s. Excerpt from Nakamura (2001).102 
Courtesy of Nakamura Miho.  
 
To conclude the section “Building a community”, we should briefly point out the 
social outreach of KUPRI’s chimpanzee research. Chimpanzee research at KUPRI is 
frequently broadcast by NHK and CBC television (e.g., “Ai the Intellectual Chimp”, “The 
Baby and Ai”, “Ayumu and Ai”)103,104,105 and so are the research activities in partner 
institutions like the Japan Monkey Centre and Kumamoto Sanctuary. High school 
students may even be asked to write essays based upon KUPRI research.106 Additionally, 
PRI has an “open campus” program by which high school and bachelor-level students 
visit the laboratories. On Ayumu’s first birthday, they received many letters and presents 
from all over Japan.107 In fact, as we shall see, Ayumu would become one of the most 
famous chimpanzees worldwide for his performance in a memory test, in one of the few 
experiments to demonstrate chimpanzees might outperform humans intellectually. But 
much before him, his mother was already an icon. As Matsuzawa reminisces:108  
 
On the subject of letters, we have over the years received many messages from 
children all over the country. I remember one of these letters very clearly. I 
published a children’s picture book 16 years ago called “The chimpanzee who 
learned words”.[109 ] It became part of the elementary school curriculum around 
the same time as the city of Kobe was shaken by a devastating earthquake. Many 
people were killed in the disaster and much of the city lay in ruins. Although 
schools reopened not long after the quake, many of the victims were still living in 
the gyms of school buildings. A teacher at a school in Kobe sent me a letter to tell 
me the story of some of these people. The homeless taking refuge in the gym had 
heard the voices of children reading out loud the story of a chimpanzee. The bright 
voices cheered them up and gave them back their will to live. There were other 
memorable things in that package from the school. One was a small envelope with 
“donation” scrawled on it in a child’s handwriting. Inside the envelope was a small 
amount of money, seemingly a portion of a child’s allowance. Another pack was 
filled with biscuits rescue units distribute in emergency situations, along with the 
message “Please give to Ai”. I was deeply moved by the warmth and courage in 
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the hearts of these small children. Although they themselves had been suffering 
greatly in the earthquake, they found it in themselves to lend a helping hand to 
others.  
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Chapter 2 
Physical Boundaries 
The Architecture of Dangerous Social Interactions 
 
 
2.1 The Social Organization of Space in Captivity 
 
‘Dangerous, do not approach.’ 
So reads the sign next to the 
chimpanzee facilities when entering 
the Primate Research Institute (Photo 
1). Yet, the warning stars an adorable 
infant, nothing but approachable. 
Although the use of puerile mascots is 
a trend in Japan, 1  this plaque, 
nevertheless, powerfully condenses 
the paradox of engaging in social 
interactions with a related and 
relatable wild animal. It seems to be a 
widespread view among primatologists and keepers that from the four nonhuman great 
apes, common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are the most dangerous regarding 
husbandry. Indeed, caution is required when handling all these great apes, but orangutans 
(Pongo spp.)  are “slow”, gorillas (Gorilla spp.) are “gentle giants”, and the pigmy 
chimpanzees, the bonobos (Pan paniscus), are “feminists” and “hippies” - except, a 
bonobo keeper might warn that they are not as peaceful as most think.2   
The enhanced danger of working with chimpanzees is acknowledged by 
chimpanzee specialists and non-specialists, but researchers focusing on other species 
might have less generous words to describe the troglodytes: utterances by more than one 
interlocutor range from “I never trust chimps!”, passing by how chimpanzees try to “take 
advantage from each other always”, up to how they are “nasty”. Conversely, personnel in 
charge of chimpanzees are particularly sensitive about one’s ability to keep all fingers, 
on a palette from advice to brag: seniors warn newcomers; a keeper defines “success” as 
having all ten fingers; a professor proudly presents his unscathed hands…  
A certain communion among researchers is created based on the specificities of 
the species with which they work. One can be a “chimpologist”,3 or an “orang-person” in 
 
 
Photo 1 ‘Dangerous, do not approach.’  
Sign next to chimpanzee facilities, 2014. By Daly. 
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contrast to a “chimp-person”,4 or one can be part of “the Language and Intelligence 
people” (a reference to the chimpanzee section at PRI); so on, and so forth. Danger is one 
of the main features to bring chimpanzee personnel together in terms of both specific 
skills and responsibilities. At PRI, staff and researchers receive specialized training for 
chimpanzees’ escape, which differs from the drill to catch the relatively light-weighted 
and less physically threatening macaques, equally housed in the Institute.5,6; I,Note 7   
In a formal meeting at PRI, a researcher who studies Japanese macaques was quite 
intrigued about this topic and asked the chimpanzee personnel attending the event what 
she should do as a “civilian” in case of a runaway chimpanzee. Indeed, while both 
Japanese macaques and chimpanzees are wild species, regarding the latter, the potential 
consequences of an escape gain a slight military tone. Incidentally, the transparent dome 
inside the chimpanzee living area, where humans conduct research completely 
surrounded by chimpanzees, has been said a couple of times to resemble the scenery of 
the dinosaur movie “Jurassic Park”. Although the facility complies with safety measures, 
even trained students are only allowed to go inside if supervised by seniors.8, 9 This 
extreme case clearly indicates that a given risk level comprises more than the physical 
aspects of facilities.  
Regardless, chimpanzees are capable of real bonding with humans, and more than 
one interlocutor remarked that interactions among chimpanzees can be quite rough, not 
to mention contact with a physically weaker species like us. In episodes when PRI 
chimpanzees accidentally wounded researchers during face-to-face experiments, 
professors reported that they looked surprised at the sight of having inflicted injury to the 
human in question. In fact, in one of the few studies to measure chimpanzee strength, it 
was found that chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) were more than four times stronger than men 
used to hard manual labor, when body mass was accounted for.10, 11 If comparing extreme 
values, while tested with a dynamometer, the most motivated chimpanzee (a female!) 
pulled approximately 571 kg (Sic 1,260 pounds), whereas the strongest man of the study 
reached about 222 kg (Sic 491 pounds). Furthermore, it has been argued that the human 
nervous system exerts finer inhibition over our muscular system, allowing us better 
strength control in less forceful tasks.12 All in all, not only are chimpanzees stronger than 
humans, but they seem to have a harder time controlling their power.  
                                                 
I Danger here refers to serious or to fatal physical hazard, yet, the bite of some monkeys may pose a severe 
biohazard. E.g., B virus in Macaca, which is life-threatening for humans and listed as the highest level of 
biosafety precautions, i.e., BSL-4 (Hilliard, 2007). Regardless, monkeys are more easily restrained.  
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Currently, PRI has twelve living members but they do not live in the experimental 
rooms. Instead, eleven chimpanzees form two separate groups named after their 
respective alphas (Akira’s and Gon’s groups). They inhabit three main spaces, the 
“Outdoor Enclosure”, the “Green Cage” and the “Silver Cage” (Photo 2, Photo 3 and 
Photo 4). Sometimes personnel relocate females to the other counterpart for husbandry 
purposes, and they make the groups rotate to balance the use of the spaces. The only 
chimpanzee to live in the experimental area is Reo, who woke up one day to an 
unexpected disease.13,14 Due to his former tetraplegia and current lower limb paralysis, 
researchers and staff at the Institute decided it would be a risk to his life to reintegrate 
him given that he cannot defend himself, nor can he receive specialized care elsewhere. 
As a countermeasure for the isolation from conspecifics, humans schedule regular visits 
from formerly known chimpanzee mates. Considering his progress over the years, a plan 
to reintegrate him into the community is now foreseen.15  
 
 
 
Photo 2 Aerial view of the chimpanzee research area. Adapted from Matsuzawa (2017) by Daly.16 
Courtesy of Hayashi Misato to Matsuzawa. 
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Photo 3 Outdoor enclosure. View from the ape 
research annex, 2014. By Daly. 
Photo 4 Outdoor enclosure. View from the green 
cage, 2015. By Daly. 
 
 
 
Photo 5 Chimpanzee being called into the experimental/feeding area, 2015. By Daly. 
 
By their names, chimpanzees are called inside from their living areas (Photo 5). 
All of them must head to the basement in the silver cage for feeding and health check, but 
the ones participating in experiments are led, in a second moment, into the experimental 
area of the basement and/or first floor of the ape research annex (Video Frame 1; 
Audiovisual Material 1). The administration building and the offices inside the ape 
research annex are human-only spaces, and the compounds primarily intended for 
chimpanzee use, such as the outdoor enclosure, can be entered for cleaning, repairing, 
and enrichment purposes (cf. Photo 2). Importantly, though, in this case, chimpanzees 
need to be relocated for humans to enter. In general, humans and chimpanzees are never 
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together in a barrier-free room, except for particular cases like face-to-face experiments 
with specific human-chimpanzee pairs.  
 
  
42s 46s 
  
1m 1m18s 
 
Video Frame 1 Calling chimpanzees into the experimental area. From Audiovisual Material 1. 
Audiovisual Material 1 Calling chimpanzees into the experimental area, 2015, 1m28s. By Daly.  
 
 
When considering the management of dangerous wild species, the main concern 
is how to establish safe care. However, an additional issue at PRI is the fact that some 
physical structures are made purposefully “porous”, unlike zoos. All these structures are 
intended to be exceptionally strong and to separate both species, yet, the boundaries 
between human and chimpanzee spaces are made porous precisely in order to allow 
interspecies social interaction during husbandry. This creates what shall be referred to as 
“permeable interface areas” for human-chimpanzee contact, or spaces in which - by 
architectural design - both species are allowed to share the immediate surroundings and 
briefly trespass physical borders while still being separated.  
Permeable interface areas are composed of an amalgam of materials and designs; 
acrylic, polycarbonate panels, metal bars, meshes, and different types of feeders, doors, 
corridors, and experimental apparatuses. The combination of design and material results 
in a spectrum of risk levels that a physical structure can embody. On the other extreme 
lies the risk assessment by humans (and chimpanzees) regarding the context of a given 
115
 
interaction. In situ, these aspects are referred to respectively as the “hardware” and the 
“software” of interactions, in the sense of how the materiality of spaces and how one’s 
modus operandi influence the danger level. 17  Therefore, the flow of humans and 
chimpanzees and their social interactions in mixed spaces are mediated by physical 
structures and dispositions one toward another.  
When considering the social aspect, space is organized according to how it is 
conceived (sensu design), how it is sensed (sensu space perception), and how it is 
occupied (sensu territory and body techniques). In permeable interface areas, the social 
organization of space is a constant trade-off between safety and interspecies physical 
proximity. An etho-ethnographic analysis of PRI permeable zones indicates that safety 
measures involve an understanding of (a) the architecture of interface areas (b) the 
physical structure of the apparatuses (c) the surroundings immediate to one’s body (d) 
the context of the activity being undertaken (e) chimpanzee behavior and individuals’ 
abilities (f) human-chimpanzee relationship on a dyadic basis (g) group dynamics among 
humans and chimpanzees (h) safe body techniques. We shall see these in detail.  
Be for experiments or for feeding and care, the flow of Homo and Pan through 
interface areas, such as the basement and experimental rooms, is a complex activity of 
coordination and cooperation within and across species. First, let us consider the general 
architecture of interface areas, taking the basement as the most prototypical example 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2). Experimental rooms are the typically known “laboratories”, 
where chimpanzees are tested inside booths or transparent compounds that separate them 
from humans. In particular, testing this species requires additional safety measures in the 
structural design, in comparison to, for example, Japanese macaques. Thus, there is the 
need for “chimpanzee-proof” experimental rooms, and these exist in the basement and on 
the first floor of the ape research annex, along with a series of less used rooms elsewhere.II 
Moreover, there are rooms conceived for chimpanzee use during feeding and care, which 
provide shelter to sleep in, especially during winter (i.e., N1 to N5 and S1 to S4). At last, 
the “Eastern Sunroom” and “Western Sunroom” are chimpanzee living areas within the 
silver cage (cf. Photo 2).  
 
                                                 
II E.g., the “dome” within the outdoor enclosure, and the so-called “skylab” facilities in the silver and green 
cage. 
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Figure 1 Chimpanzee flow in the basement. Adapted from KUPRI (2011,6) by Daly.18  
Courtesy of Hayashi Misato. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Human flow in the basement. Adapted from KUPRI (2011, 6) by Daly.19  
Courtesy of Hayashi Misato. Measurements taken in 2015 by Daly.  
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For safety reasons humans and chimpanzees do not share doors, thus, we can 
group them into two major categories, which organize human and chimpanzee flow. 
Doors for humans, dubbed as “human doors”, are of human size and connect human 
spaces and areas for chimpanzee use. These are equipped with three locks; one by key, 
and two by sturdy metal levers. Additionally, a light bulb placed on the top of each door 
indicates whether they are open. These extreme precautions signal how risky can be a 
forgotten open access between chimpanzee and human areas. In fact, in the experimental 
rooms, not only one but two human-sized doors separate the chimpanzee booth and the 
human space. Conversely, “chimpanzee doors” are of reduced size (approx. 47Lx 38H 
cm), which acts as a safety measure, allowing passage exclusively one by one. They 
resemble an upward-downward guillotine (also known as “guillotine doors”) and are 
operated by humans from the outside of chimpanzee rooms and experimental booths. 
Thus, no direct interaction is needed when coordinating the chimpanzees’ flow. 
Another important architectural feature of the interspecies organization of space 
is the tunnel system. Chimpanzees move from one room/floor to another through an 
overhead tunnel, split in two by a metal barrier (50cm width each).  The tunnel itself has 
automated doors within, which, again, are controlled by humans standing below the 
chimpanzees they wish to move (see Audiovisual Material 1; Video Frame 1). A set of 
doors block the entrances and exits, while another set allows communication between 
tunnel one and two (respectively, yellow and blue sets in Figure 1). This way, chimpanzee 
flow is organized and restrained, similar to how car traffic is controlled by red and green 
lights.  
All laboratories have a fixed time slot to test either a single chimpanzee or a 
mother-offspring pair at a time. For instance, the South Play Room (SPR) on the first 
floor tests the Ai and Ayumu pair in the first morning slot (approx. 9:00-10:30), while 
Laboratory 4 tests Chloe and Cleo at the same time. To go to both places, Ai and Ayumu 
share one tunnel, while Chloe and Cleo, another. By controlling the automated doors, 
SPR members are in charge of Ai and Ayumu’s flow, and Lab 4 members, of Chloe and 
Cleo’s. Furthermore, other laboratories test different chimpanzees in the same period. Up 
to seven chimpanzees have been observed distributed across laboratories at once, 
although this is not even the Institute’s full experimental capacity. 
During this ethnography, humans coordinated the flow of a total of twelve 
chimpanzees being called into the basement for feeding, that is, into rooms N1 to N5 and 
S1 to S4 from around 8:00 to 8:30 am. Afterward, seven chimpanzees were led to the 
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experimental rooms from 8:30 to 9:00. This activity is done not only once but several 
times a day due to the fact that chimpanzees attend sessions in multiple laboratories and 
have their main meals served in the basement.  
 
Despite the careful 
planning, overlaps do occur 
because chimpanzees are not forced 
to move. Instead, they cooperate 
upon human request or our sheer 
begging. They might also become 
agreeable after negotiation 
techniques are employed, such as 
the use of peanuts and other treats 
(Photo 6). When these resources fail, a chimpanzee may be found stuck in another’s way, 
a situation referred to as “traffic jam”.20 In smooth days, though, the calling activity 
resembles a ballet in which humans and chimpanzees dance their parts according to the 
choreography. 
In fact, there is a specific protocol to move chimpanzees. For safe flow to occur, 
the architecture of human and chimpanzee spaces and the correct actions linked to these 
venues need to be mastered.  In the learning protocol, at first, a trainee is allowed to watch 
seniors, then to operate doors under supervision and, finally, the trainee is allowed to 
move chimpanzees independently; however, promotion to the next level is judged by 
several skilled persons.21 To prevent fighting, two spans of safety in the overhead tunnels 
are enforced, in other words, two vacant adjacent compartments separating a chimpanzee 
or a mother-offspring pair from others. In practice, this means that the flow is structured, 
and it is coordinated following a rule for positioning.  
Moreover, the two broad categories “door for humans” and “door for 
chimpanzees”, are, in fact, divided into several unlabeled subcategories, so that each 
door-subtype is associated with an action on the part of the operator. Where an outsider 
sees a “human” or a “chimpanzee door”, the expert sees linked actions. Chimpanzees’ 
ground doors that give access to the sunrooms and the outdoor compound require 
assessing the “inner state of each enclosure and chimpanzee arrangements”; chimpanzees’ 
overhead doors from/to the main overhead tunnel require confirming “back and forth 
situation” and warning people near; humans’ doors from/to N and S rooms require 
 
 
Photo 6 Luring with peanuts, overhead tunnel, 2015.  
By Daly. 
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double-checking whether someone is cleaning the area; chimpanzees’ access to the first 
floor calls for a person staying on each floor to accompany the animals; and so on.22 Only 
trained personnel are able to act according to the risk level that seemingly equal-looking 
doors embody, that is, only a trained eye can accurately spot the qualitative difference 
among deceivingly plain entrances and exits. The same applies to other physical features 
of human and chimpanzee spaces, such as feeding apparatuses. It takes “literacy” to read 
the danger levels in the architecture and to respond appropriately.  
Nonetheless, accidents may occur occasionally. According to a case report of 
unintended encounters, in 2010 an undergraduate student opened a chimpanzee guillotine 
door (in S2) in order to call in a chimpanzee from the outdoor enclosure, while a keeper 
was cleaning the chimpanzee rooms (S1 and S2).23  However, since the human door 
between both rooms and the main corridor was closed, the chimpanzee’s escape into the 
main corridor was prevented. In addition, the keeper was keen enough to lock himself 
into the room not yet reached (i.e., S1), instead of trying to exit through the corridor, an 
act that would possibly jeopardize everybody’s safety. In another case report, this time, 
of unintended encounters among chimpanzees, in 2008 a PhD student returned Puchi to 
the wrong group, that is, Akira’s, due to overlooking the information board and releasing 
place.24  
Indeed, communication is key to safety and is enforced by protocol, as observed 
in “the flow chart of chimpanzee’s experiment” (in Figure 3, see information board; 
checking for human presence; call for support). Messages are, in fact, quite standardized 
in both the basement and in the laboratories, and they may sound like template phrases. 
Matsuzawa even encourages newcomers to whistle when alone in the basement so as to 
signal one’s presence and, also, to always speak loud and clear during husbandry and 
experiments and never rely on “theory of mind” (or mind reading) when it comes to 
protocol.25  In a review of the recent accidents at PRI, Professor Hayashi considered that 
they were “mainly caused by human error”, with some situations being influenced by a 
“misunderstanding or over-trust” regarding chimpanzees and, in addition, by “weak 
points in facilities”.26 Faculty members were involved in a few accidents as well, but most 
episodes seem to have occurred during a period of experience from one to two years.27  
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Figure 3 Safety protocol to conduct chimpanzees from/to experiments. Sic KUPRI (2011).28  
Courtesy of Hayashi Misato. 
 
 
Call ambulance or            
visit a hospital noted above 
with a officer 
Supporter will return chimp, 
recover the condition,               
and inform person related
Save experimenter, 
call for support, 
initial report
＜The flow chart of chimpanzee’s experiment＞
Check location of individual by the information board,
check whether keeper is cleaning the room
Prepare reward, check lock of 
the experimental booth
Check safety of 2 spans forward, 
lead chimp: room - path - exp 
Move the magnet of individual 
on the board
Call chimpanzee to the room, check the condition
Good Problem
Conduct exp
CancelImprove gradually
Check safety forward and backward, lead chimp: room – path – exp, 
check the group visually and then return chimp 
Move the magnet on the board
Check the lock of the pathway before 
opening the door to clean exp
＜Response to emergency＞
Accident
Wash and 
clean injury
Office（X512）, Sakura Hospital（0587-95-6711）, 
Inuyama Central Hospital（0568-62-8111）
L&I：Tomonaga（PHS 600）, Hayashi（PHS 645）
Centre：Watanabe（PHS 668）, Furuhashi（PHS 657）
Check individual location by the board,
check whether keeper is cleaning the room
look call
※check whether feces or 
urine is on the pathway 
※check whether feces or 
urine is on the pathway 
121
 
Putting Hayashi’s report in context, even trained personnel can make mistakes, 
and it is likely that new obligations bring students a wider range of judgment calls and, 
with that, the possibility of major errors. Alternatively, regarding the presence of both 
faculty members and students in accidents, it cannot be ruled out as an explanation the 
fact that the “Section of Language and Intelligence” (i.e., researchers, technicians, and 
students) has an increased number of working hours in comparison to employees of the 
“Center for Human Evolution” (i.e., keepers). Thus, fatigue and lower attention levels 
may be involved. Once more, overall, reading the architecture of permeable interface 
areas involves being able to link topographies with certain types of actions. These actions 
are defined either by protocol, such as the rules for moving chimpanzees in husbandry 
and laboratory spaces, or by a concrete danger assessment, such as the keeper’s decision 
to lock himself in rather than escaping in that given context.   
However, if accidents are rare, one of the most dangerous daily activities in 
human-chimpanzee interaction is personalized feeding, whereby a human, instead of 
scattering food in an empty room, accompanies a chimpanzee through the whole meal. 
As with children, humans make sure chimpanzees are eating properly, and they 
coordinate their actions with chimpanzees’ responses, such as the refusal of certain 
vegetables, and so on. Due to the increased contact, and given the fact that humans are 
handling very desirable items for chimpanzees, feeding duty requires as much expertise 
as moving chimpanzees around.  
In general, trainees are put under a varying period of training, which consists of 
just observing seniors during dinner feeding (i.e., up to four months on weekdays in 2015), 
before they can start feeding “amenable” chimpanzees, like Puchi and Popo. The main 
meals are given in the sunrooms and in the husbandry rooms (N1-N5 and S1-S4), usually, 
through a major opening in the concrete structure secured by metal bars (Photo 7). Each 
structure varies in size (Figure 2) and is furnished with one or more types of feeders. In 
practice, this means that the composition of the apparatuses is not the same across 
locations. A few rooms have the feeder directly built into the wall with no opening (S4 
and S1), so, in these cases, the only way to observe chimpanzees is through perforated 
metal structures, which are part of the human doors accessing the chimpanzee rooms. 
These variations introduce a vast array of risk levels to be assessed on the spot.  
This brings us to the second point of attention formerly mentioned, that is, the 
physical structure of the apparatuses. While evaluating the risk of the feeders in the 
basement area, Hayashi determined risk points by a sum of “frequency of approach” (i.e., 
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use), “possibility of injury”, and the “level of injury severity”.29 Depending on its points, 
a feeder was categorized into risk levels ranging from I to V; the maximum corresponding 
to “problems to be solved immediately”.30 Apart from Hayashi’s evaluation in 2012 
during a presentation targeting the section of Language and Intelligence, the risk level of 
feeders is not explicitly labelled on the spot and, instead, danger perception is passed on 
orally during training and other contexts, in a more fluid manner.  
 
 
 
Photo 7 Feeding area in the basement. Room N3, 2015. Risk level data from Hayashi (2012), courtesy 
of Hayashi Misato.31  Measurements, adaptation, and photo by Daly. 
 
A clear example of the risks that a permeable interface area entail is depicted in 
Photo 7:  A keeper stands on one side (a human-only corridor) and a chimpanzee on the 
other (a chimpanzee-only room); but to allow feeding and interaction, the structure is not 
sealed. Instead, it has openings through which both humans and chimpanzees can trespass 
temporarily (e.g., hands, mouth, etc.) while being well anchored in their exclusive spaces. 
The feeder level II in Photo 7 is, in fact, the safest feeding apparatus of the basement in 
native perception, because its distance to the metal bars is comparatively higher and 
chimpanzees’ hands cannot reach the end of the funnel. In contrast, the feeder risk level 
III requires humans to precisely place the food into the hole in much shorter range.  
Be it by curiosity, gluttony, or mischief, a chimpanzee who inadvertently grabs a 
human may inflict serious injury, thus, all feeding activities require careful observation 
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of the individual. For example, in the same room of Photo 7 (N3), a case report discloses 
a bite accident through the metal bars, which resulted in a student losing part of the index 
finger. 32  In 2007, during breakfast feeding, “[chimpanzee] Chloe seemed calm and 
invited the student to play with a piece of grapefruit held on her lips”. Then, she suddenly 
caught the student’s finger and bit the tip off. Despite Chloe’s innocent look and funny 
nature, this and other minor episodes gave her the fame of one of the most dangerous 
chimpanzees at PRI. To stress the importance of the design of physical structures, it 
should be noted that an interlocutor expressed concern over how Chloe’s current feeding 
location could be better furnished in terms of apparatuses, which reflects how danger 
perception is tied to the idiosyncrasies of a chimpanzee and the material features that 
support interaction with a given individual.   
Now, we shall inspect how humans move safely next to chimpanzees. Once again, 
permeable interface areas, regardless of some fair amount of separation, are spaces that 
can be briefly occupied at the same time by both species. Due to this particularity, 
considerable attention is devoted to being aware of the surroundings immediate to one’s 
body, which is the third point previously evoked as safety assessment. Suppose 
chimpanzees are being moved into the basement area, a time when they can potentially 
be roaming free either in the sunrooms, rooms or overhead tunnels. In this case, humans 
will actively avoid being caught off guard by a nearby chimpanzee, yet, with up to twelve 
chimpanzees on the move in several possible locations, body positioning in relation to 
points in space becomes crucial.  
The materiality that constitutes someone’s surroundings plays an important role 
in orienting placement in space. Because of the overhead tunnels structure, where the 
inferior part is made of metal bars (see Photo 6), chimpanzees can potentially reach 
through, grasping a human’s extended arms and fingers, or they may urinate, and more 
rarely defecate through the tunnel, thus, crowning unwary bystanders. More clearly 
intentional is spitting at newcomers, seemingly, an almost rite of passage before some 
chimpanzees become habituated to a novice. As a result, people in general avoid standing 
below the overhead tunnels when chimpanzees are being moved (Figure 4), although 
members responsible for “traffic” may be seen standing below but just a little ahead of 
them.  
In theory, unless someone reaches out, chimpanzees cannot grab humans though 
the overhead tunnels, except for relatively tall persons, like a student (1m86) who reports 
having to pay attention to his cap. Furthermore, walking before or after a chimpanzee’s 
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position seems unproblematic. In spite of that, in practice, when affluence is high or when 
the routine locations are not so clearly mapped in one’s head, as during training, the 
context calls for a general attentiveness to the region below the tunnels. Therefore, the 
“walkable” area in the humans’ main corridor is reduced. As shown in Figure 4, if both 
tunnels are potentially being used, given that tunnel one and two take up 1m width, a 
70cm “tunnel-free” area is left. Still, there are two factors to consider. The first is the 
20cm groove to the extreme side, which is difficult to be walked upon. The second is the 
fact that feeding locations exist on this border, therefore, this area comprises permeable 
areas where chimpanzees may reach humans. Thus, a space of 50cm within the main 
corridor is ideal to cross the basement. Yet, a closer look into Figure 2 and Figure 5, 
reveals obstacles to this remaining “walkable” area. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Human and chimpanzee flow in the basement main corridor.  
Measurements, photo icons and figure by Daly. 
 
Following, we will simulate the crossing through the basement area. This mental 
exercise will provide a clear picture of the importance of the surroundings of the body, or 
the so-called “peripersonal space”.33  The concept of peripersonal space refers to the 
distance in which things in the environment are within reach and it is opposed to 
someone’s “extrapersonal space”.34  Indeed, while navigating through interface areas, 
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humans need to avoid being within chimpanzees’ peripersonal space in its furthest limit 
beyond barriers. Therefore, when crossing the basement, an awareness of human and 
chimpanzee peripersonal space is needed. Now, imagine someone is on the opposite end 
of the feeding area and wishes to go to the laboratories during peak traffic time, that is, 
when the chimpanzees can potentially be in the rooms and overhead tunnels.  
In Figure 5, the person starts the crossing from the lower far right, which is next 
to the chimpanzee outdoor enclosure. There, there are feeding stations with 15cm width 
(purple spheres), but because the stations are recoiled and do not stand below any 
overhead tunnel, freedom of movement is enjoyed and attention level may drop. Then, 
just a few steps ahead to the left of the map, space perception becomes narrower and 
attention increases: Rooms S3 and S4 have feeding stations of equal 15cm width (green 
spheres), but this time, the stations are placed next to an imminent bottleneck, that is, just 
before the overhead tunnels. Moving along S2 in the direction of the western sunroom, 
an overhead passage is necessarily crossed and one must stay within the 50cm “walkable 
area”. Luckily, the sunroom feeding zone is 80cm width, which is far beyond 
chimpanzees’ grasp (dark blue spheres). Thus, one can make use of the entirety of this 
50cm space. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Detail of Figure 2, Human flow in the basement.  
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Right after, however, in front of room N2 on our walking side, there is a kitchen 
with a sink occupying 45cm and then a rack for chimpanzee food boxes that take up 
approximately 67cm (orange stripes) from the precious 70cm overhead tunnel-free area. 
In other words, here, human space might feel quite “squeezed”. On the top of that, just 
afterward, there is an overhead passage. Thus, the N2/Kitchen area is the narrowest space 
in the main corridor during peak, which calls for highly controlled locomotion, when 
comparing to other points of the basement. Yet, a subtlety should be noted. Even though 
the rooms N2 and N3 have the same type of feeding station (a small window of 10cm 
width), during flow the N2 station poses no major problem, since it is already neutralized 
by the width of the sink area, while the barrier-free N3 station requires attention (beyond 
being placed just below an overhead tunnel). Therefore, one should be attentive to the 
particularities of both the left and the right side of the basement.  
To conclude the simulation, we are brought to the fourth point in safety assessment, 
that is, the importance of not just the surroundings, but also the context of the activity 
undertaken in order to determine one’s body positioning. Again, during calling, 
chimpanzees can potentially roam through overhead tunnels and rooms. However, during 
feeding duty, accesses to these tunnels are blocked, making a person’s “walkable” area 
considerably enlarged, and the sense of usable space expanded. The surroundings are 
identical, but by framing the presence and absence of chimpanzees, locomotion is more 
or less restrained according to the context. In other words, an activity such as walking is 
not the same during calling or feeding slots. By simulating the context, the obstacles, and 
chimpanzees’ peripersonal space it is possible to identify and predict controlled 
locomotion and space perception among researchers and keepers.  
In addition, professional roles play a part in the context as well. For example, 
keepers seem to attend very carefully to zones related to their duties, such as the border 
between the human main corridor and the chimpanzee outdoor enclosure, in other words, 
the far end of the basement. Since it is mainly keepers who access this chimpanzee living 
area and since they are in possession of this door key, this is a spot to be double-checked, 
especially considering that the door is large sized (ergo escape prone) and that it directly 
separates humans from the full chimpanzee group. In contrast, as a trainee, I quickly 
remarked I did not fully know where to place myself and I could not accurately identify 
the risk that certain zones pose, or the appropriate safe distance. Yet, as time passed and 
I received keys linked to high security doors, I could not help but noticing that passing by 
and through newly accessible doors occasionally sent chills down my spine, possibly 
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because from that moment on, I had become responsible for these doors as well and, 
consequently, for people’s safety. In other words, the activity of “passing by” as a trainee 
and as a keeper potentially differs.  
It is clear, though, that unlike the precise measurements above, humans do not 
move neatly in space as if calculating and keeping an exact width in their pace. 
Nevertheless, these are points that by default of the architecture, context, and chimpanzee 
behavior, one needs to be aware of when navigating through permeable interface areas. 
There is, indeed, a controlled locomotion in what the Gibson refers to as “the edge of 
danger”,35 and because risk level varies from apparatus to apparatus, chimpanzee to 
chimpanzee, and factor to factor, the so-called “margin of safety” is highly contextual.36 
Once again, at PRI, a clear-cut separation between humans and chimpanzees is not 
desirable for the sake of social interactions and this is reflected in the architectural design 
of interface areas. In native’s terminology,37  the “hardware” (i.e., the infrastructure) 
allows trespassing, that is, potentially unsafe interactions and, in turn, the “software” (i.e., 
personnel’s behavior) needs to counterbalance this fact by being particularly skilled in 
identifying dangerous situations. This lead us to the fifth point; the understanding of 
chimpanzee behavior and individual abilities. Now, let us turn to a few ethnographic 
episodes to make this point clear.  
Be careful! Staff lost many cameras over the years, but once you learn how fast 
they are, you can put your camera through the fence - so said the keeper Michael Serres 
after seeing my frustrated attempts of getting clear footages of bonobos in my visit to 
Kumamoto Sanctuary.38 In my first encounter with the sole pigmy-chimpanzee group 
living in Japan, I felt sandwiched between the wall and the mesh barrier at a distance of 
no more than 1m40cm. By experience, I knew that at this distance I could not avoid the 
spitting or feces flinging that sometimes welcome newcomers, and bonobos’ excited 
high-pitched vocalization made me a bit disoriented. Instead, unlike my predictions, there 
were no such agonistic interactions and, in fact, one of the males, the bonobo Vjay,39 
looked at me straight into my eyes as if I were the most interesting person in the world. 
Soon, my initial tension dissipated with some exchanged greetings. During my stay, 
Serres and two other visiting students kept me company and, as I would later come to 
know, this bonobo group never learned to spit or throw feces.  
On the other hand, the chimpanzee group was another story. One of them, 
Mizuo,40 (from Mizu, meaning ‘water’ in Japanese), made spitting a refined part of his 
display to newcomers as an “insecure dominant”, as Serres puts it.41 “Mizuo is preparing 
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water” said a researcher, warning us. Mizuo would use the water available in his 
compound to turn his mouth into a water cannon, reaching visitors from afar. Throwing 
is such a common practice among these chimpanzee groups that the Sanctuary put up 
human-sized barriers to protect a few areas. However, according to Serres, it is visitors 
in white coats who are usually covered by feces, because most of these chimpanzees are 
retired from biomedical research, where this garment is typically worn.42  While the 
keeper was showing us each group, my colleague, who would soon be relocated to the 
Sanctuary, bravely endured the spitting session while I hid cowardly behind the panels, 
particularly afraid for my electronics (Photo 8). Later, she clarified that they would 
eventually have to get habituated to her and hiding would not help her future work.  
For a moment, I evaded Mizuo and the others, but he eventually managed to strike 
me when I let my guard down. I went to another part of the Sanctuary to observe the blind 
chimpanzee Kanako but since I had no knowledge of its architecture, to me, Kanako’s 
room seemed completely disconnected. Giving some steps back, I sat down on a stair-
step without fully acknowledging the wooded compound behind. Without further delay, 
I was crowned and my ear was completely sprayed: I had just sat behind Mizuo’s territory. 
To judge by the volume, it was at least comforting to think it was mostly water, not full 
chimpanzee saliva in my ear canal.  
Noteworthy, aimed throwing is a rare behavior in nonhuman animals, but in 
nonhuman primates it has been more frequently observed in chimpanzees and it is 
hypothesized that it might have been a precursor for adaptations necessary for complex 
motor actions, like language, and speech in hominins.43 Hopkins and colleagues found 
that chimpanzees who reliably throw (n=38) are significantly better at communication 
tasks, but they do not differ in physical cognition tasks from those that do not throw 
(n=38). 44  The results suggest a correlation between this action and communicative 
sophistication, in the sense of an increased sensitivity to how one’s own behavior may 
change or manipulate the behaviors of the others. It seems Mizuo and the other poop 
flingers might be particularly skilled in communicating their ways to undesired 
newcomers.  
While navigating the Sanctuary, other faux-pas happened. In one of these episodes, 
I would learn bonobo females are a force to be reckoned with. The bonobo group is 
composed of two males and four females, and although they live together, at times they 
are separated by sex. My experience with bonobo males was very positive and I spent a 
lot of time observing them, but from the start I noticed that the females seemed to 
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challenge me and my colleagues. As form of enrichment of their daily routines, seeds 
reachable only through the manipulation of twigs are placed near the meshes, and the 
bonobos use the small branches from the trees inside their compounds to obtain the treats 
(Photo 9). I had observed this form of tool use in both the male and the female groups, 
but having spent most of my time with the pacific males, I did not pay particular attention 
to the possible alternative uses of these twigs, until two bonobos in the female group used 
it to try to pierce us.  
 
 
 
 
Photo 8 Panel barrier against spitting and feces 
flinging, Kumamoto Sanctuary, 2015. By Daly. 
Photo 9 Bonobo Junior uses a twig to reach for 
treats, Kumamoto Sanctuary, 2015. By Daly. 
 
Caught with my guard down, I remember being hit in the thigh at least once. I 
managed to evade to some extent, but the strike hurt, and my impression was that the 
amount of strength invested was not friendly, in comparison to my interaction with the 
males. At this point, I realized the safe “walkable” area had considerably diminished 
around the female compound, meaning I had to squeeze myself at the opposite side. I was 
very much surprised by the females’ determination. As I had to cross over, one of them 
was preparing a twig, disbranching it to make it pass smoothly through the mesh holes. 
While I was preparing myself to cross, I and this female stared at each other. I was trying 
to evaluate her behavior and, likely, she was doing the same. As soon as I got near her 
grasp, she tried to pierce me again but, this time, I knew better. I felt slightly paranoid, 
yet, I was not willing to downplay their cognitive capacities or their individual abilities. 
Indeed, they acted upon the environment in ways I clearly could not have foreseen. I had 
to count on the fact that they can outsmart us. I became cautious - not due to what I knew 
-  but due to what I did not know. 
Phrased in another way, at that time, I failed to perceive an affordance of the tool 
(i.e., the twig). The term “affordance” was coined by Gibson to refer to potential actions 
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made possible because of the inherent relationship between the environment and an actor 
(e.g., a human or an animal):45 In a straightforward example he provides, air is a feature 
of the environment that affords breathing for terrestrial animals, but not for fishes. 
However, to Gibson, an affordance is rather a capability, which is relational, but which, 
nonetheless, is independent from the individuals’ subjective experience. Building up on 
this concept within cognitive engineering and design perception, Norman distinguished 
affordances from “perceived affordances”, the latter being the subjective ability to fathom 
this relationship between an actor and how the environment can be acted upon.46,47  In 
sum, through the behavior of female bonobos I came to picture, the hard way, an 
alternative use of the environment by this species and could, thus, adjust body positioning 
accordingly.    
Sometimes, dangerous positioning can happen in places one believes to know well. 
This was the case for the Primate Research Institute. During training, I had always 
perceived the S1 room in the feeding area as safe, mainly because in this place there are 
no exposed openings like meshes or bars; just the door and a feeding apparatus built into 
the wall. The chimpanzee typically fed there is Pendesa and I did not pay particular 
attention to the surroundings of the apparatus, that is, until the day I was warned her hand 
and arm can unbelievably pass through the feeder and reach our side. From this day on, 
it is as if the danger borders were enlarged around the feeder. In fact, while not all 
chimpanzees have the same arm-reach beyond a normal fence, the thinnest hands at PRI 
are indeed Pendesa’s, who stretches approximately 24cm beyond metal bars,III while the 
width between bars and human side is usually only 15cm (see Photo 7). Thus, it is 
important to learn and acknowledge the individual idiosyncrasies of chimpanzees in a 
detailed, concrete manner.  
Understanding how particular chimpanzees behave toward sharing nearby spaces 
or interface areas with humans is important for safety and so is perceiving and visualizing 
the reach of each individual, which may vary. Whereas female and male bonobos did not 
spit or throw feces, the area next to females required more caution than the one next to 
the less territorial males. In other words, the structure of the compound and the tools 
available (i.e., twigs) were the same, but the uses of the environment differed. Likewise, 
even one’s garment may influence a chimpanzee’s willingness to extend reach to act upon 
                                                 
III I thank the keepers Fujimori Yui, and Godjali Shizuka, and the technician Takashima Tomoko for helping 
me measure Pendesa’s hand reach.  
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a nearby human, like in the lab coat case. Body positioning has a communicative, social 
function that should not be underestimated. 
Furthermore, knowing individuals’ specific abilities, like Pendesa’s, orients our 
attitude toward the environment, because what is considered as an interface area may 
shrink or enlarge accordingly. This does not imply we will always be on the human-only 
side of the border, but it is dangerous not to draw the boundaries in a correct manner, in 
other words, it is risky to believe to be out of a chimpanzee’s reach when one is not.  
Humans need to be fully conscious whether space is being shared, not only in the sense 
of chimpanzees’ within-grasp peripersonal space, but also in the sense of tool use and 
throwing, which considerably enlarge contact range. To this purpose, an assessment of 
chimpanzees’ behavior and individual abilities is called for. However, this alone does not 
suffice because, in the social organization of space, the relationship between individuals 
considerably alters the ways in which they act. This brings us to our sixth and seventh 
points:  the understanding of human-chimpanzee relationship on a dyadic basis, and group 
dynamics among humans and chimpanzees.  
The most extreme case of space sharing is face-to-face encounters; however, safe 
close-range interactions with chimpanzees depend on many factors. During this 
ethnography, in a daily, situated context, I have asked interlocutors (N=8) what is 
necessary to be capable of such proximity.48 All these interlocutors were or are currently 
capable of sustaining unbarred physical contact with at least one adult chimpanzee. 
Overall, the responses varied but were not mutually exclusive. In addition, the same 
elements appeared in the discourse of those who have never been in such context. Across 
all personal communications (i.e., with face-to-face experienced and naïve personnel) 
“time spent with chimpanzees” appeared more prominently. For interlocutors, it is 
important to spend time building up a good relationship with the particular targeted 
chimpanzee before any barrier-free contact is made.  
Personality, age, and frequency of recent interactions were also mentioned. Some 
chimpanzees never seem to accept humans.  Then, teenagers are most difficult to deal 
with, for example, Ayumu, Ai’s son, who tries to challenge Matsuzawa. Because the 
professor could not continue face-to-face encounters on a daily basis to assert his 
dominance, Ayumu’s behavioral changes during teenage years made Matsuzawa 
discontinue this type of interaction. Furthermore, even if a person has a history of face-
to-face interactions with a certain chimpanzee, after an extended period of absence it is 
advisable to rebuild the relationship by increasing interaction time before getting into the 
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same room. At last, for Matsuzawa, trust between humans and chimpanzees is the most 
important factor.  
It is noteworthy that food was not mentioned as a factor explaining the possibility 
of unbarred interaction, although food items are usually provided in this situation. Instead, 
like play, food has been mentioned only as one of the means to build up a good 
relationship with chimpanzees. In all the face-to-face interactions I observed during this 
ethnography, be it at PRI or at Kumamoto Sanctuary never once did I witness a 
chimpanzee trying to obtain edible items in the possession of a human by aggressive 
means (sensu threat or attack).IV As long as food was within the humans’ personal space, 
these chimpanzees respected the boundary. Obviously, if chimpanzees really wanted to 
obtain the food items immediately, no human could have stopped this. It seems it is not 
because one has food to provide that the chimpanzees will refrain from doing any harm, 
rather, it is the relationship a chimpanzee sustains with a human that guides interactions.  
However, the relationship between a single human and a single chimpanzee may 
change with the introduction of a third party. While explaining how dominance plays a 
role in safety, Professor Matsuzawa comments in a joyful manner that he usually warns 
students: “Matsuzawa is dangerous”.49 This is because if he approaches, chimpanzee 
behavior may change. He believes this would not happen to chimpanzee Ai but, perhaps, 
to adolescent chimpanzees. Likewise, keeper Michael Serres stresses that when 
interacting with chimpanzees and bonobos it is important to have a panoramic view of 
the situation:50 If you are, suppose, touching a lower ranking individual and a more 
dominant one approaches, then the subordinate may become aggressive toward the 
respective human to signal protection of the dominant. Another point the keeper raised is 
the role that stimuli from the outside play, such as noises (e.g., from airplanes), which can 
quickly disturb the animals and provoke a change in behavior. A professor at PRI also 
considers that the number of visitors present at once may contribute to a chimpanzee 
feeling less at ease in a face-to-face experiment, although this depends on the individual 
and the context.  
                                                 
IV Even though no sampling was conducted, 19 face-to-face encounters were observed reflecting a total of 
nine chimpanzees and five humans (three researchers and two keepers) at PRI and Kumamoto Sanctuary 
from October 2014 to December 2015. Interactions were observed from beginning to end except for one 
case. Most were fully recorded.  (a) n = 13, human ♂-chimpanzee ♀ dyad, chimpanzee’s age ca.39 y/o (b) 
n = 1, ♂- ♂dyad, ca. 33 y/o (c) n = 1, ♀-♀ dyad, ca. 22 y/o (d) n = 1, two humans ♂ and one chimpanzee 
♂, age n/a (e) n = 1, two humans ♂ and one chimpanzee ♀, 10 y/o (f) n = 1, two humans ♂ and two 
chimpanzees ♀, ca. 19 and 7 y/o (g) n = 1, two humans ♂ and two chimpanzees ♀, ca. 16 and 7 y/o.  
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At Kumamoto Sanctuary face-to-face experiments with more than one adult 
chimpanzee at a time are currently conducted. Professor Hirata, for instance, has 
developed a long-term relationship with certain chimpanzees with whom he has worked 
since they were children.51 On the other hand, Nogami Etsuko, keeper at the Sanctuary, 
is capable of face-to-face encounters with adult chimpanzees not familiar from 
childhood.52 Perhaps, the chimpanzee to whom she is dedicated the most is Kanako,53 a 
blind female chimpanzee. Her case is quite intriguing though. Hirata and colleagues 
consider her to be the second chimpanzee so far confirmed with trisomy 22, a condition 
seemingly analogous to human trisomy 21 (i.e., Down syndrome), and she is also the only 
one to have survived into adulthood.54 
Due to not being able to evade aggressive interactions, Kanako is housed alone 
and, in Nogami’s assessment, she does not deal well with social stimulus to the same 
extent as fully healthy chimpanzees do.55 However, to improve her welfare, Kanako visits 
a wooded and sunny outdoor compound every day and Nogami spends time with her 
twice a day. In addition, an encounter between Kanako and Roman, 56  a female 
chimpanzee with a calm demeanor, is provided on average once a month, and sessions 
last from half to one hour.57 Yet, what allows Kanako and Roman to share space is 
Nogami’s presence as mediator, or practically, as a barrier. Habituation went step by step. 
First, they have met through bars and only six months later were they allowed to be in the 
same space.58 
Nogami considers that this type of group dynamics works because of Roman’s 
high social skills and her ability to follow humans’ suggestions.59 For Nogami, Roman is 
interested in Kanako but Kanako’s companion does not know very well how to 
communicate in this context. Also, Kanako has restrictions of her own. Sometimes 
Roman gently touches Kanako but the reverse is very rare. Occasionally, though, both 
Kanako and Roman display against each other, in which case, Nogami acts “like [an] 
alpha male”.60 Yet, before being able to do this, one needs to build a good relationship 
first, as Professor Morimura contends during our conversation.,61  
The closer humans and chimpanzees share space the more habituated they need to 
be to each other, and both humans’ and chimpanzees’ personal boundaries depend on the 
idiosyncrasies of each dyad or group. A human X who shares an unbarred space with 
chimpanzee Y might not do the same with Z, or might have this relationship altered by 
the introduction of another party. Likewise, in an extreme case such as Kanako and 
Roman’s, a human may serve as a physical barrier between chimpanzees, adjusting the 
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potential shared space according to context (i.e., affiliative or agonistic). Now we shall 
see the last vital point for safe interactions with chimpanzees: one’s ability to internalize 
safe body techniques.  
Indeed, safety assessment is expressed by controlled locomotion in space.  Due to 
the multiplicity of factors that can turn the tide of the interactions, it is never completely 
safe being placed in permeable interface areas, where humans and chimpanzees can 
temporarily cross boundaries. This is supported by the fact that even experienced 
researchers and keepers suffered from minor injuries during face-to-face experiments.V  
Thus, to be more precise, judgment calls are on a spectrum of “less safe” to “safer”.  
At Kumamoto Sanctuary, I had the opportunity of learning an interesting body 
technique to initiate physical contact in a safer manner.62 At a secured distance, a keeper 
held my hand close to the bonobo VJay, and I was instructed to clench my hand into a 
fist. Vjay reached for my hand through the mesh, and when the bonobo had stretched his 
hand the furthest, I approached. With the point of his fingers, VJay patted the upper part 
of my fist, and as he did it, he looked into my eyes, as if tracking my reactions. 
Progressively, Vjay increased his strength but not in an aggressive manner and he never 
exceeded the use of force; the bonobo was firm but gentle. The keeper believes that VJay 
was testing me: What will she do if I do this? Or that?  In fact, the keeper considers that, 
in these situations, not only should we let them extend the arms at maximum reach but 
we should not show the palm open. In this context, presenting the fist would signal 
friendly interest, because they are aware that humans can grab them otherwise. In addition, 
this is a way to protect our fragile fingers.  
Yet, experienced humans can go as far as placing small food items into 
chimpanzees’ mouth, although only with individuals who are highly trusted. Safe, or 
rather, safer forms of interaction are varied. For instance, one may use twigs to scratch a 
chimpanzees’ back, always paying attention to hit a place not easily reached by the hands; 
one may ask for objects by saying chōdai (roughly, ‘give me’) and then place an open 
hand far from grasp; one may “catapult” food or small items instead of entering in direct 
contact, a practice very often used during chimpanzee feeding; one may alter body 
                                                 
V  Considering the extreme case of complete space sharing, like face-to-face situations, during this 
ethnography five past incidents were brought up, having occurred to four humans at PRI within both keeper 
and researcher’s role. None of them were serious. Notice though, that the total number of accidents in this 
condition was not surveyed.   
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positioning depending on pieces of clothes that might be seized like caps; so on and so 
forth.  
Through progressive learning, certain ways of being and behaving in space are 
internalized and are felt, to a good extent, as mechanical to the agents, as Mauss’ 
techniques of the body.63 These particular ways to make use of one’s own body during 
interactions are to some degree efficacious in terms of safety and are transmitted in oral 
form, as during training or presentations, and in written manner, like in protocols. 
Furthermore, they are also learned through sheer observation of “models”, which is 
particularly praised by Japanese researchers at PRI. It is important to read space 
boundaries in conjunction with architecture, context and inter/intraspecific social 
relations. This orients how the controlled locomotion in space will be exerted, even when 
this knowledge becomes quite implicit and unnoticeable.  
Increased danger perception requires an increased control of locomotion. In the 
terms of this ethnography, the edge of danger potentially reflects the space just before any 
permeable interface areas where chimpanzees may briefly share space with us. In fact, as 
already argued, the real boundaries are not always physical barriers, but an imagined 
extended space. Some behaviors, like spitting and feces flinging, enlarge this space 
considerably, although the consequences are not as dire as in the case of direct physical 
contact. Others, like object throwing, might be extremely dangerous. Thus, depending on 
the “gradient of danger”, a person needs to estimate a more generous “margin of safety”.64    
Now, let us consider as an example, Matsuzawa’s laboratory, or the South Play 
Room (SPR), since its entrance provides a concrete case to assess danger. The South Play 
Room entrance door has a kitchen area on one side and, on the other, a chimpanzee area 
separated by metal bars (Photo 10 and Photo 11). Overall, bars pose a challenge for 
orientation in narrow spaces because humans have to estimate how to position the body 
in relation to a chimpanzee’s potential maximum perispersonal space, that is, the distance 
a chimpanzee’s hand can reach through at best. Having taken measurements based on the 
maximum reach of the thinnest chimpanzee hand, I have estimated the minimal safety 
distance in order to be out of a chimpanzee’s hand grasp. Then, based on body positioning, 
I have assessed how comfortable each placement felt, as if an average chimpanzee was in 
front of me, that is, a chimpanzee whom I did not trust neither the most nor the least.VI 
                                                 
VI Measurements have as reference an immobile human body, centered at the hips and dressed in laboratory 
garment. The chimpanzees’ maximum reach was approximately 24cm beyond bars (i.e., Pendesa’s max.), 
and for human arm reach the reference was 71cm (i.e., extended hand to clavicle).  Measurements were 
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Photo 10 South Play Room entrance measurements, 130cm, 55cm and 40cm, 2015.  
Photo and measurements by Daly.  
 
Based on this simulation, there 
were three critical distances: (a) 40cm, 
corresponding to the very minimal 
distance in order to be out of grip 
reach (b) 55cm, which reflects the 
distance between the door opening 
and the metal bars (c) 130cm, which 
represents the subjective assessment 
of a comfortable distance. In the first 
case, body locomotion is completely 
restrained, because any movement of 
the arms or the garment may cross the 
minimal threshold, in other words, the 
person should stand as a “statue”, with 
arms next to body. In the second case, 
when entering the laboratory while a 
chimpanzee is present, upper limb 
                                                 
taken on December 11, 2015, approximately 14 months after my arrival. For safety reasons, a “live” 
measurement with real chimpanzees was not advisable.  
 
 
Photo 11 South Play Room entrance and danger 
perception, 130cm, 2015. By Daly. 
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movement is controlled, that is, the person enters with caution. Lastly, at the subjective 
estimation of 1m30cm, full upper limb movement is allowed, but within felt proximity 
important for social interaction.  
 Regarding the margin of safety for the most dangerous form of contact in this 
situation, that is, direct grasp, 40cm is indeed a poor margin in comparison to 130cm. The 
first is likely to produce feelings of narrowness and it supposes a much greater control of 
movements, whereas the second allows less attention to body positioning, attention that 
can be directed to other tasks. Notice, though, that more experienced workers may have 
a different subjective threshold, which, remember, is relative to one’s relationship to each 
individual chimpanzees and context. Nonetheless, the principle remains the same; 
whenever a situation is perceived as more dangerous - whatever the threshold - increased 
controlled locomotion is in order.  
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2.2 The Dynamics of Space Boundaries in the Wild 
 
Physical boundaries between humans and chimpanzees are extremely delicate, as 
it has been argued. Yet, numerous times interlocutors remarked that wild and captive 
chimpanzees have different attitudes when facing humans; captive chimpanzees seem to 
know they are stronger than humans. I ,Note 1  Even though in the wild there are no 
enclosures with barriers such as meshes, concrete, and panels to mediate the encounters 
between humans and chimpanzees, individuals not familiarized with human presence will 
mostly flee. Researchers who wish to study chimpanzee communities go through the 
process of habituating individuals to humans either by provisioning them of food or by 
gradually shortening distances without resorting to edible items, a process that may take 
several years. II ,Note 2  Curiously, there seems to be an effect of social learning, with 
habituation being catalyzed by the migration of habituated individuals into a non-
habituated group, as a study in the Budongo Forest supports.3  
As a result of habituation, there is a decrease in the distance and an increase in the 
time animals spend next to humans. In other words, chimpanzees can be observed for 
longer hours and within shorter range. Nonetheless, researchers and guides usually guard 
a distance of at least seven meters (e.g., Taï Forest, Côte d’Ivoire; Budongo Forest, 
Uganda; Bossou, the Republic of Guinea).4,5,6 This is due to several factors, including 
ethical considerations such as disease transmission and over-habituation, whereby the 
loss of fear of humans might make primates more vulnerable to poachers and more prone 
to crop-raiding and negative interactions with local people.7 McLennan and Hockings 
caution, however, that “[w]hile habituation might make apes less reticent about directing 
physical aggression towards humans in some situations, it is important to note that many 
recorded attacks involved semi-habituated (e.g., Bulindi) or entirely unhabituated 
individuals (e.g., Kibale)”.8 
When human population density is low and advances into their natural habitat is 
not far-reaching, encounters between humans and chimpanzees do not pose a problem, 
                                                 
I This is consonant with a review of aggressive encounters with wild chimpanzees, which remarks that 
“unlike captive apes, wild chimpanzees are presumably unaware of their greater strength relative to adult 
humans” (McLennan and Hockings 2016, 383).  
II The estimation for pygmy chimpanzees, i.e., the bonobos (Pan paniscus), is two to five years, whereas 
for common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), five to fifteen years are 
expected. Note though, that several factors influence habituation time such as species, home-range size, 
group composition, among others. Besides, even over the years, strong individual differences in tolerance 
levels may be remarked (Williamson and Feistner 2011).  
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and, in fact, in the two field sites where human-chimpanzee interaction has been studied 
the most (i.e., in Bossou, Guinea, and Bulindi, Uganda) attacks occur less than once per 
year, even though the animals come across people daily.9 Moreover, attacks of great apes 
are rarely fatal.10 Human-chimpanzee coexistence in original habitats is indeed a broader 
political, economic, and environmental issue, yet, when focusing on the micro scale of 
human-chimpanzee interaction during encounters and during the occupation of 
potentially common spaces, then, similarities with the captive setting emerge.  
The first point to notice is the surroundings immediate to one’s body. In a recent 
review, McLennan and Hockings consider that provoked attacks commonly occur when 
humans - intentionally or not - enter an animal’s “personal space”, that is, the animal’s 
surroundings where it reacts to our presence; a threshold that depends upon context.11 
Therefore, hands-on efforts such as clearing around fields and trails, which increase 
visibility, are important to prevent surprise attacks.12 Moreover, different solutions have 
been suggested and implemented, as for example, the creation of green corridors 
connecting patches of forest, buffer zones between natural and cultivated areas, and buffer 
crops to which apes show no interest, although each one of them entails different financial 
costs and ecological side-effects.13 This supports our second point by suggesting that the 
configuration of bordering places between the forest and heavily anthropogenic habitats 
play a role in the dynamics and outcome of encounters.  
Thirdly, regarding the material composition of blockades, several options are 
possible; from traditional and electrical fencing, and boundary water canals, to live, 
thorny species.14 However, even though the use of physical barriers and fencing has been 
a usual solution in delimited spaces, like sanctuaries; the practicality of fencing off large 
areas inhabited by human populations is indeed low, the economic and ecological costs 
might be high and, in addition, apes show the ability to surmount these challenges, which 
altogether, suggests that barriers in the wild may help but do not guarantee the solution 
to human-ape conflicts.15 Moreover, cases such as Bossou, where human and chimpanzee 
areas have traditionally overlapped extensively,16  complexify the picture because no 
clear-cut separation between human and chimpanzee territories has been historically 
conceived and enforced.   
The fourth and fifth key points to remark are human-chimpanzee dynamics on an 
individual and on a multiparty basis. It is known from laboratory studies that chimpanzees 
not only identify conspecific faces and their behinds, but are also able to effectively 
discriminate and search for human faces.17,18 Curiously, experiments conducted at the 
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Primate Research Institute with three mother and offspring pairs (Ai and Ayumu; Chloe 
and Cleo; Pan and Pal) support that whereas younger chimpanzees are better at 
discriminating faces of their own species, older captive chimpanzees with limited 
exposure to conspecifics and greater exposure to humans show the inverse pattern, that 
is,  they recognize human faces better. 19  Therefore, like many primate species, 
chimpanzees are able to identify particular humans and it is even advisable in the early 
phases of the habituation process that observers be fairly the same and keep a consistent 
appearance (e.g., clothing, hat, backpack, etc.).20 
 
Overall, the role that 
local guides play in 
mediating interactions with 
wild chimpanzees should not 
be underestimated. This is 
suggested by accounts and 
observations during a short-
term fieldtrip to the research 
site of Kyoto University in 
Bossou. In Bossou, local 
guides (i.e., the native 
research assistants) regularly access the forest to monitor the population and to manage 
the camera-traps located in different points to record chimpanzee behavior. It was 
possible to observe how the guides’ presence safeguards both researchers and locals. A 
clear example is seen when chimpanzees cross roads:  When the research group has been 
following chimpanzees in the vicinity of a road, if there are pedestrians nearby, a guide 
escorts the locals through the area where chimpanzees might potentially traverse (Photo 
12). 
In Bossou and in other field sites, reports indicate that attacks are more likely to 
be initiated by male chimpanzees and be directed against children and women, which, in 
turn, translates into formal recommendations to not leave children alone and, whenever 
possible, to put a man in charge of leading or accompanying a group throughout the 
bordering areas of the forest.21,22  Yet, it is not clear which factors explain this pattern; 
sex, physical size, or reactions.23  
 
 
Photo 12 Guide escorts woman and children on a road, Bossou, 2016. 
By Daly.  
141
 
Additionally, local guides stay in close proximity to researchers, especially when 
chimpanzees approach. An ethnographic episode in Bossou illustrate well this point. 
Being used to PRI chimpanzees and the dynamics of sharing space in captivity, my first 
encounter with a wild chimpanzee was breathtaking - in the metaphorical and literal sense 
(Audiovisual Material 2; Video Frame 2). After having located a few individuals in the 
forest, our group crouched. Yet, we did not creep on the chimpanzees; our location was 
clear and we occasionally engaged in conversation. As a lab researcher, my eyes were not 
trained to sort out figures in the vegetation and, naïvely, I started to adjust my camera in 
the chimpanzees’ direction, with the serenity and confidence that our distance would not 
decrease unless we, humans, chose so.  
With a guide to my right but perhaps a meter apart, I was surprised by a 
chimpanzee coming to our (mine!) direction. First, he glanced at me, then he paused, 
briefly looking away as if searching for something. Next, he continued to approach, 
gazing at me intently. In this split second, I froze. I did not know whether I wanted to 
retreat in fear, enjoy the experience, or continue to film this personally unique moment. 
Feeling a chill down the spine, I lowered the camera to assess the situation, ending the 
footage. This chimpanzee seemed much smaller than the ones I worked with at PRI. Yet, 
he was no one but Jeje, the alpha male. As he continued to stare and draw near in a straight 
line, I made visual contact with the guide, who signed me to stay put. I held my nerve to 
the best and, finally, Jeje changed trajectory to my left in an abrupt manner, looking with 
determination to his new path as if I and the others did not exist.  
These few seconds were challenging: Not being able to move and, yet, have an 
unknown, bold and wild chimpanzee approaching me like a straight arrow to a target… 
As a researcher from the “lab-tribe”, this encounter put the field primatologists’ skills into 
perspective as a different set of challenges to deal. After this episode, I was told that had 
the guide not been by my side, I would for sure have been in danger. In another episode 
of a series mirroring the same type of boundary issues, while Jeje was passing by, a guide 
calmly changed his position and sat right next to me, again, to act as a safeguard (or rather, 
as a bodyguard).  
Furthermore, this seems to occur not only with newcomers but with researchers 
who visit the site seasonally each year. An interlocutor of our group in Bossou reminisced 
on a few stories when guides were unavoidably far away: Upon chimpanzees’ approach, 
the guide had to be called back in a rush. It is not far-fetched to assume that, overall, the 
guides’ presence acts as an inhibitor, preventing chimpanzees from diminishing distances, 
142
 
like a sort of barrier. In sum, the relationship that chimpanzees maintain with specific 
humans (e.g., guides, newcomers, etc.) and the composition of the group (women, 
children, male chimpanzees, etc.) are factors that might contribute to the repartition of 
physical boundaries between species. 
 
  
19s 23s 
 
Video Frame 2 First encounter with the alpha male Jeje. From Audiovisual Material 2. 
Audiovisual Material 2 First encounter with the alpha male Jeje, Bossou, 2016, 26s. By Daly. 
 
An integral part of the previous points discussed are the sixth and seventh factors 
to influence the physical boundaries, namely, the context in which human-chimpanzee 
encounters occur, and chimpanzee behavior and individual idiosyncrasies. Who attacks, 
who is attacked, where and when the encounters take place, the activity undergone, or the 
reactions during the incidents are all important facets of dangerous interspecies contact, 
although it is not clear-cut which of these aspects contribute the most to increase risk. As 
already mentioned, surprise encounters in which chimpanzees suddenly enter in close 
proximity to humans are a potential danger and, additionally, most of the episodes in the 
literature suggest the pattern of male chimpanzees targeting women and children. 
However, humans may also provoke chimpanzees, for example, by throwing branches 
and stones, and by chasing them off with dogs; to which apes usually retaliate.24,25  
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Figure 6 Chimpanzees’ feeding points in Bossou. (Bryson-Morison et al. 2017, 388).26 
 
 
Not only do attacks occur in places where human-chimpanzee encounters are 
more likely, such as roads, narrow paths, and cultivated fields (see Figure 6 for reference) 
but they coincide with periods of fruit scarcity (when apes venture into human crops) and 
with cropping seasons (when the human use of paths is increased).27,28 Yet, chimpanzees 
do not have the same stance toward humans and those with a more risk-taking attitude 
pose higher danger. For instance, currently in the Bossou community, only Jeje, the alpha 
male, is a matter of concern in human-chimpanzee encounters.29 Furthermore, during my 
fieldtrip to Bossou, interlocutors stressed the existence of fine-grained individual 
idiosyncrasies regarding interspecies etiquette; for example, a physician studying aging 
in chimpanzees advised me not to stare at the old female Velu, after realizing from her 
long-term study that Velu seems to find it inconvenient.30  
Finally, in situations in the wild, one needs to ponder the safest body techniques 
during encounters, controlling one’s locomotion. In the practice guidelines to prevent 
human-ape conflict, Hockings and Humle advise: “In general, people should keep calm, 
try not to scream, and avoid running away and scattering, especially when in groups”.31 
In fact, in the literature, running ranks as the worst reaction toward not only chimpanzees 
but also other great apes.32,33 Indeed, a local guide in Bossou believes that running gives 
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chimpanzees strength because, in such case, they will know they are stronger; also, 
because they are habituated, running may make them think you are a ‘bad person’ 
(“mauvaise personne”).34 Instead of running, a second guide advised me to calmly recoil 
a bit whenever Jeje crosses, in order to give him space.35       
People’s overall disposition toward chimpanzees may vary depending on location. 
In the case of Bossou, chimpanzees are protected by the local Manon people due to being 
considered the founding family’s totem, but note that locals mostly avoid direct contact 
with them.36 Eleven incidents have been reported from 1995 to 2009, all non-fatal, and 
educational programs instruct how people should behave in such encounters.37 In the 
villages of Cadique and Caiene (Cantanhez National Park, Guinea-Bissau), where 
chimpanzees are not considered a physical threat, people remain calm during contact and 
there have been no reports of attacks (as of a 2013’s study). 38  
At this point, one may ask how chimpanzees might perceive anthropogenic spaces 
within their natural habitat. Systematic accounts of chimpanzees’ innovative solutions 
and reactions to human-made challenges provide us with insights. In the Sebitoli region 
of Kibale National Park (Uganda), where anthropogenic spaces border chimpanzees’ 
home-range by more than 80%, 39  Krief and colleagues found that in this location, 
chimpanzees, a species considered strictly diurnal, repeatedly raid crops at night, an 
activity which accounted for more than 40% of the time spent in the vicinity of the maize 
field.40 With the aid of video traps equipped with infra-red light, it was possible to 
conclude that chimpanzees hesitate less to enter the field at night and, in addition, they 
stay twice as long and show less frequent signs of anxiety and vigilance at night than 
during the day.41 Moreover, they transport food items to the forest with higher frequency 
during daytime, indicating that, in this period, chimpanzees may not feel at ease to 
consume raided items in situ.42 
Thus, not only is the crop-raiding activity (Photo 13) perceived in regard to a 
riskier anthropogenic space (i.e., human fields), but also to a riskier time when 
chimpanzees are most likely to encounter humans (i.e., daylight). Chimpanzees’ 
movement within anthropogenic spaces may influence the spatial boundaries of research 
groups as well. In the field station of Bossou, there is a fairly delicate triangulation created 
by (a) chimpanzees’ incursions into cultivated fields (b) a research group’s location and 
(c) local farmers. For instance, during my field trip in 2016, when chimpanzees ventured 
into the fields, the research group did not follow the apes. As a local guide explained, this 
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is mainly because farmers may be led to think that assistants and scientists somehow bring 
them along.43  
 
Nonetheless, the 
relationship to chimpanzee crop-
raiding in Bossou seems to have 
differed historically. There, the 
founding family, the Zogbila, 
instituted the local chimpanzees 
as the totem of the village, 
therefore, the consumption of 
their meat has become a taboo for 
all the inhabitants. Moreover, in 
an interview with the village 
sages, which had as topic the 
human-chimpanzee relationship 
in Bossou, the eldest living 
member of the Zogbila family 
affirmed that offerings were made to chimpanzees:44 Villagers living around the sacred 
Mont Gban would offer chimpanzees a part of the first harvest of the year, leaving crop 
items on the ground for them to pick up. This tradition, however, is observed only by the 
two older, worshipers’ family, the ones allowed to occupy this space (i.e., the Zogbila and 
the Goumy). The director of the Environmental Research Institute of Bossou (IREB) 
remarks, though, that when he arrived in 1981, locals indeed used to leave a part of the 
harvest, but that this observance changed over time. 45  It is likely that this practice 
contributed to the well-known historical habituation of chimpanzees in this field site 
before long-term studies were conducted.  
Another example shedding light into chimpanzees’ perception of anthropogenic 
spaces is road-crossing, although systematic studies of this activity are still sparse. In the 
Kibale National Park, Cibot and colleagues found that chimpanzees were particularly 
cautious when crossing a high-speed traffic road (13m incl. shoulder): More than 50% of 
the individuals crossed running, more than 90% looked left and/or right, almost 20% paid 
attention to conspecifics; furthermore, vulnerable chimpanzees (e.g., mother with infants) 
crossed less frequently while healthy adult males led the way predominantly more than 
 
 
Photo 13 Velu crop-raiding, Bossou, 2016. By Daly. 
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when compared to climbing and descending trees.46 Moreover, although they did not 
choose safer points to traverse, in addition to showing individual vigilance, they 
readjusted group size accordingly, that is, by crossing in small subgroups (likely due to 
the short distance between vehicles).47  
In Bossou, where chimpanzees’ home-range is fragmented and where they have 
to cross roads to reach foraging sites, chimpanzees even developed preferential crossing 
points used for decades.48  Hockings and colleagues found that, when comparing two 
routes, a large one with pedestrian and vehicle traffic (12m wide) and a narrow one for 
passers-by (3m), chimpanzees waited longer before crossing the large road, in which case, 
the auditory or visual presence of locals and vehicles increased the waiting time.49 Adult 
males led and scanned the way, and appeared in the rearward more often, whereas the 
alpha female increased her forward positioning on the large road.50  
Thus, a “protective socio-spatial organization” is implemented during riskier 
situations, with males preferentially being placed at the front and rear-end while females 
and youngsters occupy middle, more protected positions.51 Additionally, chimpanzees 
took longer to move toward open-areas than toward the forest.52 These results suggest 
that the forest in which the chimpanzee community of Bossou inhabit is, comparatively, 
a less threatening space, and that spaces occupied by humans are perceived in terms of 
the degree of risk the may pose (higher for larger, busier spaces). Thus, chimpanzees 
modify how they socially occupy spaces according to potential interactions with humans. 
Moreover, the socio-spatial organization is likely adapted to the specificities encountered 
by each community, given that, for example, in Kibale’s high-speed asphalted road, 
chimpanzees cross in subgroups instead of in a straight line, like in Bossou (cf. Cibot and 
colleagues)53.  
The social organization for crossing an anthropogenic space can be witnessed in 
a movie clip shot in Bossou (Audiovisual Material 3; Video Frame 3). In this event, all 
members from the Bossou community were present.III,Note 54,55  The first one to screen the 
route and walk on is the male Foaf (Video Frame 3; 2s23frames), followed by the elder 
females, Jire and Fana, respectively (12s20frames; 26s2frames), succeeded by the infant 
Fanwaa (on his own) and the others (34s4frames on). During the crossing, chimpanzees 
                                                 
III MALES: Jeje (Dec 1997, 18y/o, adult, Jire’s son, alpha), Foaf (late 1980, 35y/o, mature, Fana’s son), 
Fanwaa (Nov 2012, 3 y/o, infant, Fanle’s son) FEMALES: Fana (1956 estimated, 60 y/o, very old), Fanle 
(Oct 1997, 18y/o, adult, Fana’s daughter), Jire (1958 estimated, 58 y/o, very old), Velu (1959 estimated, 
59 y/o, very old), Yo (1961 estimated, 55 y/o, very old). Lineage information from Ohashi (2011) and, for 
Fanwaa, KUPRI (2017); Age grouping after KUPRI (2017); For age reference, video filmed in July 5, 2016. 
147
 
show frequent looking at the road sides and also at conspecifics. In particular, a couple of 
times, Foaf moves ahead, stops, and looks at others, continuing as they come closer. He 
scratches himself once, perhaps, indicating mild anxiety. As the crossing comes to an end, 
the members form a straight line: First Foaf, then the elders Fana (1m4s), Yo, Jire, and 
Velu (1m10s), followed by the mother Fanle, and her clinging infant Fanwaa (1m17s), 
escorted by the alpha male Jeje at last (1m23s). This episode mirrors the probability of 
the social organization described by Hockings and colleagues,56,57 with the exception of 
the increased presence of the alpha female in the last position in the small road condition. 
 
   
2s23: 1) ♂Foaf 12s20: 2) ♀ Jire 26s2: 3) ♀Fana 
   
34s4 42s14 47s 
   
50s 1m4s: 1) ♂Foaf 2) ♀Fana 1m10s: 3)♀Yo 4)♀Jire 
5)♀Velu 
 
  
1m17s: 6)♀Fanle 7) ♂Infant Fanwa 1m23s:  8)  Alpha ♂ Jeje 
 
Video Frame 3 Chimpanzees cross road in Bossou. From Audiovisual Material 3. 
Audiovisual Material 3 Chimpanzees cross road in Bossou, 2016, 1m33. By Daly. 
148
 
 
The event, however, provides other interesting points for discussion. I have 
conducted a microanalysis of this crossing episode (Solomon Coder©; 0.2 second), in 
order to demonstrate the social organization of space in a concrete manner and to explore 
how conspecifics, researchers, and the assessment of anthropogenic landscapes can be 
integrated, at the same time, in this type of study. Thus, for each individual it was 
calculated (a) the time spent walking on the road (b) the frequency of head-turns toward 
the road, conspecifics, and researchers.  
 
Regarding time spent on the 
road, the route was categorized into 
three segments (Photo 14); two for 
bordering areas and one for the 
middle of the road. It was assumed 
that the main part of the road is 
likely the most dangerous one, not 
only because of vehicle 
positioning, but also because it is 
the farthest away from the borders. Therefore, the hypothesis was that chimpanzees 
occupied these spaces in a different manner, and it was expected they would refrain from 
segment two. As a result, the mean time spent on the road for all chimpanzees was 47 
seconds.IV The average for the males Foaf and Jeje was 55 seconds (i.e., 43.2 and 67.6); 
for old females, 47 seconds; for all vulnerable individuals, including mother and infant in 
not-clinging position, 44 seconds. On an individual level, the maximum time spent on the 
road was recorded for the male Foaf, surprisingly, followed by the elder female Jire (67.6; 
65.8), whereas the minimum was recorded for mother Fanle, followed by elder Yo (28.8; 
38.6). Interestingly, infant Fanwaa spent more time exploring the road on his own next to 
conspecifics (44.6), than his mother’s total time spent on the route (28,8).    
Taking all chimpanzees into consideration, on average, segment one was occupied 
18 seconds, the middle segment 14 seconds, and segment three 15 seconds. Jire was the 
one who occupied the middle of the road the most (26s) in contrast to Yo (4s). When 
comparing the bordering segments one and three with the main segment two, there was, 
                                                 
IV All averages were rounded. Fanwaa’s time on the route excludes clinging period, since carried infants do 
not choose which segment they occupy.  
 
 
Photo 14 Chimpanzee crossing and road segments. By Daly. 
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however, no significant difference (t[7] = 0.3), meaning, chimpanzees did not 
preferentially occupy the borders in this episode, likely due to the reduced size of the road. 
Furthermore, chimpanzees’ attention was also investigated, being calculated as a measure 
of the frequency with which they turned their heads in the direction of the road, the 
conspecifics, and humans (before, during, and after crossing). Whenever it was not 
possible to visualize head direction, “time-out” was computed, so that an individual score 
is relative to the visible, not the total observation time.V,Note58  
During the whole crossing and filming, I was placed on segment three and a guide, 
on segment two, at approximately ten meters distance (n.b., scenes were zoomed). 
Therefore, all head turns to the right of the traffic sense were scored as belonging to both 
categories, “human” and “road”, but this was not necessarily the case for turns to the left; 
only in the end of the crossing when another researcher and a guide appeared to the 
chimpanzees’ left (1m7s on), head-turns to the left of the traffic sense were marked as 
attention to humans and the road. Overall, chimpanzees’ attention was greater toward the 
road (0.2 turns per second), than toward humans (0.1) and conspecifics (0.09).  
On a group level, the two males scored the minimum values, showing, 
comparatively, less head-turns toward the road (0.11), conspecifics (0.09), and humans 
(0.7), whereas the old females scored the maximum values, showing more attention to the 
road (0.25) and conspecifics (0.1). Regarding increased attention to humans, vulnerable 
individuals (i.e., elders plus the mother-infant pair), ranked as high as the elderly group 
alone (0.15).  When comparing the mean for attention toward the road versus the mean 
for attention to humans and conspecifics, a significant difference was found (t[7] = .0028), 
meaning, chimpanzees in this crossing episode scanned the route significantly more than 
humans or conspecifics. Overall, the results suggest that for these individuals, while there 
was no preferential locomotion pattern within the route, the road elicited more attention 
than the presence of others (humans and chimpanzees).  
This however, refers to a single, modest episode and systematic studies contribute 
to eliminating biases such as differences in visibility records. It is also possible to conduct 
a more fine-grained analysis and take into account other behaviors and operational 
                                                 
V Attention was operationalized as each head-turn between 45° and 95° in the direction of the traffic, 
humans or conspecifics (adapted from Cibot et al 2015). Infant Fanwaa’s attention score was calculated for 
the entirety of the crossing. Time-out for head-turns considering individual appearance time: Foaf, Jire and 
Yo 0%, Jeje 19%, Fana 6%, Fanle 13%, Velu 20%, Fanwa 28%. 
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definitions. VI ,Note 59 , 60  Nonetheless, beyond the concrete illustration of the social 
organization in space, one of the reasons why this case study was conducted was to 
propose a design bringing to light the observers’ presence. This is vital due to the 
difficulty in discriminating whether a chimpanzee was monitoring the road or, actually, 
the researchers, and guides on the road. Thus, it was assumed here that habituation level 
does not preclude increased attention to researchers, especially when danger is enhanced.  
True, some instances are better grounded in one of the two categories, such as 
infant Fanwa’s turn-back look at the end of the crossing (see 1m16s), which seems likely 
toward the researcher and the guide than the road. When studying social factors, it might 
be risky not to hold into account the observers’ view, and it can be difficult to delimit 
clear criteria to analyze only what falls outside the observers’ influence. To stick to the 
previous analysis, this issue can be though in the sense of the following questions: What 
are the criteria that make sure the chimpanzee was screening the road and not researchers? 
Or even, that a screening was not serving the function of checking up the observer and 
the road together?   
Etho-ethnographers and ethologists wishing to assess the influence of 
anthropogenic landscapes regardless of the observers’ view may alternatively count only 
those instances of attention directed to researchers’ opposite side (e.g., head-turns to the 
other side of the road as an exclusive measure of attention to the road), likely at some 
costs such as increased data collection.VII Indeed, how to take into account the observers’ 
influence should be adjusted depending on the design of each study and the research 
questions, given that, for instance, even the act of not-looking may serve a social purpose 
and be considered a social interaction per se despite the apparent non-interaction. These 
are important points when trying to assess what the “perception” of nonverbal animals 
(taken in socio-anthropological terms) would be.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
VI For instance, Cibot and colleagues (2015) included postures, gaits, and Krief and colleagues (2014) 
included anxiety indicators such as diarrhea, self-scratching, among others. 
VII For etho-ethnographers wishing to conduct video studies, it has been particularly helpful the use of both 
a video camera and an action camera attached to a chest mount harness, which provided material to check 
up the broader context of a shooting (especially useful for follow-ups).  
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Chapter 3  
Experimental Boundaries 
Testing and Being Tested by Chimpanzees 
 
 
3.1 Practices Structuring Chimpanzee Care and Research 
 
The main peculiarity at the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University is the role 
humans are encouraged to play in chimpanzees’ social lives. Professor Matsuzawa places 
considerable importance to what he calls a “holistic approach” to chimpanzee care and research.1 
First, in what concerns scientific work, he considers that this line of thought is translated into his 
parallel effort to execute both experiments and fieldwork in the wild. Secondly, in terms of 
chimpanzee management, this holistic philosophy is expressed through the fact that researchers 
and research assistants, unlike most institutions around the world, actively participate in duties 
traditionally allocated to keepers.  
Thirdly, perhaps a more subtle point in which this philosophy is expressed is the fact that 
research personnel are expected to understand chimpanzees as a whole. In practice, this means that 
the knowledge of chimpanzees’ wild behaviors is supposed to be linked with how chimpanzees 
act in captivity. In other words, humans should stimulate the appearance of wild behaviors in 
captivity or functionally simulate nature through artifice.2 This is meticulously articulated; from 
striving to simulate fission and fusion wild social dynamics through the way facilities are built,3 
up to tiny details such as the use of wooden protectors for chimpanzees to sit on the concrete floor 
during experiments. This is due to the fact that they apparently dislike sitting on cold, wet feeling 
surfaces in the wild, and females’ swollen bottoms usually stand outside tree branches.4  In fact, 
at PRI, not only experimenters but also keepers, veterinarians and research assistants are given the 
opportunity to go to the field station administered by professor Matsuzawa and colleagues, in 
Bossou, Guinea, in order to understand the bigger picture of chimpanzee behavior. Moreover, 
knowing chimpanzees as a whole also means mastering the particularities of each individual of the 
PRI community in a very detailed, concrete manner; from a chimpanzee’s reluctance to perform 
experiments on a slightly wet floor, to a chimpanzee’s handedness.  
  However, Matsuzawa does not view this holistic philosophy as his own idiosyncrasy; he 
interprets it as a part of a general Japanese mindset.5 Indeed, the structure of chimpanzee care and 
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research at PRI bears more similarities to other Japanese facilities than to Western institutions. 
Likewise, over the years, PRI, has been the major hub of Japanese primatology in terms of 
publication and rotation of Japanese and international researchers. On a worldwide level, 
chimpanzee research conducted at PRI figures among the most reputable, a fact well documented 
by its immense production and impact. INote 6 ,7  If chimpanzee research at PRI has become an 
“obligatory passage point”8 in terms of scientific outcomes, its caretaking practices and philosophy 
seem to be more visible in the context of a national network of institutions than in a worldwide 
scenario.  
So far, the holistic approach has been presented as one of the major points structuring 
chimpanzee care and research at PRI. This is expressed through the effort of conjointly studying 
chimpanzees in the wild and in the laboratory; in the active participation of research personnel in 
duties that entail considerable social interaction with chimpanzees; in the promotion of the 
appearance of wild behaviors in captivity or in the implementation of artificial means that function 
as processes observed in nature; and at last, in the knowledge of the particularities of each 
individual of the PRI community. Now, other structuring points follow as a consequence of the 
holistic approach, namely, face-to-face caretaking practices, face-to-face experiments and 
personalized feeding.  
It should be clear from previous discussions that face-to-face interactions with adult 
chimpanzees are, overall, considered risky. Whereas younger chimpanzees may be hand-reared 
whenever necessary in institutions around the world, few are those who venture into entering the 
same enclosure with an adult chimpanzee. Matsuzawa even remarks that, in the wild, the 
humongous and likely more confident gorillas may even groom humans, but the professor reveals 
not to risk grooming a wild chimpanzee, including those he has observed over many years in 
Bossou.9 In the recent history of PRI, face-to-face caretaking (i.e., in the same enclosure) has been 
restricted to a few members (keepers; veterinarians; professors) who sustain a good relationship 
with certain chimpanzees, and entering the space of adult chimpanzees is only done due to a strong 
reason, as for instance, medical care. This practice is now occasional but qualitatively differential 
                                                 
I Readers may simply consult the vast references cited in this manuscript and the quality of the journals in which PRI 
publications appear. Matsuzawa’s (1985) early publication in the journal Nature can be considered a milestone in the 
Ai Project. Furthermore, from 2012 to 2016, Matsuzawa was president of the International Primatological Society. 
From 1964 to 2016, 25% of the presidential terms were occupied by Kyoto school primatologists (i.e., Matsuzawa; 
Yamagiwa; Nishida) (see IPS 2017).  
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(e.g., Reo’s face-to-face physiotherapy). On the other hand, face-to-face experiments with adult 
chimpanzees continue to be performed systematically, although in 2015 only Matsuzawa 
conducted them on a regular basis.  
For Matsuzawa and other interlocutors, mutual trust is the key allowing humans and 
chimpanzees to share the same space, have physical contact and positive social relations. In order 
to reach this goal, personalized feeding is considered to be vital, especially when personnel are 
new or still inexperienced. At PRI, before the year 2000 when Ayumu, Cleo and Pal were born, 
for the most time-consuming feeding duty, that is, dinner, all available researchers joined feeding 
and chimpanzees moved freely.10 However, in 2000, the current system was implemented. In this 
system, research personnel are allocated to different feeding duty slots and chimpanzees are fed in 
separate rooms in the basement. Each chimpanzee has a lunch box with the appropriate amount of 
food, which is generally equal for all but can vary depending on dietary and health issues. With 
each species in their own separate areas, humans give the food items one by one to each individual, 
accompanying them through the whole meal to make sure the chimpanzees are eating properly 
(thus, this practice is dubbed as personalized feeding). Usually, for dinner feeding duty, each 
person is in charge of two or three chimpanzees, rotating among them while each one is eating. 
This contrasts with the system of scatter feeding generally found in zoos, where food is scattered 
in the enclosures and chimpanzees feed on their own. 
During experiments, chimpanzees are fed on three occasions: (a) every time the individual 
scores a correct response, the automatic feeder delivers a piece of apple or raisin (b) when a set of 
trials ends, a research assistant or researcher delivers pieces of fruits (c) when research personnel 
want to motivate a chimpanzee to perform an action. However, formal feeding duties, that is, main 
meals in personalized style, are viewed as opportunities to strengthen and test social bonds with 
each particular individual.  This brings us to the last structuring point in chimpanzee care and 
research, already glossed previously: feeding is important but relationships are based on mutual 
trust not on positive reinforcement though food. In positive reinforcement, a desired stimulus (e.g., 
food reward) is presented after a behavior that the experimenter wishes to reinforce occurs (e.g., a 
correct answer or a specific action).11  As consequence, an increase in the appearance of the 
behavior is expected (i.e., correct answer or a specific action).  
Yet, Matsuzawa points out that even though food is used during interaction with 
chimpanzees, they allow humans to perform many actions without previous reinforcement. An 
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example evoked is when chimpanzee Ai calmly accepted a blood draw. Moreover, as observed 
during quasi-experiments in Matsuzawa’s laboratory in 2015, chimpanzees may continue 
experiments even when the automatic feeder is intentionally turned off and replaced for a social 
praise such as ‘yes!’ (“sō!”), which shows how human praise is viewed positively by chimpanzees. 
Furthermore, keen observers may notice that in PRI food can be used as a motivator, that is, 
preceding the behavior that one expects, therefore, acting in a different way of positive 
reinforcement. Sometimes, a human may present or tease with a treat and wait for the chimpanzee 
to perform the desired action, in which case, the food acts as positive reinforcement. Yet, it also 
occurs that after repeating a request several times (though husbandry commands, gestures, etc.) 
the human gives the chimpanzee a few pieces of fruit or a piece of jelly as an incentive. In simple 
terms, food as positive reinforcement is akin to “you did good, here is your treat”, while food as a 
motivation can be translated as “I am giving you a treat, so please do as I asked”.  
For Matsuzawa, the relationship between chimpanzees and humans is based on mutual trust, 
however, he considers that there is another level to this relationship. For him, trust means that “I 
am always on your side, in any situation, even if I lose something”.12 In his point of view, the one 
who trusts another is ready to accept anything. So, if Matsuzawa asks Ai to open her mouth and 
he places his hand inside, he does not expect her to bite him; but if she does, he is willing to accept 
it. Matsuzawa also considers that trust takes time to build, and once a human and a chimpanzee 
have been apart for too long, time is needed to reestablish the relationship (however, this does not 
seem to be the case between Ai and Matsuzawa, who can go on long periods without interaction). 
Matsuzawa mentions chimpanzee Chloe as an example. If he would ever wish to perform face-to-
face experiments with her, then, he says: “I need the time to be friends with Chloe again, like two 
or three months”.13  
 To recapitulate the points explored so far, at PRI, chimpanzee caretaking and research is 
supported by a set of vital practices and views, namely, (a) its holistic approach to the research 
setting in the wild and captivity; to the division of labor between research personnel and keepers; 
and to knowing chimpanzees as a whole in terms of wild behaviors and individual particularities 
(b) strategic face-to-face caretaking of adult chimpanzees (c) systematic face-to-face experiments 
(d) personalized feeding and participation of research personnel (e) emphasis on mutual trust over 
positive reinforcement. Nevertheless, PRI shares some of these characteristics with other Japanese 
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and worldwide institutions while, at the same time, it sets its own boundaries to distinguish its 
uniqueness.   
 Now, we should inspect the differences and similarities between PRI and other institutions. 
The golden thread connecting the above-mentioned points on caretaking and research is, as evoked 
before, the role humans play in chimpanzees’ social lives. At PRI, as it is the case of other Japanese 
research institutions, humans are expected to develop their social relationship with chimpanzees 
to sustain the smooth carrying out of experiments and chimpanzees’ husbandry. However, 
conspecific living and mother-rearing are also factors stressed by interlocutors. Their own species 
should be the primary source of social contact, yet, human interaction is not perceived as a 
handicap to chimpanzees as long as they can express wild behaviors as much as possible in 
captivity. In other words, human contact per se does not “taint” chimpanzees’ status as real 
chimpanzees.II  
 When comparing institutions, the one to resemble PRI the most is Kumamoto Sanctuary. 
Kumamoto Sanctuary currently belongs to Kyoto University and is a sister institution located in 
the south of Japan, created to absorb retired chimpanzees from invasive biomedical research.14 
Unlike PRI, the facility counts with a large number of common chimpanzees, approximately sixty, 
and it has welcomed six bonobos more recently.15 A short-term visit to the sanctuary indicates that 
this institution mirrors, to a great extent, PRI’s caretaking and research philosophy. Moreover, key 
researchers at the Sanctuary have conducted research at PRI in the past, and they are constantly in 
collaboration. As in PRI, strategic face-to-face caring of adult chimpanzees takes place (e.g., face-
to-face social interaction with the blind chimpanzee Kanako). 16  Systematic face-to-face 
experiments are conduct as well, however, with more than one adult chimpanzee at a time (two 
humans and two chimpanzees in a booth were observed). As of 2015, Kumamoto Sanctuary 
exceeded PRI in terms of researchers systematically conducting face-to-face experiments and in 
terms of the number of chimpanzees in face-to-face setting. Regarding feeding, both scatter and 
direct handing occur, and researchers also participate in the breakfast, lunch and dinner during 
weekdays, while keepers are exclusively responsible for weekends and holidays.17 
                                                 
II In the wild, though, the situation differs, as a short-term visit to the field site of Bossou in 2016 indicates. In this 
context, researchers make sure to refrain from close contact due to the danger involved in unmediated encounters, due 
to concerns regarding over-habituation, which may lead to an increase in chimpanzees’ incursions into anthropogenic 
habitat and, more drastically, due to epidemiological concerns as chimpanzees are vulnerable to human diseases. Still, 
long-term studies in Japanese field stations are needed for in-depth comparisons.  
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Given that the Sanctuary 
and PRI are formally considered to 
be sister institutes,19 and given the 
prolific exchange between their 
researchers, it is not surprising that 
they share many similarities. 
Although such institutional 
comparisons merit a long-term 
study on its own, at Kumamoto 
Sanctuary, some face-to-face 
practices seem to be more 
intensive. This is likely due to the 
previous participation of current researchers in the now deactivated Great Ape Research Institute 
of Hayashibara Biochemical Laboratories (GARI). 20  GARI was regarded by more than one 
professor at PRI as being PRI’s extreme version of human-chimpanzee interaction.21 A few factors 
were evoked to justify such boundary. The first was systematic multiparty, interspecies contact, in 
which several chimpanzees and several humans would occupy a barrier-free space, allowing 
physical contact for an extended period. The second and third factor mentioned were co-feeding, 
meaning, humans and chimpanzees would eat in the same enclosure, and co-sleeping, meaning 
both species would fall asleep together in the same space (Photo  1). Yet, a few PRI interlocutors 
pinpointed that some practices at GARI seemed difficult to maintain. They point out that, for 
instance, humans would wait for chimpanzees to be asleep but quietly withdraw to human-
exclusive spaces. Matsuzawa, as one of the interlocutors, considers that GARI’s approach is “more 
radical than mine”.22  
If PRI is not like GARI, on the other extreme, interlocutors consider that PRI “cannot be 
like a zoo”, where a more prominent separation between humans and primates occurs; both on an 
architectural and on a social level. This view is well illustrated by the perception regarding a case 
occurring at Japan Monkey Centre (JMC). At JMC, a newborn siamang (Symphalangus 
syndactylus) called Melon23 was abducted by her father, who would not let go of the infant, thus, 
making it difficult for the mother to breastfeed. Siamangs live in a family group composed of 
 
Photo  1 In the deactivated GARI, humans and chimpanzees slept in 
the same place (Nakagawa et al. 2012, 192).18 
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mother, father and offspring, and males actively participate in rearing.24 Yet, as a result of this 
extreme situation, Melon was growing weaker each day, reaching a critical stage. According to a 
view from PRI, because personnel did not take time to build up a good relationship with the 
siamang father, they could not effectively ask him to return the child and, eventually, the father 
had to be anesthetized, a move that entails risks: it is not possible to be sure of how an anesthetized, 
groggy animal will manipulate the baby in the process. Melon had to be hand-reared for some time 
to regain her strength but she was successfully reintroduced later. Luckily, the case was closed 
with a happy ending. However, an interlocutor at PRI stressed that the case should teach JMC staff 
a valuable lesson on the importance of the relationship between humans and primates. 
This perception is not shared everywhere. For instance, a keeper at Kumamoto Sanctuary, 
Michael Serres, who has worked in several and prominent institutions around the world, remarked 
that whereas in Japan personnel are expected to play with chimpanzees, in some countries where 
he previously worked, like the Netherlands, personnel are supposed to refrain from any contact 
with chimpanzees to allow them being chimpanzees: “In Holland, still, animals are respected but 
they are animals. Here [in Japan], they are equal with humans (…) In Holland they had this 
philosophy that once they rescue the animals, they are already living in a - from their point of view 
- bad life. So, they should become animals again, they should live a decent life. So, when you 
rescue them and put them in a cage it is already bad; but respect them and do not interact with 
them because they should interact with each other and become animal again.”25  
Then, Serres, who is an advocate of human-primate interaction in captivity, and has 
received the tender nickname of “chimp-whisperer”,  complements that the reason for his different 
experiences in Japan and elsewhere is not only based on contrasting philosophies, but also on how 
institutions operate: “[in Holland] only few people are working full time with these animals and 
they control other people who are volunteers (…) Partially because they want the animals to be 
animals, they said “no touch policy”, “no communication with animals”.”26  However, Serres 
continues saying that part of it was to make sure people kept their fingers and accidents were 
prevented, given that many of the volunteers “have a pet shop love attitude [squishy sounds] 
without realizing that the animal can be dangerous.”27 Indeed, at PRI, only regular personnel are 
trained to feed chimpanzees and, more recently, stricter selection has been applied.28 
Similar philosophy regarding human-chimpanzee separation is also found in the Catalonian 
sanctuary studied by Alcayna-Stevens, where humans strive for dehumanizing and re-socializing 
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chimpanzees in the correct manner so that they can learn how to be chimpanzees.29 Again, in 
chimpanzee research in Japan, whereas mother-rearing, contact with conspecifics, and the support 
for the emergence of wild behaviors in captivity is emphasized, human interaction is sought and 
desired as part of their lives in a captive setting. In this sense, humans are not denied of becoming 
part of chimpanzees’ social ecology in captivity; the issue is rather how to administer this process 
well. 
So far, we have observed to which extent PRI’s philosophy and practices are similar and 
to what extent they differ from its partner Kumamoto Sanctuary, from the deactivated GARI, from 
the zoo-type facility Japan Monkey Centre, and from a couple of other institutions outside Japan. 
Now, we shall briefly address other high performing institutions for chimpanzee research in the 
world. At the Max-Planck Institute, organization that makes use of the Leipzig Zoo facilities in 
Germany, research personnel are not required to participate in any ape feeding non-related to 
experimental purposes; such task is covered by keepers, although research personnel might be 
welcome to do so occasionally.30,31 Furthermore, the feeding system is a combination of scattered 
and personalized. 32  Prominently different from Japanese institutions, neither keepers nor 
researchers enter the enclosure in the presence of adult apes.33,34 Likewise, at the Edinburgh Zoo 
in Scotland, where the University of Saint Andrews focuses its research activities in captivity, 
research personnel only engage in feeding related to experiments. 35 Moreover, the meals are 
scattered and no barrier-free interactions between humans and chimpanzees occur.36  
Perhaps, more closely resembling the infrastructure at PRI is the Yerkes National Primate 
Research Center, in the United States, which is also a laboratory facility. There, research personnel 
(mostly research assistants, students, and postdocs) are reported to often attend feeding outside 
regular research time, due to this being considered “good bonding time with the chimpanzees”.37 
Nonetheless, husbandry staff is responsible for feeding, while research personnel are an extra in 
case they show up.38 It should also be noted that, although the schedule varies, experiments are 
said to often take up one to two hours a day; the same for observation time.39 In practice, when 
comparing schedules, at Yerkes, personnel’s voluntary participation seems to occur under a less 
constrained time budget. As for the feeding system, it is reported that feeding is scattered due to 
Yerkes hosting larger groups, yet, at least a portion of the food is individually targeted; from a 
tower, personnel would call a chimpanzee’s name and throw pieces of food.40 Finally, at Yerkes, 
no unbarred face-to-face contact is said to occur.41  
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Overall, at these institutions, we observe predominantly a scattered or mixed system, no 
binding engagement of research personnel in feeding and, more conspicuously, absolutely no 
unbarred face-to-face interactions with adult chimpanzees.  However, it would be misleading to 
assume that face-to-face practices are restricted to Japanese research. The ape language research 
of the 70s, which sought to teach apes human language, 42,43 is a clear example of face-to-face 
interaction spanning beyond ape adulthood. Nonetheless, it should also be noted, that although 
face-to-face interactions with adult bonobos44  (Pan Paniscus) and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla)45 
occur conspicuously, the picture is not so clear for common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), as 
many programs ceased by the time chimpanzees were too dangerous for unbarred encounters. For 
instance, chimpanzee Washoe, studied by the Gardners was maintained under cross-fostering 
during only 51 months.46 Nim Chimpsky, initially studied by Terrace, moved from one institution 
to another during maturity.47 Chimpanzee Sarah, studied by the Premacks, had to be separated 
from humans after reaching maturity, although it is true she was said to be a particularly difficult 
chimpanzee. 48  In other words, if face-to-face practices with common chimpanzees are not 
restricted to Japanese research, it seems that is in Japanese research where they are observed in 
their most extreme form, that is, during chimpanzees’ adulthood.  
 Overall, elements of the philosophy and practices structuring chimpanzee care and research 
at PRI appear on other research sites to a lesser (Western facilities) or a greater extent (Japanese 
facilities), and when taken individually, none of them seem completely unique to the Institute. 
However, such skeleton should be taken in its entirety and in conjunction with other practices 
revolving caretaking and research, such as linguistic usages to refer to chimpanzees, power 
relations affecting human-chimpanzee interaction, the assessment of chimpanzees’ perspective, 
the views on chimpanzees’ life and death, to name a few points that shall be later explored. When 
these elements interact together, they present us a powerful and particular model of chimpanzee 
research and caretaking.  
Unlike most institutions, at the Primate Research Institute, research personnel are expected 
to actively participate in many duties traditionally allocated to keepers. By research personnel it is 
understood researchers, that is, professors, post-docs and graduate students who are experimenters, 
and research assistants, also referred to as technicians. Furthermore, this category composes the 
section of Language and Intelligence, whereas keepers work under the Center for Human 
Evolution Modeling Research. Thus, these professional categories are separated on an institutional 
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and practical level. The most striking duty research personnel take upon is feeding, however, some 
other tasks are also performed along with keepers, be it occasionally or in parallel. Below, readers 
will find a comparative table summarizing the main duties of each category (Table 1), and a table 
providing a description of the duties (Table 2). The tables have as main reference the laboratory 
work conducted at South Play Room, laboratory where Matsuzawa bases his research activities.  
 
Overview of Duties by Personnel 
 
Scientists  Technicians Keepers 
Experiment – Chimp. Calling  X X  
Experiment – Assistance X X  
Experiment – Execution X   
Experiment – Analyses X   
Experiment – Cleaning X X  
Scientific Presentations  X X X 
Husbandry – Chimp. Calling   X 
Basement Cleaning    X 
Daily Health Check-up X X X 
Enrichment Duties  X X X 
Feeding Duties  X X X 
Obs: X in bold/red indicates the main responsible personnel when duties are shared 
 
Table 1 Comparing duties by chimpanzee personnel at PRI.  
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Duty Description 
Experiment   
Chimp. Calling 
Guidance of chimpanzees into and out of the laboratory  
Experiment 
Assistance 
Refilling the feeder; preparing rewards and food for feeder; giving 
chimpanzees rewards; preparing cameras; etc. 
Experiment  
Execution 
Computer manipulation; exchanges with chimpanzees for 
experimental purposes (e.g., objects)  
Experiment  
Analyses 
Processing of the data from experiments; analyses 
Experiment  
Cleaning  
Cleaning of the booths after chimpanzee use 
Scientific 
Presentations  
Presentations in meetings on behavioral data and/or animal welfare 
(oral or poster) 
Husbandry  
Chimp. Calling 
Guidance of chimpanzees into and out of the basement for husbandry 
purposes (health, management, feeding, etc.) 
Basement 
Cleaning  
Cleaning of the chimpanzee basement rooms and enclosures 
Daily Health 
Check-up 
Measurement of female estrus size, administration of regular 
medication (e.g., pills); Technicians and scientists are expected to 
report any visible alterations in chimpanzees’ health  
Enrichment 
Duties  
Daily enrichment (e.g., food distribution into enrichment tools); 
occasional enrichment (e.g., planting trees) 
Feeding Duties  Providing breakfast, lunch, dinner and snacks outside experiments;  
Preparing food 
 
Table 2 Description of chimpanzee personnel's duties at PRI. 
 
There are two important points of overlap between the duties of keepers and research 
personnel: the calling and the feeding. Regarding the calling activity, as it has been discussed 
previously (see architecture of dangerous interactions), chimpanzees inhabit outdoor compounds 
and are called into the basement and into the laboratories by their names. This activity can be quite 
time-consuming because it mainly depends on chimpanzees’ motivation to come, given that they 
are not forced to participate in experiments or to join humans in the basement. The three 
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professional categories work together to accomplish this activity, although some division of labor 
occurs. Keepers’ main objective is to call chimpanzees from the outdoors into the basement (and 
vice-versa), the place where chimpanzees are fed, including the chimpanzees that do not partake 
in experiments. This has been referred to as “husbandry – chimp. calling” on Table 1 and Table 2. 
On the other hand, researchers and technicians work together to bring the chimpanzees into the 
basement as well, however, their focus is on accompanying the chimpanzee(s) participating in 
experiments; passing by the basement is a required step for reaching the laboratories (i.e., 
“experiment – chimp calling”).  
The calling into and out of the laboratories is done by both the experimenter and the 
technician(s). Especially in the mornings, experimenters and technicians call chimpanzees together 
until they arrive in the room right next to the laboratory. Then personnel split. In South Play Room, 
a tunnel connects the basement to the first floor, so one person, usually the experimenter, stands 
inside the laboratory to receive the chimpanzee (open doors, etc.) while the other sends him or her 
off. Furthermore, after the first session in the morning and in the afternoon, the technician is the 
one to bring the chimpanzees in and out of the laboratory while the experimenter receives and 
sends off the newcomers. Overall, the calling activity is conducted by all three professional 
categories, although the immediate objectives may differ and some division of labor is seen.  
Note that keepers do not participate in the calling of chimpanzees into and out of the 
laboratory; thus, researchers and technicians need to sustain a quite good relationship with 
chimpanzees to make this process smoother. In other words, research personnel must not rely on 
the keepers’ social experience with chimpanzees; they are “on their own”.  This is when the second 
point of overlap with keepers’ duties comes to play. Feeding that is non-related to experiments is 
considered of major importance in order to strengthen ties with chimpanzees, yet, elsewhere this 
is an activity traditionally allocated to keepers. Building up a good relationship with chimpanzees 
has multifold purposes; it allows research personnel to effectively bring chimpanzees in and out 
the laboratories, but it also supports the social negotiation required for the conduction of 
experiments. Thus, feeding is highly regarded as a key activity for this purpose, although the 
intensity of feeding duty is sometimes called into question. At PRI, as we shall see, the major 
stakes rely on research personnel.  
At this point, one may ask why feeding is important in human-chimpanzee relationship in 
captivity. Regarding PRI, the first reason why feeding is considered central is due to the context 
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in which a human provides helpful, essential care for chimpanzees, who come to acknowledge the 
human as a provider; a not far-fetched assumption. For instance, whenever humans spot a wound, 
the chimpanzee is asked (though husbandry commands) to show the spot. Yet, they do not always 
receive a treat after complying with the request, meaning, they are not always positively reinforced 
for it. Once, Pendesa was said to have spontaneously shown a wound on her hand to humans 
around, a behavior that made some researchers wonder whether she was not calling humans’ 
attention to her care rather than a simple act of positive reinforcement. Chimpanzees’ acceptance 
to humans can vary greatly. In addition, they vary regarding which task they accept a human to do. 
For example, a person to whom no agonistic behaviors are shown while manipulating the 
automatic feeder, might face banging, spitting and other not so friendly attitudes when trying to 
conduct an experiment. In this context, feeding aids building a positive relationship, that is, a 
relationship where affiliative behaviors increase and agonistic behaviors decrease. 
Moreover, feeding is considered important because during this activity relationships are 
tested; there is nothing more dangerous than having a chimpanzee’s desired food item in 
possession, especially when the chimpanzee knows to whom the item belongs. During feeding, a 
non-accepting chimpanzee will show agonistic behaviors toward the feeder, although chimpanzees, 
like Ayumu, may continue to do so with familiar humans, only to a lesser extent. Newcomers to 
feeding always start with amenable chimpanzees like the Puchi and Popo pair. Moreover, in 
feeding, much negotiation occurs. Because personnel are instructed not to deliver all food at once 
but item by item, some chimpanzees may even hide food to proceed to the next treat. Pendesa, for 
instance, has been spotted hiding unwanted food behind her back or discarding items by passing 
them through the gap between her room and that of her companion Mari. Thus, feeding 
chimpanzees is not as straightforward as it might appear, and the activity involves interspecies 
social skills and substantial knowledge on what is safe or not to do. Such situations act as a clear 
means to assess where one’s relationship stands.  
At last, personalized feeding duty is translated into considerable time spent with 
chimpanzees in a barriered but face-to-face manner. The quality of the relationship is important 
but time is also vital; a good, stable relationship with a chimpanzee is not built over a single feeding 
instance of ten minutes. On this day a chimpanzee or a human might have acted particularly 
friendly, but is it always the case? Consistency is important for both humans and chimpanzees. At 
PRI, research personnel spend considerable time with chimpanzees outside the context of 
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experiments, a practice that, as stressed, differs from several institutions of chimpanzee research 
worldwide. III In addition, when research personnel are considered, feeding duty, even though 
tacitly expected, is voluntary, and so the level of commitment shown by personnel is extremely 
high. Next, we shall see how time spent with chimpanzees and engagement level are concretely 
reflected into personnel’s schedules, and how the holistic philosophy is translated into blurred 
boundaries across professional categories and increased interaction time outside experiment-
related tasks.  
In order to better understand human-chimpanzee relationship at PRI and the dynamics 
personalized feeding under the perspective of research personnel, I have conducted a quantitative 
analysis of time spent with chimpanzees during feeding. Four studies constitute the material: 
Feeding Duty Study 1 assesses the total amount of time that research personnel spend per month 
with chimpanzees during feeding, whereas Feeding Duty Study 2 and Feeding Duty Study 3 
investigate the commitment level that research personnel display by tackling, consecutively, the 
total time spent with chimpanzees in feeding during leave days and the percentage of leave days 
on feeding duty. It is important to notice that feeding during weekends and holidays is done only 
by research personnel not by keepers, and this activity is voluntary, albeit expected. This fact 
motivated further investigation, addressed in the two later studies. However, in order to put all 
three studies in context, a last study, Feeding Duty Study 4, was conducted to compare the roles 
of research personnel and keepers in feeding duty.  
Regarding data collection and study design, the data were assembled from all the 
chimpanzee feeding duty schedules pertaining to the section of Language and Intelligence in the 
year of 2015 and were analyzed with SPSS®24. Additional clarifications were provided by several 
participants. IV  To comply with the time frame and purpose of this etho-ethnography, only 
participants who took part in laboratory experiments with chimpanzees during 2015 were included; 
the part-time helpers in the feeding duty were not included because these were not related to the 
chimpanzee experimental research. One outlier has been eliminated as, after further inspection, it 
did not comply with the selection criteria and, therefore, was not representative. Apart from this 
                                                 
III Cristopher Krupenye brought to my attention that the situation might differ in monkey research in laboratories, 
where graduate students might be responsible for feeding.  
IV I am indebted to Kawakami Fumito, Hayashi Misato, Chloé Gonseth, Duncan Wilson, and, indirectly, to Fujimori 
Yui and Ichino Etsuko for having answered my questions thoroughly and/or having provided missing parts of the 
feeding duty schedules for the purpose of these studies.  
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exception, the data represent all those regularly and fully involved in chimpanzee feeding in 2015 
(in sum, Professor = 4; Student = 5; Technician = 2; Postdoc = 2).  
For each member, an individual mean was calculated based on the full schedule for 2015. 
However, months of absence/departure, that is, months with no data points (or “ghost months”) 
were not taken into so that the group mean would not be dropped unrealistically. Thus, the 
individual means were calculated proportionally. Weekends and holidays were included in the 
analyses (i.e., “leave days”). Holidays consisted of national holidays and PRI closing days in 2015, 
in accordance with the label for holidays in the feeding schedules. When a holiday fell on a 
weekend, it was not double-counted. During the meeting of the Primate Society of Japan, keepers 
took over the duty (n = 2 or 1.5% of total holidays in a year).   
As for the schedule structure, feeding occurs in two places; in the basement where twelve 
chimpanzees are fed in individual rooms, and on the first floor, where the handicapped chimpanzee 
Reo is fed. Thus, basement feeding and Reo’s feeding cannot occur at the same time. The time 
slots analyzed were breakfast, lunch and dinner for twelve chimpanzees in the basement and Reo; 
on weekdays and on leave days. This amounted to12 slots across January to December 2015 (for 
reference, see Table 3 in Feeding Study 4). Snack-time by keepers and food given during the 
experiments were not considered. It has been reported that in 2015 keepers gave snacks twice a 
day, however, because this was done as scatter feeding it has not been included, since only 
personalized feeding is being analyzed due to its role in human-chimpanzee relationship. On the 
other hand, snacks given by keepers twice a day but in personalized style were disregarded as well. 
The main reason for this choice lies in the fact that research personnel feed chimpanzees during 
the experiments as well; not only as positive reinforcement after correct answers, which directly 
relates to the necessities of the experiment, but also as a means to keep chimpanzees motivated. 
This last mode of feeding chimpanzees may fall within the category “snack”. Therefore, in order 
to keep equanimity and consistency, only major meals were compared on the three studies.  
In regards to the amount of time allocated to each feeding duty slot, the studies followed 
mostly what was stated in the official schedules. However, in the absence of precision in a schedule, 
time was estimated according to information from participants. When the same person had 
overlapping duties (i.e., feeding Reo and chimpanzees in the basement) the largest slot was counted 
and smallest slot was not summed up so as not to increase the means unrealistically.  It is important 
to notice that the time spent preparing food in the basement was excluded, whereas preparation 
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time for Reo was maintained. This decision was based on the fact that, in the basement, preparation 
time is spent in the kitchen, away from chimpanzees, whereas in Reo’s case it is prepared in locu, 
as supported by regular participant observation. Therefore, because the goal of the study was to 
account for human-chimpanzee interaction, the results report the average time in which research 
personnel are potentially in the presence of chimpanzees and not the total time worked in care.  
In Feeding Duty Study 1, in order to understand how much time research personnel invest 
in personalized feeding and the differences within this group, the total amount of time potentially 
spent with chimpanzees in feeding was calculated. This total amount refers to minutes spent per 
month on average, calculated from all months worked in 2015 (“ghost months” excluded). A one-
way ANOVA was conducted and personnel were classified into four groups: professor (n = 4), 
student (n = 5), technician (n = 2) and postdoc (n = 2). Data were normally distributed as assessed 
by visual inspection of normality plots (probability and quantile-quantile plot) and by Shapiro-
Wilk’s test (p = .2). There was no homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test (p = .306).  
Time spent per month was statistically significantly different across groups, F(3, 9) =  18.780,  p 
< .001. The data are presented as mean ± standard deviation: time increased from professor (M = 
277, SD = 49.8) to postdoc (M = 924, SD = 256), to student (M = 1,194, SD = 293) and to technician 
(M = 1,545, SD = 180), in that order. Tukey post hoc analysis revealed that the mean increase from 
professor to postdoc (647, 95% CI [42.9, 1,250]) was significant (p = .036), as well as the increase 
from professor to student (917, 95% CI [449, 1,384], p = .001) and professor to technician (1267, 
95% CI [664, 1,871], p < .001), but no significant difference was found among the postdoc, student 
and technician groups (Graph  1).  
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Graph  1 Feeding Duty Study 1, time spent per month with chimpanzees during feeding. 
 
As postdoc, student and technician did not significantly differ from each other, they were 
clustered to summarize the data (Graph  2). A one-way ANOVA was run to precise the significance 
level when the above-mentioned categories are conflated. Data were normally distributed as 
assessed by visual inspection of normality plots (probability and quantile-quantile plot) and by 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p = .127). However, homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by 
visual inspection of the residual plot and by Levene’s test (p = .031). Because the equal variance 
assumption was violated but not normality, a Welch’s ANOVA was conducted, Welch’s F(1, 
8.814) = 71.859, reaching a significance level of  < .001. In conclusion, potentially, professors 
spend on average 4h37m and postdocs, students and technicians 20h12m per month with 
chimpanzees during feeding.  
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Graph  2 Feeding Duty Study 1, summary of time spent per month with chimpanzees during feeding. 
 
 
 In Feeding Duty Study 2, in order to assess the research personnel’s engagement level in 
a quantitative manner, it was taken as proxy the time spent (per month) with chimpanzees in 
feeding during leave days. By leave days, it is understood weekends and holidays; holidays 
overlapping with a weekend were not counted and ghost months were excluded. Furthermore, the 
groups were the same as in the previous study. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate 
whether there was a significant difference in at least one of the groups. However, the assumptions 
of normality (Shapiro-Wilk [p = .009]) and equal variance (Levene [p = .002]) were not met. Thus, 
a Kruskal Wallis H test was conducted.  
In this study, the significance level reported is the asymptotic sig, which is corrected for 
ties. Moreover, given that the shape of the distributions was not similar, mean ranks instead of 
medians are reported. The mean rank for professor (M = 3.25), postdoc (M = 7.25), student (M = 
8.60) and technician (M = 10) were not statistically significant, H(3) =  5.788, p = .122. The graph 
bellow (Graph  3) was plotted according to mean minutes per month, as this is likely more 
informative than visual information on mean ranks. The group mean for all 4 groups is 427 minutes 
on average or approximately 7h12m per month spent with chimpanzees in feeding during 
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weekends and holidays. In sum, professors, post-docs, students and technicians do not significantly 
differ regarding time spent during leave days.  
 
 
Graph  3 Feeding Duty Study 2, time spent per month with chimpanzees during feeding on leave days. 
 
 
In Feeding Duty Study 3, in order to complement the previous analyses, another aspect of 
feeding was investigated, that is, the leave days on duty in relation to the total leave days within 
all months worked in 2015. The groups were the same as all the above-mentioned studies. By 
design, “ghost months” with no data points were excluded (i.e., departure from the Institute or 
vacation); the data were calculated relative to the period the person was present in at least one duty 
slot in a month. They are, therefore, relative and not absolute, in which case, the total number of 
leave days in a year would have been taken into account.V Furthermore, these studies are designed 
to investigate potential interactions (consequently, relative proportions) and they are not intended 
to reflect a sociology of labor strictly speaking (to which absolute proportions would be the most 
                                                 
V N.B., 46% were present in at least one slot in a month across all months within a year, in other words, they had their 
scores calculated according to the total number of leave days in 12 months, overlapping relative and absolute scores.   
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appropriate). In other words, Study 3 presents the percentage of the total leave days engaged on 
feeding duty in the months research personnel were actually present at PRI.  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether at least one of the mean 
percentages of the groups differed. However, the assumptions of normality (Shapiro-Wilk [p 
= .016]) and equal variance (Levene [p = .016] as well) were not met. Thus, a Kruskal Wallis H 
test was conducted. In this study, the significance level reported is the asymptotic sig, which is 
corrected for ties. Moreover, given that the shape of the distributions was not similar, mean ranks 
instead of medians are reported. The mean rank for professor (M = 3.63), student (M = 7.70), 
postdoc (M = 9.50), and technician (M = 9.50) were not statistically significant, H(3) =  4.895, p 
= .180. Again, as in Study 2, the graph below (Graph  4) was plotted according to mean minutes 
per month, as this is likely more informative than visual information on mean ranks. The group 
mean of all four groups was 24.55%, that is, when research personnel are at PRI, they spend on 
average approximately 25% of their leave days on feeding duty.   
 
 
Graph  4 Feeding Duty Study 3, percentage of total leave days on feeding duty when in PRI. 
 
175
 
Altogether Study 1, 2 and 3 indicate that (a) postdocs, graduate students and technicians 
spend, on average, 20h12m per month in potential interaction with chimpanzees during feeding, 
while professors spend 4h37m per month on average; weekdays, weekends and holidays 
comprised (b) during months of presence in PRI, professors, postdocs, graduate students and 
technicians spend all, on average, 7h12m per month of their leave (weekends and holidays) in 
potential interaction with chimpanzees during feeding (c) during months of presence in PRI, in 
25% of their leave days, professors, postdocs, graduate students and technicians are recruited to 
be on feeding duty.  Furthermore, these data do not represent the amount of time worked in 
chimpanzee care, which is higher, but the potential amount of time spent with human-chimpanzee 
interaction during feeding.  
Although quite comprehensive, the three studies had some limitations. First, they only 
reflect a snapshot of the dynamics of personalized feeding in the time frame of this etho-
ethnography, reason why they must be complemented and interpreted in the light of qualitative 
data. The second limitation consists in the fact that these studies represent a rough approximation 
of the interaction time with chimpanzees (thus, the use of the word “potential”). The actual 
interaction time on a microscopic level (i.e., recording each minute spent in front of chimpanzees) 
was not a method sought. This was based on the consideration that, in socio-anthropological terms, 
it might be regarded as too invasive. Besides, this procedure would require an unrealistic 
observation time to reach the same number of participants. Yet, I deem that for the purpose of 
investigating this sociological practice, no such microscopic level of precision is required, and the 
method used, despite imprecise, appears accurate, that is, it measures what we seek to observe. 
At last, in order to estimate the roles of research personnel and keepers in the feeding duty, 
a final study, that is, Feeding Duty Study 4 was conducted. No data from keepers were readily 
available for a direct comparison, thus, as proxy, I have assessed which professional category was 
assigned to which duty slot. The official schedules are distributed according to three main 
categories: professors; students, technicians and postdocs (hereafter, STP); and keepers. Twelve 
slots composed the schedules (vide Table 3 Basement – breakfast, lunch, dinner on weekdays and 
weekends; Reo’s North Play Room – breakfast, lunch, dinner on weekdays and weekends).  
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Feeding Duty for Main Meals 
Weekdays 
 
 12 Chimpanzees 
 
Reo 
Breakfast 1 Student, Postdoc or Technician 
≅ 30m 
 
1 Student, Postdoc or Technician 
≅ 30m 
Lunch  3 to 5 Keepers  
NG 
1 Student, Postdoc, Technician or 
Keeper 
≅ 1h30 
 
Dinner  2 People (St./Postdoc/Technician) + 
2 to 3 Keepers  
≅ 1h30 
1 Keeper 
NG 
 
Weekends and Holidays 
 
 12 Chimpanzees 
 
Reo 
Breakfast 1 Student, Postdoc or Technician 
≅ 30m 
 
1 Student, Postdoc or Technician 
≅ 30m 
Lunch  
(overlap) 
2 People (St./ Postdoc/Technician) 
 + 1 Professor 
≅ 30m 
 
1 Student, Postdoc, Technician or 
Professor 
≅ 1h30m  
Dinner  
(overlap) 
2 People (St./ Postdoc/Technician) 
 + 1 Professor 
≅ 1h30m 
1 Student, Postdoc, Technician or 
Professor 
≅ 1h30m 
 
Obs: 
 
Preparation time in the kitchen excluded for the 12 chimpanzees’ feeding; 
preparation time in Reo’s room is maintained in Reo’s schedule; when the 
same person had overlapping duties in the same slot, only the largest was 
counted.   
 
 
Table 3 Summary of feeding duty by slot, profession and time. 
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First, consider the exclusive responsibility for slots, that is, when a professional category 
does not take turns with another to fill in the slot, and recruitment for duty is exclusive to a single 
category. Comparing the total number of slots, keepers were exclusively in charge of 2 slots (i.e., 
basement lunch on weekdays; and Reo’s dinner on weekdays) and STP of 4 slots (i.e., Reo’s and 
basement breakfast on weekdays and weekends) while the category professor was never 
exclusively in charge of a slot; a professor might feed a chimpanzee (Reo) alone, but the category 
will take turns with STP to meet this demand. In sum, keepers were exclusively in charge of nearly 
17% of the total slots, STP of 33% and professors of 0%.  
However, let’s now consider, as a second point, how slots are distributed in total, including 
taking turns with other categories to fill in a slot and sharing a slot with other categories at the 
same time. According to this criterion, keepers might be assigned to up to 4 slots (i.e., being 
exclusive for basement lunch on weekdays and Reo’s dinner on weekdays; taking turns for Reo’s 
lunch during weekdays; and necessarily sharing the slot with STP for basement dinner on 
weekdays). Professors might be assigned to up to 4 slots (i.e., taking turns with STP for Reo’s 
lunch and dinner on weekends; and necessarily sharing the slot with STP for basement lunch and 
dinner on weekends).  STP might be assigned to up to 10 slots (4 breakfasts; 3 lunches; 3 dinners). 
In other words, when considering professional categories, STP are mostly responsible for feeding 
duty. Moreover, the category professor and keeper are responsible for the same amount of charge 
for chimpanzees’ main meals.  In sum, keepers and professors might appear in up to 33% of the 
slots, whereas STP might appear in up to 83%.VI  
On the other hand, in order to refine this short analysis, a third point becomes of interest; 
the within-group distribution inside each slot. In 2015, the category professor was composed of 4 
people distributed across 4 slots, each slot requiring one professor at a time (i.e., 1 head each in 
the basement for lunch and dinner on weekends, sharing with STP; 1 head each in Reo’s feeding 
for lunch and dinner on weekends, alternating with STP). Then, in the category keeper, there were 
6 members distributed across 4 slots. These 4 slots required, in total, the presence of minimally 7 
keepers and maximally 10 keepers to fulfill the slots (i.e., 1 head in Reo’s for lunch alternating 
with STP; 1 head in Reo’s for dinner during weekdays, exclusively; 2 to 3 heads in the basement 
                                                 
VI N.B., the total number of slots is twelve, however, because each of them is differentially subdivided across, and 
assignment of a professional category might vary within the slots, the percentage of slots in which categories appear 
will not add up to compose 100%.  
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for dinner on weekdays sharing with STP; 3 to 5 heads in the basement for lunch on weekdays, 
exclusively).  
In the category students, technicians and postdocs (STP), the participants meeting the 
criteria of the feeding duty studies were maximally 9 and minimally 6 (some departed the Institute 
at some point in the year 2015). The number of slots to which STP might be assigned is 10 (4 
breakfasts; 3 lunches; 3 dinners), requiring a total of 13 “heads” to fulfill the slots (i.e., 1 head each 
in the basement for Reo’s breakfast, necessarily; 1 head in Reo’s for lunch on weekdays alternating 
with keepers; 2 heads in the basement for dinner, sharing with keepers on weekdays; 1 head each 
in Reo’s feeding and in the basement for breakfast on weekends, necessarily; 2 heads each for 
lunch and dinner in the basement on weekends, sharing with professors; 1 head each in Reo’s lunch 
and dinner on weekends, alternating with professors).  
When comparing ratios of the number of existing members and the number of heads 
required to fill all duty slots for the category, if the number of actual members is lower than the 
number of members required, then participants are expected to engage more. When comparing 
ratios in the best possible conditions, that is, increased number of participants and lowest number 
of required members, then we encounter: professors 4:4; keepers 6:7; and STP 9:13. In the worst 
condition, we find for professors a ratio of 4:4, for keepers 6:10, and for STP 6:13. In any of these 
two conditions, none of the ratios are comparatively equal, meaning that there is a variation across 
categories in how often an individual is called for duty, due to the differences in the relationship 
between the number of members and number of requests across all three units. Increasingly, it 
seems that professors, then keepers, and finally, STP are more requested. 
When taken together, the analyses point out that (a) STP bear most of the exclusive duty 
slots (33%), with a decrease followed by keepers (approx. 17%) and then professors (0%) (b) STP 
might appear in up to 83% of the slots, whereas keepers and professors are equally mobilized in 
up to 33% of the slots (c) within each category, STP members are requested more often, following 
a decrease in the keeper’s category and then in the professors’. The differences and similarities 
among students, technicians, postdocs and professors’ duties have already been well assessed by 
the previous studies (Study 1, 2 and 3). However, this study attempted to place such findings in 
the bigger context of PRI personnel.  
Caution is, however, recommended due to the limitations of the study. This study is but a 
rough estimation of the amount of time keepers spend in feeding duties. Furthermore, it is also 
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important to notice that some variation in the schedule occurs, since a keeper would occasionally 
give breakfast to chimpanzees that do not participate in the experiment in case they did not come 
to the basement before experiments started. Nonetheless, even though the study may not 
quantitatively and accurately depict feeding duty hours for direct comparison with research 
personnel, they do point to a clear contrast, at least in terms of research personnel (as of students, 
technicians and post-docs) and keepers. It remains to assess the exact differences in the role that 
professors and keepers play, as both categories seem to match, to a great extent.  
After having explored all four studies, the first conspicuous point is that postdocs, graduate 
students and technicians spend considerably more time per month with chimpanzees during 
feeding in comparison to professors. However, qualitative information on chimpanzee feeding aids 
at interpreting such results in a diachronic manner; professors have had an increased amount of 
interaction during feeding in the past, either as postdoctoral researchers or as graduate students.49 
If feeding supports the construction and maintenance of a good relationship with chimpanzees, 
“newcomers” are then expected to spend considerably more time with chimpanzees (approx. 
20h/month) than those who already have a long history built up (approx. 4h30m/month). On a 
quantitative scale, the philosophy of building up a good relationship with chimpanzees is then 
reflected in additional twenty hours per month of interaction with chimpanzees in a feeding context, 
on the top of interaction hours during experiments. Thus, each graduate student, postdoc and 
research assistant is expected to set this time apart for this type of caretaking.  
The second interesting point of these studies is that professors and other research personnel 
did not significantly differ neither in the number of hours dedicated to feeding during weekends 
and holidays nor in the percentage of leave days in which they are recruited. For a voluntary 
activity, the commitment level of all research personnel is high, translated into being recruited for 
feeding nearly 25% of the leave days during months one is not fully away from Inuyama city. 
Curiously, not only in English but also in Japanese the word employed in the schedules is “duty”, 
or “tōban” (当番). The holistic philosophy that blurs the boundaries between keepers’ duties and 
research personnel’s duties is reflected into a high level of engagement on the part of researchers 
and alike.  
The third important point is the difference in keepers’ participation in feeding duty, in 
comparison to students, technicians and postdocs. If elsewhere worldwide keepers are traditionally 
allocated to feeding as main function, at PRI research personnel take up the biggest share ofthis 
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role. Moreover, although further investigations are needed, keepers and professors’ role seem 
surprisingly similar, even when keepers are likely recruited more often than researchers.  
There are still some points to be made regarding the perception of this practice by 
participants. As already mentioned, this activity is voluntary for research personnel but not for 
keepers. Yet, voluntary work is what composes the schedule on weekends and holidays.  During 
the course of this ethnography, never has an interlocutor doubted the importance of the practice. 
However, the intensity with which it is practiced has been occasionally called into question. As 
this was not a study in sociology of labor, at this point, it is worth emphasizing that, for instance, 
a participant on duty during a weekend might have a great part of the day blocked if his or her turn 
is divided into more than one slot (e.g., breakfast and dinner). Moreover, duties on weekends mean 
that, in general, research personnel need to call chimpanzees into the basement area,50 a time-
consuming task.  
Therefore, when the bigger picture is considered, caretaking work is higher than the actual 
interaction time with chimpanzees. Some interlocutors mention a few points of concern, however, 
two are recurrent: (a) the unequal distribution of work between keepers and research personnel, 
given that the latter are the sole responsible for feeding during weekends and holidays (b) the 
preoccupation that increased caretaking duties consume precious time of scientific work, which is 
pushed more and more to the end of the day, since the conduction of experiments might take an 
experimenter’s full working hours. All things considered, when viewed under this perspective, 
PRI’s holistic philosophy requires a deep commitment on the part of research personnel. Whereas 
this commitment is positively valued, its intensity is subject to debate.  
At this point, readers from different academic backgrounds might still question what the 
inclusion of such quantitative studies brings to the bigger ethnographic picture given that such 
composition is not traditionally observed in ethnographies. In fact, the role of quantitative studies 
is, here, understood as complementary to qualitative analyses as in a feedback loop. The 
quantitative aspect is informed by qualitatively vital issues, yet, it refines those and inspires further 
qualitative investigations.  
First, we were able to pinpoint in a very concrete manner the most important factor in 
human-chimpanzee relation as perceived by interlocutors, namely, interaction time with 
chimpanzees in a feeding context. Thus, the studies per se were informed by ethnographically 
crucial issues and covered all the relevant population. Being able to measure this specific factor 
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provides us a clear picture of how much time is actually dedicated to this practice, or, in other 
words, what “time” really means, especially given that what interlocutors bring to light is directly 
quantifiable.  
Moreover, such “interaction-time design” makes possible to compare these results with 
other future research sites in a very concrete, achievable manner, in order to look for patterns of 
interaction and idiosyncrasies across sites. In such design (elaborated specifically for this 
manuscript), we do not need to record in presence every single interaction during feeding.  This 
would take several researchers and a yearlong to follow all personnel and to cover the relevant 
population. Instead, we are able to count on available schedules that are then adjusted in an 
ethnographically-informed manner to account for the most likely time-range of interactions. Such 
design even makes possible to conduct historical investigations. In other words, a quantitative 
study of this sort is (a) meaningful (b) feasible (c) supportive of comparative efforts across sites 
(d) synchronic and diachronic.   
Secondly, we were able to inspect another facet considered ethnographically important, 
that is, the division of labor. Such design allowed a fine-grained treatment of this factor, and we 
could observe differences within research personnel, and between them and keepers. The choice 
of analysis by profession was not meant to simply bring superfluous details because, as we have 
observed, the way labor is organized is one of the vital elements structuring chimpanzee care and 
research philosophy. Whereas the division of labor is stricter elsewhere, the hybridization of the 
professional roles at PRI changes the way through which research personnel cares for chimpanzees 
and how they make science of them. This is mainly the reason why we have systematically 
explored “who does what” at PRI.   
The blurring of the traditional division of labor indicates the strong need for not bracketing 
off the social relations as a realm inhabited by keepers and the scientific, protocoled interactions 
as a realm inhabited by researchers. In addition, here, the quantitative level offers us a picture not 
foreseen by qualitative analyses, or the fact that the hybridization of professional roles is even 
higher than expected. When researchers from humanities carefully make use of quantitative studies 
and re-design them for their own ethnographic purposes, then, the measurement of phenomena has 
a lot to provide to ethnographic accounts.  
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3.2 Computer and Face-to-Face Settings 
 
After having explored the philosophy and the structuring practices surrounding 
chimpanzee care and research at PRI, we shall now investigate the points emphasized by actors 
when introducing their activities to third parties. It has already been mentioned that Matsuzawa’s 
laboratory receives regular visits from filming crews from several TV channels, including Japan’s 
national public broadcasting company, the NHK. Yet, even though PRI members participate in 
shaping the content of such programs,1 a material that is entirely produced by researchers is likely 
to provide valuable insight into how actors perceive their own activities, or which features they 
wish to promote. Chimpanzee research at PRI is promoted by members themselves through a series 
of media. The website “Ai and her friends”, is abundant, featuring not only the latest publications, 
but also photos, chimpanzees’ drawings, a rich number of videos, and detailed information on each 
chimpanzee member, along with other materials. 2  In addition, the YouTube channel 
“TheFriendsAndAi” (sic) provides viewers with a vast array of videos, and as of 2017, it has 
reached more than a thousand subscribers.3  
A video clip prepared for the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (the AAAS) is revealing of the points that researchers wish to highlight, figuring as the 
most popular video on the website “Ai and her friends”.4 The 2013 video “symbolic representation 
and working memory in chimpanzees” features what perhaps has become PRI’s most popular 
experiment in chimpanzee research, due to the simplicity and powerfulness with which it is capable 
of catching humans off guard. The chimpanzee who performs the trials is Ai’s son, Ayumu, who 
lived up to his mother’s reputation from early age and was the participant with the most “legendary” 
performance in such experiments. His performance has even been evoked in a documentary about 
the Nonhuman Rights Project, an organization which seeks to give chimpanzees and other 
cognitively complex animals the legal status of persons.5,6 On the internet, surprisingly, Ayumu 
has gained his own memory game, “Ayumu’s game”, where humans can test whether their 
performances can beat his.7  
The above-mentioned video is reproduced in Audiovisual Material  1 and Video Frame 1. 
While chimpanzees are performing experiments, the video teases the viewers with the following 
subtitles: “Do we underestimate chimpanzees? Do we overestimate ourselves? See for yourself. 
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Ai and Ayumu”. The camera cuts to show a panoramic view of Inuyama city: “Historical city 
Inuyama, central Japan. The Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University.” Next, the footage 
shows where chimpanzees live: “14 chimpanzees live in an outdoor compound, designed to be like 
an African forest. Ai and her son Ayumu live here.” The scenery changes to both chimpanzees 
entering the South Play Room, Matsuzawa’s laboratory: “Each day they come to the laboratory by 
choice to take part in cognitive research. Each chimpanzee uses a different screen.” Now, the 
footage zooms into Ai performing kanji-color tasks: “Ai touches the kanji representing the color 
shown. She can also do the opposite task matching color to kanji.” The camera switches briefly to 
Matsuzawa writing on his notebook: “Tasks are run and recorded automatically.”  
Afterward, zooming into Ayumu performing tasks, the caption explains: “Ayumu has 
learned the sequence of numerals 1-19. We tested his working memory. When the first numeral is 
touched… the others are masked. He touches the correct order from memory. In a more difficult 
task, numerals are masked automatically at 210 ms. This task is so challenging that sometimes he 
loses concentration”. Ayumu is then seen looking aside several times. In the last event, he starts 
the trial and, subsequently, numerals are masked but he turns his back to the screen. When he 
resumes the task, the caption continues: “but he still remembers the correct order.” Next, the movie 
shows Ai and Matsuzawa’s face-to-face interaction: “Trust between researchers and chimpanzees 
is fundamental.” The video concludes, displaying once again the outdoor compound, with a zoom 
in Ayumu and Ai: “Although Ayumu is the best at these memory tasks, other chimpanzees here 
can also succeed. Chimpanzees are so similar to us but not the same. Knowing the chimpanzee 
mind illuminates the human mind.   
 
  
2s 8s 
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32s 56s 
  
1m16s 1m44s 
  
2m14s 2m18s 
  
3m37s 3m42s 
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3m56s 4m19s 
  
4m22s 4m34s 
 
Video Frame 1 Video presentation of chimpanzee research at PRI. From Audiovisual Material  1. 
Audiovisual Material  1 Video presentation of chimpanzee research at PRI, 4m50s. KUPRI (2013).8 
 
 
The video highlights many of the points important for interlocutors of chimpanzee research 
at PRI, which have so far been explored in this manuscript: simulation of nature, trust, voluntary 
participation of chimpanzees, objectivity of the experimental interface, and chimpanzees as 
outgroup to understand human mind. However, the strongest message of the video is how 
chimpanzees’ abilities might “decenter” humans’ perception of our own abilities and that of our 
closest evolutionary relatives. Whoever watches Ayumu’s disconcerting performance, will quickly 
notice that any non-trained human will miserably fail at catching up with the animal. Yet, the virtue 
in question is not exactly a physical one; it might not be surprising that an animal might see, hear 
or smell better than a human, or be faster and stronger. But can an animal really be smarter than 
us? Can a chimpanzee’s test performance decenter the perception of human cognitive abilities?  
The experiment above investigated a specific cognitive competence: working memory 
using as means symbolic representation of numbers. In a simple way, working memory can be 
defined as “memory as it is used to plan and carry out behavior”.9 As for symbols, in the usage of 
cognitive sciences, the most basic way in which they are conceptualized is to consider that “a 
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symbol is something that someone intends to represent something other than itself”. 10 , 11 
Chimpanzees at PRI have learned to represent, to some extent, both the ordinal and the cardinal 
aspects of numbers (e.g., 8 comes after 7 and before 9 versus 8 means ******** units).12 By the 
end of 2015, chimpanzees had advanced as far as 19 in terms of the ordinal aspect of numbers.  
Two types of task were set in place and three mother-infant pairs were tested (Ai and 
Ayumu; Chloe and Cleo; Pan and Pal) in addition to human participants. After all naïve 
chimpanzees (i.e., non-experienced) had learned the numeral sequences, a masking task started 
when youngsters were around five years old.13  As we have seen above, in this task, after a 
chimpanzee touches the first numeral, all others are replaced with a white square so that the 
individual has to remember which numeral appeared where, and has to choose the next one based 
on the knowledge of numerical sequence.14 For instance, if the nonadjacent numerals dispersed on 
the screen are 1, 8, 6, 5, 3, 9 you should first touch 1, then 3, then 5 and so on.  
Moreover, not only the set of numerals but also the location of the numbers was randomized 
so that chimpanzees would not follow any cues (e.g., as in number 8 always appearing on the 
bottom right and number 9 on the upper left). All chimpanzees mastered this task but youngsters 
performed better than their mothers.15  In addition, the accuracy of the youngsters was within 
human variation (i.e., spread of humans’ data points), with Ayumu’s accuracy matching the human 
average.16  In regard to chimpanzees’ response time, Ayumu, Cleo, and Pal were faster than 
humans at an accuracy of approximately  80%, 60% and 50%.17 In sum, in this  task, humans were, 
on average, more correct than Cleo and Pal but both were still better than a poorly performant 
human, while Ayumu was as good as humans in general.  
Afterward, a new test was introduced, the “limited-hold memory task”.18 In this task, 
whenever chimpanzees touched the regular white circle to start a trial, five numerals appeared 
during a limited duration, that is, for 650, 430 and 210 milliseconds. 19 Note that, in contrast to the 
first task, where subjects could look at the screen disposition and only have numerals disappear 
after touching their first choice, in this new task, the decision was not up to the participant and the 
stimuli were presented and masked at controlled durations. In the limited-hold memory task, the 
experimenters, Inoue and Matsuzawa, compared the best mother and younger performer, that is Ai 
and Ayumu, to nine human participants, all university students.20 Whereas the humans and Ai 
showed the tendency to perform poorer with a decrease in the duration with which stimuli were 
presented (i.e., 650→ 430→ 210 ms), Ayumu kept his performance regardless; outperforming in 
187
 
both speed and accuracy.21 Interestingly, 210 milliseconds is a timeframe close to human saccadic 
eye movement, meaning that subjects do not have time to explore the numeral dispositions through 
eye movement.22  
Matsuzawa compares this ability to eidetic or photographic memory, and considers that 
“[t]he common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees five to six million years ago may have 
possessed an extraordinary memory capability. At a certain point in evolution, because of 
limitations on brain capacity, the human brain may have acquired new functions in parallel with 
losing others—such as acquiring language while losing visuospatial temporal storage ability”.23 
The 2007 study received appraisal but also critique, in particular, the second task in which Ayumu 
not only performed as good as humans but outperformed our species in terms of speed and 
accuracy.  
In a 2009 study, Silberberg and Kearns contended that Inoue and Matsuzawa’s study was 
methodologically flawed because chimpanzees had many sessions on the limited hold task.24 
Indeed, Inoue and Matsuzawa report that for the limited-hold memory task, each session consisted 
of 50 trials; each chimpanzee received ten sessions while humans received one (i.e., fifty trials).25 
Concretely, this means that for condition one at 650 ms chimpanzees had 450 more trials than 
humans, for condition two at 430 ms they had other 450 more trials, and for 210 ms, again, 450 
more. The statistical difference between Ayumu and humans started to be observed from the 
second condition on, that is, from 430 ms to 210 ms.26  
Thus, “to determine whether practice on the limited-hold task elevates human 
performances to the levels seen in Ayumu”, Silberberg and Kearns, two male university professors 
aged sixty-three and thirty-three years old respectively, tested themselves with the same procedure 
but with extended practice.27 The two participants/authors used different data collection strategies. 
One of the participants showed no practice effect due to having to debug their own program, 
therefore, completing sessions before recording his own data.28 Yet, the other improved over 
sessions.29 The conditions were 250 ms, 210 ms (like the original), 100 ms and 210 ms again.30 
Both were able to match Ayumu, however, the author who had no previous experience before 
recoding his results, reached Ayumu’s accuracy rate in approximately 2,500 trials. 31  They 
conclude that “the results suggest equivalence of function and capacity between apes and humans 
on this sensory-memory task”.32  
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In 2010 the discussion was fueled again. Cook and Wilson contended that Silberberg and 
Kearns results did not “decisively overturn” Inoue and Matsuzawa’s result because Ayumu 
succeeded with no prior practice in the 210 ms condition, while Silberberg and Kearns trained this 
condition over and over and so it was necessary to test humans under the same conditions from 
650 milliseconds (Inoue and Matsuzawa’s first condition). Cook and Wilson teased:33  
 
Do chimpanzees have better spatial working memory than humans? In a highly publicized 
study, a juvenile chimpanzee, Ayumu, performed substantially better than university 
students on memory for digits displayed for 210 msec in a spatial array (…) The authors 
described these abilities as “extraordinary” and likened them to eidetic (so-called 
“photographic”) memory. The findings were reported by The New York Times, the BBC, 
NPR, and all four U.S. television networks, as well as in the pages of Science. 
 
Cook and Wilson underwent to test two undergraduate research assistants:34 First, they 
introduced a phase called “pretest” in which each participant accomplished two blocks of fifty 
trials at 210s and the first block was eliminated as practice. In the second block, both performed 
as good as the humans in Inoue and Matsuzawa’s study. Then, in the so-called “training phase”, 
humans did sessions at 650ms; 300 blocks of 50 trials. In the posttest at 210ms, humans ran one 
block of fifty trials for practice, which was discarded, and four test blocks. The authors achieved 
94% and 96%. Cook and Wilson considered important to stress that:35 “humans tested by Inoue 
and Matsuzawa on the training procedure chose to look at the display much longer (sometimes 
over 7 sec), but were more accurate than the chimpanzees, indicating a speed–accuracy trade-off. 
Clearly, humans, left to their own devices, would give themselves a training experience different 
from that chosen by Ayumu.” Finally, the critics concluded:36  
 
Our results show that practice with a 650-msec stimulus duration is sufficient to improve 
task performance at 210 msec without notable prior exposure at the shorter duration and 
that humans are capable of better performance on this task than even the most talented 
chimpanzee. In addition, humans can tolerate a delay on this task with no impact on 
performance, undercutting any claim that Ayumu’s ability is extraordinary in this regard. 
 
Now, we shall inspect the details of Cook and Wilson’s procedure comparatively. To make 
it simpler, we shall refer to Inoue and Matsuzawa’s paper as “Ayumu’s study”,37 and the critics, 
the “professors’ study”.38  Unless gross misreading of the reports, the conditions and trials are 
summed up in Table 4 and Table 5. When analyzed comparatively, in any possible condition, the 
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professors’ study seems to grant a considerably higher amount of trials for reaching the 
chimpanzee’s performance. Remember that differences between humans and Ayumu started 
already at 430ms, the second condition, but when considering 210ms specifically, chimpanzees 
had an “advantage” of 900 trials prior to being tested at 210ms.  
 
Ayumu’s study 
 
                    Conditions 
 
 650ms 
 
430ms 210ms 
Chimpanzees 500 trials 500 trials 500 trials 
Humans  50 trials 50 trials 50 trials 
Difference 450 trials 450 trials 450 trials 
 
Total ≠ before 210ms 
 
900 trials 
 
 
Table 4 Summary of limited-hold memory task, after Inoue and Matsuzawa (2007).39 
 
Professors’ Study, Human Training 
 
                                       Conditions 
 Pretest 210 ms 
 
Training 650ms Posttest 210ms 
Trials 50 trials practice 
(discarded) 
50 trials test 
(included) 
 
15,000 trials 
 
50 trials practice 
(discarded) 
200 trials test 
(included) 
 
W/o Practice  50 trials  
at 210ms 
 
15,000 trials 
at 610ms 
 
 
̶ 
 
200 trials 
at 210ms 
With Practice  100 trials 
at 210ms 
 
250 trials  
at 210ms 
Total 
Exposure  
At 210ms: 350 trials 
At 650ms: 15,000 trials 
 
 
Table 5 Summary of limited-hold memory task, after Cook and Wilson (2010).40 
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Notwithstanding, in the professors’ study, humans were given prior exposure to the very 
condition they intended to be tested upon, conducting a pretest which gave participants up to 100 
trials of exposure to 210ms condition. In such case, a between-subjects design should better assess 
the baseline condition, that is, recruiting other humans to be naïvely tested at 210ms and then 
comparing results with those that underwent training at 650ms and then 210ms.  In addition, in 
both the pretest and the posttest, trials were discarded as training; again, within the very condition 
that was critical for the analysis. Regarding the 650ms condition, it amounted to 15,000 trials (300 
blocks of 50). These numbers contrast with the 900 trials of “advantage” that Ayumu had in 
comparison to humans, before consistently maintaining his performance at 210ms.    
Inoue and Matsuzawa’s publication of 2007 reported the results for the condition where 
there were five digits distributed around the screen.41 However, building up on Matsuzawa’s more 
recent report in 2009, which indicated unpublished data where Ayumu was performing at 80% 
with eight digits, Roberts and Quillinan recruited nearly 170 participants, adopting the task to run 
online in the form of a game with increased difficulty modes to allow training.42 The most difficult 
condition, the so-called chimp mode consisted of nine digits at 210 milliseconds.43 Some points of 
the original experimental setting could not be exactly replicated in this study, for instance, the task 
was run online and participants would “unlock” phases and return to the beginning if the “lives” 
they accumulated were lost.44 However, with a much larger sample size and with the eight and 
nine digit conditions, humans’ performance was still significantly lower than Ayumu’s.  
Now that we have argued from within cognitive sciences, let us take a step back and discuss 
from another perspective, a more anthropological one. The type of critiques addressed at 
“Ayumu’s study” misses out one point about training conditions: humans, the species who created 
the very symbols upon which chimpanzees are being tested, consider largely unequal not to be 
tested under the same amount of training. Had the task mobilized memory capabilities exclusively 
in a way in which chimpanzees could have been equally exposed to stimuli, then the objection 
might have been more grounded. However, the task mobilizes the ordinal aspect of numbers, and 
in this realm, by and large, humans are at advantage.  
 Instead, university professors that have had not only a lifelong exposure to numerals but 
also advanced math, consider that “humans, left to their own devices, would give themselves a 
training experience different from that chosen by Ayumu”.45 Under this light, it becomes unclear 
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which part of this process is not a human “device” in the multiple senses of the word. In this 
context, by making the number of trials unequal, one is actually making the conditions more equal. 
This is not to say that Inoue and Matsuzawa’s study cannot be criticized. However, the types of 
critique we address say a lot about our implicit assumptions and our conception of what good 
science should stand for. Largely, in cognitive sciences, when species differences are assessed, 
differences in socialization are “the elephant in the room”; to the disadvantage of nonhumans.  
After having scrutinized the laboratory’s key computerized experiment and its worldwide 
repercussion, we shall turn to the dynamics of Ai and Matsuzawa’s unbarred experiments. 
Whenever Professor Matsuzawa is in Inuyama, city where the Primate Research Institute is located, 
he accompanies Ai and Ayumu’s session in the South Play Room, his laboratory. Ai and Ayumu’s 
session is the first one in the morning, thus, if calling occurs smoothly, around nine o’clock 
experiments start. Occasionally, Matsuzawa enters the booth with Ai, an activity known in the 
laboratory as “face-to-face experiment”. This occurs mainly when there are visitors, when 
Matsuzawa has been absent for a long time, or when there is a specific need for health check 
training. Over the fourteen months of this etho-ethnography, Matsuzawa has engaged in unbarred 
face-to-face interactions with Ai once a month on average, although the distribution of the sessions 
varied greatly due to his fieldtrips and commitments outside Inuyama. Curiously, the denomination 
“experiment” congregates experiments strictu sensu and, in addition, a series of activities, such as 
play, grooming and health check, which take place conjointly. In what regard experiments per se, 
those consisted of trials (single attempts) of previous studies. In the past, however, face-to-face 
experiments denoted new studies, systematically conducted in an unbarred form. 
In 2015, the regular experiments during face-to-face were block stacking and nesting cups. 
Both types of experiment stem from child developmental psychology and they are means to assess 
object manipulation and cognitive development in chimpanzees and human infants. 46  In the 
simpler version, block stacking consists of giving the chimpanzee several blocks; the task is to pile 
them up in a way that they do not fall, although more complicated varieties exist. In the nesting 
cups task, the chimpanzee is presented with a series of different-sized cups, one slightly smaller 
than the other, and she or he has to insert one cup into another, observing their sizes. The task ends 
when all cups have been inserted into the largest one. In studies with human children, three 
strategies for combining cups have been described: (a) the pairing method, in which a single cup 
is placed into another (b) the pot method, in which two or more cups are inserted into another but 
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one by one, and (c) the subassembly method, where two or more cups are picked up as a unit and 
inserted into another cup or structure at once.47 In human development, the subassembly method 
is considered the most advanced strategy, increasing with age in children.48 
When Ayumu, Cleo, and Pal were younger, they have been tested with a nesting cups task, 
along with their mothers. The results report that the three infant chimpanzees rarely showed 
subassembly strategy, and so did the mothers Chloe and Pan; yet, the adults increased the use of 
this method after being presented with fewer cups.49 On the other hand, Ai, from the start, showed 
increased use of subassembly (34%).50 Note that naïve, non-trained chimpanzees did, in fact, 
present some subassembly usage, however, the percentage was low (4% infants; 7% Pan and 
Chloe).51 These methods mirror a hierarchical complexity in terms of sequential codes that an 
individual has to fathom, and, therefore, it is likely that chimpanzees with no experience preferred 
simpler forms due to the cognitive load while combining cups.52 The interesting point to notice 
from such experiments relating object manipulation and developmental processes is that the 
underlying elements of action have differential loads in terms of how they are processed, even 
when they are not clear to the bare eye. Thus, something as evident as inserting cups hides complex 
processes at play to produce a visible, simple action.   
Apart from nesting cups and stacking blocks, during face-to-face, Ai would occasionally 
be asked to draw or paint. Usually, either Matsuzawa would present a series of marker pens, and 
Ai would choose her favorite color, or Matsuzawa would give her a pen of a certain color. This 
activity is conducted in an ordered fashion, color by color. In the painting version, Matsuzawa 
presents her the brush tipped into a paint and Ai carefully paints within the canvas area, usually 
avoiding brushing the floor. When the chimpanzee is done with a color or when the brush is dry, 
she gently delivers it back to Matsuzawa. Not only Ai, but other chimpanzees in the past have been 
given the opportunity to paint extensively. More recently, Pan, during the object categorization 
task with pencils, occasionally enjoyed doing what has been labeled in the laboratory as “street 
art”, that is, “graffiti” on the booth door. On the other hand, also recently, her daughter Pal, when 
presented with marker pens but left unattended, preferred to shred the paper and feast on the tip of 
the pen than to perform any activity resembling an art form, even though in the past her paintings 
had been aesthetically pleasing to human eyes.  
Another curious activity of Ai and Matsuzawa’s face-to-face is taking pictures. Typically, 
this occurs when Ai has finished a masterpiece or when there are visitors. Matsuzawa asks Ai to 
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pose for the cameras while he holds the canvas. Whenever she looks at him or elsewhere, he points 
and redirects the position of her face. When there are visitors, usually Ai takes great interest in the 
newcomers and Matsuzawa takes advantage of the momentum; he chooses the best position for Ai 
and asks her to stay in place, instructing humans in a similar fashion. In this sense, in many of the 
photos, Ai is posing as a model, a task to which she is usually most agreeable. In addition, selfies 
with Matsuzawa’s cell phone are another modality of photo taking; Matsuzawa comes close to Ai 
and asks her to pose along, focusing on their image mirrored in the phone. Indeed, not only Ai but 
most chimpanzees at PRI are used to camera click-sounds and recording, and even though 
chimpanzees’ response to cinematographic scenarios merits a study on its own, they apparently do 
not alter their behavior as a function of being filmed, although they might show self-inspection 
with reflective surfaces as in mirror self-recognition.   
Beyond the somewhat superfluous but amusing activity of photo taking, a very important 
task conducted during face-to-face is health check. Regularly, Matsuzawa weighs Ai, inspects her 
body, and measures her temperature. Occasionally, her nail is clipped, and a series of activities are 
conducted, aimed at helping the health check by veterinarians. For instance, during 2015, 
ultrasound training was observed. In this training, Ai is asked to lie down while Matsuzawa places 
one of the nesting cups on her abdomen, simulating the exam. Occurring more often was the 
injection training and the training for blood exam: Matsuzawa would cut her hair and clean the 
area where the needle would be in contact with the skin and would apply an injection or draw 
blood. These activities were meant as means to conduct future health checks without the need for 
anesthesia, that is, with a conscious chimpanzee.  
Another activity conducted during face-to-face shall be dubbed here as “husbandry 
training”. This activity is recognizable due to being a series of sequential husbandry words. These 
words are command-type utterances meant to ask chimpanzees to accomplish a certain task or 
show a certain part of their bodies so that humans can inspect their health. The commands are 
usually in Japanese, however, Matsuzawa also uses a vast array of English words, in addition to 
gestures in Japanese sign language (JSL).I During this activity, Ai is prompted to show body parts 
                                                 
I EXAMPLES OF WORDS AND GESTURES: Regular husbandry words to show body parts: ashi (foot); te (hand); mimi 
(ear); me (eye); onaka (belly); oshiri (bottom, used with a specific gesture: rotating index and thumb at the same 
time); kuchi (mouth, used with specific gesture: first pinching index and thumb and then moving them in the opposite 
direction). Except for oshiri and kuchi, they usually co-occur with pointing and with the touching of human’s 
equivalent part. Regular words in Japanese to prompt action: itte (go); suwatte (sit); dame (no good); chōdai (give 
me); matte (wait). Itte and suwatte are generally accompanied by pointing, whereas chōdai may be accompanied by 
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or move from one location to another, and the primary function seems to assess how well she 
responds to these words, except when, for instance, commands such as “open your mouth” are 
followed by a health inspection.  
Last but not least, Matsuzawa and Ai’s face-to-face session is punctuated by many episodes 
of play and grooming, activities that strengthen social bonds. The interspecies version of play 
includes features of chimpanzees’ version of social play,53 such as tickling, swinging, and pulling. 
However, curiously, Ai has not been observed to engage in play forms that mimic fight, like play 
bite, or any rough play form. On the other hand, as in chimpanzee play, Matsuzawa may firmly 
slap Ai’s back while mimicking chimpanzee’s play face; yet, Ai has not been seen reciprocating 
the movement. The absence of certain forms of play in Ai’s context is likely an indicator of her 
self-control during interactions with a weaker individual. Furthermore, Ai frequently directs pant-
grunts at Matsuzawa when he enters the booth and in other contexts, which provides us clues into 
Ai’s perception; this vocalization functions “as a token of respect given during greeting by 
submissive chimpanzees and during submissive interactions”.54 
The interspecies version of grooming is more idiosyncratic. Grooming is a behavior that 
may function as appeasement, reassurance, reconciliation, and hygiene, and the action per se is 
characterized as the “use both hands, pushing the hair back with the thumb or index finger of one 
hand and holding it back while picking at the exposed skin with the nail of the thumb or index 
finger of the other”.55 Regarding Ai, typically, she inspects Matsuzawa’s head hair and, seemingly, 
searches for grooming spots in Matsuzawa’s ears and his almost hairless arms, in addition to 
uncovering his skin by pulling hems and alike. However, there is another related activity she 
enjoys: buttoning and unbuttoning Matsuzawa’s shirt. Ai carefully unbuttons the shirt in an 
ordered manner, button by button. After she is done, she delicately buttons it again. The professor 
considers it a form of grooming a hairless ape, and he notes that she has come up with this behavior 
on her own when she was younger. As for Matsuzawa, he may groom Ai in the chimpanzee manner, 
however, he usually performs a human activity that resembles grooming in the sense of 
                                                 
gesturing a palm open or by the equivalent Japanese sign language in the case of Matsuzawa addressing Ai. Regular 
words to prompt action in English (mostly used by Matsuzawa): sit; sit up (on the bench); sit down (from the bench 
to the floor); touch (the computer); open (the mouth). Open follows the same gesture as kuchi (mouth). Regular words 
in Japanese sign language: arigatō (thank you); chigau (it’s not that); owari (the end) (see Table 6). Regular words 
of praise: sō (yes); sō da (that’s it); yoshi (good); erai (great). These are only conspicuous examples of words and 
gestures used, however, more than a thirty have been identified to be consistently used by humans during this 
ethnography. Chimpanzees’ understanding seems to be most efficient through multimodal communication (i.e., use 
of words and gestures in conjunction).   
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manipulation of other’s skin and this is usually done in conjunction with standard grooming: 
Matsuzawa may rub a wet cloth over the chimpanzee’s body parts, such as hands and feet; or oil 
her skin, especially her back (at PRI, chimpanzees are said to have dry skin).  
 
 
Japanese Sign Language (Shuwa 手話) 
 
  
Arigatō: thank you56 Sō desu / sō da: that is it57  
 
  
Chōdai: give me58 Owaru/owari: the end59 
 
 
 
 
Yoi: good60 Matsu: wait61 
 
 
Table 6 Example of Japanese sign language used by Matsuzawa with Ai. 
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After this overview of the activities conducted during Ai and Matsuzawa’s face-to-face, 
we shall explore them concretely though footages of sessions recorded in 2015. Usually, not all 
the above-mentioned activities take place in the same session but at least a few of them occur 
during a short session. The first activities to be described are the nesting cups task and block 
stacking. In the video (Audiovisual Material  2; Video Frame 2), Matsuzawa disassembles five 
cups of various sizes and presents them to Ai. She quickly picks up the smallest one. However, 
she hesitates; without letting go of the smallest, she simulates insertion into the third biggest one, 
then the fourth, then back to the third, then, she briefly aims toward the fifth but finally inserts her 
cup into the second biggest, that is, the correct choice. Next, she picks up the smallest and second 
smallest cup together (i.e., using the subassembly method) and subsequently moves the units into 
bigger and bigger containers (8s; 10s) until she accomplishes the task. Matsuzawa claps his hand 
once and Ai delivers all the cups as one unit to him (14s). Then, Matsuzawa says 
“arigatōgozaimasu” (thank you in a politer form) and gestures the corresponding Japanese sign 
language, while setting the cups aside.    
Now, Matsuzawa presents Ai with several small wooden blocks; Ai tries to stack them but 
as the number of stacked blocs increase, they become unstable and the incomplete structure falls 
four times (50s; 51s). As Ai is initiating her 5th attempt she hears a pant-hoot outside and leans 
toward the voices (1m10s); Matsuzawa asks her to pay attention twice (in English), and she 
resumes the task. Once more, Ai stops to hear the sounds but swiftly focuses again. The structure 
falls once more. At last, in her 6th attempt, the complete structure holds (1m33s). Matsuzawa claps 
his hands effusively and says “sō da” (that’s it) (1m35s). Ai moves her right hand in the direction 
of Matsuzawa’s, who was still clapping, and they hold each other’s hands (1m36;1m37s). Then, 
Matsuzawa holds Ai’s right hand with both of his hands. A slight shake is seen during their hand 
grasp, although it seems to be initiated by the human.  
When the “handshake” is over, Ai seems distracted, looking to her left, and Matsuzawa 
calls her attention verbally. Afterward, he points at the blocks and then at the bowl where the 
blocks are usually stored (1m45s). She is responsive and starts grabbing the structure. At the same 
time, Matsuzawa is making use of Japanese sign language to repeat the request, asking her to insert 
the blocks into the bowl. He praises her verbally (“sō da”) and in the equivalent JSL as she 
continues to comply (1m49s). Matsuzawa then says “good” and afterward “give me” (in English), 
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while gesturing the JSL for chōdai, that is, the Japanese version of ‘give me’.  Ai gives him the 
bowl and Matsuzawa says “arigatō” (thank you), both verbally and in JSL. The video ends.  
 
  
8s 10s 
  
14s 50s 
  
51s 1m10s 
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1m33s 1m35s 
  
1m36s 1m37s 
  
1m45s 1m49s 
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1m58s 2m 
 
Video Frame 2 Face-to-face, nesting cups and block stacking. From Audiovisual Material  2. 
Audiovisual Material  2 Face-to-face, nesting cups and stacking blocks, 2015, 2m. By Daly. 
 
 
After having detailed the block stacking and nesting cups tasks, we shall turn to painting. 
The video (Audiovisual Material  3; Video Frame 3) begins with Matsuzawa giving Ai a brush he 
had just tipped in light green paint (8s). Ai starts painting with her right hand and then switches to 
the left (33s). She smells the brush and puts it in her mouth but Matsuzawa redirects her hand to 
the canvas. Ai continues to paint until the brush is dry, when she drops it. Matsuzawa points at the 
tool and signals ‘give me’ in Japanese sign language (JSL) (36s; 37s). Ai picks up the brush and 
hands it to him, to which Matsuzawa replies “arigatō”; verbally and in JSL. Then, Matsuzawa 
delivers her another brush, this time, in color red. Ai makes wide movements and the brush slightly 
trespasses the canvas, making a spot on the floor. When Ai is done with this color, she delivers the 
brush back to Matsuzawa (1m19s); he smiles at the personnel. He signs ‘thank you’ in JSL and 
while storing the brush, he utters “subarashī” (wonderful).  Matsuzawa gives Ai a third color, dark 
green, and Ai begins to paint (1m56s) [the camera moves slightly; the filming area is busy]. When 
the color wears off, Ai drops the brush; she picks it up, tries to paint once more and then delivers 
it to Matsuzawa, who signals JSL and utters “arigatōgozaimasu” (‘thank you’ in a politer manner).  
With the painting ready, Matsuzawa points at the canvas, Ai starts picking it up and 
Matsuzawa opens both his palms. She delivers the canvas with her right hand and he receives it 
with both hands (2m25s). Matsuzawa thanks her verbally (“arigatōgozaimasu”) and in JSL. 
Matsuzawa gets closer to Ai and tries to position her face for pictures, along with the canvas. Now, 
Ai and Matsuzawa are both looking at the cameras and he holds the canvas between them (2m35s). 
Photo shots are heard.  He comes closer, repositions her body again and points in the direction of 
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the cameras. Ai moves toward Matsuzawa to inspect his collar (2m49s). Matsuzawa smiles and 
recoils. The footage fades to the next painting.  
A new canvas Ai colored in yellow can be seen on the floor and Matsuzawa prepares the 
next brush. He hands her a brush with light blue paint (3m2s). As Ai uses the brush, she smells it 
but does not put into her mouth. After the paint is dry she drops the tool. When she moves on to 
pick it up, Matsuzawa signals in JSL ‘thank you’ and then ‘give me’ (3m44s). After he receives 
the brush, he says “arigatōgozaimasu” and signs JSL once more. Now, he presents her the last 
brush, in purple. Interestingly, Ai pays particular attention to filling the borders (4m20s). When 
the paintbrush seems dry she drops it, but then she picks it up and tries again, yet, no color comes 
out. As she places the brush on the floor for the last time, she glances at Matsuzawa. The professor 
signals ‘give me’ in JSL and then says “arigatōgozaimasu” along with the corresponding JSL sign 
(4m39s; 4m40s). Then, he stores the brush and utters “subarashī” (wonderful). As Ai is about to 
change location, Matsuzawa says “Ai, sit, sit” pointing at the wooden protector on the floor. She 
regains her initial position. Matsuzawa comes closer to her and places the canvas between them 
but Ai reaches for his clothing. The professor puts her hand down and points at the cameras saying 
“pay attention” (5m07s). Ai is not responsive so he points at the cameras once more until she 
finally gives a quick look in their direction. Soon after, a vocalization is heard in the room and Ai 
turns her attention to it.  Matsuzawa inspects her reaction and starts pant-hooting (5m32s). Ai does 
not pant-hoot together but inspects his ears instead (5m35s). The video comes to an end. 
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Video Frame 3 Face-to-face, Ai painting. From Audiovisual Material  3. 
Audiovisual Material  3 Face-to-face, Ai painting, 2014, 5m40s. By Daly. 
 
 
The next activity illustrated is health check, or better, its simulated version. The video 
(Audiovisual Material  4; Video Frame 4) starts with Ai and Matsuzawa in the booth and a visitor 
watching from the outside. Matsuzawa is cutting Ai’s arm hair while she quietly observes his 
movements (9s). Matsuzawa tells the foreign visitor: “Very interestingly, no positive reward 
training”. The visitor agrees: “yeah”. Matsuzawa continues the talk without stopping his activity: 
“Nothing; just the mutual trust… very much Japanese way. This is for the first time in her life… 
trial to the injection to get the blood. I give the injection here for anesthesia [points at Ai’s upper 
arm] but we never tried [this; blood draw]. The advantage of taking blood like this means no 
anesthesia is necessary. Anesthesia is not good for her health but we need the blood sample for her 
health check.” Then, while holding her chin and gazing at her, Matsuzawa whispers: “Aichan” 
(little Ai). Ai puts her right hand on his shoulder and her left arm on his head (1m30s); she starts 
inspecting his collar but Matsuzawa recoils. The video fades to the next scene within the same 
face-to-face session.  
Now, Matsuzawa is cleaning Ai’s left arm with a cotton pad (1m41s). He chooses the place 
to introduce the needle in her left arm (1m52), while Ai inspects his left-arm sleeves, uncovering 
one of them. Matsuzawa chuckles and says “don’t touch” (in English), after which Ai stops. Ai 
looks at the syringe while Matsuzawa says “yoshi, yoshi, yoshi” (good, good, good); “don’t move” 
(in English). Apparently, Matsuzawa is finding it difficult to find the veins and so he sighs. He 
tries to position the needle once more and Ai looks around (2m17s). At this point, he realizes he 
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has been using a pseudo-needle and notes it cannot perforate Ai’s skin (2m31s). Matsuzawa 
changes to Ai’s right arm; he cleans it with a cotton pad, says “yoshi”, and apparently introduces 
the needle [his left hand is incidentally covering the view]. Ai seems tranquil and both make a play 
face, swiftly (2m48s). Matsuzawa says “don’t move, ok?”. Matsuzawa notices the syringe is not 
drawing blood; he seems to cut the tip of the needle and makes another try, while Ai inspects his 
head (3m36s). Ai remains tranquil and Matsuzawa reiterates “Ai, don’t move, ok?”. He picks up 
a gauze and places it on her arm while withdrawing the syringe. At last, he counts until ten in 
Japanese, while applying pressure to the spot with the gauze. The video fades to the next activity 
during the same session.  
Now, Matsuzawa is about to simulate an ultrasound exam. While placing his hand on her 
shoulder and directing her back downward, he asks: “nete kudasai” (please, lie down); “neru” (lie 
down); “sit” (in English). Then, he taps the floor indicating where she is supposed to lie, and he 
repeats “neru”; “neru”; “nete”. Ai starts leaning toward the floor and Matsuzawa says “sō, sō, sō” 
(yes). He touches her right foot for her to extend it and says “kochi no ashi” (this foot/leg here). 
As Ai extends her leg, Matsuzawa emphatically says “sō!” (yes). Matsuzawa caresses her belly 
and places a plastic cup on it (of those used for the nesting cup experiment). He simulates scanning 
her abdomen by moving the cup around; Ai has both her legs extended, her back slightly leant and 
she finds balance holding the upper bench with her right hand (4m29s). While looking in Ai’s 
direction, Matsuzawa says “kakkoī, ne” (cool, right?!); “subarashī, ne” (wonderful, right?!); “yoshi” 
(good). He puts the cup aside, then says “don’t move, ok?!”; “don’t move” (twice more). Ai holds 
her position.  
Matsuzawa picks up a scissor and starts cutting the hair around her abdomen. Ai watches 
as he manipulates her hair (4m53s). Matsuzawa puts the scissor aside, picks up the cup again, and 
makes another simulation (5m24s): “we have to check the kidney”, he comments. Ai moves her 
body toward him and Matsuzawa taps her head. With one finger, Ai pulls the hem of Matsuzawa’s 
pants slightly up, uncovering his lower shin skin and Matsuzawa holds her index finger. He finally 
puts the cup down and says “beautiful girl”. While he utters “yoshi” (good), he gestures Japanese 
sign language for ‘the end’ (see Table 6; Video Frame 5m38s). After he signals, Ai moves aside 
but Matsuzawa touches her arm, calling her attention: “wait a minute”. Then, he points at the 
wooden protector (5m41s), slaps it, and says “sit down”. Ai goes on to sit and the video ends. 
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Video Frame 4 Face-to-face, health check simulation. From Audiovisual Material  4. 
Audiovisual Material  4 Face-to-face, health check simulation, 2015, 5m47s. By Daly. 
 
 
Now, we shall accompany the multifold activity labelled as “husbandry training”, in which 
common husbandry words are said one after another without being necessarily used for the 
immediate purpose of health check, apart rare exceptions during these sequences. We shall also 
explore the dynamics of play, which, in this video, is intercalated in the previous activity. In fact, 
husbandry training per se might have a double purpose: on the one hand, it checks the commands 
consistency, one the other, it may act as a form of play. For clarity, readers might recognize such 
activity as the famous “do as I do”.  
In Audiovisual Material  5 and Video Frame 5, the footage starts with a wide frame, 
picturing most part of South Play Room. Ai is sitting on an elevated bench, Matsuzawa sits on the 
floor, and a research assistant records the face-to-face session (4s) (recording is usual for all 
sessions in the laboratory). Matsuzawa verbally asks Ai to sit down (“Ai, suwatte”) and points at 
the same time. Then, he gives filming instructions to the assistant. Finally, their activity starts: 
Matsuzawa utters “atama” (head) and puts his hand on his head; when Ai puts her hand on hers, 
he praises: “sō” (yes). Next, he utters “kuchi” (mouth) while pointing at his mouth, and Ai moves 
her hand toward her face, but imprecisely. Matsuzawa makes the husbandry gesture ‘open’ and 
says “open your mouth” (in English), to which Ai is responsive. He touches her teeth with his 
index and thumbs open. After, Matsuzawa voices “touch nose” (in English), while pointing at his 
own nose. Ai touches her eyebrow area and she moves her hand away. Matsuzawa repeats the 
word “nose” and then he touches the chimpanzee’s nose. As a result, this time, Ai touches her own 
nose and Matsuzawa praises: “sō” (yes).  
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Next, Matsuzawa says “me” (eye) and touches his eye. Ai goes for her head but swiftly 
switches to her eyes; “sō, sō, sō, sō”, he answers (26s). Now, Matsuzawa proceeds to utter ear 
(“mimi”), pointing at his ears (33s). He repeats “mimi”, but Ai touches her head with both hands 
instead. Matsuzawa points at his own ears again. Ai passes her index finder in the area between 
her eyes and then along her nose. Right after, she glances at her index. Changing request, 
Matsuzawa points at the bench and says “sit up” (37s). Ai sits on. Then, pointing, he asks her: 
“climb up” (42s). Climbing up, Ai holds onto the bars of the ceiling with both of her hands and 
stops half way upside-down, as in a summersault. Matsuzawa approaches and both make a 
chimpanzee play face (48s). He grabs her right foot and points at her left foot, which is near the 
ceiling. Ai moves her foot downward and Matsuzawa grabs both of her feet, shaking her upside-
down body (53s). Ai changes position; while continuing to hold onto the bars with her hands, she 
now grasps them with her two feet as well. Both Matsuzawa and Ai make a play face and he 
massages her shoulder (59s).  
Changing the location of the activities, Matsuzawa verbally asks Ai to sit again on the 
bench, while he bangs the seat. As Ai reaches the bench, Matsuzawa points at the wooden protector 
on the floor (1m7s) and asks her to sit (twice), supporting the request with gestural communication. 
Ai heads on and he replies “sō da” (that is it) while signaling the corresponding sign in JSL (1m9s). 
Matsuzawa repeats the gesture and the vocal praise: “sō da, sō da, sō da”. With Ai well sat, 
Matsuzawa says “open your mouth” while doing the husbandry gesture for ‘open’, to which Ai is 
responsive (1m16s). He continues: “keep open”. He touches her teeth with his index and thumb 
open. Then, he utters “yoshi” (good), followed by “good” (in English), and JSL for ‘good’ (“yoi”). 
At last, Matsuzawa presses her forehead with his open hand.  
Next, he asks “te” (hand) and open the palm of his left hand; Ai puts her right hand on his. 
He repeats the request for the other hand and she follows (1m25s). Changing body part, he points 
at her right foot and says “ashi” (foot); Ai presents him her foot, onto which he holds. He repeats 
the request, now, pointing at the other foot: “kochi no ashi” (this foot here). Ai presents her left 
foot; “sō” (yes), he replies. Then, holding both of her feet in his hands, he swings them slightly 
(1m27s). The following word he utters is “atama” (head) and he proceeds to put his hand on his 
head; Ai does the same for hers, doing as he did (1m32s). Next, Matsuzawa touches Ai’s hand 
over her head. Now, letting his hand go, he asks “mō hitotsu” (once more) while moving his hand 
onto his own head. Ai hesitates and then presents him her right hand open. Matsuzawa slightly 
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caresses her hand. Matsuzawa goes back to a difficult command; he utters “o mimi” (ear), pointing 
at his ears. Then, he touches Ai’s ear. He repeats the request verbally and touches her ear three 
times more. He rephrases by saying “touch” twice and pressing her earlobes gently, but Ai is not 
responsive. Matsuzawa holds her face with two hands.  
Changing request, he slaps the floor with his open hand. While positioning his body next 
to the floor and saying “neta” (lied down), he opens one palm of his hand and makes it move 
toward his other open palm, the one closer to the floor (1m54s; n.b., this is a slightly modified 
common gesture for “sleep”; the movement reenacts trajectory). Matsuzawa also escorts Ai’s body, 
prompting it to lean. As Ai changes position, he replies “sō da” (that is it), repeating it several 
times (2m1s). Next, Matsuzawa says “Ai, sit up” and points at the wooden protector, gesturing 
along. As Ai stops near the seat, he repeats the request in order for her to precise the positioning; 
Ai is perfectly sitting down.  Now, making use of the husbandry gesture, Matsuzawa asks her to 
open her mouth and instructs her verbally: “keep open”. Ai slightly opens her mouth. Then, 
Matsuzawa gestures in JSL for her to wait. As Ai moves her face, he replies by verbally saying 
“open” while gesturing the husbandry command (open). This is followed by the JSL sign ‘wait’ 
and by the verbal command “wait”, uttered twice.  
Ai does not open her mouth, instead, Ai’s hand is next to her face. Matsuzawa casts her 
hand aside and repositions her face up: “pay attention”, he asks. Then, he gestures JSL for ‘wait’ 
and says it twice, verbally. Ai moves her index finger in the direction of her chin. Matsuzawa, once 
again, casts her finger aside and says “don’t move”. He utters “wait” and gestures it in JSL (2m19s). 
As Ai remains completely immobile, Matsuzawa responds “sō da”, both verbally and in JSL. He 
holds her face with two hands and leans his forehead onto hers. Ai gently touches his right shoulder. 
Then, she reaches his sleeves; he redirects her face and says “pay attention”. Next, he requests 
“open your mouth, keep open, keep open” while distancing his index and thumb (i.e., the 
husbandry gesture for open). He touches her upper and lower teeth with his index and thumb and 
says “keep, keep, keep, keep open” while having her widen her jaws by opening his fingers 
(2m32s). 
When Matsuzawa slightly closes his hands, Ai relaxes the position but Matsuzawa asks 
“don’t move, ok?”. He recoils, gestures the husbandry for ‘open’ and says “keep open”, while 
touching her teeth. Ai holds her mouth open. He repeats: “keep”. Once Ai is completely immobile, 
he manually inspects her teeth, and her full gums and teeth show in an impressive manner. After 
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Matsuzawa is done, he presses her lips with his fingers and then puts his hand on her head. Ai 
presents him her right hand open, and Matsuzawa reaches it. A slight handshake is seen (2m53s) 
and the footage comes to an end.  
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Video Frame 5 Face-to-face, husbandry and play. From Audiovisual Material  5. 
Audiovisual Material  5 Face-to-face, husbandry and play, 2015, 2m59s. By Daly.  
 
 
The last activity we shall explore is buttoning and unbuttoning, which has been considered 
to be Ai’s idiosyncratic grooming of a naked ape. The video (Audiovisual Material  6; Video Frame 
6) also presents an example of the beginning of a face-to-face session. The footage starts with a 
vision of the full laboratory; chimpanzee vocalizations can be heard (2s). When vocalizations cease, 
the camera is redirected to the lateral of the room, where a window faces one of the chimpanzees’ 
enclosure; in fact, a chimpanzee can be seen in that area (15s). Ai moves around the second booth. 
She glances in the direction where Matsuzawa is about to come in, and she shortly stops while 
looking in the direction of chimpanzees’ enclosure. Next, from the first booth, Matsuzawa 
addresses an experimenter: “Could you help me? Please open the door and leave it open”. As 
Matsuzawa is finishing the sentence and the door starts opening, Ai pant-hoots (56s). She moves 
on her own to the bench and sits. While the door is still opening, Ai swings her body and pants in 
Matsuzawa’s direction. Matsuzawa says “don’t move, leave it open, ok?!”. When the door is fully 
open, Matsuzawa looks at the experimenter and confirms: “yes, keep it open”. Ai continues to 
swing her body. Matsuzawa enters the booth and puts the utility basket on the floor.  
Right after, Matsuzawa moves toward Ai, who immediately manipulates his laboratory 
coat. Matsuzawa places his hand on her back; Ai starts unbuttoning Matsuzawa’s shirt from top to 
bottom (1m28s). He caresses her head. Soon, Ai looks to her left as if distracted by some outside 
noise (1m38s). Matsuzawa taps her right arm once and Ai turns her head to the shirt again. 
Matsuzawa does it again and says “pay attention”. A faint pant-hoot can be heard outside; Ai 
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moves her head in that direction but rapidly resumes the activity, while, at the same time, the pant-
hoot gets louder (1m44s; 1m50s). As the pant-hoot is reaching its end, Ai turns left. After climbing 
up to the ceiling (2m2s), she quickly regains her original position (2m5s).  
Now, Ai manipulates the lace of Matsuzawa’s pant (i.e., a laboratory garment used over 
common pants). With a new vocalization starting, Ai glances in that direction. Yet, she does not 
put her activity on hold (2m31s). Ai continues to inspect Matsuzawa’s clothes and Matsuzawa 
swiftly caresses her shoulders and arms as the vocalizations outside continue. Ai opens wide his 
laboratory coat (2m44s).  Matsuzawa swings his arms up and down toward her body and leans his 
head against hers a couple of times. As Ai apparently starts buttoning up his shirt Matsuzawa says 
“sō da” (that’s it). Ai briefly stops to move her head twice toward the vocalizations outside but 
keeps on with her activity. While Ai buttons his shirt up, Matsuzawa encourages: “sō, sō, sō, sō; 
sō; sō; sō da, sō da, sō da” (yes; that’s it). Once more, Ai glances toward the vocalizations outside, 
but continues to manipulate the buttons. Then, she moves on from the bottom to the middle of the 
shirt; Matsuzawa says “yoshi” (good) (3m40s).  With another button done, he repeats: “yoshi”.  Ai 
continues working on the upper-middle area of the shirt (4m3s) and as she moves to his collar, 
Matsuzawa exclaim: “yoshi; sugoi” (good; amazing). Ai buttons the collar area (4m18s) and the 
video ends.  
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Video Frame 6 Face-to-face, Ai unbuttoning and buttoning Matsuzawa’s shirt. From Audiovisual Material  6. 
Audiovisual Material  6 Face-to-face, Ai unbuttoning and buttoning Matsuzawa’s shirt, 2015, 4m26s. By Daly. 
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3.3 Coproducing an Experiment with Chimpanzees 
 
After having explored one of PRI’s most famous experiments in chimpanzee research, and 
having discovered the dynamics of Ai and Matsuzawa’s face-to-face experiments, we shall turn to 
the preparation, implementation and execution of a particular experiment, from beginning to end. 
This experiment is no other than the one proposed by Professor Matsuzawa to the author of this 
manuscript. The experience of conducting an experiment in the site where, as an anthropologist, I 
studied human-chimpanzee relationship, was revealing of many inside aspects of chimpanzee 
research at PRI that otherwise might have gone unnoticed. On the one hand, it refined my analysis 
as an anthropologist. On the other, the practice of thinking in others’ terms and, at times, of 
becoming native enabled a perceptual switch through which my own discipline, social 
anthropology, would be re-signified. At last, this involvement was vital in order to become a 
member of PRI Homo/Pan community and be accepted by chimpanzees; an experience not only 
intellectually enriching but profoundly meaningful on a subjective level.  
Nonetheless, the journey of being both a social anthropologist and an experimenter was 
characterized for quite a long time by what Bateson describes as a “double bind”, that is, a situation 
in which a subject is confronted with two important but contradictory demands that he or she is 
not able to escape or ignore.1 This had been the experience of dealing with the taboos and precepts 
of sociocultural anthropology and biology-oriented sciences until both could be seen at distance 
and understood in a metacommunicative form. I have chosen to craft this part of the manuscript in 
the first-person form, not to indulge in self-absorption, but to be able to unveil epistemologically 
and methodologically powerful tools for practitioners of both fields; because such tools relate more 
to a subjective questioning of one’s own scientific practices than to pre-set, third-person guidelines 
on how to be objective in these sciences.  
Here is how the journey began: I had started field work in Matsuzawa’s laboratory in the 
beginning of October 2014, and although the idea of field work in a laboratory sounded quite 
strange for the “natives” (i.e., the primatologists), from the start I was welcomed into their schedule 
even more deeply than I expected. I was familiarizing myself with the “field” and I had been given 
the consent to place a fixed camera to record interactions in the laboratory. Apart from the goals 
set for my ethnography, I had planned an observational study with video-coding, focusing on 
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human-chimpanzee-machine interaction. The inspiration for this specific project had come not 
only from ethology but also from ethnomethodogy and Goffmanian-like approaches. In sum, from 
the start, I had never planned to conduct a fully traditional ethnography in social anthropology but 
I never anticipated the ways in which the ethnography would really unfold. Once the material was 
collected, its analysis would have had to be put on hold for a couple of years because a different 
opportunity I could not refuse was being presented on a tray, literary.  
One day, late October, Professor Matsuzawa asked me and another student whether he 
could join us for lunch in the cafeteria. After we had finished our meals, Matsuzawa mentioned 
that he would like me to think of a work with chimpanzees; nothing like the traditional matching-
to-sample tasks in the computer, but something that allowed me to ask larger questions, since I 
was an anthropologist. He then proceeded to demonstrate what he had in mind. Our meals had 
come in different bowls and plates on a tray and, at this point, Matsuzawa started to rearrange them 
mysteriously. He ordered them in multiple ways and, at last, he said: but look, I can also do this. 
Then, he sorted the plates and the bowls from bigger to smaller in size, one inside another. He 
continued: Action can be organized in different manners. What if there is a grammar of action? 
Think about it; action grammar.  
The cryptically organized bowls and plates resonated with me, but I still thought of it as all 
too abstract and soon my attention was diverted to the more practical anthropological concerns of 
my daily life at PRI. In about a week, Matsuzawa brought the subject up again: You are studying 
scientists and a particular manner of studying chimpanzees, which is different from the West. 
Please, continue to do so. But for this purpose, it would also be good if you could conduct an 
experiment. There is a professor here who focuses on object manipulation, but I am thinking of an 
even simpler level; object categorization or object sorting. There has been an idea back in the 
beginning of the Ai Project, which was never pursued further….  
Matsuzawa detailed: Imagine you have twenty-five objects; five kinds of objects painted 
in five colors. Like pencil, spoon, block, rope and key - in red, yellow, green, blue and orange. 
You put them all in a bucket and throw them into the chimpanzee area. Then, the chimpanzee 
returns the objects one by one - to a box, which is safer. In the end, the chimpanzee receives an 
apple. The next day; the same session, so on and so on. This would be the baseline trial. After, 
there are many variations you can test but only a single returned object or color is rewarded. 
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Suppose the criteria is to reward “spoon” and you divide the apple into five pieces and give a piece 
to the chimpanzee every time he or she delivers a spoon. What will happen?  
He continued: Across sessions, if the chimpanzee has the concept of spoon, then, in twenty-
five actions, spoon will be delivered earlier and earlier to obtain the rewards sooner. Overall, 
nothing changed, there is always one apple - but behavior might differ. So, in the initial stage, no 
reward for specific items; then you observe what changes when the reward is introduced. What is 
key to this test is that they have the free choice of items, but by making them sort these in a 
temporal order, you might be able to access chimpanzees’ representation through nonverbal 
response. But look, before doing the experiment you need to simulate it. Also, you need to think: 
What kind of potential does this task have? What does this task mean? You can make any kind of 
modifications - he concluded.  
The experiment sounded very interesting because of its simplicity and the ways in which 
one could increment upon. The whole notion of underlying principles that could structure, or, at 
least, scaffold action was appealing to me, and the idea of investigating the building blocks 
supporting categorization in chimpanzees was very intriguing. I had to admit; the level was much 
more micro than I was used to. As an anthropologist, should I not simply conduct experiments on 
primate social cognition? But again, as a social anthropologist, I had always been interested in 
categories and categorization processes, and I was still inebriated by a methodology course in 
action, conversation analysis and the likes, which I had taken just before going to Japan. What if I 
could expand my horizon even further simply by zooming in even more?! From the start, I was 
motivated beyond the sheer lessons I would learn as an anthropologist immersed in the natives’ 
practices. And frankly speaking, this would be the only reason for not quitting the excruciating 
schedule of becoming an experimenter and an anthropologist full time.  
But then, there was one last problem. I was a “humanities-person”, meaning most of my 
practical higher education included highly advanced philosophy but no real-world experience with 
our typical nemesis: numbers. Also, I did not feel my mind was oriented in the same way lab 
primatologists’ minds were. I gave myself a pep talk: Look, you are not completely inexperienced. 
You have taken many classes in cognitive psychology and all the related fields required for this 
task. You even went that extra mile to take statistics and…. you survived! So, ok you are still raw, 
but you are motivated and you will learn a lot. How embarrassing can it be playing another part? 
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Challenge accepted - and I soon had many modifications and a next phase with symbol 
categorization proposed. By the beginning of November, I had been introduced to my main advisor 
for the experiment, Professor Hayashi, who would become a long-term collaborator. In our first 
meeting, I let all my hidden obsession with synthesis come out in the form of a structured proposal 
divided into stimuli, phase 1, phase 2, research questions, and predictions. In our third meeting for 
the experiment, this time, with Professor Matsuzawa, things were taking shape. We were starting 
to think about the apparatus and other practical details. Soon enough it had been decided that the 
object “key” would have to be substituted by something else; it was definitely not good to have 
chimpanzees systematically manipulating keys, even non-functional ones.  
Back in the old days of the Institute, before doors were automated, someone once dropped 
a bunch of keys next to Ai’s enclosure. As expected, Ai probed them all. She opened her room, 
Akira’s and that of the orangutan next door. The event occurred outside working hours: Ai headed 
directly to the bureau and was caught using the phone (she used to play with a toy phone when she 
was younger). The gentle Akira, on the other hand, was found completely frightened in a nearby 
temple. While no one got seriously wounded by Akira’s escape, the local media publicized that 
the experiments made them so smart as to be able to break out.  
Eventually, we set up the object stimuli as pencil, spoon, block, rope and cup; and the color 
stimuli as red, yellow, green, blue and white. We wanted stimuli with which the chimpanzees have 
had some familiarity either during tasks or during husbandry (e.g., spoons for medicine). The 
colors were all equivalent to those in the color-kanji/kanji-color matching-to-sample tasks on the 
computer. The rationale was that the goal of the experiment was not to know whether chimpanzees 
had the capacity to categorize; a point proved by several experiments, especially those previously 
conducted at PRI. The point was how they categorize. Therefore, instead of novel stimuli, we could 
count on already familiar ones. This was advantageous; it would allow us to build upon during the 
next stages, because at least the color stimuli would be fairly the same as the ones in the automated 
tasks. In addition, for the object stimuli, we pondered that we could, in the future, be able to test 
Ai’s long-term memory of the symbols for these objects, which she had learned in the past.  
In addition, there was another motivation behind the experiment, a point long discussed 
with Professor Hayashi. The experiment consisted of semi face-to-face exchanges with an 
experimenter (i.e., mediated by a box). Hayashi had conducted unbarred face-to-face experiments 
with chimpanzees in the past and her work mainly focused on object manipulation and 
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developmental psychology, therefore, her specialty was different from the traditional automated, 
computer experiments at PRI. The non-computer, “real world” setting brought together a common 
interest: if chimpanzees at PRI have systematically been tested with computers; how would they 
apply this knowledge in a “real world”, 3D situation? By using the same stimuli as those in the 
computer tasks and in previous language-training at PRI, we would be able to, perhaps, tackle the 
effect of being “computer-proficient”. Yet, before the first experimental session could be 
conducted much planning was still required and things needed to get off the paper.  
At this point, one of the most important practical tasks was to decide upon and construct 
the experimental apparatus. This was a critical point because chimpanzees are so strong and safety 
needed to be addressed well. With some considerable back-and-forth, first, we considered several 
designs, such as a funnel system, before we made our final call. In addition, we had to decide the 
best location to set the apparatus. Last but not least, we also needed to refine the protocol as much 
as possible because this could influence the type of the apparatus and location. When looking back 
in retrospective, the neat steps necessary seem obvious, however, I had been given much freedom 
to work on the ideas and the implementation, and for an inexperienced person, many things that 
should have been done sequentially were being conducted in parallel, only to discover one point 
was a necessary step for another.  
Whereas vital points in the experimental design were readily addressed, when considering 
the implementation of the experiment, a few directions were provided instead of a clear, fully 
structured plan; I was expected to sort things out by initiative and by consulting with superiors. 
Indeed, personnel were always at my disposal; not only the advisors for the experiment, that is, 
Professor Matsuzawa and Professor Hayashi, but also my senpai, in other words, the senior student 
in the laboratory. In fact, freedom was evoked as the motto of Kyoto University. However, I must 
admit I was struggling. Even if I could count on the superiors, I could not anticipate some potential 
issues and so I would have to learn the hard way. Or, as a philosopher of science puts it: one does 
not know exactly what one does not know.I,2 In fact, the experience of working with chimpanzees 
proved this point several times.   
Then, another issue started to show: the cultural barrier. Having lived and studied in six 
different countries across Europe, and North and South America, I had learned to be flexible, but 
I could not be more Western. Sure, I had dedicated a long time to learn about Japanese culture, 
                                                 
I In the original: “Man weiss nicht genau, was man nicht weiss.” (Rheinberger 2007)  
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language and history, but this was still my first time in Japan... I did not have the ambition to be a 
Japanologist and I definitely stuck out and made faux pas. Again, looking in retrospect, I was too 
blunt, too direct, too explicit and too pragmatic for a modus operandi that relies heavily on picking 
up people’s implicit cues and on a precious concept: ‘reading the atmosphere’, or the famous “kūki 
wo yomu” (空気を読む). Once in a while, my adventures in Japanese soil seemed like those of 
Amélie Nothomb in her comic novel Stupeur et Tremblements.3   
 
As inexperienced as I could 
be, the implementation was on its 
way. The apparatus for the 
experiment would take considerable 
time so we started thinking of its 
design right away. We went through 
many ideas and when we had a rough 
sketch of its important features, we 
decided to ask for the help of a more 
experienced person. It was, at this 
point, that one of PRI’s first keepers, 
Kumazaki-san, came to our aid. The plan was to have him help with a safer design. Kumazaki 
designed a chimpanzee communication box with two holes, in which one would serve the purpose 
of receiving objects from chimpanzees and, the other, of providing their rewards. He worked on 
two designs (Photo  2) but the second and final one reflected an improvement to account for the 
size of chimpanzees’ hand. It was important not to give the chimpanzees a chance to fully access 
the experimenter’s side, otherwise, in a tantrum, they could hurt the experimenter or passing-by 
personnel. Thus, the last model had the holes slightly diminished, matching the chimpanzee’s body 
part.    
At the point where the design was final and consolidated, it was still not clear how it would 
come to life. Apparently, the company that was usually hired to fabricate some of PRI’s panels 
could not be fully counted upon for the whole process. When discussing the issue with colleagues 
in the laboratory, I came to know some students in the past had been quite independent and 
produced their own panels: How and with which machinery? - I asked, surprised. Oh, there is a 
 
 
Photo  2 Design of the experimental apparatus, 2015. By Daly.   
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workshop in the building to cut acrylic panels and stuff, you know, with those big machines - said 
my colleague. I let the idea sink in for a second. I recalled some carpentry gears I had seen as a 
child and, by then, I had already imagined myself clumsily manipulating the electric saw, cutting 
my hand off and fainting at the sight of blood sprinkling in the room, like a horror movie. Ok, I 
am not up to that task - I thought. When I confided it to Hayashi-sensei, she mentioned that I could, 
in theory, ask for Kumazaki’s help, but that I should hurry up because he was about to retire.  
So, I humbly turned to Kumazaki-san again and admitted defeat. He not only helped me 
but became a precious source of stories of PRI’s old days and of his relationship with Reiko, 
although my Japanese skills were crude and lacking elegance. He was, on all levels, incredibly 
patient. Kumazaki worked on the confection of the panel throughout many days and I accompanied 
him to the workshop whenever I could (Photo  3 and Photo  4). He explained parts of the process 
to me, including some important details, such as smoothing the borders of the holes so that 
chimpanzees would not get cut in the case of trying to insert their full hand. Watching his skills in 
action, I was certain I would not have been able to accomplish the task and felt somewhat relieved 
that my exaggerated imagination had been, in fact, a good guide. When the panel was ready, it 
looked like a piece of art to me and I was thrilled (Photo  5). 
 
  
Photo  3 Confection of the experimental apparatus, 
2015. By Daly. 
Photo  4 Confection of the experimental apparatus, 
2015. By Daly. 
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In parallel, we had been figuring many 
other points out. Because we decided to use the 
same color stimuli of the computer experiments, 
I turned to my senpai to know exactly the colors 
they employed. But how do I match these colors 
in a precise way? - I worried. At that time 
though, a French intern had been experimenting 
with color preference in the same laboratory and 
so she suggested that I to compare the colors on 
a Munsell scale. She had a readily available 
Munsell color chart, in which each color composition (hue, lightness and chroma) is attributed a 
number. I then bought color paints based on the computer stimuli and Munsell notation, and tested 
upon the objects. Afterward, she helped me visually evaluate whether the colors were equivalent; 
we would look at the colored object, compare it to the chart, note down what we thought was the 
matching number and then compare with what others in the laboratory had chosen.  
 
The process of working on the 
stimuli, however, was not a straight 
line. Because the design of the panel 
had slightly changed, now some of the 
objects we had ordered did not fit 
through the hole and we had to buy 
new ones. In addition, the paint I had 
chosen was not appropriate. Except for 
the rope, all the objects were in wood, 
yet, the so-called “paint for wood” 
would show different colors on 
different objects depending on how the 
object would absorb it. No matter what I did, the result did not look good. I investigated which 
type of paint would provide better results, ordered those online or quickly biked to the next shop, 
and started painting the stimuli again with as many coats as necessary to make them all even. And, 
 
 
Photo  5 Final experimental apparatus.  
Left, object hole. Right, food hole. 
 
 
Photo  6 Stimuli of the object and color categorization experiment, 
2015. By Daly.   
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oh, we never managed to find the same green paint of the computer stimulus, so I had to 
manufacture that at home using other colors and testing the product against the color chart, just in 
case. By the end of the workday I could be seen crouching in the balcony of our office putting 
another layer on the twenty-five official objects and their twenty-five spares (Photo  6). Painting 
objects was such a tiny, little detail of the experiment but so time consuming and never ending; 
either because chimpanzees would break objects, especially in the first half of the experiment, or 
because the paint started to look faint.  
Yet, painting was, still, somehow fun. As an experimenter, my true tantrum trigger was the 
“cabin”. The cabin was, in fact, a tent-like protection where the experimenter was supposed to sit 
to conduct the experiment. At this point, we had simulated several potential spots to place the 
experimental apparatus but one issue remained recurrent. Wherever we would put the apparatus, 
the other chimpanzee could see the companion’s performance, given that offspring and mothers 
usually come in pairs. In principle, this was not an issue for me but soon enough my colleagues, 
cognitive psychologists, started to become unruly over the subject. Why is this an issue? - I asked 
my advisor, Hayashi-sensei. I continued: Why is there a problem if they eventually peek at the 
other’s task? After all, when human children learn to categorize, they do not withdraw to an empty 
room, but they do so in the presence of other humans, right?! Wouldn’t this be more realistic? - I 
argued. However, without completely dismissing my point, sensei considered that a stricter version 
of the experiment would have to control for peeking.  
Over many days, I reflected upon the issue. I also recalled the experiments conducted on 
social learning in the past, in PRI. In those experiments, the chimpanzees were tested with their 
partners. However, there was a striking difference. The social factor was present but was controlled 
for. This means, for instance, that a chimpanzee duo would have the same amount of sessions with 
all other pairs. In other words, exposure was balanced to make conditions even. That means that 
the results would not come as a matter of Ai and Ayumu preferentially partnering Chloe and Cleo 
or Pan or Pal, and vice-versa.  
In fact, what we were about to set up was not an observational study of the “situated 
cognition” type, which anthropologists know well. We had to set up an experiment; this inevitably 
meant controlling as many variables as we could to be able to infer causation. In simple terms, the 
logic is as follows: we control all the factors we think might interfere, making them equal across 
sessions; we test to see what the results look like when everything is the same; we then manipulate 
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only the factor we want to investigate while holding others equal; and, finally, we compare the 
results with and without manipulation to see what changed. Because we kept everything equal, we 
are able to infer that this tiny thing we modified is what caused the change in the results.  
Indeed, sensei did not dismiss the social aspect of the experiment but its uncontrolled part. 
I eventually came to the conclusion that if we wanted to test for social factors, we should be able 
to control them in a certain way, but our immediate laboratory setting and chimpanzees’ schedules 
were more prone to individual testing than a social experiment, which, in theory, could be 
conducted in the future. So, after this long detour, we shall return to the “cabin”. After having 
agreed that chimpanzees should not peek at each other’s results during our experiment, we headed 
to control this variable. We concluded that, in order to effectively separate chimpanzees and to 
allow the experiment to be conducted outside the other’s visual field, the apparatus should be 
placed in the first booth, the one closer to the chimpanzees’ entrance. While one chimpanzee 
waited in the “hall” area, the other would perform the task.  However, from the entrance, the 
standing-by chimpanzee could still peek. To solve this issue, we came up with the idea of building 
a “cabin” that would protect the experimenter’s area.  
The idea was great, in theory, but not exactly practical. Going over the issue with my 
colleagues in the laboratory, they presented me beautiful wooden panels that, put together, looked 
like a professional photographer’s booth. It was elegant, aesthetic, it did not occupy much space, 
and, of course, it was of no-use. The panels were too low to provide effective cover. Now, what is 
our other option? - I asked, disappointed. Build a higher cabin out of cardboards - suggested my 
senpai. In this moment, I confess I wanted to avoid any extra work beyond the fair amount I usually 
had on my plate, attending experiments on a full-time basis in addition to researchers’ seminars at 
PRI; but as Japanese say - shōganai; it cannot be helped, one must accept one’s fate. My busy 
senpai provided me old cardboards stored in the building and, in the evening, once alone in the 
laboratory, I proceeded with the construction. I put up several layers of cardboard to make the 
structure hold, built a ceiling and wrapped it all up with tape. The move took me several hours to 
achieve just a humble hut. Yet, in the end, I was proud. It is a success - I thought. Let’s get in!  
Well, let’s just say the structure did not hold the first bump and I found myself defeated 
among bent cardboard. In fact, the process of strengthening the cabin would take several days, and 
many set-backs and tantrums in the solitude of the empty lab. Finally, holding the structure with 
flexible wire made it definite. The final product was fairly invasive and stuck out like a sore thumb 
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as soon as someone would enter the laboratory. Nonetheless, it was the minimum amount of space 
needed to accommodate my body and the box to store the received objects.  
 
In reality, the ugly, clumsy cabin (Photo  7) 
triggered other mixed feelings. It started to look like 
this was not going to be a marginal experiment in the 
laboratory routine but that, instead, it would disturb the 
working area and actually demand considerable labor 
on the part of other people. Even if social 
anthropologists reject naïve notions of objectivity and 
consider that one is always in social relation with the 
people they study, still, this started to seem a bit too 
intrusive for my standards. As an anthropologist, do I 
have this right? - I sometimes asked myself. At this 
point, our protocol included extra work for others, such 
as separating chimpanzees, preparing rewards, being 
present for my experiment when no other experiments 
were being conducted, and so on. Even if I would 
accomplish a lot alone, it was still a collaborative 
work. 
Little by little I came to realize that such burdens were not accepted because I was an 
anthropologist but because I was an experimenter, regardless of the means by which I ended up 
becoming one. When taking care of the experiment, my role was not that of an anthropologist 
making use of the experience for my own anthropological writings. This role was marginal in those 
situations. The anthropologist can always think from the “outside” but I had to think from “within” 
to be able to fulfill my role. In this regard, my first presentation as an experimenter was quite 
challenging: I presented our experiment, for about one hour or so, to an audience of cognitive 
psychologists and chimpanzee researchers at PRI. In such a situation, I could not step out and 
digress, that is, go over what I was making of my experience as an experimenter. I had to be the 
experimenter and had to present and answer the questions in experimenters’ terms.  
 
 
Photo  7 The experimental cabin, 2015. By 
Daly. 
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Eventually, during my stay at PRI, I would propose changes to procedures and comment 
others’ work based on anthropological and philosophical concerns. Later on, I also had the 
opportunity to give more humanities-oriented presentations. However, I still had to be fully 
committed not to run away from specialist questions I was supposed to answer. Whenever handling 
the experiment, I dove as much as I could into an experimenter’s life and paradigms. From time to 
time, I would step out and ask what my “anthropological self” would make out of my practices as 
an experimenter, and vice-versa. In the beginning, this experience felt slightly schizophrenic, as in 
double bind situations, but after a while I discovered more common goals than I previously 
imagined, and spaces for fostering understanding across disciplines rather than epistemological 
and methodological clashes. However, the journey would be quite long.  
For our experiment, there were still several issues to be dealt with. The visibility problem 
was still a matter, despite the cabin. Even though chimpanzees and humans are so alike, there is a 
vast array of immense practical points in which our species differ and when experimenters design 
an experiment thinking within a human perspective, they are setting themselves up for failure. This 
was a lesson I learned over and over. Still, many facets of “chimpanzees’ perspective” only become 
evident after our own miserable blunders and so, as in everything in life, experience is precious to 
anticipate potential problems. Luckily, a point of chimpanzees’ perspective that was easily spotted 
was their visual field. Unlike humans, chimpanzees are naturally gifted climbers and when coming 
to South Play Room, they would climb up to higher locations. When assessing visibility, at a 
certain point we noted: But wait, can they perhaps peek from the ceiling? We brainstormed: Humm, 
it is possible… But how do we verify? Our conclusion was that, well, when in Rome, do as the 
Romans do.  
As the experimenter, logically, I had to take the initiative, after all, this was my problem. 
In fact, the entrance was small, the ceiling was not too high and I could count on bars and an upper 
box connected to the trap door to climb up. This would be more convenient than finding suitable 
stairs that would fit the restricted area. Once up there, I explored all the areas chimpanzees could 
access and tried to peek at the experiment location. Before these shenanigans, we had covered all 
the potential visible areas of the panels in the first booth with either black paper or black fabric; 
we even noticed that the fabric was relatively see-through so a double layer was necessary. After 
the chimpanzee climbing simulation, it became clear that, overall, we were correct in our guesses 
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of places requiring cover but some minor adjustments were still needed. As in the case of the hole 
size in the apparatus, assessing chimpanzees’ bodily dispositions proved useful.  
Now, we still had some perspective issues to address. This time, not chimpanzees’ but the 
cameras’. In principle, the experiment should require us to identify only the stimuli given to the 
experimenter. Thus, in theory, a single clear view should suffice. However, because we wanted to 
address larger issues in the future, such as, object manipulation, we concluded that a setting with 
no blind spots would be required. After doing some simulations, we decided that three cameras 
would be needed: A camera placed next to the bottom of the booth, picturing an upper, broad view; 
a camera focusing on the experimental apparatus and the exchanges; and a third, marginal camera 
covering the whole floor.  
A long testing of the camera positioning was required because the perspectives had to be 
confronted: First, to make sure of how many cameras were actually needed (perhaps with a 
different combination we could diminish the number of cameras used); secondly, to ensure that all 
of them had a holistic, entire picture of the experiment (i.e., that we could see everything if we 
synchronized them together); thirdly, the views had to be consistent across sessions to guarantee 
that no blind spots would occur as a result of misplacing the camera one day or another, or of 
someone bumping into them (i.e., the positioning had to be trackable). Thus, after the best 
parameters were decided, the tripods, panels and floor were marked.  
Three aspects were important; inclination, height and positioning of the tripod feet. In fact, 
the experiment was quite ritualized in this regard. Before calling a chimpanzee into the booth, I 
turned on and checked all three cameras in a precise sequential form, and only then proceeded to 
go inside the cabin. Due to the nature of the experiment, this task was not delegated to a research 
assistant. By the time my stay was coming to an end, my body had ingrained the full sequential 
steps of the experiment: turning on cameras, picking up the storage box, avoiding nearby obstacles, 
squeezing into the tight cabin without bumping into the apparatus, positioning rewards in my hands 
effectively, and so on.    
When recollecting the practicalities of implementing an experiment, a powerful experience 
was paying attention to minimal details and being surprised that some unthinkable others were 
important. A vital feature of experiments, without which an experiment can only be called a 
pseudo-experiment, is randomization. Randomization allow us to eliminate biases that we did not 
even know we had. As such, of course, the positioning of the stimuli (i.e., the objects) should be 
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randomized. In this experiment, when chimpanzees would enter the booth they would always find 
the same objects laying on the floor. We went through a couple of options of how to randomize 
their location but decided that the most effective one would be to just put the objects inside a box, 
shake them and throw them on the floor.  
After having found a seemingly appropriate box, I decided to test, just in case. I carefully 
observed the position of the objects after some shaking. I was surprised to discover that this box 
did not correctly randomize the items as expected. The objects inside remained fairly as they were 
before. I quickly came to the conclusion that the box was simply too small and low for the objects 
to freely move inside and change positions. Of course, once thrown in the floor they would likely 
randomly change positions, but to make sure there was no patterning, the box was changed and 
tested before the sessions started. The other issue was in the case that an object would eventually 
roll too far from the location where the stimuli were supposed to stay (e.g., under the bench). For 
these cases, a pseudo random would be more appropriate: the assistant would carefully put the 
objects within the previously designated area, maintaining its initial disposition.  
With this issue came another concern: What if chimpanzees are influenced by my gaze? 
Gosh, should I do the experiment in sunglasses? - I chuckled at the vision of it.  Still, when 
assessing the setup again, it became clear that our procedure was a safeguard in this regard; it 
guaranteed that objects would be thrown and kept within a certain circumference and were not so 
separated as to provoke a detectable change in eye gaze. In addition, the apparatus height was just 
in front of my eye level when sitting, and although chimpanzees could see my eyes, their vision 
was somehow barred. At times, I questioned whether or not I was becoming a little paranoid. On 
the other hand, already during the training phase, I discovered, by experience, that even more 
important than my face were my hands, because they were the ones picking up and holding the 
rewards. Consequently, I devised a consistent hand positioning, which held all the required 
rewards at the same time but effectively delivered them one by one. This too, was a part of the 
experiment that was very much embodied.  
A last randomization concern was which chimpanzee would receive which stimulus in 
which order. After a chimpanzee encountered the objects on the floor, according to the protocol, 
they were required to deliver the object of their choosing one by one. We foresaw a preference test, 
or a baseline condition, in which they would only receive a reward for completing the experiment, 
nothing else.  Then, in the test phase, each chimpanzee would receive a “target”, that is, a stimulus 
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that would be rewarded (e.g., the color red or the object cup). The targets were five colors (i.e., 
color condition) and five differently shaped objects (i.e., object condition). From our readings on 
human categorization and child development, we expected shape targets to be easier for 
chimpanzees as well. That is, supposing they categorize in a similar fashion to humans. Had 
randomization not been implemented, implicitly, it could be that the less performing chimpanzees 
would be allocated to the condition we assumed to be the easiest (i.e., shape). Thus, randomization, 
like in any experiment, was a vital step to eliminate any implicit bias.  
However, by purely randomizing which chimpanzee would receive which target, there was 
still the possibility that chimpanzees were allocated to a certain condition in a very unbalanced 
manner; let us say, from eight chimpanzees, the randomization output could match seven 
chimpanzees in the color condition and one in the object condition. Obviously, this is not what we 
wanted but, in theory, a pure random may produce an unbalanced matching. Therefore, to account 
for balanced conditions, we conducted a pseudo-random. In simple terms, this just means that we 
want randomization but within certain established criteria that we need to control for. This design 
balances out the conditions and chimpanzees. For instance, concretely speaking, four chimpanzees 
started with targets in the object condition (spoon, cup, rope, block) and four with targets in the 
color condition (blue, white, green, red). However, even if balanced, the matchings were all 
randomized (i.e., chimpanzee X was randomly assigned to stimulus Y but half chimpanzees were 
in the object condition and half were in color, plus, stimuli were not repeated).   
In addition, as it is usual for cognitive experiments with chimpanzees, our experimental 
design foresaw repeated measures. A repeated measures design means simply that several 
measurements are taken across a period of time. Concretely, chimpanzees repeat sessions with the 
same target. For instance, consider chimpanzees’ preference test, that is, the phase without any 
rewards during the experiment, nor targets; where all objects have equal value except for 
chimpanzees’ own choosing. Suppose one day a chimpanzee is particularly non-responsive, 
distracted or chooses randomly. Shall this single session be representative of a chimpanzee’s 
preference? At least for our experimental purposes, likely not.  
Thus, in repeated measures, the chimpanzee performs the same task (condition; target; etc.) 
over several days. With preferences, a chimpanzee’s choosing may vary slightly from one day to 
another, but what is the overall pattern? Likewise, with tests where there is a correct choice, if a 
chimpanzee is very consistent, little variation will occur (e.g., being mostly good or mostly poor), 
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yet, it might also be the case that great variation takes place (one day is great, the other awful, and 
so on). We do not want to judge chimpanzees neither by their best nor by their worst performance 
but by their average. A repeated measures design is particularly useful when working with a limited 
number of participants, that is, the ever-so-dreaded small sample size. Other experiments might 
call for other designs, however, in our case, especially because we did not verbally communicate 
the target to the chimpanzee, he or she would have to learn over the course of the sessions and 
would not have means to know a target in advance. A similar concern was accounting for training 
effect. We expected learning but under controlled conditions. This translates into balanced 
sequences of stimuli and into a comparison between chimpanzees’ preferences with no 
manipulation and their choices after the introduction of a sequence of targets.  
The conception and practical set up of the experiment took us a considerable amount of 
time; the experiment had been proposed by Matsuzawa in late October 2014, but its first session 
occurred only by late May 2015. In addition, we had planned to test Reo, the handicapped 
chimpanzee who lived in North Play Room, just next to South Play Room on the first floor. 
Therefore, we had to take care of not only one, but two setups. Because Reo’s schedule conflicted 
with the one in South Play Room, taking Reo up on our wings would require considerable effort, 
especially because he would have to be tested during lunch time.  
For this endeavor, I counted on the two technicians of South Play Room, who fed Reo’s 
lunch once a week, and tagged along to test him after feeding. It is, of course, always best to have 
larger sample sizes, so this was one reason for testing Reo as well. The prospects of having to 
squeeze, twice a week, the already short lunch time was discouraging, but I had another motivation. 
At that point, I knew nothing about the activities taking place in North Play Room, and I felt this 
ethnographic aspect should be covered. Nevertheless, this was still not enough to skip lunch. 
Indeed, my true motivation was to get to know him and have a common activity that would likely 
be enriching for him (and for me). In fact, as the experiment progressed and our plans changed, 
Reo’s data could not be included anymore, simply because the number of sessions would not 
suffice. Still, for quite a while I continued to accompany the technicians and conduct the 
experiment nonetheless, without regret.  
 Regarding formalities, some requirements had to be crossed off of our list prior to the 
experiment. A vital one was the approval of the ethics committee, which was submitted by 
Professor Hayashi and granted in the beginning of February 2015. Another formality that had to 
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be fulfilled was certification. I would have to pass a test to receive a license on primate care and 
experiments. A colleague in the same laboratory prepared for the exam at the same time and so I 
had someone with whom I could share insights. The topics for the exam covered basic primates’ 
physiology and social structure, animal welfare, safety in general and biosafety, primate handling, 
laws, ethics, among others.  
In addition, because chimpanzee escape was somewhat on another level of that of monkeys, 
all members working with chimpanzees, even those already licensed, participated in chimpanzee 
escape drills each year. In such drills, a student or research assistant from the section would serve 
as a guinea pig, or better, as a chimpanzee, and play the escape. The act was elaborated; no one 
was supposed to know the “chimpanzee’s” plan and people would scatter in several teams, with 
maps, restraining nets and walkie talkies to find the escapee and support the veterinary team to 
shoot the runaway with tranquilizers.   
The preparation for the license also included some material communal to all types of 
certifications. Whereas our license was specific for non-invasive procedures, others were aimed at 
monkey researchers and veterinarians, who deal with surgery. Being a hemophobic myself, it was 
quite a surprise to discover we shared the same video material after having to witness torn-apart 
rats without prior warning. The viewing must had felt nothing but natural for the idealizers of the 
syllabus, after all, most of those engaged in animal research come from biology-oriented sciences, 
and at a certain point, these students must have had some live tutorials on how to deal with open 
flesh, a fact that my lab colleague brought to my attention with a compassionate look for my pitiful 
exaggerated reaction.  
Indeed, at the end of my stay I had toughened up a little bit.  I would ask a morphologist, 
a colleague of mine, to accompany her and her supervisor in their work so that I could gain insight 
into that primatological field. The experience proved enriching - and bloodless, because the 
monkey corpses had already been treated, and our task of the day consisted of carefully washing 
out the flesh from the bones so that model skeletons could be made. At PRI, a morphologists’ work 
was, in fact, to deal with the aftermaths of invasive research in monkeys, along with death by 
natural causes. It astonished me that specimens coming from noninvasive research were named, 
instead of being anonymized. In reality, many came from zoos. It was a powerful experience; to 
wash the flesh off of bones and skulls of individuals who had names and, likely, stories in their 
home institutions.  
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My colleague admitted that, in the beginning, this specific task was psychologically 
strenuous, but that she eventually got used to it and found relief in the fact that she was not 
conducting invasive experiments herself. Afterward, we dove into PRI’s bone collection and I was 
surprised to discover Reiko’s bones in the “library”: Wow, so this is Reiko! She is still here in 
PRI… somehow - I thought. In fact, morphologists use the bone library for their studies. A 
Professor at PRI, who conducts non-invasive research with chimpanzees, once made a clear point 
during an informal discussion: Even in an enriched setting for chimpanzees, we cannot forget that 
we are using life. Why did you bring them? You should not just be friends with them but take 
responsibility for using life, that means, do research! 
Indeed, in ways I could not foresee, the ethical implications of becoming an experimenter 
would creep up on me. At a certain point of my stay, I had become friends with primatologists of 
other sections, whom I admired on an intellectual but also on a personal level. In one of our many 
discussions, a friend, field primatologist, voiced that she did not agree with the rationale for 
maintaining chimpanzees in captivity, even if it were for studies, and she called the validity of 
experiments into question. We usually had more philosophical conversations about primatology, 
and so, likely, my friend voiced her strong opinions without immediately picturing that I, too, was 
an experimenter just like the others.  
In reality, during a great part of our conversation, I did not put myself in those shoes either. 
We long debated many points, and some I found compelling. At a certain point, I understood that 
some primatologists also had strong positions against captivity and experiments with chimpanzees, 
even if non-invasive. I could relate to her feeling, which I mentally paraphrased as “how could 
they?”; “even if it is for science?!”. I have had this feeling many times about invasive 
neuroscientific work on primates. I recalled once during my master’s degree, to have met an Italian 
PhD student in neurosciences, who trained two macaques to perform the same action using a 
joystick in order to understand what happens in their brains when they coordinate action. Fair 
enough.  
The bémol, as French speakers say, is that her research involved inserting an electrode into 
an animal’s brain while alive. She took care of explaining that after they healed from the surgery 
to maintain a precise part of the brain constantly exposed, there would be no pain because the area 
is not irrigated by nerves. However, due to such exposure, the macaques could not be socially 
housed and had to be kept in individual cages. Furthermore, she had to eliminate the influence of 
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social factors in her experiment (Isn’t isolating social primates the true bias, instead? - I pondered 
quietly). As to how the monkeys were convinced to work, dehydration was the solution, otherwise 
- she lamented - they would not perform the experiments. And while she felt she would like to 
interact with them, she also had warnings from others and from herself not to grow attached to 
them.   
To be fair, as an anthropologist, I should be able to tackle neuroscientists’ practices, their 
paradigms and values, before providing any professional assessment; after all, many consider they 
ought to balance our moral obligations to animals and the benefits that invasive research can bring 
to humans,4,5 although primatologists evaluate that this claim is not justified on several grounds.6,7 
This endeavor moves the discussion from “the bad guys versus the good guys” to “what motivates 
people to conduct acts that are morally repugnant to others?”. At PRI, entering neuroscientists’ 
world was an anthropological task I could not pursue further, although the topic was never my 
focus, only a growing interest of mine. Again, as my friend heatedly criticized captivity and non-
invasive experiments with chimpanzees, I too could relate to a strong emotional reaction elicited 
by certain scientific practices, although the content differed. 
During my stay at PRI, I revived the “how could they?” feeling when, in the hall, I 
encountered a monkey being transported in a restraining box. “It” looked at me very curiously and 
I immediately wanted to interact but I realized the human in charge of it did not like much. Then, 
it hit me; this monkey is likely a subject in invasive research. My heart sank. I had just gotten out 
of a full day of experiments with our beloved chimps, of whom I knew each of their names, 
personalities, tricks and all. No wonder Jane Goodall received such a backlash when she first 
named the chimpanzees she studied. Naming is powerful, it is deeply personalizing. Even in the 
famous Koshima island, cradle of cultural primatology, primatologists do not name individuals 
before a certain age, because many infants are likely not to survive.  
I thought about the nameless monkey in the hall with which I could not interact, and our 
chimpanzee “persons” in South Play Room. I had just opened one door, and it felt like another 
world. In my early days as a social sciences student, I was impacted by Bauman’s book “Wasted 
lives” where he describes the process of how humans become waste for others.8 Sure, chimpanzees 
are cognitively more complex than monkeys but are monkeys the “primate waste” of research?  As 
an anthropologist, I had no real knowledge of the practices in invasive research, therefore I had no 
intellectual answer for this question. Yet, again, I, too, could relate to my friends’ feeling of “how 
236
 
could they?”. Indeed, this was a very pure emotional response. I felt it every time we smelled the 
melted flesh of monkey corpses being flushed through the connecting pipes in South Play Room. 
It was visceral. I was deeply grateful that, at least for chimpanzees, invasive research has been 
banned around the world.  
The discussion my friend and I had went on for some time, and, her position in the heat of 
the moment was that chimpanzees are prisoners, and they are prisoners of our experimental 
research as well. I tried to fully grasp her perspective and dwell on the points of her argument with 
which I agreed, or at least, related. This “they are the bad guys” feeling; “how could they?”; I knew 
from somewhere. Except - and then it hit me - now, I was the bad guy. I was the experimenter. At 
this moment, I did not have any anthropological leverage to think from outside. It was like going 
from conducting war studies to raging war.  
Of course, this does not mean that anthropologists do not engage in the natives’ practices 
and do not have ethical concerns about their own anthropological practices; but “going native” 
was another level of liability. I had never thought naïvely about the ethical implications of 
chimpanzee research, even in an enriched environment. However, I had never felt as if I were 
responsible for it neither. I would have to switch the question from “how could they?” to “how 
could I?”. Even if perhaps unaware of it, this dear friend, by addressing me as an outsider, forced 
me to go beyond my anthropological duty of making sense of other experimenters’ ethics, to start 
addressing my own ethics as an experimenter on a deeper level.  
Another profound facet of the experiment was its interspecies social aspect. This aspect 
would necessitate considerable time to be fully developed, and would contribute to the long 
preparation time, before we could officially start by late May 2015. In my inexperience as a 
chimpanzee researcher, I was very enthusiastic the first time we had figured out all the elements 
for the preference test and the test phase; participants, stimuli, randomization, design, orders, 
positions, verbal praises, food rewards, so on and so on. “It has been quite a journey but the 
protocol is done and we can soon start once all the minor practicalities are dealt with”, or so I 
thought. 
My senpai brought me back to reality, twice. The first time, she informed me that I would 
need to have more experience with chimpanzees and build up a good relationship with them. This 
meant going through the first phase of feeding duty training, that is, watching others feed the 
chimpanzees dinner. Especially because my setting was semi face-to-face this was important. For 
237
 
several months, I would accompany dinner feeding in the basement, and in the beginning, almost 
every week day. First, I would follow a particular person, asking to “stalk” in advance, but once 
familiarized with the basement, I could move freely and watch several human-chimpanzee pairs. 
Yet, being both an anthropologist and an experimenter was proving to be ruthless; I squeezed 
dinner feeding into the schedule just after the last session of a full day accompanying others’ 
experiments and just before the multiple seminars occurring in the evening for researchers.  
In the end, I was not required to feed chimpanzees but, somehow, having had the 
opportunity to regularly attend dinner feeding (not just once or twice) made all the difference in 
both my work as an anthropologist and experimenter. It was also a time in which, research 
personnel, tired from a full day of obligations, would sometimes stand by just a bit more to observe 
chimpanzees, as if we were inebriated by their interesting acts and our own sleep at the same time. 
In fact, it was sheer contemplation. A last gift from attending dinner feeding, was the opportunity 
to become acquainted with the chimpanzees not tested in South Play Room, that is, Akira, Puchi, 
Popo, Mari and Gon, who each had their own persona, which I was eager to meet.  
My second reality check was the “training phase”. My senpai was clear: You need to train 
chimpanzees to come to your experiment. Raising an eyebrow, I questioned: What do you mean? 
Don’t they already come to other experiments in the lab? If they will already be here, can’t we just 
take it from there? - or so I imagined. Well, in fact, no. And like this, I would come to know the 
slow pace of the so-called “training phase”. In general, training phase is a series of sessions run to 
make chimpanzees understand the setting before the test phase per se starts. This means that how 
chimpanzees will accomplish a task needs to be very clear for them before they can answer the 
task in itself. In the same way, human participants of cognitive experiments and exams in general 
are also given instructions, such as “press this button when you see this or that”, or “write the test 
with pen and not with pencil”, and so on. Except, this time we cannot rely on extended verbal 
instructions but only on a sort of “trans-species pidgin”, to quote Kohn’s term.9  
However, when you have more to say than your communicative repertoire in interspecies 
pidgin or when you need to rely on consistent action, operant conditioning will serve experimenters 
well; not as means to solve a task, but as means to inform about a task. As such, our team would 
proceed to engage in a long training to make chimpanzees understand the “know-how” aspect of 
the experiment, before we could test their “know-what” of the task. The first part of the training 
was to condition chimpanzees to be tested separately. This was necessary because although for the 
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computer experiments each chimpanzee has her or his own booth, they come to the laboratory in 
dyads, with one exception. Our sessions were the following: first in the morning, Ai and Ayumu, 
followed by Chloe and Cleo; in the afternoon, Pan and Pal, followed by Pendesa. The training was 
multifold; they had to learn that another “event” would take place after the computer experiments, 
that they would do it separately and that they needed to use the apparatus in a certain way. In 
addition, they had to get used to me just being there, as part of the setting.  
To this purpose, after the computer experiments chimpanzees would be called into the 
entrance. One of the lab members would go inside the first booth and place a treat on the floor in 
front of the apparatus. I would then sit inside the cabin and the members would ask the youngest 
chimpanzee to proceed to the booth first. This is not necessarily an easy task because some 
scenarios can arise.  At times, chimpanzees (a) want to go together, or (b) the requested 
chimpanzee does not want to go but the unrequested does (c) none of them are agreeable. Thus, 
two people separate the dyad; one takes care of entertaining the chimpanzee staying in the entrance, 
either with treats or simply by playing, while the other gestures and verbalizes for the “target” to 
move. When the requested chimpanzee is next to the door and the other is paying close attention 
to a human, the door is opened. The youngest one will come into the booth, find the treat, eat and 
head back to the entrance. Then, the procedure is repeated for the older chimpanzee. Afterward, 
the training session is over and chimpanzees leave the laboratory for good.  
This is repeated over several days until chimpanzees get more used to being separated in 
such way. Note, they are not asked to merely come to the booth, stay in a designated spot and stare 
at the experimenter in the cabin; instead, a positive stimulus, a treat, is placed where they will 
manipulate objects in the future, and the experimenter being there is just another fixed factor in 
this configuration. This can be referred to as locale enhancement: they come to associate the place 
positively. With time, they anticipate the full sequence and configuration; that an event occurs 
after computer experiments, that the youngest will go first, that everybody will have their share, 
that there will be a person in the cabin, not anyone, but that one specific person, and so on.  
Of course, this does not mean they comply with our schedule all the time. However, in this 
way, first, they have a clearer understanding of what we, humans, want and when they are 
cooperative they proceed without much instructions on our part, or sometimes, none. Secondly, 
this implies that when they are uncooperative, they are so with a clearer picture of what is intended 
for them instead. A behaviorist might oppose: What has been described simply means that behavior 
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is shaped by doing the same actions over and over again associated with a positive stimulus; we 
can pass without the explanation that they understand humans’ mental states. However, the 
converse also applies because, in the process, shaping does not preclude some level of theory of 
mind (i.e., attribution of mental states to humans) or metacognition (awareness of one’s own 
behavior). In addition, not all interspecies communal actions are shaped.  
Now, back to the training sessions, once a specific spot was enhanced in certain constant 
configuration, our next step would be to make chimpanzees understand how to use the apparatus. 
It was vital to make them grasp that they had to give the experimenter the objects encountered on 
the floor. And this, one by one.  Our initial experiment counted with twenty-five stimuli, therefore, 
we divided the training session into small steps. We bought several wooden, uncolored balls of 
three centimeters each to serve as items for the training phase. It was important that these were (a) 
different from the stimuli (colors and objects) of the test phase (b) small enough to fit the hole and 
(c) small enough to give chimpanzees the chance to make mistakes, that is, to deliver two or more 
at the same time, since this would be a real situation faced during test phase.  
This official training session consisted of five steps to be accomplished over time: five 
balls; ten; fifteen; twenty; twenty-five balls. Whenever chimpanzees would enter the booth, now 
they would see balls scattered next to the apparatus, instead of a treat. They would all begin with 
five balls and pass to the next steps depending on how well they performed. Our protocol allowed 
me to say a common husbandry word they know well, that is, “chōdai”, or ‘give me’. In addition 
to the verbal request, I would concomitantly knock three times on apparatus. The knocking was 
always on the same spot, that is, the translucid protective cover facing the hole where chimpanzees 
were supposed to deliver the items (named object hole).  
These details were important because relying on multimodal communication (verbal plus 
gestural) to convey the same message seems to be more effective in reinforcing meaning.10 In 
addition, the precise spot of the knocking indicated that they were supposed to deliver it through 
the object hole, not the food hole. In sum, the formula was: chōdai + 3 knocks next to the object 
hole. Then, for each ball delivered a praise would follow: “sō”, that is, ‘yes’. Moreover, we had 
also planned to signal when they made a mistake, in which case, the experimenter had to say 
“chigau”, also a husbandry word, which indicates loosely the idea of ‘otherwise’ or ‘it is different’ 
or ‘that is not it’. The protocol was to say “chigau” and return the items to the participant. In case 
of destructive behavior, the stronger “dame” would be used (no good).   
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After all items were returned, the experimenter would check them and reward the 
chimpanzee for accomplishing the task by saying “erai” (good job) and by providing a food reward. 
The chimpanzee would pass to the next stage (e.g., from five to ten balls) when all the balls were 
successfully given one by one without any damaging actions, like biting. Chimpanzees quickly 
understood which hole they were supposed to deliver with near perfection. Also, the food hole was, 
in fact, inverted so that things would drop from the top of the experimenter’s side to the bottom 
accessible to chimpanzees. Yet, the reverse, that is, giving the experimenter an object from bottom 
to top, was not possible. Thus, they swiftly grasped the mechanics of the apparatus. Having a few 
sessions as exception, chimpanzees were performing well and delivering the balls one by one when 
they could have simply thrown a bunch through the hole. In such sessions, I would see myself 
flooded with balls on the human side, cumbersomely trying to pick them up for return. Indeed, the 
balls proved not to be a very experimenter-friendly object. Curiously, the defiant Ayumu would 
occasionally vent some frustration at a ball, throwing it against the floor vigorously while we 
watched it ping-pong from floor to ceiling. 
I could extend myself to describe in precision all the protocols for each phase of the 
experiment, but there are indeed several scientific journals as space for such facet of the scientific 
work. However, to the best of my knowledge, what lacks in terms of publishing venues are journals 
in which other aspects of experimental work are contemplated seriously: such as etho-ethnographic 
aspects of an experiment, its social interactions entailed, and so on. Recently, a replicability crisis 
in cognitive psychology has been evoked, supported by a large-scale study,11 although the study 
itself has been criticized as well.12 Regardless of which side of the debate is most accurate, the 
truth is that, in scientific journals, more detailed social aspects allowing us to move beyond 
standard words, such as “enculturated”, “socially housed” and “language-trained”, have no formal, 
institutional space. This occurs even when authors have the best intentions of elaborating and 
reflecting upon the context of studies themselves.  
In mass, experimental scientists have to deal with standardized, air-tight formal structures 
in their reports. Sure, one could publish books and so on, however, this misses two points. First, 
other publication types are never as valuable as journal articles for biology-oriented sciences; and 
in order to receive already scarce grants one must “publish or perish” (obviously, “publish” sensu 
high impact factor journals!). Secondly, by dissociating contextual from other technical details, 
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the reader loses possibly important information that could help their experimental setup or their 
replication efforts. In this sense, the “contextual” is an important technical aspect. 
This necessity of an attention shift occurs not only on a formal ground of how much space 
scientists are given, but also on an epistemological and methodological level of what counts as 
data, and what counts as a good report of results. Thus, this parenthesis was meant to convey that, 
here, we will not dwell on providing readers the same type of information they could read in a 
possible future publication; luckily, our experiment has continued through collaborative efforts 
after my departure and we are on the stage of data analysis and conception of follow-up 
experiments. What I would like to provide readers, instead, are mainly “unofficial” aspects of an 
experiment, which, nonetheless, are not any less vital. They comprise failures and surprises in 
which the social aspect of an experiment became paramount to the reflection upon our 
experimental protocols and practices.  
Now, one may ask whether experimenters can be tested by chimpanzees themselves. 
Chimpanzees are such socio-cognitively complex creatures that those involved in chimpanzee 
research could likely give a positive answer to the above question without fearing being crucified 
for the sin of anthropomorphism. Yet, it is not only that chimpanzees can test us but, indeed, they 
do. This occurs in numerous situations when they try several means, and probe our reactions 
attentively watching the outcome. In addition, chimpanzees do not necessarily conform to our 
intended protocols and the task of designing and conducting an experiment goes through a true 
feedback loop, instead of a top to bottom decision from experimenters to participants.  
One of these feedback loops that changed the course of our experiment was an episode 
occurring during Pan’s session, after she had passed the training phase and was just beginning the 
preference test. Before exploring the case in detail, we should put the session in a bigger context. 
At this point, we had started the preference test for some chimpanzees, where we would assess 
whether chimpanzees would spontaneously sort items preferentially by color or by shape. 
Remember, each item had two features: its shape as an object and its color (e.g., red cup). If a 
chimpanzee preferentially groups by color, she or he will be more likely to return colors 
sequentially (e.g., red cup, red rope, red block; then green spoon, green pencil, green block, etc.). 
On the other hand, if a chimpanzee preferentially groups by object type, then she or he will be 
more likely to return objects in sequence instead (e.g., red cup, green cup, yellow cup; then white 
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rope, blue rope, yellow rope, etc.). Our stimuli were five colors and five objects. However, a 
problem started to occur in the very first sessions of the preference test.  
The first problem was the coding of the videos. After the sessions, I would watch the videos 
and write down the sequence of the chimpanzees’ selections. There, an unforeseen problem 
occurred: some stimuli like spoons and pencils, and their colors, were becoming too difficult to 
identify in the videos, even if we had a close view through one of the cameras. We had simulated 
the experiment before with humans, and even asked them to try to enact chimpanzees’ patterns 
and speed, but no true issue was spotted at that point. When the real preference test with 
chimpanzees started, action was too fast for coding thin objects and although slow motion 
essentially improved coding quality, reliable coding was becoming so time consuming as to be 
impractical. That was a main scientific issue. A second, more practical issue was the destruction 
of the items. Apart from a few destructive behaviors Ayumu had shown during the ball phase, 
which improved over training, we did not have major issues with how they treated the items. Yet, 
this would change with the introduction of real stimuli. Whereas the cups, ropes and blocks were 
sturdy enough to survive some eventual biting, pencils and spoons were not.  
Chimpanzees behaved differently toward the novel items. Ai, in all the sessions she 
completed for the preference test, manipulated them very carefully. Cleo would spend an immense 
amount of time playing, and, in the beginning, she would amusingly get very frustrated whenever 
she did not manage to stack blocks correctly. She also bit a couple of objects. Pendesa, curiously, 
created a “nest” with the items, exactly as chimpanzees in the basement would do sometimes with 
the blankets given to them. A few of the items, Pendesa damaged. Pal, Chloe and Ayumu, for 
various reasons, had their preference test delayed. The quiet, sweet Pan, on the other hand, would 
be the record breaker for bringing down the house. When trying to make sense of their actions, I 
realized that, first, they are so much stronger than us, and small objects for human use are designed 
for human strength and learned delicacy.  
Then, I realized they were curious about the stimuli and exploring the affordances of the 
objects. In fact, during the first sessions we would include a time window in which the 
experimenter would not ask ‘give me’ if they were away, in order to allow them to explore the 
items at will. Yet, exploring also meant breaking! Especially for the super strong chimpanzees. 
After one of Ai’s session, I felt so excited and commented with a technician about Ai’s delicacy 
with the items; ‘As expected from Ai’, she replied (“sasuga Aichan”). Indeed, it has been evoked 
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in the laboratory how Ai had a more human mindset. Even though chimpanzees have their own 
right to act the way they want, I felt deeply grateful for Ai’s soft handling of objects; a feature 
which I infer must have been learned over the course of thousands of close interactions with 
humans, in the same way human children learn not to destroy their belongings. On the other hand, 
whenever Ai is curious about something out of reach (like computer cables), if given the chance, 
she would tear the place apart to gain access to a novel stimulus, so I was told. Anyhow, tough 
handling was an issue we would have to deal with.  
There was still a third difficulty we were facing, which, in theory, could be circumvented 
by our protocol but, in reality, was making the experiment very challenging. The issue was the 
multiple returns at the same time. If overall chimpanzees had done great with the balls during 
training phase, they were now more prone to deliver objects in groups at once, especially the 
problematic spoon and pencil. This was, in fact, already a function of their preferential 
categorization of picking up items by shape. Curiously, this facet of multiple returns could not 
have occurred during the training phase, because the items were all of one shape (i.e., ball) and 
“colorless” (i.e., non-painted wood).  
Thus, during training there were no differences to sort out, and if there were, then, it could 
not be counted as training but as a test phase. Indeed, we did not want any sorting at that stage, 
just (a) learning where the object hole was (b) learning not to bite items and (c) to return them one 
by one. In retrospect, because big items cannot fit together in the hole, the small size of the balls 
covered only one aspect of multiple returns: its possibility. However, one of the reasons they 
usually did not return the small balls together, when they could, might have been because they 
were not categorizing them (there were no categories!). When you add the powerful combo 
“possibility (i.e., small size) + meaningful grouping (i.e., categories)”, then they would return thin 
objects at once (e.g., group of pencils).  
Already during the first sessions of the preference test, chimpanzees were more likely to 
return items by object category. By design, multiple returns were interdicted given that (a) this 
would make chimpanzees have to decide clearly how they wanted to group objects (b) this would 
allow a reliable rewarding system and clear analysis (c) this would allow them to correctly identify 
which were the items that were rewarded in the test phase, otherwise, they would have a harder 
time identifying the targets. Suppose a chimpanzee has “red” as a target. If we accepted multiple 
returns and the chimpanzee delivered at the same time a red pencil, red spoon and yellow spoon, 
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then, two rewards would be given because the target “red” was given twice. However, the target 
could also have been spoon, correct? In addition, the reward delivery would be much more error-
prone because the action happens extremely fast. In other words, we did have strong reasons for 
organizing the returns in a sequential, one by one manner.  
Most of the time, in the preference test phase, chimpanzees returned items according to the 
protocol. Yet, all of them, at some point, would break the protocol. We assumed that chimpanzees 
would transfer the modus operandi (return one by one) from training balls to experimental items. 
Mostly, they did. However, when they were not complying to the protocol, they were, in fact, 
already categorizing. In most of their multiple returns of thin objects, pencils and spoons were 
grouped apart, although occasionally a mixed grouping occurred (e.g., several pencils and one 
spoon). In sum, when they were breaking our protocol, they were breaking it because they were 
smart. In their “failure” in complying with our protocol, they were, in fact, outsmarting our 
protocol. Testing intelligent animals can be hard, and it can be a blow to a human’s ego.  
As you can see, little by little, during the very first sessions of the preference test, issues 
began to accumulate. However, the one specific episode with Pan changed my mindset in a very 
important way. My relationship with Pan had always been great, and she was one of the first 
chimpanzees to acknowledge me and show many affiliative behaviors whenever we met. In the 
presence of her daughter, Pal, she could become difficult because of Pal’s defiant character. Yet, 
Pan is one of the PRI chimpanzees who seems to appreciate humans the most. This includes 
greeting humans, being curious about our things, using human typical clapping as attention getter, 
being preferentially interested in human faces when given the opportunity to “surf” the internet, 
and having some of her vocalizations sound a bit modified (although the topic merits studies). In 
addition, she had to be hand-raised for a while in Matsuzawa’s home after her mother, Puchi, 
rejected her.  
It is true she is not known for being PRI’s most performant chimpanzee and, in fact, some 
experimenters hypothesized she comes to experiments because she likes human interaction, 
sometimes more than chimpanzees’. When recalling Pan’s way of being, a very conspicuous image 
emerges. Many chimpanzees viciously banged or knocked the panel to warn personnel when there 
were occasional problems with the automatic feeder or when they had finished the tasks and 
humans forgot their treats. But Pan was gracious. Indeed, unlike other chimpanzees, her apples 
had to be frozen for her taste, but the melting fruits occasionally would get stuck in the tube of the 
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automatic feeder and she would receive no rewards for a while. Despite facing this issue more 
often than any chimpanzee, Pan would calmly and gently knock to inform us of the problem. Her 
gestural expressions were often precise, elegantly using one or two fingers to make her point.  
Such difference could be due to many factors; because of her personality, because of how 
she perceives herself in chimpanzee and human hierarchy (among chimpanzees, she is lower 
ranking), or any other reason. Nonetheless, the difference was so striking. Sometimes we discussed 
whether chimpanzees think of us as their servants while we are placed next to the feeder, especially 
because of their impatient, strong attitude to see some results from us. Pan’s daughter, the lovely, 
grumpy Pal, was the most typical example. So was the hilariously gluttonous Chloe. Ai, on the 
other hand, was usually not boisterous, yet knocked with confidence. But Pan… she was a butterfly. 
Of course, these are my personal impressions of their patterned behaviors. Their ways are a rich 
material that merits a full study, but my description suffices for the purpose of understanding Pan’s 
experimental session in context. In sum, from my perspective, Pan was a quiet chimpanzee, who 
could be influenced by her daughter’s behavior and turn more boisterous, but who was overall 
very tender, whatever that means. I and Pan were on great terms. Nonetheless, one of our sessions 
together did not go well.  
It was the penultimate preference test trial. Pan had done computer experiments for the day 
and had greeted me beforehand. This episode was documented in a footage of her session (Video 
Frame 7; Audiovisual Material  7). For clarity, the episode will be retraced in third person. The 
video starts with Pan already manipulating the items (9s). The experimenter calls her attention by 
saying “chōdai”. Soon, it can be seen that a blue spoon had been given back to the chimpanzee 
through the food hole (this was an item she had given back together with another). Pan picks up 
the spoon and tries to insert it into the object hole. As it falls, she picks it up again and her insertion 
is successful. The experimenter praises “sō, sō, sō, sō, sō”. Then, Pan picks up items one by one, 
and with each return she receives a verbal praise (42s). After having delivered all blocks and cups, 
some spoons and pencils remain.  
With a spoon in her mouth, Pan gathers three pencils (1m1s) and as she is about to insert 
them in the hole, the experimenter says “chigau, chigau, chigau, chigau, chigau… Pan-chan” (that 
is not it, little Pan) (1m4s). Some pencils fall on the floor. Rapidly, Pan, still in bipedal position, 
lifts up her arms and bangs the panels (1m7s). The adjacent panels vibrate as a result. The 
experimenter says “chigau” once more while giving back a pencil through the food hole. Pan 
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collects the pencil in the hole and proceeds to collect another pencil on the floor while holding a 
white spoon. This time, she delivers just one item, the yellow pencil, to which she receives praise. 
Then, she returns the white spoon (1m16s), and the blue pencil one by one, receiving praise each 
time.  
Next, Pan picks up the red spoon and green spoon (1m24s) and as she proceeds to insert 
them in the hole, the experimenter utters “chigau”. Pan inserts both anyway. The experimenter 
responds “chigau, chigau”. Pan makes a full grin showing her gums and teeth, at the same time the 
experimenter is saying “Pan-chan”. Pan bangs the bottom panel and then the upper panel (1m28s). 
She screams, bipedally, she quickly glances at the humans to her left, turns her vision to the 
experimenter again, and claps three times while screaming (1m33s). A white pencil falls from the 
food hole. The graduate student in charge of the laboratory calls her name: “Pan…” (Pan’s scream 
makes the sentence inaudible); Pan turns to her (1m36s). A red spoon is seen falling from the food 
hole. Pan’s scream increases and she hits the panel of the apparatus with both her hands (1m38s). 
The student in charge says “Pan, kaerō” (Pan, let’s go back). Pan inserts the red spoon into the 
object hole and receives praise. As the experimenter is praising, Pan resumes screaming. Pan picks 
up a white pencil and is praised. As she returns the red pencil, she breaks it in half (1m54s) and 
gives the item back each half at a time. She receives praise. She picks up a green pencil and 
virtually breaks it in half (1m59s). As she delivers the item, she receives praise.  
Now, no more items are seen on the floor. The experimenter asks personnel: “Do you see 
any objects there?” (Not visible from the camera view but detailed in the lab notes: inside the cabin, 
the experimenter bends to observe the floor). Pan passes her hand through under the bench (2m3s) 
and then bends down looking to the floor (2m4s). She turns approximately 90° degrees to her left 
in a bent position (2m5s midway). At the same time, the observing student bends down as well to 
look for any objects left on the floor. The student answers: “No”. The experimenter confirms: 
“No?”. Next, the experimenter proceeds to the end of the session with the standard verbal formula: 
“erai ne, Pan-chan” (good job, right, little Pan). As the experimenter is delivering the reward, it 
falls down on the experimenter’s side: “opa” (‘oops’ in Brazilian Portuguese). The experimenter 
continues “gomen, gomen, gomen.” (‘sorry’ in informal Japanese). The rewards are finally 
delivered: “erai ne, Pan-chan” (good job, right?! little Pan). Pan starts eating and the video ends.     
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Video Frame 7 Pan reacting to the protocol of the categorization experiment. From Audiovisual Material  7. 
Audiovisual Material  7 Pan reacting to the protocol of the categorization experiment, 2015, 2m27s. By Daly. 
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This episode is interesting on many aspects. First, it clearly depicts some of the most 
important problems we had been facing, like multiple returns and destruction of the objects. A 
quick remark on this point is worth mentioning. Note that, when Pan breaks one of the pencils in 
half, she delivers one half after another. This had been one of the chimpanzees’ interesting 
behaviors during the preference test (later on they would not destroy objects anymore). With some 
exceptions, when they damaged or tore an item apart they did not intercalate the delivery of the 
pieces and other items (e.g., a third of a pencil, then spoon, then another third, etc.). Instead, they 
gave back pieces sequentially, as belonging to a same group (i.e., former unscathed item) even if 
the pieces were lying on the floor along with other items.  
The second interesting point is how, in the end, Pan helped look for the object. By 
experience, she knew the session was only over once all items were returned. At the same time the 
experimenter bent over, Pan did the same, and the observing student as well. Action is clearly 
synchronized (see the video in Audiovisual Material  7 for a powerful visual effect). Taking action 
to close an experiment was one of the chimpanzees’ patterns across all phases. Some situations 
arose. In the first scenario, the experimenter would timely count all items on her side and give 
rewards, in which case, no action from the chimpanzee occurred. Note that, by protocol, we did 
not give rewards before making sure all the items were delivered, but even when this was evident, 
the experimenter refrained from overlapping the last item given with the reward for accomplishing 
the experiment.  
In the second scenario, while counting items on her side, the experimenter would take a 
few seconds longer than normal to deliver the final praise and reward. Here, there were several 
possibilities of response: (a) the chimpanzee would patiently wait for the experimenter (b) would 
hurry the experimenter up by knocking on the panel right away or at some point (c) would peek at 
the experimenter’s box by leaning over to see the inside (d) would, by her or his own initiative, 
look for items on the chimpanzee’s side (e) would look for items in the booth by request of the 
experimenter (chōdai). In sum, closing the session entailed coordinated action.  
In fact, during the training phase with balls, from time to time, I felt a profound empathy 
on the part of chimpanzees. Imagine yourself receiving twenty-five balls one after another in high 
speed. With a footer preventing the correct placement of the receiving box under the object hole, 
not all items fell properly inside and, sporadically, the tiny balls rolled outside. In such cases, I 
would not stop the session, obviously, but would quickly remark the experimenter’s side was 
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messy. Occasionally, chimpanzees would adjust their speed; while holding a ball right next to hole, 
they would stop for a split second or more before dropping it. Normally, this occurred when I was 
repositioning my hands to receive more balls and prevent them from falling outside. I noticed that 
as the sessions continued, for most of the time there was some kinesthetic empathy to synchronize 
action in difficult situations.  
The third important point regarding the episode with Pan was the impact our 
communication during the experiment was having on her. Sure, chimpanzees have some 
understanding of the meaning of husbandry words like chōdai, dame and chigau. In general, such 
words are somehow supported by communication forms that reinforce their meaning like voice 
tone, gestural communication, context and so on. Chigau was essentially negative: something is 
not correct. However, much later I reflected upon the full implications of the use of chigau in the 
sense of signaling to chimpanzees that something was not done correctly (i.e., return one by one). 
This can be easily translated into Quine’s “gavagai” problem or the indeterminacy of translation.II  
Quine frames the issue as such:13 Suppose there is one English speaker and one speaker of an 
unknown language to the former. Upon seeing a rabbit, the second person utters the word 
“gavagai”.  
For the English speaker, some translations appear more obvious and some less, however, 
without any knowledge of the given language to detail and confirm the meaning with the other 
speaker, the English native is left with some indeterminate possibilities: “gavagai” may well mean 
‘rabbit’, but it may also mean ‘food’, or ‘let’s hunt’, and so on. Likewise, in the protocol, “chigau” 
may indicate that delivering items at once is wrong, but it may also mean that an item per se is 
wrong. Possibly, because chimpanzees heard chigau with different items, one meaning becomes 
more privileged than another. However, in advance, chigau is not specific enough to convey 
precisely what chimpanzees are doing incorrectly. Conversely, dame seems somewhat different 
because the context is always clear: biting. Still, one of the most important features of the 
experiment we needed chimpanzees to understand, was not being conveyed in the best way.  
In Pan’s next session, running on the same protocol, after having used the pencils to draw 
at will on the wall, she chewed them all completely. That was the last straw, and it called for a 
change. We reformulated the protocol and the stimuli, eliminating pencils and spoons, and 
therefore, the necessity for any “chigau” of the sorts. This proved to be extremely effective, and 
                                                 
II I thank Nicolas Langlitz for referring to Quine as a possible analogy.  
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the few preference test sessions that some chimpanzees have had with the old protocol, matched 
the preference test running with fewer stimuli. In other words, their preferences had not changed 
once we dropped two stimuli.  
As we have seen, issues had been accumulating with the old protocol. Nonetheless, what 
really motivated me to pursue a change was the increased probability of experimenter’s error on 
spot and, in addition, Pan’s reaction (and other chimpanzees’ likely reaction in the future). 
Experimenting was becoming very stressful and requiring so much attention during the return of 
the objects that I was afraid of not being able to keep up without making mistakes on my side. This 
may seem pretty straightforward for outsiders: to coordinate receiving items and give back “wrong” 
returns before the next legitimate, orderly return. However, the task was really challenging because 
of its speed. First, once falling, the incorrectly returned items could be mixed with the correct ones 
in the box or even fall outside. In this way, I had to distinguish what was correct, what was wrong, 
pick them up, and return them to the food hole within seconds, before the chimpanzee could make 
the next move. Secondly, if this was already challenging during the preference test, imagine during 
the test phase, when a target is rewarded with food. The protocol was becoming too hard for my 
motor and cognitive abilities! 
Then, on the top of that, I was extremely saddened by the fact that I had caused Pan 
frustration in such way. This was likely to become systematic and, perhaps, more chimpanzees 
would eventually feel the same way. Some collaborators evoked the fact that she was on estrous 
and more sensitive to being reprimanded, according to people’s past experience. Regardless, I did 
not want to have any openings where our social relations could deteriorate. I have had chimpanzees 
showing agonistic behaviors toward me, however, it had never been because of something I 
intentionally provoked, or of which I was aware.  
This problem, on the other hand, was different. I felt personally responsible for her 
frustration and guilt sank in. No matter what, the protocol had to be changed and my most driving 
motive was not science but the type of social relation that was unfolding in the experiment. Luckily, 
our good relationship was not changed and she continued to show affiliative behaviors as she did 
in the past. I recall that once, when I went to observe dinner feeding in the basement, I dropped by 
next to Ayumu’s room to greet him after meals were over. Next door was Pan, but, because I could 
only see through small openings, I was unaware that she was still in that room. When she heard 
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my voice while talking to Ayumu, she clapped to call my attention and when I came close to the 
perforated window, she greeted me enthusiastically with an onion breath. This was Pan.  
Afterward, our new protocol would still be put to the test by chimpanzees’ intelligence. 
Fortunately, this time, it involved no such reactions and our protocol would prove to be 
chimpanzee-cheat proof. Now that the protocol had been changed, chimpanzees completed all the 
preference test sessions and they demonstrated to be shape biased when no items were food 
rewarded (Graph  5).III This means, concretely, that chimpanzees preferentially grouped by shapes 
than by colors. Now, in the test phase, we wanted to address whether and how they would change 
their patterns if one category or another was targeted. In other words, comparatively, we wanted 
to investigate the structure of their actions when certain features were highlighted.  
 
 
 
Graph  5 Results of object and color categorization, preference test. 
 
                                                 
III For reference: p = .0002, repeated measures ANOVA. 
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In the test phase, whenever chimpanzees returned a target, 
regardless of the position of the return, she or he would receive a 
reward (Figure 1). In addition, we expected that if chimpanzees were 
explicitly aware of the targets, they would deliver it in the first three 
positions in order to obtain the rewards earlier. Note that the amount 
of food chimpanzees received in all phases never changed, only the 
moment when they would receive it. Thus, whatever rearrangement 
might exist in the structure of the sequences, it cannot not be attributed 
to a differential amount of food reward.  
During the test phase, by and large, Pendesa was my best and 
most motivated “student”. Pendesa was a curious chimpanzee. She 
was easily recognizable by her constant sideway swings. Usually, in 
a chimpanzee, repeated movements as such might be a sign of 
stereotypy, which is not a good welfare indicator. However, because 
Pendesa has her vision partially damaged in one side, it seems that 
this is more likely a way to compensate for her vision loss, especially 
as she is well integrated into the group. Pendesa’s typical move 
whenever coming to South Play Room is pant-hooting and eventually hitting the panels. As I first 
came to PRI, I was impressed by her vigorous kicks and punches, and assumed that she was an 
aggressive chimpanzee but I came to realize that this was a sort of ritual of her own. Other 
researchers believe that these repeated actions are meant to signal the group where she is because, 
apparently, in the other laboratories further away from the outdoor enclosure, she seems to be 
quieter when entering.  
Pen-chan, as we call her, had been randomly assigned to “cup” as first target. The criterion 
to move to another target was to give the experimenter the targeted items back in the first three 
positions - but that - across three consecutive sessions, to make sure results could not be attributed 
to chance. From session ten, she started to meet our criterion and in thirteen sessions she was done 
with her first target. Then, Pendesa would be tested with “rope”, her next randomized target. This 
time, it took her only two sessions to grasp her new target, and in a total of five sessions she 
completed her second target. This was impressive, especially considering chimpanzees were tested 
only once a day for this experiment, not the nearly hundred trials per day of computer experiments.  
 
Figure 1 Example of target 
in the object and color 
categorization experiment. 
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Unfortunately, Pendesa would never grasp her third randomized target, yellow. And future 
sessions (and subsequent follow-up experiments) revealed that the color condition for real, 3D 
items would be extremely difficult for all chimpanzees, even for Ai. They never got it once! True, 
chimpanzees have not been tested yet with the same setting in a computer version. Still, it is 
remarkable that whereas they excel in difficult 2D computer tasks such as color categorization by 
symbols, when confronted with real, 3D items, the color aspect is hindered. Likely, this occurs due 
to the affordances of the objects, that is, what chimpanzees can do with real objects (e.g., stacking, 
nesting etc.). We are designing new experiments to tackle the issue, given that it is not a matter of 
inability to categorize colors, a well-known capacity in their species. Instead, the difficulty 
revolves around how features of the real and virtual world impact the structure of chimpanzees’ 
actions and categorization; and, in addition, how our experimental protocols can embody the right 
features to bring preferential color categorization to life in a real-world setting.  
Pendesa, however, presented strategies to try to evade difficulties in solving the task. She 
began to present what shall be dubbed here as “testing behavior”. Recall that her first target was 
cup and that from session ten she started meeting our criterion. Well, in the ninth session, she first 
started to probe whether her “hypothesis” was right. By protocol, the experimenter verbally says 
“sō, sō” when a target is delivered, along with a food reward. Therefore, in anticipation, instead of 
dropping an item through the object hole, Pendesa would insert the item through the opening, as 
if she meant to drop it on the experimenter’s side - but then she would wait. In the absence of a 
response (sō, sō), she would take the item back and try another. This was her strategy to circumvent 
the forced choice we had imposed upon her. Like this, she could “try” several objects and only 
make up her mind once she was certain to have chosen the correct one. Moreover, Pendesa could 
be clearly seen looking at items and hesitating to choose among them.  
I was very much surprised when I saw she was passing the items to my side but not 
dropping them. This sent chills down my spine; we had defined that in the test phase the verbal 
praise would only be given after the chimpanzee dropped the targeted item. I was being particularly 
careful about this; however, I was not expecting such “testing behavior” the first time this occurred. 
Had I not been quick to grasp her “cheating” intentions, I might have broken the protocol and said 
‘yes’, when, in fact, she was just testing to see whether her choice was correct… not making a real 
choice. Luckily, I was firm. Even when she tested me with the correct item, I did not give a verbal 
praise until she dropped it.  
255
 
In total, Pendesa showed this testing behavior twelve times. This occurred once during her 
first target, cup, and she tested it against yellow block. Parenthetically, blocks and cups were the 
objects that had more mixed grouping. Next, Pendesa repeated this behavior three times more for 
her second target rope: twice against green cup and once against red cup. Note that her testing was 
likely based on her previous target, cup. In other words, she might have wanted to verify that the 
target had changed indeed. At last, for her subsequent target, yellow, she would show this behavior 
eight more times (yellow block 2x; green cup 2x; yellow cup 1x; red cup 3x). Probably, Pendesa 
was testing the third target against her first one (Cf. the possibility of grouping by colors: 3 times 
yellow; 2 times green; 3 times red vs. the possibility of grouping by objects: 2 times block; 6 times 
cup). With time, she abandoned the strategy, likely because she noticed it was ineffective. In sum, 
there are reasons to believe that Pendesa was not only testing the experimenter by fishing for a 
positive feedback before making her choice, but that she was doing so in a strategic manner, basing 
it on her previous experiences.  
Now, we shall explore a video compilation of some of Pendesa’s instances of “testing 
behavior” to ground the points discussed (Video Frame 8; Audiovisual Material  8).The video 
starts with a session during Pendesa’s first target, rope. Pendesa comes to the booth, sits down (3s), 
glances at the items and picks up “green cup”. She introduces it through the hole (4s) but takes it 
back (5s). She puts the cup on the floor, swiftly touches “red cup” but pushes items away with one 
hand (yellow block, yellow cup, and red cup roll). Then, she picks up the red rope and introduces 
it into the hole, letting it drop. As rope was her target, she receives praise “sō, sō, sō, sō, sō” and a 
food reward. Next, the video cuts to another session. This time Pendesa’s target is yellow. Pendesa 
is seen picking up the yellow rope (14s), introducing it into the hole and letting it drop. Because 
her target was yellow, she receives praise (sō, sō, sō, sō, sō) and a food reward that she readily 
eats.  
Next, Pendesa looks at the objects on the floor. Only cups and blocks remain. She gently 
touches a group of items with her hand (red block, green block, and red cup) and they become 
slightly more scattered. Pendesa picks up the slow rolling red cup next to her and proceeds to insert 
it in the hole (28s). However, she withdraws and positions it next to her mouth (30s). She puts the 
red cup down and this time picks up the yellow block. As she puts it in her mouth she slightly 
rotates it (33s) and then she passes it through the hole (35s), but she takes it back. Pendesa puts 
the block into her mouth again, rotating it, and proceeds to put it down (39s). Next, Pendesa picks 
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up the green cup and places it halfway through the hole (42s) but takes it back, placing it in her 
mouth (45s). She seemingly licks the cup while rotating it. Afterward, Pendesa inserts the green 
cup into the hole, holds it on the experimenter’s side (48s), until she finally drops it and the video 
ends.  
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5s 14s 
  
28s 30s 
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Video Frame 8 Pendesa’s testing behavior during the categorization experiment. From Audiovisual Material  8. 
Audiovisual Material  8 Pendesa’s testing behavior during the categorization experiment, 2015, 51s. By Daly.  
 
 
What is most impressive in Pendesa’s case is that the final amount of food reward is the 
same. What would she lose if she had just dropped an item that was not correct? Sure, chimpanzees 
are very impatient regarding food and usually precipitate to receive it as soon as possible. Yet, her 
strategy also took time she could just have spent delivering items in an increased speed, which was 
Chloe’s strategy, for instance. Thus, Pendesa’s motivation for going as far as probing the responses 
must have lied elsewhere. It looks almost as if she were completely “in the game”; by the way she 
moved items, by the way she carefully went across them, and so on. Interestingly, one day, Pendesa 
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even waited for this experiment despite our otherwise instructions. On that particular day, I was in 
South Play Room accompanying my colleagues’ computer experiments but it had been decided 
that my experiment was not going to take place this once. So, after the computer experiments, 
Pendesa was called to the chimpanzees’ entrance to leave the lab. Yet, no matter how we would 
tell her to go back (by verbal and gestural communication), she remained there, swinging her way 
as usual.  
We insisted for some time until my senpai asked me to head to the back of the lab, out of 
her sight. I stood there but to no avail. We had to turn the lights of the laboratory off for her to 
leave. I was curious of the possible explanations for it and asked my senpai. She said chimpanzees 
knew they had to accomplish my task after the computer experiments, in other words, it was simple 
reinforcement. Nonetheless, none of the other chimpanzees had done so in the sessions I had to 
cancel. Whatever confirmation bias it might be, I felt my experiment was appreciated by Pen-chan. 
Curiously, Pendesa might not respond in the same fashion to all experiments. A professor at PRI 
once commented how they had to stop a certain experiment with Pendesa, because they discovered 
that before Pen would be called in, she was hiding, trying to avoid going to the respective 
laboratory. Whereas this experiment was very amusing to other chimpanzees, Pendesa seemed not 
to be enthusiastic about it.  
When my stay was coming to an end, I had accumulated considerable experience when 
looking back in retrospect. I had even become a senpai myself. I had never pictured myself in this 
place before Matsuzawa specifically pointed it out, on the occasion my senpai was absent and I 
was the more experienced one in the laboratory (even if the experience difference was not so large).  
In fact, at times, I would be the only experimenter in South Play Room, an irony for an 
anthropologist studying others’ relationship to chimpanzees, although, true, there would always 
be at least one experienced technician to help with the experiment and ensure safety. This 
opportunity, too, proved to be enriching on an anthropological level because I had to be even more 
aware of my duties and make an experimenter’s responsibilities explicit to myself, in terms of both 
science and safety.  
During the last months of my stay, we had plans to continue the experiment: I would still 
be responsible for analyzing the data and correlates but a graduate student of the laboratory would 
take my place in locu. I trained my “successor” the best I could. I wrote down all the details I could 
remember and, most importantly, all the details that were not in the protocol but that were 
259
 
nonetheless vital. This included how to keep your cool when facing heated agonistic reactions, 
how not to be “cheated on”, and so forth. We simulated the experiment beforehand, but just among 
humans, so that the specifics could be passed on. I even imitated some of chimpanzees’ worst 
reactions to make my point.  
But it was not until I had to “pass the torch” that I realized one of the most important 
features of the experiment: it was ingrained in me. My body knew the experiment by heart; in the 
way I moved, in the way I would almost ritualistically cross-check the steps, in the way I positioned 
myself in the cabin, in the way I kept distances, in the way I mastered its temporality… This semi-
face-to-face experiment was, in a certain way, like a musical instrument I knew how to play. And 
I could play several songs with it. Or better, the experiment was a duet between I and the 
chimpanzee. Indeed, there was so much implicit knowledge that I had a hard time figuring out 
what was meaningful to pass down, and what was just idiosyncrasies of my own.  
Yet, during this transition phase I would still learn another lesson on what experimenting 
with chimpanzees truly means. By the end of my stay, I was still a very pragmatic person, perhaps, 
too pragmatic despite my previous lessons. Once most essentials of how my colleague would take 
over had been cleared out, I wanted her to start the sessions with chimpanzees before I would leave. 
This way, I could help the transition and supervise the details. In my everlasting naïve imagination, 
she could start right away with the next test phase. Once again, my senpai brought me back to 
reality. Now, for the third time. She informed me that the training phase would have to be 
reinstalled. Whaaat??!! - I thought. Training phase? But don’t they already know the apparatus 
and all that jazz? Isn’t our colleague already an experimenter? Aren’t they already used to her as 
an experimenter? Why then?? - I asked, anxious. My senpai was simple and compelling. It was 
because chimpanzees had to be used to our colleague being the experimenter for the categorization 
experiment. Chimpanzees had to be used to her not as the experimenter for her own computer task 
- but as the experimenter of the categorization task. In other words, they had to acknowledge our 
colleague in her new position as my substitute.  
Indeed, when connecting the dots, a similar case had been evoked in the past. In another 
PRI lab, it was not without resistance on the part of chimpanzees that a new experimenter started 
to alternate days with the old one. And this took place in an automated, computer setting with less 
social interaction. However, perhaps this occurred simply because this other colleague was a 
newcomer. Instead, my lab colleague was already an experimenter in South Play Room, so our 
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case seemed more dramatic to me. But then, again, it is true that the setting was comparatively 
more dangerous, therefore, even more experience was required. In a very synthetical form, my 
senpai referred to the training phase specifically as “relationship training”. Chimpanzees would 
have to be tested again with non-meaningful items for the experiment, but this time, not because 
they did not know the protocol, but because the social relations per se had to be put to the test. In 
this sense, the “social” was part of the experimental setup all along, much more than I could have 
envisioned.  
 Testing chimpanzees and being tested by them had proven to be one of the most enriching 
experiences I had ever had. Also near the end of my stay, the experiment would be the object of a 
series of shootings and Professor Hayashi and I were invited for an interview to discuss the 
experiment. The interviewer was a long-term collaborator of South Play Room, who was a 
biological anthropologist and film maker. She was there on my first day at PRI and she was well 
aware of the fact that I was a social anthropologist focusing on studying human-chimpanzee 
relationship in Japanese primatology. Yet, she was interested in how I crossed the bridge from 
human-chimpanzee interactions to chimpanzees per se.  
As I was describing how I viewed chimpanzees, the portrayal felt, in a way, very much 
anthropological and she proposed me the following analogy: It is as if chimpanzees were an 
unknown tribe, with their own language, and culture, but whose lives I still knew very little and, 
thus, was fascinated to study. At a first glance, I thought that this could sound like the 
anthropological cliché of the exoticism of the “primitives”, but on a second thought, she was 
correct; it was exactly how I felt it. However, not because chimpanzees are “primitives” or akin to 
“primitive” humans - but in the sense that the effort to understand chimpanzees’ own terms was 
already an essentially anthropological adventure. Except that, this time, the “natives” were of 
another species. And with that feeling, I somehow reconciled the experimenter and the 
anthropologist in me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
261
 
 
3.1 Practices Structuring Chimpanzee Care and Research 
 
1 Matsuzawa, personal communication, October 9, 2014.  
2 Regarding broader Japanese society, the topic of the functional simulation of nature through artifice is unveiled by 
Augustin Berque, Le Sauvage et L’artifice. Les Japonais Devant La Nature. (Paris: Gallimard, 1986). 
3 Tetsuro Matsuzawa, “Comparative Cognition.” (Workshop, Kyoto University, Kyoto, August 6-8, 2015). 
4 Matsuzawa, personal communication, October 28, 2015. 
5 Matsuzawa, personal communication, October 9, 2014. 
6 Tetsuro Matsuzawa, “Use of Numbers by a Chimpanzee.,” Nature 315 (1985): 57–59, doi:10.1038/315057a0. 
7  S.v., “past officers”, IPS, “International Primatological Society. Website.” (Accessed September 10, 2017. 
www.internationalprimatologicalsociety.org, 2017). 
8 Michel Callon, “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation. Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of 
St. Brieuc Bay.,” in The Science Studies Reader, ed. Mario Biagioli (Routledge, 1999), 70. 
9 Matsuzawa, personal communication, December 1, 2015.  
10 Misato Hayashi, “Chimpanzee care, accidents, and risk assessment.” (Lecture and slides, KUPRI, Inuyama, June 
26, 2012), 34. Courtesy of Hayashi Misato. 
11 Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Science and Human Behavior. (Oxford: Mcmillian, 1953). 
12 Matsuzawa, personal communication, December 1, 2015.  
13Ibid.  
14 Naruki Morimura, Gen’ichi Idani, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa, “The First Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Japan: An Attempt 
to Care for The ‘surplus’ of Biomedical Research,” American Journal of Primatology 73, no. 3 (2011): 226–32, 
doi:10.1002/ajp.20887. 
15 S.v., “members” WRC, “Kumamoto Sanctuary. Website.” (Retrieved, September 13, 2017. http://www.wrc.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/kumasan/indexE.html, 2017). 
16 Satoshi Hirata et al., “Chimpanzee Down Syndrome: A Case Study of Trisomy 22 in a Captive Chimpanzee.,” 
Primates 58, no. 2 (April 21, 2017): 267–73, doi:10.1007/s10329-017-0597-8. 
17 I thank Professor Hirata Satoshi for confirming this information. Email, July 11, 2017.  
18 Hisashi Nakagawa, Masaki Tomonaga, and Juichi Yamagiwa, eds., Nihon No Sarugaku No Ashita. Ningen-Gaku 
No Kanōsē. Wakuwaku Tokimeki Saiensu Shirīzu 3 [The Future of Japanese Monkey Studies. The Potential for Human 
Studies. Wakuwaku Tokimeki Science Series 3]. (Kyoto: Kyōto Tsūshinsha, 2012), 192. 
19 They are sister institutions due to the affiliation of the Sanctuary to the Wildlife Research Centre of Kyoto University. 
WRC, “Kumamoto Sanctuary. Website.” 
20  See how former GARI researcher, current professor at Kumamoto Sanctuary describes how the close relationship 
with chimpanzees at GARI led to scientific findings. Joseph Milton, “Chimps Give Birth like Humans.,” Nature News, 
April 19, 2011, doi:10.1038/news.2011.247. 
21  For a microanalysis of human-chimpanzee interaction at GARI, see Akira Takada, “Mutual Coordination of 
Behaviors in Human–chimpanzee Interactions: A Case Study in a Laboratory Setting.,” Revue de Primatologie, no. 5 
(2013), doi:10.4000/primatologie.1902. 
22 Recorded with permission, Matsuzawa, “Comparative Cognition.” 
23  S.v., “Melon” GAIN, “Great Ape Information Network. Website.” (Accessed September 14, 2017. 
http://shigen.nig.ac.jp/gain/index.jsp, 2017). GAIN Registration Number: 0323. 
24 S.v., “siamang” Noel Rowe, The Pictorial Guide to the Living Primates. (Charlestown, RI: Pogonias Press, 1996). 
25 Michael Serres, interview, May, 22, 2015.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Hayashi Misato, email, August 7, 2017.  
29  Lys Alcayna-Stevens, “In the Shadow of Man: An Exploration of Pan-Human Perspectives in a Catalonian 
Chimpanzee Sanctuary.,” The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology 28, no. 1 (2008): 1–33. 
30 I thank Christopher Krupenye for his answers on Max-Planck’s practices. Email, July 4, 2017.   
31 I thank Katie Slocombe for her answers on Max-Planck’s practices. Email, July 6, 2017.  
32 Christopher Krupenye, email, July 4, 2017.   
33 Ibid.  
 
262
 
 
34 Katie Slocombe, email, July 6, 2017. 
35 I thank Katie Slocombe for her answers on Edinburgh Zoo’s practices. Email, July 6, 2017. 
36 Ibid.  
37 The answers refer to the practices at Yerkes in 2013. I thank an anonymous interlocutor for the information. Email 
to author, September 16, 2017.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Anonymous interlocutor, email to author, September 17, 2017.  
40 Anonymous interlocutor, email to author, September 16, 2017.  
41 Ibid. 
42 For a review, see William A. Hillix and Duane M. Rumbaugh, Animal Bodies, Human Minds. Ape, Dolphin, and 
Parrot Language Skills. (New York: Springer, 2004). 
43  For a review, see Dominique Lestel, Paroles de Singes. L’Impossible Dialogue Homme-Primate. (Paris: La 
Découverte, 1995). 
44 Sue Savage-Rumbaugh et al., “Culture Prefigures Cognition in Pan / Homo Bonobos,” Theoria 54 (2005): 311–28. 
45 Francine G Patterson and Ronald H Cohn, “Michael Edition,” Journal of the Gorilla Foundation 28, no. 1 (2012): 
1–16, www.koko.org. 
46 Beatrix T. Gardner and R. Allen Gardner, “Signs of Intelligence in Cross-Fostered Chimpanzees,” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 308, no. 1135 (February 13, 1985): 159–76, 
doi:10.1098/rstb.1985.0017. 
47 Nim’s life is beautifully retraced in a documentary. James Marsh, “Project Nim.” (Documentary, 93m. BBC Films, 
Passion Pictures 70 and Red Box Films, 2011). 
48 David Premack and Ann James Premack, The Mind of an Ape. (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1983). 
49 Hayashi Misato, email, August 7, 2017.  
50 Hayashi Misato, “Chimpanzee care: a historical view.” 
 
3.2 Computer and Face-to-Face Settings 
 
1 For instance, Matsuzawa authored a textbook accompanying NHK’s documentary on PRI’s chimpanzee community. 
See (in Japanese) Tetsuro Matsuzawa, NHK Ningen Kōza: Shinka No Rinjin Chinpanji. Ai to Ayumu to Nakamatachi 
[NHK Course on Humans: Our Evolutionary Neighbors, Chimpanzees. Ai, Ayumu and Friends]. (Tokyo: Nippon 
Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2002). 
2  KUPRI, “Ai and Her Friends. Website.” (Accessed September 15, 2017. http://langint.pri.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/ai/index.html#intro, 2017). 
3  KUPRI, “TheFriendsAndAi. YouTube Channel.” (Accessed September 15, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC62zJ0Vnf2zzER0NnQmci1Q, 2017). 
4 KUPRI, “Symbolic Representation and Working Memory in Chimpanzees.” (Video.4m50s.http://langint.pri.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/ai/ja/member-gallery/Ayumu-video.html, 2013). 
5 Chris Hegedus and Donn Alan Pennebaker, Unlocking the Cage. (United States: 1h31m. Pennebaker Hegedus Films, 
2016). 
6 “Nonhuman Rights Project. Website.” (Accessed July 19, 2017. https://www.nonhumanrights.org/, n.d.). 
7  “Ayumu’s Game. By Novel Games.” (Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.novelgames.com/en/ayumu/, 
2017). 
8 KUPRI, “Symbolic Representation and Working Memory in Chimpanzees.” 
9 Nelson Cowan, “What Are the Differences between Long-Term, Short-Term, and Working Memory?,” Progress in 
Brain Research 169 (2008): 325, doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(07)00020-9. 
10 Judy S. DeLoache, “Becoming Symbol-Minded.,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, no. 2 (February 2004): 66, 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.004. 
11 Addessi and colleagues employ DeLoache’s definition to approach symbolic representation in capuchin monkeys. 
Elsa Addessi et al., “Preference Transitivity and Symbolic Representation in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus Apella).,” 
PloS One 3, no. 6 (January 2008): e2414, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414. 
12 Tetsuro Matsuzawa, “Symbolic Representation of Number in Chimpanzees.,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 
2009, doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.04.007. 
13 Sana Inoue and Tetsuro Matsuzawa, “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.,” Current Biology 17, no. 23 
(2007): 1004–5, doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.10.027. 
263
 
 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See figure S1 in supplemental material. Ibid. 
17 See figure S1 in supplemental material. Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 1004. 
19 Inoue and Matsuzawa, “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.” 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Matsuzawa, “Symbolic Representation of Number in Chimpanzees.,” 97. 
24 Alan Silberberg and David Kearns, “Memory for the Order of Briefly Presented Numerals in Humans as a Function 
of Practice.,” Animal Cognition 12, no. 2 (2009): 405–7, doi:10.1007/s10071-008-0206-8. 
25 Inoue and Matsuzawa, “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.” 
26 Ibid. 
27 Silberberg and Kearns, “Memory for the Order of Briefly Presented Numerals in Humans as a Function of Practice.,” 
406. 
28 Silberberg and Kearns, “Memory for the Order of Briefly Presented Numerals in Humans as a Function of Practice.” 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 407. 
33Peter Cook and Margaret Wilson, “Do Young Chimpanzees Have Extraordinary Working Memory?,” Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review 17, no. 4 (August 2010): 599, doi:10.3758/PBR.17.4.599. 
34 Cook and Wilson, “Do Young Chimpanzees Have Extraordinary Working Memory?” 
35 Ibid., 599. 
36 Ibid., 600. 
37 Inoue and Matsuzawa, “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.” 
38 Cook and Wilson, “Do Young Chimpanzees Have Extraordinary Working Memory?” 
39 Inoue and Matsuzawa, “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.” 
40 Cook and Wilson, “Do Young Chimpanzees Have Extraordinary Working Memory?” 
41 Inoue and Matsuzawa, “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.” 
42 Seán Roberts and Justin Quillinan, “The Chimp Challenge: Working Memory in Chimps and Humans.,” in The 
Past, Present and Future of Language Evolution Research, ed. Luke McCrohon et al. (Tokyo: EvoLang IX Organising 
Committee, 2014), 31–39. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Cook and Wilson, “Do Young Chimpanzees Have Extraordinary Working Memory?,” 599. 
46 Misato Hayashi, “A New Notation System of Object Manipulation in the Nesting-Cup Task for Chimpanzees and 
Humans,” Cortex, no. 23 (2007): 308–18. 
47 Patricia Marks Greenfield, Karen Nelson, and Elliot Saltzman, “The Development of Rulebound Strategies for 
Manipulating Seriated Cups: A Parallel between Action and Grammar.,” Cognitive Psychology 3, no. 2 (1972): 291–
310, doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90009-6. 
48 Hayashi, “A New Notation System of Object Manipulation in the Nesting-Cup Task for Chimpanzees and Humans.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See “play” Toshisada Nishida et al., Chimpanzee Behavior in the Wild. An Audio-Visual Encyclopedia. (Tokyo: 
Springer, 2010), 136, doi:10.1007/978-4-431-53895-0. 
54 Ibid., 130. 
55 Ibid., 86. 
56 “Shuwa (Japanese Sign Language).” (NTTWest, Zaidanhōjin zen’nihon rōa renmei (The Japanese Federation of the 
Deaf). Accessed 17 September 2017. https://www.ntt-west.co.jp/kouken/communication/syuwa.html, n.d.). 
57 Ibid. 
58  “Shuwabenkyōkai (Association for the Study of Japanese Sign Language).” (Accessed September 17, 2017. 
http://www.syuwabenkyokai.jp/syuwa_words/2008/02/1-6ee1.html, n.d.). 
264
 
 
59 Ibid. 
60  “Shuwa Shushushu. Japanese Sign Language Shushushu.” (Accessed September 19, 2017. 
http://hs84.blog.jp/archives/124187.html, n.d.). 
61 Ibid. 
 
3.3 Coproducing an experiment with chimpanzees 
 
1 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and 
Epistemology. (San Francisco: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 210. 
2 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, “Man Weiss Nicht Genau, Was Man Nicht Weiss. Über Die Kunst, Das Unbekannte Zu 
Erforschen.” (Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Accessed September 21, 2017. https://www.nzz.ch/articleELG88-1.354487, 
2007). 
3  The English translation can be found under the name “Fear and Trembling”. Amélie Nothomb, Stupeur et 
Tremblements. (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2001). 
4 Gurdon John, “Open Letter. Primate Research Is Crucial If We Are to Find Cures for Diseases like Parkinson’s.” 
(The guardian. Retrieved September 23, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/13/primate-research-
is-crucial-if-we-are-to-find-cures-for-diseases-like-parkinsons, 2016). 
5 Pieter R. Roelfsema and Stefan Treue, “Basic Neuroscience Research with Nonhuman Primates: A Small but 
Indispensable Component of Biomedical Research.,” Neuron 82, no. 6 (2014): 1200–1204, 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.06.003. 
6 David Attenborough, “Open Letter. Testing on Non-Human Primates in Neuroscience Research Is No Longer 
Justifiable.” (Independent. Retrieved September 23, 2017.http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/testing-on-
non-human-primates-in-neuroscience-research-is-no-longer-justifiable-a7230071.html, 2016). 
7 Jarrod Bailey and Katy Taylor, “Non-Human Primates in Neuroscience Research: The Case Against Its Scientific 
Necessity.,” ATLA 44 (2016): 43–69. 
8 Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
9  Eduardo Kohn, How Forests Think. Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2013), 145. 
10 For discussions on multimodality, see Katja Liebal et al., Primate Communication. A Multimodal Approach. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
11 OpenScienceCollaboration, “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science.,” Science 349, no. 6251 
(2015), doi:10.1126/science.aac4716. 
12 Daniel T. Gilbert et al., “Comment on ‘Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science’.,” Science 351, no. 
6277 (March 4, 2016): 1037, doi:10.1126/science.aad7243. 
13 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013). 
265
Chapter 4  
Symbolic Boundaries 
The Subtle Line between Humans and Chimpanzees 
 
 
4.1 Linguistic Practices on Nonhuman Personhood  
 
You should not count chimpanzees like humans!  So said my Japanese language 
teacher, a peaceful, kind old woman whom I visited during my stay in Japan hoping to 
improve my skills... Once a week after a full day of experiments and participant 
observation I would pick up my bike and rush up late at night to Inuyama’s International 
Center for an intensive Japanese session with no English translations granted, as my 
teacher knew all about Esperanto but nothing about English. That late at night, I usually 
felt brain-dead trying to communicate fully and effectively in Japanese but our warm-up 
was usually amusing and I sometimes would tell the chimps’ shenanigans of the week. 
So, there I was describing the entertaining events of that day, talking effusively about 
“everybody” and how Pendesa and Pan did this and that, and how the “two” were so 
unalike during my experiment when I noticed she looked puzzled. She patiently asked 
me; This “everybody” you mentioned, would it be the chimpanzees? Pendesa and Pan are 
chimpanzees, right? Yes – I replied, as if it should have been obvious so far. She smirked 
and said – So, you should use nihiki to count them instead. 
At that moment, my linguistic world turned upside-down. I have been talking 
about chimpanzees exactly in the way people referred to them in the lab, or have I not?  
But wait – I insisted – I always hear “nin” in the Institute. She elaborated – chimpanzees 
are animals and they are smaller than humans, so you should use hiki. Indeed, I had 
studied some of the numerous Japanese counters for beings and objects but before coming 
to PRI I had never really considered which counter applied to chimpanzees. Intrigued, I 
retorted – But is not hiki a suffix to count cats and other small animals? Chimpanzees are 
much bigger! Ah – she said – some people use tō which counts large animals… but what 
is the size of a chimpanzee? As I stood up and demonstrated, she confirmed – still smaller 
than us, so hiki. Then she added –  Maybe in the Institute they use the human counter for 
chimpanzees but this is unusual. After that, the teacher invited me to tell the story again 
but I could not bring myself to call them hiki. In the end, I gave up and said –Would you 
mind if I call them nin? As chimpanzees are “like people”  to me (hito to onaji 人と同
じ)…  
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In Japanese, the linguistic counting of animals and other beings is not as 
straightforward as one may imagine, and they depend upon the feature of what is being 
counted. In addition, since Japanese is composed of three main writing systems (i.e., kanji, 
katakana and hiragana) certain groupings or rather categorizations become more evident 
than in the languages that have a single writing system. A typical example is imported 
words such as chimpanzee. The origins of this word are said to be traced back to Vili, a 
Bantu language of Congo, 1  and the name first appeared in Europe in the London 
Magazine of 1738, having been glossed as “mockman”. 2 , 3  In Japanese, the word 
chimpanzee goes by its phonetics, being “Japanified” to chinpanjī (チンパンジー). As 
it is traditional for species, animal names and foreign words, it is written in a phonetic 
syllabary named katakana instead of the alternative phonetic syllabary hiragana or the 
Sino-Japanese characters called kanji.  
In Japanese, as in Chinese and Korean, whenever one wishes to count beings, 
events and objects a suffix called counter or numeral classifier follows the number. There 
are numerous different counters varying from gathering very specific groups to more 
general ones. There are approximately 150 Japanese numeral classifiers, however, only 
thirty are most commonly used.4,5 They specify the combined nouns in terms of attributes 
such as animacy, shape, size and so on.6 For instance, objects have precise counters like 
the one for long, cylindrical shapes such as pencils (hon 本) or thin, flat materials like 
paper (mai 枚), among many others.7  There are also some apparently odd groupings like 
birds and hares, counted both as wa (羽),8 perhaps because a hare’s ears might resemble 
the shape of feathers, the meaning of the counter.9 Likewise, humanoid forms such as 
corpses, mannequins and images of Buddhist and Shinto deities − but also ashes − are 
counted as tai (体),10  in other words, body. However, gods as well as Buddhist mortuary 
tablets are hashira (柱), or pillar, while the deceased spirits are counted by i (位), also 
applied to rankings.11  
Numeral classifiers do not match the counting structure of languages like English 
or even broader Germanic and Latin languages I,Note12 because it is ungrammatical to 
simply add a number to a noun; thus, instead of saying directly No. + Noun, one must 
employ No. + Counter + no の + Noun as in “7 (counter) of something”, or likewise, 
                                                 
I According to Gil (2013), from 400 studied languages numeral classifiers are absent in 260, optional in 
sixty-two and obligatory in seventy-eight, the latter being mainly concentrated in East and Southeast Asia.  
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Noun + No. + Counter as in “something 7 (counter)”.13 In fact, item and piece would be 
the words in English to resemble classifiers the most.14 However, given that numeral 
classifiers refer not to measures but to the qualities of the addressee, their function is 
usually considered to be categorization.15  
Humans, who are called ningen (人間), are counted by the suffix nin (人), the 
default human classifier, 16  whereas in the realm of possible counters traditionally 
attributed to primates we should distinguish three. First, the already mentioned hiki (匹). 
This counts small animals17 and might be applied to smaller monkeys fitting well within 
the category,II,Note 18  as for instance, marmosets (Callithrix spp. ♂ approx. 18.8 cm, 256 
g)19. Yet, it might be noted that any animal physically smaller than humans can be counted 
as hiki.III,Note 20 In fact, linguists detail that even though hiki is originally intended for small 
animals, it has gradually been used more and more as a default animal classifier that 
children start acquiring from around age five.21  
The second counter to be highlighted is tō (頭). This one designates large animals 
like cows and horses,22 a category where gorillas fit well (Gorilla spp. ♂ approx. 1,70 m, 
180 kg)23. In terms of language usage, this category is applied to count bigger macaques 
such as Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata; ♂ approx. 11 kg, 57 cm)24.  It is reported 
that in the Primate Research Institute keepers of this species employ tou.25 Furthermore, 
this seems to be the case for experimenters working with macaques in the same place,26 
and tō is observed in broad media articles referring to Japanese macaques.IV,27 Likewise, 
some interlocutors, like Professor Matsuzawa, remark they used to regularly employ tō 
to count chimpanzees before starting chimpanzee research. 28  For a pictorial 
representation, refer to Table 1. In addition, counters nin, hiki and tō are compared up to 
five individuals and have their kanji structure and pronunciation discriminated. 
Now, a third option to name primates is kotai (個体), that is, individual.29 This is 
considered to be a more neutral counter and is regularly used in scientific publications 
regardless of the primate’s size. At this point, a fourth – unusual – possibility should be 
added, as previously hinted. In the section of Language and Intelligence at the Primate 
                                                 
II For instance, Matsumoto (1987) uses monkeys as familiar hiki category in his experiment with children, 
although the species names are not provided. Other animals in the same category are dogs, snakes and 
grasshopers. For unfamiliar hiki category, Japanese sables and marmots were used. 
III  In discussing language usages with Professor Hayashi, she recalled how a journalist writing on 
chimpanzee research at PRI emphasized that human size should be the threshold between using hiki or tou 
counters.   
IV I thank Sayuri Takeshita for bringing this point to my attention.  
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Research Institute (i.e., the section responsible for chimpanzees) most researchers, 
although not all, reported to use the counter nin while in the laboratory. In other words, 
they employ the counter traditionally and grammatically attributed to humans to refer to 
chimpanzees.   
 
 
Japanese Counters  
(josūshi助数詞) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humans nin 人 
 
Large Animals tō頭 Small Animals hiki 匹 
1) hitori (一人) 1) ittō (一頭) 1) ippiki (一匹) 
2) futari (二人) 2) nitō (二頭) 2) nihiki (二匹) 
3) sannin (三人)  3) santō (三頭) 3) sanbiki (三匹) 
4) yonin (四人) 4) yontō (四頭) 4) yonhiki (四匹) 
5) gonin (五人) 5) gotō (五頭) 5) gohiki (五匹) 
 
 
Table 1 Japanese counters for humans, small and large animals.30,31 
 
Matsuzawa considers that due to striking phylogenetic and behavioral similarities 
between humans and chimpanzees the use of such counter is justified. One of his books 
explaining chimpanzee research to lay audiences is even entitled “chinpanjī wa 
chinpanjin” (sic チンパンジーは ちんぱんじん),32V creating a neologism derived 
from the kanji character 人, which has as reading both nin and jin (the Sino-Japanese 
on’yomi reading). Matsuzawa voices that “based on the evidence you say it is 
chinpanjīn”.33 He believes the word might be appropriately translated as “chimpanzee 
being”,34 rendering the translation of his book “the chimpanzee(s), chimpanzee being(s)”.  
In fact, while humans are called ningen (人間), the character 人 alone designates 
person.35 This character has three readings: when isolated it takes up the native kun’yomi 
reading as hito; when combined with other kanji characters, it might be read as hito, or 
                                                 
V NB., the first term “chimpanjī” is written in katakana, as is the rule for this type of word; the second one, 
the neologism “chinpanjin”, is in hiragana, denoting the peculiarity of this word.  
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follow two Sino-Japanese readings, that is, nin or jin. One finds the jin reading of this 
kanji when designating nationalities (e.g., nihonjin 日本人, Japanese) or inhabitants of a 
specific planet (chikyūjin 地球人, earthling; kasējin 火星人, Martian), among other 
examples (see Table 2 for a summary).  
 
Default Personhood Marker  
人 
Kun’yomi Reading 
 
On’yomi Reading 
Hito 
 
Ri 
 
Nin Jin 
 
Person: hito 人 
 
Human: ningen 人間 
 
Homo sapiens: hito ヒト 
in katakana 
 
Martian: kasējin 火星人 
Japanese National: nihonjin 日本人 
 
Counter: 1 person hitori 一人 
 
 
Counter: 3 persons Sannin 三人 
 
Neologism: chinpanjin  ちんぱんじん 
in hiragana (Matsuzawa 1995)
 36 
 
Table 2 Human numeral classifier in Japanese.37 
 
Indeed, the space-analogy38 might be a proper tool to exercise our anthropological 
imagination and convey the meaning of personhood in a phylogenetic argument: Science 
fiction green Martians with antennae are indeed not earthlings; but in our imaginary, they 
interact with us in a much more human-like manner than, for instance, earth insects. They 
are not humans, yet they have crucial human-like features. While chimpanzees are 
individuals (i.e., kotai 個体) just like any other specimen in the biological realm, their 
cognitive capacities are equal to what is expected from beings that are yet different from 
humans but nonetheless still intelligent and sentient enough to be grouped together under 
the title of “persons”. Even more; unlike the hypothetical science fiction aliens, humans 
and chimpanzees do have a common ancestor. Thus, the personhood argument on behalf 
of nonhuman animals becomes more striking in the chimpanzees’ case due to 
phylogenetic proximity.  
True be told, there are other ways of conceptualizing personhood without 
necessarily passing by cognitive capacities. This can be found in in other ontologies, that 
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is, in other forms of relating to animate and inanimate nonhuman entities. Modern science 
has emerged in the context of what is labeled naturalism, which, according to Descola, 
posits a physical continuity of beings within the biological realm, while setting apart 
human properties loosely gathered under the notions of mind or consciousness (e.g., 
intentionality, reflexivity, subjectivity and so on).39,40 Animism, on the other hand, can 
be considered the structural inversion of naturalism, because in animism these human-
typical properties are shared across (certain) beings while their physicality differs.41  
Thus, we fail to see the animals’ humanity because bodies, understood not just as 
a morphology but as an ensemble of affections and habits, have particularities of their 
own, becoming the source of different viewpoints; while colonizers doubted Amerindians 
had souls, Amerindians were eager to discover whether the white men had the same body 
as theirs, in other words, whether the foreigners’ body was capable of the same affections 
and perspective. 42 , 43  Viveiros de Castro sustains that Amerindian words commonly 
translated by human being, instead of denoting humanity as a natural kind, represent the 
social condition of personhood.44 
Viveiros then questions, would the Amerindians be anthropocentric for 
hominizing animals? Not quite – he answers; because the human body, the culture, the 
modes of perception and action change with the beings’ point of view. To be “human” 
for an animal is to be exactly as the animal is. The tag “human being”, therefore, indicates 
− not a noun – but a personal pronoun marking of the point of view of the one who talks, 
that is, an “I”, a perspective. Animals see themselves as humans because “Humanity” is 
the general marker of the “Subject”. This occurs, at least, in the complementary side of 
animism just described, called perspectivism, which is present in many Amerindian 
ethnicities and attributed to animals like important human predators and preys and, to a 
lesser extent, to the florae in societies making use of hallucinogenic plants.45  
In the Japanese context, Jensen and Blok defend that Japanese possess a “different 
sensibility towards hybrids”.46 Nature-culture entities that would commonly be separated 
in what Latour calls the Great Divide between Nature and Culture 47  are in fact 
acknowledged and play an explicit role. Grounding the reasons of this particularity in 
Buddhism and to a greater extent in Shinto practices, Jensen and Blok stress the “radical 
‘personalization’ of the universe” where “[h]uman beings, ancestors and more-or-less 
anthropomorphized gods can be kami [spirit beings], but so too can foxes, trees, thunder, 
rice, stones, mountains and waterfalls”.48  
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To the best of my knowledge, no ethologist would publicly argue in favor of 
attributing personhood to inanimate beings or spirits because such attribution is not 
foreseen in the premises of scientific naturalism and encounters no argument to be 
supported, given that, on evolutionary grounds neither cognition nor sentience are 
attributable to beings such as rocks, meteorites and rivers, which is not the case of other 
modes of relationship with nonhumans. Therefore, in case of Japanese primatology, this 
sensibility towards hybrids is channeled to the attribution of personhood based upon 
biological commonalities from which even cultural behaviors arise, as expected in 
naturalism. This receptivity is reflected in the linguistic practice of their scientific 
community. 
At the Primate Research Institute, even the exception to their linguistic pattern 
insists upon the continuity between humans and chimpanzees given  proper context: A 
professor at PRI who reports to employ the counter individual (kotai) not only in scientific 
presentations and articles but also in the laboratory, makes clear that he uses the human 
counter nin in some public talks as a means to remind the audience that chimpanzees “are 
in the same biological category as we humans”. 49  Another professor, who works at 
Kumamoto Sanctuary, PRI’s sister institution, stresses that personhood should be based 
on “evolution” and not on a “social contract”. 50  Furthermore, all interlocutors who 
commented on the nin usage for chimpanzees informed it to be based on our evolutionary 
proximity.  
In fact, based on this premise, the Great Ape Project (GAP), founded in 1993 by 
Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri 51  and the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) founded 
in 2007 by Steven Wise 52 have advocated the change of the legal status of great apes and 
other cognitively complex animals, like cetaceans and elephants, to that of nonhuman 
persons.VI,Note 53 GAP’s “Declaration on Great Apes” endorses (1) the right to live (2) the 
protection of individual liberty (3) the prohibition of torture, and it has been supported by 
a series of primatologists and academics including Jane Goodall, Nishida Toshisada, 
Roger and Debora Fouts, Francine Patterson, Richard Dawkins, among others. 54 
Moreover, the NhRP has been on a legal battle in the United States on behalf of certain 
chimpanzees in particularly dire situations, petitioning for an habeas corpus, a legal 
                                                 
VI  The focus of the legal battle has been so far on chimpanzees and is brilliantly illustrated by the 
documentary on the NhRP “unlocking the cage” (Hegedus and Pennebaker 2016), which interestingly 
features Ayumu’s famous performances on cognitive tasks.  
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procedure that until recently was only granted to humans.VII,Note 55 Indeed, Matsuzawa 
filled an affidavit (i.e., a written sworn statement) in support of the NhRP’s case on behalf 
of chimpanzee Kiko, presenting scientific findings on chimpanzees for that matter.56  
For these primatologists and supporters, it seems we might be risking repeating 
history, as Nishida Toshisada powerfully conveys:57   
 
The ‘Declaration’ at the beginning of this book [The Great Ape Project] proposes 
the inclusion of chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans in ‘the moral community 
of equals’. Such an attempt is long overdue, given the similarity of humans and 
the other great apes, but it demands courage. Many people will protest against this 
proposal: some will say that human affairs are more important than anything else, 
while others will argue that the logical extension of including the great apes in the 
community of equals is the inclusion of all other life forms into that community.  
I think we should extend the right of membership to other life forms where and 
when that becomes possible. But we can and should include the great apes in our 
moral community immediately, as a first step. Remember that for a long time 
people did not consider that even their neighbours belonged to their own kind. 
The concept of ‘people’ was applied only to members of one’s own tribe. A British 
traveller who roamed around the Malay peninsula in the early 1900s believed that 
the naked indigenous hunter-gatherers he watched were not human beings, but a 
kind of anthropoid ape. He held to this belief, despite having watched these 
hunter-gatherers walking on two legs and using blow-guns as a hunting weapon.  
You might laugh at this British gentleman, saying that he lacked common sense. 
But can you really laugh? After another century has passed our descendants might 
laugh at those who hesitated to give basic moral rights to the great apes.  
 
Who is entitled to personhood and who is not differs according to particular 
ontologies. More precisely, personhood attribution depends on how the thresholds are set 
in the spectrum of possibilities allowed by the premises under which these forms of 
relationship operate.  
We shall now ask how researchers at PRI refer to chimpanzees in different 
contexts. In order to systematically assess the research personnel’s linguistic practices at 
the Primate Research Institute interlocutors were asked, either by personal 
communication or by email, to report which counter they use for chimpanzees while in 
the laboratory (Linguistic Study 1). The total number of native Japanese speakers who 
worked with chimpanzee cognitive experiments during the period of this ethnography 
(October 2014-December 2015) was analyzed (N = 13; Professors = 5; Postdoc = 1; 
                                                 
VII According to NhRP (Ynterian 2017), in 2017 in Argentina, an habeas corpus was granted for the first 
time in the world to a chimpanzee called Cecília; she was transferred from a “jail-like zoo” to a sanctuary 
in Brazil.  
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Technicians = 3; Students = 4 incl. a native bilingual). From thirteen, eleven reported to 
employ the counter nin (人) for chimpanzees during their work. The exceptions were, a 
technician, who reported to use tō (頭) and a professor, who employs kotai (個体). Thus, 
nearly 85% of the native speakers working with chimpanzees at PRI in the period of the 
study reported to employ the counter nin while approximately 15% make use of other 
counters (Graph  1).  
 
Graph  1 Linguistic Study 1. Counter uses when referring to chimpanzees during work. 
 
 
In addition, two other native speakers not belonging to this group participated: A 
professor at Kumamoto Sanctuary, who is a chimpanzee experimenter and former 
experimenter at PRI, and a PhD student at PRI, who conducts experiments with monkeys. 
The professor answered nin regarding reference to chimpanzees during his work, while 
the student reported to “use nin more frequently when indicat[ing] the number of chimps”. 
For his test animals, he reports using tō for macaques while in the laboratory.     
These results show the linguistic pattern followed by chimpanzee research 
personnel at the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University (KUPRI) in the 
laboratory context; most part of the personnel make use of the counter for humans to refer 
to chimpanzees. As discussed in the previous section, this pattern is justified in relation 
84.6%
7.7%
7.7%
Use of Japanese Counters  by Native Speakers 
Chimpanzees in the Laboratory Context
KUPRI
人 Nin (Human/Person) 頭 Tō (Large Animal)
個体 Kotai (Individual)
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to the behavioral and phylogenetic proximity between humans and chimpanzees. 
Moreover, it should be noted that this usage seems to be encouraged by professor 
Matsuzawa, as a few interlocutors indicated. Nonetheless, the respondents’ strong belief 
in the importance of stressing the continuity between humans and chimpanzees makes it 
unlikely that these results are an artifact of power relations. Moreover, this study raises 
the possibility that, among native speakers, individuals who are in contact with 
chimpanzee research at KUPRI follow the same pattern.  
One objection that could be raised is that, by relying on self-reports, this study 
might not be reliable or might not capture the true nature of how people actually speak in 
practice. Indeed, a systematic analysis of recorded naturally occurring conversations can 
unveil subtleties that are perhaps of high importance to linguists as, for instance, 
preferences in syntactical structure and other issues frequently debated when addressing 
numeral classifiers. Such follow up is to be commended. However, regarding the 
usefulness of self-reports, it should be cautioned that this study is better understood in the 
context of a broader long-term etho-ethnography of interspecies interactional practices.  
Before written or verbal questionnaires were in place, I had been working for 
nearly a year as part of this scientific community, thus, these results not only match my 
ethnographic observations, but the study per se arose from the confrontation of how these 
practices influenced me as a foreign learner to the point I did not notice they were unusual 
in a lay context. In other words, I had been socialized into PRI linguistic practices of 
chimpanzee research to the point they seemed so natural that I never imagined otherwise, 
motivating further investigations. For that reason, these results are – in my role as a social 
anthropologist − not surprising, although quite interesting.  
The previous study addressed the linguistic usages in oral conversations during 
laboratory work. However, because technical writings belong to a different contextual 
dominion a second study was conducted (Linguistic Study 2), prompted by remarks that 
in scientific writings interlocutors preferentially use the counter kotai (個体), that is, 
individual. In order to understand how experimenters in chimpanzee cognitive research 
employ Japanese counters in their writings, I conducted an analysis of publications in 
Japanese written by actual and past experimenters at PRI, who are native Japanese 
speakers. The articles of this study are not specified so as not to directly disclose 
individual preferences not informed by questionnaires or personal communication. Thus, 
only the general reference of each issue is given. An inevitable exception is single 
authored books and one important reference to Matsuzawa’s usage.  
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I have analyzed one issue of ten different publications, specifically screening for 
the uses of counters to designate chimpanzees. The screening occurred for the full text-
length. The material was chosen and grouped based on the varying technical levels and 
audiences, observed by the inclusion of detailed scientific information, the overall display 
of the material (such as precise graphs, etc.) and the presence and extent of furigana, that 
is, the reading aid placed next to kanji characters. I have specifically aimed for counters, 
excluding phrases where a word was not used for its numeral classifier function but used 
as a general statement. For example, “two individuals” serves the counting function for 
kotai (個体) but not “individual” alone (also kotai 個体).58 This selection was considered 
to be a stricter and clearer marker for the linguistic (non)attribution of personhood. Yet, 
general words such as kotai were rarely observed, with the word “chimpanzees” simply 
being preferred instead. Some types of publications were checked for editorial 
recommendations to investigate whether results could be explained in terms of instruction 
to authors.   
The analyzed material consisted of journals (n = 2),59,60 scientific magazines (n = 
2),61,62 books (n = 5)63,64,65,66,67 and a magazine for general audience (n = 1).68 One 
scientific magazine (Ecosofia) was excluded from the analyses due to counter words for 
chimpanzees being seemingly absent to the best of my efforts, likely because numeral 
classifiers are mostly used when reporting experiments and not needed to generally write 
about chimpanzees (thus N = 9).  
From these nine publications, the total number of first authors meeting the criteria 
was eleven, that is, authors who are (a) Japanese native speakers (b) were/are PRI 
experimenters in chimpanzee cognitive research, and (c) who employed counters in their 
piece of writing. Their composition was precisely (a) all current professors at PRI [n = 5] 
(b) past experimenters at PRI [n = 3] (c) graduate students at PRI in the publication date 
[n = 2] (d) post-doc at PRI in the moment of the publication [n = 1]. In terms of authors, 
they did not appear evenly spread across the material analyzed, meaning, some 
publication types had more matches than others and most authors did not appear in all 
publication types. All observations are of single authorship except when stated in the 
description. However, the most technical publication and a book for broad audience had 
high number of authors. All publication names have been translated and abbreviated. For 
full reference of the issues, please see the citations in the description of the material 
analyzed. Note, also, that a few publications have official English translations that may 
not be literal.  
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The results are described in Graph  2 in terms of which counters were used in each 
publication and by how many authors. The most important information is the type of 
counter according to the technicality of the publication type, ordered from greater (left) 
to minor (right). The number of authors was provided as a means to inform readers of 
sample size. The first publication, “Primate Research” (rēchōrui kenkyū 霊長類研究), is 
by far the most technical publication, and the issue analyzed represents abstracts from the 
meeting of the Primate Society of Japan (PSJ) in 2015. There, seven authors consistently 
employed the counter for individual (kotai 個体). The next publication, “KAGAKU” (科
学), is a science journal, however, much closer to a scientific magazine than “Primate 
Research”. Here, Professor Matsuzawa amongst others also employed the kotai counter.  
 
 
Graph  2 Linguistic Study 2. Counter uses when referring to chimpanzees in Japanese publications. 
 
Next, the scientific magazine abbreviated “Monkey Studies” (nihon no sarugaku 
no ashita 日本のサル学のあした) is an issue in a broader scientific series (WAKU 
WAKU) and is quite precise in its reports, nonetheless, it includes first person 
descriptions of the research process. In “Monkey Studies” the counter for individual was 
also observed. In the next category, the book “Cognitive Development and Evolution” 
人 
個体 
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(ninchi hattatsu to shinka 認知発達と進化) is the most technical of one. Here as well, 
the counter for individual was regularly applied to chimpanzees by two co-authors, and, 
furthermore, while describing a third-party experiment where humans and chimpanzees 
played a role, the nin counter was clearly attributed to humans whereas kotai was used 
for chimpanzees.  
From then on, all the publications consistently made use of the counter for humans 
(nin 人). The book “What is Human?” (ningen to wa nanika 人間とは何か), edited by 
Matsuzawa, consists of short articles by a series of authors, where the overall results of 
experiments are shaped in a more narrative style or where interesting episodes of 
chimpanzees’ lives are described. In this book, five different authors employ nin. Next, 
all the books described are authored by Matsuzawa and vary to some extent in their 
language-level to the audiences. The book abbreviated “Human Mind” summarizes 
Matsuzawa’s life-long research (lit., Human Mind taught by Chimpanzees, chinpanjī ga 
oshietekureta ningen no kokoro チンパンジーが教えてくれた人間の心).  
Then, the book abbreviated “Chimpanzee Being” also gives the audience an 
overview of his research although in a less technical manner (chinpanjī wa chinpanjin, 
sicチンパンジーはちんぱんじん). The book translated as “Ai and the Baby” (Ai to 
Ayumu アイとアユム) describes Ai and Ayumu’s first days together and is even clearly 
less technical and intended for lay and younger audiences with extensive furigana reading 
aid.  At last, the magazine “NHK Course” (NHK ningen kōza NHK 人間講座) is a 
material written by Matsuzawa intended to accompany the episodes of a documentary on 
his research in Africa and at PRI, broadcasted by Japan’s most famous TV channel, the 
NHK. The material is in a narrative style, although no furigana reading aid for younger 
audiences is provided.  
The results found go in accordance with what has been reported by the 
interlocutors given that the uses of nin and kotai seem to vary as a function of the 
technicality of the publication. Therefore, for publications that are more scientifically 
detailed and intend to be more “neutral”, the kotai counter is employed. On the other hand, 
when a publication is more accessible to the public, nin is used consistently. Within a 
publication no cross usages have been observed among the analyzed authors (e.g., kotai 
and nin in the same issue). In other words, each single publication represented one counter 
category only, despite having been written by different authors who matched the criteria 
in the same issue.  
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In terms of native experimenters that were active during this etho-ethnography 
(N=10), this study covered 80% of them, who appeared at least once in one of the 
publication types. However, it had some important limitations. Ideally, this study should 
have presented a more even number of issues per category. It would have also profited 
from a balanced design (i.e., equal number of observations), and a within-subject design 
(i.e., the same authors in all publication categories), although such designs are optional. 
Due to the fact that not all articles specifically describe the number of chimpanzees (thus, 
absent counters), the number of observations was drastically reduced.  
Likewise, it becomes difficult to analyze the usages of the same authors across all 
publication categories because it might be that even if an author appears in all issues 
selected this author will, not necessarily, make use of a counter in each one of them, 
therefore, the number of issues within each publication category should increase 
considerably in order to account for the occurrence of the same authors in all publication 
categories. Larger sample sizes might unveil subtleties not shown by the present study. 
Notwithstanding, given that this study mirrors what has been indicated by several 
interlocutors, these issues are likely not compromising.  
At this point, one may ask the role such study plays in the larger ethnographic 
analysis given the small sample size of the publications. The answer is quite 
straightforward. First, our objective here is to confirm a phenomenon hinted by 
interlocutors; not to make any claim beyond sample. In this point, this study has 
accomplished its purpose. Secondly, the study should inspect another realm of linguistic 
practices which may undergo important changes when passing from oral to written 
accounts. Thus, qualitatively speaking, an investigation on oral practices and on written 
ones are not equal. Thirdly, such a study should point out a concrete pathway regarding 
how to investigate personification techniques and their developments throughout written 
accounts.  
To conclude the analyses on Japanese language use when referring to 
chimpanzees, two remarks should be made. The first one is in regard to oral presentations. 
During the SAGA meeting (Support for African/Asian Great Apes) in 2015, an event 
mainly conducted in Japanese, as far as I could observe, lecturers made use of the counter 
nin to refer to chimpanzees. This is consistent with one of the ultimate goals of SAGA, a 
consortium originally created in 1998 to bring to an end invasive research on great apes 
in Japan, which finally occurred in 2006.69 Moreover, when commenting on language 
usages, some interlocutors indicated to use this counter in oral presentations as well, 
279
 
especially in not so technical ones. Interestingly, during internal presentations at PRI, the 
chimpanzees of the Institute occasionally figured among the acknowledgement-slides.VIII 
This is also a habit I learned by imitation from the senior student in charge of experiments 
in Matsuzawa’s laboratory, or my senpai.   
The second remark is in regard to the distinction between participant and subject. 
In the context of this linguistic study, one interlocutor commented on an important trend 
in cognitive psychology Japanese publications: 70 In Japanese, the word “participant” is 
named by sankasha (参加者) and is applied to humans but we may as well distinguish 
two words for “subject”. The first one is hikensha (被験者) traditionally applied to human 
subjects, whereas hikentai (被験体 ) is reserved to animals. It seems that, among 
researchers, not only the word participant (sankasha) by also the word subject in the 
human sense (hikensha) has been adopted by some to refer to chimpanzees.  
If the kanji characters are decomposed a finer understanding of these differences 
may be grasped. Now, if we decompose the kanji characters we might grasp a finer 
understanding of these differences. The suffix sha 者 designates someone of a certain 
nature or someone doing a certain work.71 Besides, the same kanji has a native reading 
mono, meaning someone, person.72 In other words, this kanji, as observed with nin/hito 
(人 ), is related to the characteristics of a person. Thus, sankasha literally means 
participat(ing) person (or sanka, i.e., participation 参加 + sha者)73. Hence, when turning 
to the word subject, it becomes clear why there are two separate forms in Japanese.  
Hikensha (被験者) points to the idea of tests, as it is similar to hikenyaku (被験
薬) or test drug.74 With the suffix sha it becomes glossed as “test-person”. Note that, the 
one who tests instead of being tested upon is the experimenter, a jikkensha (実験者) or 
“experiment-person”. It is true that it does not always seem very logical where the active 
and passive voices lie, after all, a hikensha could be the person doing the test, just as a 
jikkensha is the person doing the experiments. Nonetheless, when comparing the two 
forms of saying subject in Japanese there is a striking difference in agency.  
To recap − as readers not acquainted with Japanese might find the descriptions 
cumbersome − in Japanese writings in cognitive psychology, there are two forms of 
conveying the word subject: hikensha and hikentai. The first one is employed to humans, 
                                                 
VIII I.e., presentations in the conjoint psychology seminar of the section of Language and Intelligence 
(roughly, the chimpanzee section) and the section of Cognition and Learning (roughly, part of experimental 
monkey research).    
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the second one, to animals. So far, I have argued that hikensha conveys the meaning of 
“test-person” in a literal translation. Now, the second one, hikentai, is composed of the 
suffix tai (体). Its original meaning is simply “body”, 75  and when used as a counter it 
designates humanoid forms such as corpses and statues.76 Thus, the translation of hikentai 
can be glossed as “test-body”. It appears reasonable that due to the differences in suffix 
form (person [sha 者] and body [tai 体]), one word emphasizes agency while the second 
focus on the materiality. Thus, when hikensha is applied to chimpanzees it seems to 
concede the same type of agency that humans are granted.  
In fact, it is the term used for animals, hikentai, that may be closer to the 
etymological meaning of the term subject in English/Latin. The word subject as a noun 
appears in early XIV century in Old French (suget), meaning “person under control or 
dominion of another”, which in turn derived from the Latin subicere, that is, “to place 
under, to subordinate”. 77  From the 1590s the term seems to have acquired a softer tone 
to mean “person or thing regarded as recipient of action, one that may be acted upon”,78 
closer to the modern usage in psychology. Overall, even though in its Latin origins the 
word subject denotes a person, its meaning points at passivity and subjugation, thus, it 
would be more akin to the Japanese “test-body” (hikentai) than “test-person” (hikensha).    
Indeed, psychology as a discipline is gradually moving on from the term subject 
to the term participants and already back in 1999 English speaking authors encouraged 
the use of the word participant for humans, given that the term subject may carry a 
demeaning connotation.79,IX We shall also see, in English publications, that Japanese 
researchers seem to emphasize chimpanzees’ agency by preferentially employing 
participants instead of subjects. As we have observed, in primate research the usage of 
certain terms and not others are part of a boundary work regarding which beings are 
entitled to personhood, or the least, agency as opposed to passivity. Instead of focusing 
on erudite details which were, in fact, exposed only to substantiate and support the 
argument, the message to keep in mind is that, firstly, there are certain linguistic markers 
of personhood derived from grammatical formalities and people’s usage and, secondly, 
that these personhood markers are permissible in a scientific community’s linguistic 
practices to a greater or lesser extent according to species and context. 
                                                 
IX NB., the word subject is used in specific statistical terminology such as a “within-subject” or “between-
subject design”, and so on, not being related to the intention of the authors.  
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At this point, we may ask how researchers at PRI refer to chimpanzees in other 
languages. Once again, when reporting cognitive psychology experiments, a subtlety to 
be noticed is the difference between “participants” and “subjects”. According to the 
guideline of the American Psychological Association, the famous APA style that dictates 
most of the English publications in psychology, while the use of subjects for humans is 
not formally discouraged, it is enforced that one should “[u]se who for human beings; use 
that or which for nonhuman”.80 However, the guideline concedes that whenever animals 
have been named, instead of the neuter pronoun “it”, the appropriate pronouns 
corresponding to the animals’ sex should be used.81 Not surprisingly, most researchers at 
PRI make use of the term of participants to describe their test subjects.  
PRI researchers, as most researchers in biologically-oriented sciences, publish 
their detailed experimental results preferentially in English, be it in international journals 
or in the Japanese journal - Primates (in English). I have conducted an analysis of 
publications in English (Linguistic Study 3) in order to understand how Japanese native 
speakers address chimpanzees in the language most used by the international scientific 
community. I have screened for articles (a) authored PRI experimenters (b) in chimpanzee 
cognitive research (c) with first authorship (d) ranging from 2013 to Mid July 2017. In 
these articles, I screened for the use of participants or subjects to refer to chimpanzees, 
and in addition, to the use of the pronoun “who” whenever the term subject was used. The 
screening occurred for the full text length.   
For this manuscript, an analysis of publications in English (Linguistic Study 3) 
has been conducted in order to understand how Japanese native speakers address 
chimpanzees in the language most used by the international scientific community. I have 
screened for articles (a) authored by PRI experimenters (b) in chimpanzee cognitive 
research (c) with first authorship (d) ranging from 2013 to Mid July 2017. In these articles, 
I screened for the use of participants or subjects to refer to chimpanzees, and in addition, 
to the use of the pronoun “who” whenever the term subject was used. The screening 
occurred for the full text length.   
As search tool, I made use of the latest publications page in the website of the 
Section of Language and Intelligence.82 I also made use of the website of the journal 
Primates83 and, in addition, of the personal website of potential authors. Note that five is 
the number of Japanese native speakers who are professors in PRI chimpanzee cognitive 
research (i.e., at an advanced stage of opportunities for publication). The journals were 
screened for instructions to authors regarding the use of participant and subject, however, 
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despite all the efforts none were found. The name of the journals is provided to aid in the 
interpretation of the results, but no articles are cited so as not to directly disclose 
information on an individual level.  
PRI experimenters had an extensive list of publications, however, not all fit the 
criteria: studies on different species, co-authorship instead of first authorship, reviews 
with no description of subjects, non-cognitive studies (e.g., physiological, genetic studies 
etc.), fieldwork (where primates are usually described in terms of members of a 
community instead of participants/subjects of an experiment), articles where neither 
participants nor subjects were used, etc. The exclusion of these other studies, despite strict, 
was intended to provide a direct comparison across all above-mentioned linguistic studies.  
 
Graph  3 Linguistic Study 3. Japanese speakers referring to chimpanzees in English publications. 
 
Eight publications written by four different first authors met the criteria. Four of 
these publications were co-authored by one of the first authors of the other publications. 
From these four authors, author A had one article that met the criteria; author B two 
articles; author C two articles; author D three articles. The publications were spread across 
five different journals: i-Perception (n = 1); Peer-J (n = 1); PLOS ONE (n = 2); Primates 
(n = 1); Scientific Reports (n = 3). In six out of eight, that is, in 75% of the publications 
the word participant is used to refer to chimpanzees, appearing at least once in all five 
journals. In the remaining 25% the term subject is employed (Scientific Reports and 
PLOS ONE) but is followed by the personal pronoun “who” instead of “that” or “which” 
75%
25%
Use of Participant vs Subject for 
Chimpanzees
Japanese Speakers in English Publications
KUPRI 
Participant Subject + who
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(Graph  3). Out of these four authors (i.e., 25%), one never employed the word participant, 
but subject followed by the pronoun who.   
Albeit the small sample size, this study indicates that also in English these 
researchers’ linguistic practices emphasize chimpanzees’ agency. In the cases where the 
word subject is used, it is not employed according to APA formal writing guidelines that 
strictly separates pronouns attributed to human and nonhumans, even though the articles 
are in APA style. Furthermore, the use of participant or subject does not seem to depend 
on journal, although only larger sample sizes can establish if there is a trend or significant 
difference across journals.  
Notwithstanding, in order to have a greater understanding of how the use of 
participant and subject occur in a greater context, it will be valuable to contrast 
publications on chimpanzees with other species, and also the usages of non-native 
Japanese speakers. In the future, a broad international comparison crossing species and 
international authors should be of interest to determine worldwide, recent trends in 
primatology, however, for the time being we can address a few examples close to PRI 
authors’ main network.  
Within the same time frame (2013 - Mid July 2017), the word participant is also 
used by a Japanese native speaker who is PRI experimenter in chimpanzee cognitive 
research to refer to different species, namely, dolphins (Tursiops truncates) in the journal 
Scientific Reports and horses (Eqqus caballus) in Biology Letters. Although this matter 
has not been systematically tackled, as means of comparison, it was possible to observe 
in a recent 2017 PLOS ONE publication by Western authors not collaborating with PRI 
that the word participant was employed to refer to another cetacean, the beluga whales 
(Delphinapterus leucas). Regarding horses, a recent 2016 article in Applied Animal 
Behavior Science by Western scholars, who were also not collaborating with PRI, 
referred to this species as simply “horses”, not making use of the terms participant or 
subject despite the experimental character of the study. In sum, the use of participants for 
a non-primate species or the simple designation of the subjects by the species name do 
not appear far-fetched in publications authored by Westerns.  
When we move on to monkeys, a Japanese native speaker and PRI experimenter 
in chimpanzee cognitive research, who worked with monkeys as well, used the term 
participant to refer to Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) in the journal Primates. In 
contrast, a Japanese native speaker at PRI, not involved in chimpanzee research, clearly 
refers to humans as participants and monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) as subjects in the journal 
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Animal Cognition. Note though, that following the pattern of chimpanzee researchers 
who employ subject for chimpanzees, this monkey researcher uses the term subject 
followed by the pronoun who to refer to monkeys. In other words, in the same institute, 
Japanese native speakers differed when referring to monkeys, with the chimpanzee 
researcher employing participant where the monkey researcher employed “subject” + 
“who”.  
Interestingly, a Western experimenter in PRI chimpanzee cognitive research, who 
worked with monkeys as well, refers to monkeys (Sapajus apella) as participants in a 
2016 publication in Primates and the paper is coauthored by both a Western and a 
Japanese researcher from PRI chimpanzee section. In contrast, two first authors, who are 
Western researchers at PRI and are mainly involved in monkey research, referred to 
monkeys as subjects. For both the 2014 study in Animal Behavior (on Callithrix Jacchus) 
and the 2015 study in Biology Letters (on Macaca fuscata fuscata), no relative pronouns 
(who; which; that) were linked to the word subject. In sum, in the same institute, 
foreigners differed when referring to monkeys, with the chimpanzee researcher making 
use of participant, when monkey researchers made use of the term subject.  
As for foreign collaborators, a Western first author collaborating with PRI 
chimpanzee section refers to chimpanzees as participants in a 2016 publication in PLOS 
ONE, whereas Western authors collaborating with Kumamoto Sanctuary, PRI’s sister 
institution, use both participants and subjects followed by the relative pronoun who, in a 
study published in Science in 2016. On the same note, a 2015 article of Scientific Reports 
published solely by Westerns not collaborating with PRI used “who”, “participants” and 
“subjects” interchangeably for humans, chimpanzees and capuchins.   
In sum, it seems that the uses of participant and subject for nonhuman animals 
regardless of the species are not yet stabilized as a linguistic practice within a broader 
scientific community.  However, the increasing presence of the relative pronoun “who” 
instead of “that” or “which” enforced by the latest APA guidelines84 suggests that there 
might be a major trend towards emphasizing the agency of nonhuman animals, although 
this remains to be confirmed by systematic studies with a large sample size. In 
conjunction with the analysis of other aspects of human-animal relations in research, 
studies on linguistic practices of scientific communities are likely to provide a more 
precise picture of scientists’ attitudes toward the nonhuman animals of their studies.  
A caution note should now be added. Whereas “participant” vs. “subject” and 
“who” vs. “which/that” point at traditional divides between humans and animals, we 
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should not infer that they are directly translatable to any other language, or Japanese, for 
that matter. If English became the lingua franca of science, it does not mean that its 
usages will be the same across the globe, because some national, or even institutional 
scientific communities may weigh in words differently. Likewise, in languages with 
similar divides, it does not follow that the act of shifting categories (or crossing linguistic 
boundaries) will be weighted the same.  
This seems to be the case in Japanese, where the divide between the counters nin 
and kotai is likely much greater than participants and subjects. Once again, in Japanese, 
when one wishes to count humans a particular suffix, nin (人), follows the number, 
whereas, to count individuals in general and regardless of species, the suffix kotai (個体) 
is used. In technical scientific publications in Japanese, the counter kotai is preferred, 
however, in daily usage in the laboratory chimpanzee researchers count chimpanzees by 
nin. For researchers at PRI, evolutionary proximity is the reason for the attribution of nin 
to chimpanzees. However, this is a very rare usage outside the context of chimpanzee 
research, and laymen will likely call this species by the counter for large animals, that is, 
tō (頭).  
Jumping from tou/kotai to nin might be a greater move than jumping from subject 
to participant. If we observe, for example, one of the above-mentioned articles by a 
Japanese native speaker on Japanese macaques we might notice that while the author cites 
the macaques as participants, in the Japanese abstract of the article the same author 
employs kotai. Given that the journal was a technical one (Primates) and the species a 
macaque, this is the expected outcome according to what we have seen. However, if the 
terms participant and subject in English had the same value as the nin/kotai divide then 
we would expect the author to readily use the human counter nin to count Japanese 
macaques, a species that is, after all, much “closer to home” than the African, non-
indigenous chimpanzees. We may also wonder, why are chimpanzees who are 
preferentially called participants in English (Linguistic Study 3), not counted by the suffix 
nin in technical publications (Linguistic Study 2)? It is likely that comparatively speaking, 
nin can be viewed as human marker or rather a personhood marker in a much stronger 
sense than the emphasis on agency of the word participant when opposed to subject.  
If we now analyze how foreign PRI researchers count chimpanzees in their own 
classifier languages it becomes clearer that the semantic hierarchy across languages is not 
equal. Like Japanese, Chinese and Korean also have counters. In the chimpanzee section 
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there were three native speakers of these languages who were regular experimenters 
during this ethnography (two Koreans and one Chinese). Therefore, the question of how 
chimpanzees are addressed in those languages arose.  
Regarding Korean, I first sought a Korean researcher from another section, who 
works with bonobos in the wild and who kindly provided me information on how animals 
are counted in this language along with a few more details: in general terms, people are 
counted by myeong (명) while in modern speech mari  (마리) is used for all animals, 
including chimpanzees. X ,Note 85  I then proceeded to ask how Korean experimenters 
addressed PRI chimpanzees in Japanese and Korean, given that both of them could speak 
Japanese. One was native monolingual and the other was Korean-Japanese native 
bilingual. In Japanese, the first interlocutor informed to likely have employed nin for 
chimpanzees in the laboratory but was not completely sure of this habit, stating to prefer 
to specify chimpanzees by their names. The second informant, the native bilingual, 
detailed to remember to make use of tō when first arriving at the institute, shifting 
thereafter to the nin counter in the laboratory context but not outside.  
As for Korean, the first interlocutor reported to use mari for chimpanzees and pets 
as well. The second, likewise, reported to use mari for chimpanzees, also in scientific 
articles. This Korean-Japanese case is interesting because even though both were 
experimenters in the chimpanzee section at PRI they did not generalize the learned 
linguistic practices into the other language. This, again, brings us to pragmatics, that is, 
in which context people are using language. The Korean fieldworker, when asked whether 
myeong could be used for chimpanzees at any rate, quickly laughed it off, stating other 
people might think it is not sensible. Yet, could it not be that experimenters would − at 
the Institute − cross linguistic boundaries in Korean? Perhaps this would require a much 
stronger socialization into this linguistic practice to overwrite the conceptual categories 
in their native languages.  
Now, if we inspect Chinese, we find that, originally, the Japanese kanji system is 
derived from the Chinese characters, which in Mandarin are called hànzì (thus, kanji in 
Japanese pronunciation).86 To have an overview of Chinese counters, I first turned to my 
co-worker in Matsuzawa’s laboratory. The experimenter explained that for animals, in 
relation to what we observe in Japanese, Mandarin native speakers mostly discriminate 
                                                 
X For detailed information, Unterbeck (1994) provides a linguistic overview of Korean numeral classifiers. 
For instance, she describes four classifiers for people that cover three speech levels: neutral, honorific and 
depreciative.  
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three counters: zhī (只), tóu (头)XI,Note 87 and pǐ (匹) with no special counters for birds 
and hares as in Japanese.88  She carried on: zhī counts animals in general, like sheep, 
rabbits, but also insects as well as tigers. Tóu is used for cows and elephants whereas pǐ 
is used for horses and donkeys. Humans, on the other hand, are counted by gè (个). 
However, in formal occasions, people (such as professors) are counted by wèi (位). In the 
realm of Mandarin counters, chimpanzees and monkeys belong to zhī, which groups most 
animals.  
Numeral classifiers have developed differently in Chinese and in Japanese. Indeed, 
linguists warn that there might not be a one to one mapping in these languages, as for 
instance, counters might vary in syntactic structure (i.e., word order) and, in addition, the 
same character might be applied to different beings such as 匹, which in Japanese is 
applied to small animals and is also a general animal classifier (hiki), but in Mandarin is 
used to count horses (pǐ). 89  Once again, this points to the importance of analyzing 
pragmatics or how people actually speak in contexts. Chinese language, here, provides 
another interesting point in the comparative usages of the human counters.   
In a study comparing Japanese and Chinese classifiers, sentences from Mainichi 
Shinbun newspaper were analyzed according to how they were translated from Japanese 
to Chinese, amounting to 243 sentence pairs where at least one of the sentences had a 
classifier (either Chinese or Japanese).90 In these real-world sentences, the default human 
classifier (Nin/ hito 人) was translated into one of the three possible person classifiers in 
Mandarin Chinese, varying according to formality and status of the people addressed. The 
differences in these counters are explained by Zhang:91 the first one, as we have seen, is 
gè (个) and is formally regarded as a neutral and unmarked way of addressing people. 
The second one, also mentioned above, is wèi (位), which pays respect to the person 
addressed. The third human counter translatable from Japanese is míng (名), which is, in 
fact, formal and used in written format.XII,Note 92,93  
                                                 
XI NB., the Chinese character tóu (头) has as older, non-simplified form 頭 (Collins 2017), which is the 
same character for the Japanese counter for large animals, tō.  
XII Mutatis mutandis, the Mandarin character denoting respect, i.e., wèi (位) is used in Japanese for rankings 
and deceased spirits as i (位) (Trussel 2017). Furthermore, the formal and written Mandarin míng (名), 
when in Japanese, counts people as mē (名) in the honorific language sonkēgo (Ahlström, Ahlström and 
Plummer 2017).   
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However, Mandarin Chinese has a particularity:94 the neutral counter for humans, 
gè (个), is also a general classifier, which, when translated in this sense into Japanese, is 
more equivalent to the counter tsu (つ) for general inanimate beings.XIII,Note 95,96,97 In 
addition, gè might actually count animals as well.98 In other words, the same counter can 
be used in a specific form or extended as a general counter for beings. Many linguists 
support that the use of the general counter gè is arbitrary; however, this view has been 
challenged by a recent study correlating people’s perception of animals and the usages of 
numeral classifiers.99 Based on previous studies, seventy-five monolingual Chinese were 
surveyed to rate seventy-six animals in terms of their distance to humans, where “distance 
to humans” was deliberately vaguely explained in a short introduction, which stated that 
behavior, appearance or possibility to identify the animal could be criteria to determine 
distance and that the decision should be intuitive.100  
Participants had overall similar attitudes to animals: orangutans had the highest 
rating (8.56 of 10 [it was not detailed whether chimpanzees figured among the tested 
species]) and monkeys scored higher than other animals (over 6).101 Then, these ratings 
were contrasted to a corpus of 370 million words from modern written and spoken 
Mandarin Chinese (CCL-Corpus) and, in addition, Google searches. They examined the 
usages of five classifiers that might appear with animals: the classifiers already discussed, 
that is, gè (个), zhī (只), tóu (头) and pǐ (匹), and a fifth one, tiáo(条), used for long 
shaped entities (e.g., snakes, fishes, etc.).102  
The results showed that the frequency of words had no effect whether an animal 
would be classified as the counter gè or not. In fact, the results support that “[a]nimate 
nouns are more often associated with the classifier 个 gè if the signified living being is 
very close to (e.g. 猴子 hóuzi ‘monkey’) or, on the contrary, very far away from 
human beings (e.g. 牡蛎 mŭlì ‘oyster’).” This means that animals which had “medium 
humanness value”, that is, that were rated in the middle, like birds and fishes, rarely took 
up the counter gè.103 The authors explain this outcome as two different processes being 
in place: on the one hand, the classifier gè is used as a general classifier for “very unhuman 
living beings” like mollusks and insects.104 On the other, the same character is being used 
                                                 
XIII Note though, that the gè (个) character, is originally written as 個 (Collins 2017), which currently exists 
in Japanese as a counter for general articles such as goods, small artifacts, etc. (Trussel 2017), although the 
Japanse tsu  (つ) is the default general counter for inanimate things. On the other hand, it has been argued 
that gè (个) is historically older than gè (個) (Wang 2008).  
289
 
by analogy in the sense of the human classifier, being applied to animals “very close to 
human beings in terms of behavior and appearance”.105  
In this study, it was not clear how the participants who rated animals were selected, 
and, as in many studies in cognitive sciences an urban bias might have occurred. If so, 
this type of study should be expanded to include a more diverse sample of Mandarin 
Chinese speakers. Nonetheless, the results are revealing when we take into account the 
pragmatics of the linguistic boundary work and our modes of relation to nonhuman 
animals. A word of caution is that, again, the shifting of categories might not be identical 
in all languages: if in Mandarin the counter for humans is also employed to describe many 
other beings, then, the speaker who employs this counter in an analogy to humans might 
not sound so strange in comparison to a Japanese native speaker who uses the default 
human counter with much more precision. In Mandarin Chinese, would a chimpanzee be 
seriously addressed as the respectful wèi (位)? Or figure in a publication as the formal 
written míng (名)? Pragmatics requires empirical research, yet, the odds are that the 
answer is no.  
All in all, it is possible that first, in contrast to the English pairs “participant-
subject” and “who-which/that” observed in the scientific literature, numeral classifiers 
categorize personhood more markedly. Second, that within classifier languages some 
numeral classifiers might denote personhood more distinctly by being traditionally 
employed with more precision to human beings and human qualities. So far, the Japanese 
usages of the human counter nin appear to have high specificity so that these utterances 
have strong connotation when applied to chimpanzees in adult speech. However, we 
currently lack information on whether chimpanzee researchers in Korea and China would 
follow the same linguistic pattern observed in Japan, which, in Asia, is considered to be 
the country with the strongest tradition in the area so far. Only future comparative studies 
on linguistic practices within the chimpanzee-research community (in English and in 
classifier languages) will provide us a conclusive picture of these usages, which is of 
importance to assess emerging models of nonhuman personhood in science. 
 As a final point on linguistic usages, it could be argued that the attribution of the 
human counter nin (人 ) to refer to chimpanzees is an artifact derived from mere 
familiarity with the test subjects. Indeed, one professor explicitly stated that he also uses 
nin in the context of testing nonprimate species and with pets as well, as a sign of intimacy. 
If one regards how chimpanzees are addressed in the laboratory beyond the case of 
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numeral classifiers, one may find all intimacy markers such as “chan” (-ちゃん), “chin” 
(-ちん) to denote diminutive and even “kun” (君), used to address men younger or of the 
same age as the speaker. Thus, chimpanzees are addressed mostly as Aichan, Penchan, 
Panchan, Paruchin and so on. Matsuzawa, for instance, frequently addresses Ayumu as 
Ayumu-kun. In addition, chimpanzees might be called by a nickname like the case of 
Cleo who is Coo(chin) and sometimes ojōsama when acting princess-like, refusing to do 
experiments before someone spoils her.  
Chimpanzees may also be addressed by the suffix san (さん) equivalent to Mr. 
and Mrs., although the diminutive use is more common. Ohnuki-Tierney while analyzing 
the symbolism of the monkey in Japanese society stresses that the monkey, being the 
animal closest to humans in Japanese culture, is the only one addressed and referred to as 
san in adult language, the exception being children.106 Here as well, we observe how 
linguistic practices in the laboratory context push these linguistic boundaries forward; 
from monkeys to chimpanzees.   
 Nonetheless, the familiarity argument misses out the point that researchers’ 
linguistic practices are grounded in scientific reasons, namely, the willingness to 
emphasize our phylogenetic common ground. If researchers do not treat chimpanzees as 
nin in technical publications, they do so in broad-reach publications. Even in TV 
documentaries and in some public talks it is possible to observe this usage. In fact, 
researchers want to be taken seriously in these utterances, not as a matter of how a given 
researcher is familiar with a given chimpanzee but in the sense of how we humans are 
close to chimpanzees, all of them, not just PRI chimpanzees.  
 To emphasize symmetry, Ai is even addressed as research “partner” by 
Matsuzawa,107 which is even stronger than simply “participant”. Moreover, as discussed 
elsewhere in this manuscript, when addressing the media, the word “study” (benkyō 勉
強 ) is preferred over “experiment” (jikken 実験 ), which carries a more invasive 
connotation. Even non-verbal communication is crafted for the exact same reasons, 
observed when laboratory masks and caps are avoided while filming. Remember, the end 
of biomedical invasive research in apes was not a result of protective laws.108 However, 
if there is the constant need to gather public awareness for chimpanzees’ cause on the 
long run, one should not infer that researchers simply anthropomorphize at will to gain 
people’s sympathy. When, for instance, a Japanese documentary features the chimpanzee 
Cleo as Ayumu’s “bride candidate” (oyomesan kōhō お嫁さん 候補),109  there is a 
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process taking place which is very distinct from the type of categorization followed by 
researchers.  
 Indeed, it is important to argue that those are two different processes and they 
should be understood differently if practices in Japanese primatology are to be taken 
seriously. Especially  given that much of Pamela Asquith’s seminal work on 
anthropomorphism in Japanese primatology110 has been detoured to indicate a cultural 
bias to be wary of, when, to the best of my knowledge, within primatology itself the 
Western dualistic biases are not mentioned to the same extent, at least.XIV,111 For instance, 
Wolfensohn an Honess in the Handbook of Primate Husbandry and Welfare summarize 
Asquith’s work very well: “Western primatologists focus on the study of populations 
frequently to elucidate species-typical patterns of behaviour, whereas there has been a 
history among Japanese primatologists of studying primate social behaviour in the 
context of the interaction of interindividual relationships and personalities in determining 
the character and nature of social behaviour within a social unit (Asquith 1986).”112   
Nonetheless, the paragraph is ended with no further remarks: “The Japanese 
approach has often been viewed by Western researchers as overly anthropomorphic and 
lacking the objectivity that is so highly valued in Western scientific tradition.” 113 
Seemingly, that is it for Japanese primatology in such accounts. This appears quite crude 
when analyzing the subject from the point of view of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) and anthropology of primatological practices. True, in primatology, 
anthropomorphism is not the nemesis it once was. In reference to its positive aspects, 
“strategic” anthropomorphism is usually cited.114 Indeed, as de Waal disentangles, the 
“bambification” of animals, that is, the “anthropocentric anthropomorphism” is a 
phenomenon of a different order than the “animalcentric anthropomorphism”, which 
takes upon the animal perspective.115 Notwithstanding, I believe that anthropocentrism as 
a general term, when applied to the context of Japanese primatology, may be misleading 
for putting emphasis on different types of processes than those that have been observed 
in chimpanzee research in Japan in the context of this etho-ethnography. 
 In fact, Japanese practices in chimpanzee studies could be said to be at the 
forefront of new models of personhood in science. Thus, it is less about 
anthropomorphizing than it is about personifying. It is necessary to understand this 
process not exactly on formal, legal grounds, but rather, on the plane of concrete, daily 
                                                 
XIV NB., thus, this does not imply this issue never conceptualized in Western primatology. See for example, 
de Waal’s account in “The Ape and the Sushi Master” (2001).  
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interactions; on how scientists actually relate - and are allowed to relate - to test subjects. 
One can argue whether this is a good model or not. Some practices in Japanese 
primatology seem to be banned in Western research institutions (although not in all, vide 
the Ape Language Studies) for its potential danger such as face-to-face experiments with 
adult chimpanzees. Nonetheless, these practices present (in a much greater palette of 
colors) the dilemmas and prospects of relating to animals in ways other than our 
traditional divides foresee.  
Driving the point home, the anthropological importance of linguistic usages, be it 
of classifiers or other words, is that they are anchored in the researchers’ cultural, 
scientific and moral worldviews as well as in institutional practices. Thus, when read in 
the context of their social fabric, they can be considered an index revealing the boundary 
work demarcating what belongs to the realm of humans and nonhuman animals. Now, we 
shall turn to another aspect of the drawing and erasing of the boundaries between humans 
and chimpanzees: its social aspect.  
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4.2 Animal Perspective and its Becomings 
 
“I’m not a chimp, I’m human, speak human!” Spoken in the chimpanzee section 
at the Primate Research Institute, this utterance reveals more than the bare eyes can tell. 
Why would a human at the heart of a research center feel the need to assert one’s own 
membership to homo sapiens? And what does “speak[ing] human” mean in this context? 
Do not all humans speak “human” to humans? To appreciate in which context this 
sentence bears meaning, we first shall turn again to the notion of an “animalcentric” 
perspective.1 This idea, as it has been popularized in ethology and disciplines alike, stems 
from Thomas Nagel’s iconic paper “What is it like to be a bat?”.2 There, Nagel questions 
the possibility of accessing the subjective experience of nonhuman animals, especially 
those with a perceptual world quite distant from human experience, like sonar-using bats. 
In Nagel’s account, there are fundamental challenges in conceiving the conscious 
experience of nonhuman animals:3 
It may be easier than I suppose to transcend inter-species barriers with the aid of 
the imagination. For example, blind people are able to detect objects near them by 
a form of sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if one knew what 
that was like, one could by extension imagine roughly what it was like to possess 
the much more refined sonar of a bat. The distance between oneself and other 
persons and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum. Even for other 
persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is only partial, and when 
one moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser degree of partial 
understanding may still be available. The imagination is remarkably flexible. My 
point, however, is not that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. I am not 
raising that epistemological problem. My point is rather that even to form a 
conception of what it is like to be a bat (and a fortiori to know what it is like to be 
a bat) one must take up the bat’s point of view. If one can take it up roughly, or 
partially, then one’s conception will also be rough or partial. Or so it seems in our 
present state of understanding. 
 
Regardless of how well we are capable of fathoming an animal’s point of view, 
in order to understand an animal’s subjective experience, we are encouraged to shift 
perspectives. In fact, primatologists from different nationalities and studying different 
primates have pointed out that researchers might start resembling the species they 
investigate. During this ethnography, people’s behavior was sometimes explained (in 
either a jesting or indignant manner) in terms of similarities shared. For instance, a 
boastful individual who cannot handle confrontation, cannot handle a stare just like the 
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Japanese macaques this person studies. Likewise, researchers would occasionally use the 
studied species as a self-reference. In addition, “high” and “low-ranking”, which are terms 
used to analyze nonhuman primate societies, frequently crossed the boundaries to explain 
not only primate-primate and human-primate interactions but also human-human 
hierarchy (“I know I’m low-ranking, but…”; “It’s because he is high-ranking….”; and so 
on).  
These examples are epiphenomena of a much deeper issue, namely, that the 
identification with a studied species occurs on many layers of “entanglements”.4 They 
entail emotional aspects, passing by interspecies communication forms up to the ultimate 
challenge of understanding nonhuman minds. All these factors have their share of a shift 
in perspective so crucial for the animalcentric point of view: to comprehend another’s 
feelings, to feel the way someone feels; to recognize another’s codes, to use someone’s 
codes; to understand someone’s mind, to put yourself in the mind of this person. Shifting 
perspectives is not an all-or-none deal but appears in nuances and shades.  
This effort might prove incredibly valuable in a laboratory context as well. During 
one of Ai’s session in the laboratory, Professor Matsuzawa took the opportunity to advise 
me on experimental matters. He first talked long about the importance of precision to 
make good science and of understanding an episode within the greater context. His 
examples were simple but powerfully convincing. I was attentively following his logic 
until a statement caught me off guard: we should turn to “become chimpanzee”. He 
elaborated: you should pay attention to tiny things. Ok – I thought to myself − I grasp the 
resemblance, after all, chimpanzees are usually much more aware of the surroundings 
than we are (I cannot help but recalling how once Pal noticed the tube of the air 
conditioner in the ceiling was changed when I had been in the room the whole morning 
and failed to do so). Making a mental note, I concluded: I should pay attention to things 
like chimpanzees do. In other words, I should imitate their ways for certain matters. So 
far so good… 
However, a later episode in the same morning refuted the idea that my 
interpretation of “becom[ing] chimpanzee” should stop there. It was Chloe and Cleo’s 
session, yet, on that day, Chloe came alone. At this point, it is worth recounting the events 
recorded during that experimental session and to provide their time frame to best capture 
the tempo of the activity (for a map, see Figure 1). Indeed, Chloe’s coming in these 
circumstances was particular and, as a result, on that day we inverted the order of the 
experiments, and my experiment was conducted first. As soon as Chloe got into booth 
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one she quickly started to give me the objects through the exchange apparatus and, as it 
is usual for her, the experiment was quickly finished, this time, in less than a minute (54s). 
With the door fully open so that she could pass on to the second booth to perform another 
researcher’s experiment, we started to verbally encourage her and tease her with food 
items in a bowl (1m9s). Showing signs of anxiety, she scratched herself thirteen times 
before moving to the second booth (1m11s-1m28s).  
When Chloe 
was already in booth 
two, the guillotine 
door started to close, 
as usual, however; 
this time Chloe was 
not pleased by this 
action and began 
crossing back to 
booth one (1m39s). 
When Chloe was just in between booths, Matsuzawa asked the technician to completely 
open the door, verbally encouraging Chloe to come back to booth two (1m41s). With the 
door fully open (1m50s), Chloe began to move back toward the computer, again, 
accompanied by Matsuzawa’s words of support (1m51s). Finally, Chloe started her task 
in booth two (2m6s), succeeding in four trials, failing in one and then succeeding in 
another.  
After this last trial, Chloe interrupted the task and headed to booth one once more, 
prompting Matsuzawa to ask her to come back by saying “Kuroe, oide!” (Chloe, come!) 
and by preparing some treats to be delivered next to the computer (2m45s). In booth one, 
Chloe inspected the feeder and the exchange apparatus bipedally until she finally crossed 
the door back to booth two (2m52s). Then, Matsuzawa said “stay quiet”; he turned to 
Chloe and encouraged her to approach the computer once again (“Kuroe, oide”) (3m1s). 
Finally, Chloe moved on to the computer and Matsuzawa praised her by saying “sō da!” 
(that’s it!) (3m39s). Chloe resumed the task, and as before, she was praised by Matsuzawa 
(“sō da!”) (4m6s). Right after, Matsuzawa voiced to all lab members in both Japanese 
and English: “don’t move” (4m8s). Differing from regular sessions, he cheered her in 
almost each correct trial (“sō da!”). Likewise, when Chloe received a buzzer sound for an 
incorrect answer, Matsuzawa frequently said “daijōbu da yo!”, or something like ‘it will 
 
Figure 1Schematic representation of Matsuzawa's laboratory. By Daly.  
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be ok’. Chloe continued to do the task consistently. At a certain point, she pant-hooted to 
chimpanzees outside the laboratory room (4m34s), however, she did not stop the task 
until she finished it. At this moment, she was greeted by Matsuzawa’s effusive hand 
clapping and praise (“sō da!”) (7m46s). At last, Chloe received some pieces of fruits, as 
protocol, given after the end of each set of trials or at the end of the experiments. I  
There are many interesting points about this eight-minute episode, the most 
conspicuous being the social support given to the chimpanzee accomplish the task. This 
usually occurs when a chimpanzee is either hesitating or ignoring the tasks (and us). 
Although unusual and employed in very difficult cases, from time to time a lab member 
will “coach” a chimpanzee through almost every correct trial, bearing in mind each set 
has about a hundred trials depending on the experiment. Yet, the most thought-provoking 
point of this episode was made explicit only after Chloe’s session was over, when 
Matsuzawa gave the laboratory members some recommendations.  
Matsuzawa started the talk by reminding us that that day was Chloe’s first time in 
our laboratory without her daughter Cleo and, therefore, we needed to motivate her. 
Looking at us, he stated (as if addressing Chloe): we do the shortest experiment, then one 
more experiment and you can go. He continued:  you see, she did not do three sets as 
usual but just one. We want her to feel it is safe, enjoyable. Usually, she allows us to close 
the door when Cleo is there; today I said no, because she looked anxious. Right after, 
Matsuzawa pointed out the moment a lab member headed to check the video cameras in 
the back of booth two, when he told people not to move. He then evaluated that the lab 
member just followed a habit out of regular duties but that, in fact, we should have better 
paid attention to the novelty of the situation. He added: we need to keep quiet so that 
Chloe will focus on her task. As if he was about to make a very specific point, he turned 
to me and the other experimenter: to become top students… you are good… So, use your 
capability − he shook his open hands near his head − “become Chloe”.  
His hand gesture was telling. In fact, next, Matsuzawa encouraged us to put 
ourselves in Chloe’s position and then think about what we had to do as experimenters. 
He complemented: every day is new; not routine work as many people say. As a final 
point on this topic, noting the rare character of the conversation, he concluded: Japanese 
                                                 
I NB., only correct answers receive verbal praise, which overlaps with the chime sound signaling a correct 
answer. Otherwise, the praise would conflict with the meaning of the buzzer signaling incorrect answers. 
The most common verbal praises are sō (yes) and sō da (that’s it) and they seem to be easily recognized by 
chimpanzees. Daijōbu is not a word used in positive reinforcement at PRI. Its literal meaning is ‘alright’.  
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learn by master-apprenticeship, just watching, so usually, I do not explain these things, 
only to foreigners… After the talk, it was made clear that “becom[ing] chimpanzee” far 
surpassed a sheer, detached imitation of perceived qualities; the task was even more 
challenging. It was a matter of trying to perceive the world as chimpanzee Chloe in that 
particular situation, in other words, it was a matter of changing perspectives. In following 
sensei’s instructions, our own position as experimenters should be enriched; if we learned 
such mental maneuver, we would respond accordingly, that is, according to her mind, not 
ours. In this way, we would have understood what was needed for her to feel motivated 
to perform our experiments in that particular context. Hence, from sensei’s point of view, 
being a good experimenter and putting yourself in chimpanzees’ position went hand in 
hand.  
We shall now see how perspective-shift is approached in different disciplines. For 
researchers from cognitive sciences and from sociocultural anthropology the notion of 
shifting perspectives is familiar, although for symmetrically opposite reasons. In 
cognitive sciences, this issue is approached by studies in “theory of mind” (known as 
ToM), introduced by Premack and Woodruff in 1978 in the seminal paper “Does the 
chimpanzee have a theory of mind?”.5 Theory of mind means the attribution of mental 
states to oneself and to others, be it conspecifics or different species, and the examples of 
mental states comprise purpose or intention, beliefs and thoughts, among others.6 In the 
1990’s, theory of mind was emphasized as “the major cognitive difference” between 
nonhuman primates and us.7 However, it is important to stress that, even at that point, 
cognitive researchers (cf. behaviorists) did not contend that nonhuman primates had 
themselves intentions; the question was rather how these animals understand the 
intentions of others.8,II,Note 9 
Theory of mind is clearly associated with perspective taking and is referred to as 
comprising two levels. “Level 1 perspective taking” means “knowing that others can see 
things that I cannot and vice versa” whereas “[l]evel 2 perspective taking” equals 
“knowing precisely what others see, including that they see the same thing I do but from 
a different perspective”.10 Level one translates into awareness of what is at stake in an 
“uninformed situation”, that is, knowing that the other is ignorant about a certain 
context.11 In other words, in level one perspective taking, I know that you do not know; 
                                                 
II Similarly, knowledge on your own knowledge is currently approached by research on metacognition. For 
a recent review, see Beran (2015, 352), which indicates chimpanzees show some degree of “thinking about 
thinking”.  
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or, I do not know, but I know that you do. Level two, on the other hand, indicates the 
awareness of a “misinformed situation” in which the chimpanzee would understand – not 
only that the other does not know something – but that the other has a false belief, meaning, 
the other thinks to know right when is in fact wrong.12 Simply put, level two perspective 
taking could be summarized as I know you think you are right when you are wrong. In a 
review of the state of the art in the study of theory of mind, Tomasello and Call 
concluded:13  
 
In a broad construal of the phrase ‘theory of mind’, then, the answer to Premack 
and Woodruff’s pregnant question of 30 years ago is a definite yes, chimpanzees 
do have a theory of mind. But chimpanzees probably do not understand others in 
terms of a fully human-like belief–desire psychology in which they appreciate that 
others have mental representations of the world that drive their actions even when 
those do not correspond to reality. And so in a more narrow definition of theory 
of mind as an understanding of false beliefs, the answer to Premack and 
Woodruff’s question might be no, they do not. Why chimpanzees do not seem to 
understand false beliefs in particular – or if there might be some situations in 
which they do understand false beliefs – are topics of ongoing research 
 
In sum, as of 2008 research indicated chimpanzees were not able to pass the 
experimental paradigms testing level two perspective taking, that is, understanding of 
false beliefs. However, as technology and procedures develop, it becomes possible to test 
nonhuman animal cognition in ways not previously viable or thought. Instead of relying 
on paradigms depending on food, a recent study using noninvasive eye tracking 
technology opened the possibility that apes might, just like humans, possess level two 
perspective taking. Authored by researchers at Kyoto University, Max Planck and other 
institutions, the study highlights the importance of investigating this form of perspective 
taking: “False-belief understanding is of particular interest because it requires recognizing 
that others’ actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those 
beliefs are false”.14  
The experiments tested the anticipatory looking of three great ape species 
(chimpanzees, bonobos and Sumatran orangutans) while watching movie clips involving 
multiple situations where objects were hidden and a second party had to retrieve the 
objects. Several variables were controlled, including counterbalancing locations to 
exclude the possibility that apes were reacting to positional cues. The results show that 
these species “specifically anticipated that the actor would search for the object where he 
falsely believed it to be”. 15  However, they caution that the results might be the 
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consequence of “an implicit understanding of belief” given that apes have not yet 
succeeded in false-belief tasks involving “explicit behavioral choices”.16  
 Unlike chimpanzees, theory of mind in adult, typically developing humans is 
conceived as being always “full-fleshed”, at least in terms of species capacities (even 
though individual performances may fall short). However, it is possible that the way 
humans impute mental states to others varies according to a socially learned knowledge 
of the human and nonhuman world. This is a point to which sociocultural anthropology 
turns its attention. Thus, we shall investigate how anthropology deals with the issue of 
perspective taking in non-Western ontologies. As previously approached in the discussion 
of linguistic boundaries, there are other forms of relating to nonhuman entities not 
predicted by the traditional logic of naturalism, the mode of relationship from which 
science emerged. Animism, in such case, is a privileged example because it overturns the 
premises of naturalism and opens up for inspection a complex “ecology of selves”, or 
“[h]ow different kinds of beings represent and are represented by other kinds of beings”.17  
Perspectivism, which is the Amerindian corollary of animism, provides a striking 
exemplar of the kind of perspective taking dealt with by sociocultural 
anthropology.III,Note18 In perspectivism, “[a]ny species of subject perceives itself and its 
world in the same way we perceive ourselves and our world. “Culture” is what one sees 
of oneself when one says “I”.”19 Viveiros de Castro sustains that perspectivism is a theory 
of mind applied by natives.20,21 However, there are a few idiosyncrasies in the model of 
theory of mind studied in cognitive sciences and what shall be dubbed here as natives’ 
perspectival theory of mind, given that they seem to presuppose a different understanding 
of the nature of reality.  
Theory of mind in cognitive sciences is based on a multiplicity of views of a single 
world: level one perspective taking assumes the other sees things I do not (or vice-versa) 
and level two perspective taking accepts someone has a privileged view of a certain 
situation, which could be, for instance, the location of an object; in other words, the 
second person has a false belief while, implicitly, the first person has a correct one. Thus, 
these are perspectives upon the same world and the world that stands as referee regarding 
the perspectives. The unicity of the world assures that, provided the right perspective (e.g., 
information on where an object is hidden or visual access to a previously blocked path), 
                                                 
III It should be noted that the role perspectivism plays in animism and in anthropological theory in general 
is subject to dispute, as well summarized by Latour (2009) regarding Descola and Viveiros de Castro’s 
debate.  
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all the subjects will see the same thing or arrive at the same conclusion. The idea of a 
single invariant nature (read reality) upon which multiple points of view are projected is 
the formula assumed by the so-called multi-culturalism.22 
On the other hand, Amerindian perspectivism represents a single view of different 
worlds, so that the world changes with the subject: “What jaguars see as “manioc beer” 
(the proper drink of people, jaguar-type or otherwise), humans see as “blood.” Where we 
see a muddy salt-lick on a river bank, tapirs see their big ceremonial house, and so on.”23 
Thus, Amerindian perspectival theory of mind posits, on the contrary, a multi-
naturalism.24 Again, in this ontology, the source of these differences in perspective is the 
composition and affections of the body. Mutatis mutandis, along the lines of naturalism, 
the closest comparison might be Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt. An animal’s Umwelt is a 
product of the relationship between the animal’s bodily dispositions and the external 
environment. 25  To keep Nagel’s bat example previously discussed, sonar-using bats 
inhabit a different Umwelt than humans, for their sensory world accesses features not 
available to homo sapiens, although, unlike in multinaturalism, the external environment 
is supposedly the same.IV  
It is not surprising that Uexküll, a zoologist and a forgotten father of ethology, is 
considered one of the “scientific animists of the twentieth century”.26 A more recent 
scientific approach addressing vital issues in animist ontology is embodied cognition 
(which, parenthetically, drinks from Uexküll’s intellectual heritage), and is sometimes 
referred to as “anti-Cartesian cognition” due to its rejections of the dichotomy between 
mind and body and the emphasis on the role the body plays in thinking.27 Overall, it seems 
that scientific approaches are not all too blind to issues occupying the center of other 
ontologies. On the other hand, it is important to stress that the nature of reality might be 
conceived differently in standard animism and in its corollary, that is, perspectivism.  
The point is subtle but significant. As Descola exemplifies, in perspectivism, the 
tapirs attacked by the Amerindians see themselves as humans and Amerindians as jaguars 
or cannibal spirits; yet, because of their perspective as prey, they cannot perceive the 
other’s humanity.28 On the other hand, in habitual animism, the tapirs - even though they 
see themselves as humans - understand that the Amerindians also have certain attributes 
homologous to tapirs but that tapirs and Amerindians distinguish themselves by other 
                                                 
IV I thank Brett Buchanan for discussions on the nature of reality in Uexküll’s work.  
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criteria, such as bodily differences and idiosyncrasies in their habitus, like being nocturnal, 
or being gregarious.29  
In this context, it does not seem unreal to take the opportunity to expand the 
horizon of hypotheses tested in cognitive psychology by taking into account how non-
Western populations apply a theory of mind. That is, with the realization that our own 
scientific conceptions of theory of mind rely heavily on naturalist modes of conceiving 
reality, so that in fact, what is being investigated is but a small part of the full potential of 
what inquiries on theory of mind have to offer. When seen under this light, hypotheses 
like, “are nonhuman animals perspectivists or animists?” do not seem out of place.  
First, this position expands the sense of the cognitive theory of mind to include 
not only purely “cognitive” aspects, in the original sense of the word, but also affections, 
self-identity, group identity and embodiment. Second, it forces us to reconsider the very 
sociocultural concepts of animism and perspectivism; what would be animism or 
perspectivism for an animal, and under which bio-socio-psychological processes would 
these operate (or not)? Are there cultural or species differences in nonhuman animal 
animism or perspectivism?  
Once our universe of permissible questions in both cognitive sciences and 
anthropology has been expanded, these are to be answered by empirical research, which 
would profit from interdisciplinary collaboration. Such collaborative endeavors are likely 
to strike biology-oriented sciences and humanities at their Achilles’ heel, namely, the 
ethnocentric tendency to privilege hypothesis-testing along the lines of what is foreseen 
by Western thought and the anthropocentric tendency to let humans have the last saying 
about animals.  There is a deeper point to this statement than what we may notice at first 
sight.  
The fact that cognitive sciences have leaned onto the study non-Western 
populations is an advancement in comparison to the practice of taking Western samples 
by human universals. Yet, this is not a safeguard against ethnocentrism if we do not allow 
the way natives see the world to have the power to reformulate our own science at its 
presuppositions. This could be equated with just applying Western hypothesis testing to 
investigate non-Western populations. On the other hand, the fact that humanities are 
living an “animal-turn” and have, therefore, turned the attention to human and nonhuman 
entanglements is commendable. However, this is not a safeguard against 
anthropocentrism either, because we should recall that the study of human representations 
of animals is not the same thing as an attempt to unveil - concomitantly and in a truly 
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empirical matter - the animals’ representations at stake in these encounters. Thus, only de 
facto interdisciplinary queries and methods might be able to tackle questions that fall 
within the abyss between these major scientific worldviews.V,Note30 Now that perspective 
taking has been detailed to a fuller extent, we shall explore its implications, or stakes, 
namely, the problem of becoming the other. 
At this point, one may ask: Can scientists be “chimpified”? Before diving into 
scientific practices, once again, a digression away from naturalist ontology might prove 
useful. One of the challenges for societies bearing a perspectival relationship to 
nonhuman beings is that by taking upon the point of view of an animal, one risks 
becoming the very being into whose perspective one shifts. For instance, for the Runa 
people in the Ecuador’s rain forest, dogs are selves whose vocalizations and dreams are 
the reflection of how these animals see the world, and in this sense, the Runa spend 
considerable time trying to understand the dogs’ point of view, especially as these canines 
connect them to other beings in the forest.31 The Runa make use of special communication 
forms to relate to them, but not without stakes: “Talking to dogs is necessary but also 
dangerous; the Runa do not want to become dogs in the process”.32 Thus, in the Runa’s 
case, as Kohn summarizes, “[e]ntertaining the viewpoints of other beings blurs the 
boundaries that separate kinds of selves”.33  
The topic of becoming another is constant in animism and appears under the form 
of the metamorphosis of a human into a nonhuman being, usually an animal, and more 
rarely, into a plant.34 A subtlety, though, is that in an animist ontology there seems to be 
no ethnographic accounts of metamorphosis in terms of possession, that is, in the sense 
of a human soul entering another human’s body.35 Therefore, the animist metamorphosis 
characterizes well the interspecific “becoming”. As Descola points out:36  
 
[M]etamorphosis is not an unveiling or a disguise. Rather, it constitutes the 
ultimate phase in a relationship in which each party, by modifying the viewpoint 
imposed upon him by his original physicality, endeavors to coincide with the 
perspective in which he imagines that the other party sees itself. Through this shift 
in the angle of his approach, in which each party seeks to “enter the skin” of the 
                                                 
V For instance, investigations in goal attribution can provide us a hint of what could constitute some of the 
building blocks of such enquiry: in a series of experiments using preferential looking time paradigm, 
marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) attributed goal to a human actor, a conspecific, an unfamiliar monkey-like 
robot, but not to an unfamiliar moving black box, suggesting that, for marmosets, goal attribution might be 
dependent on features like face, body or legs (Kuperberg, Glasauer and Burkart 2013). Note though, that a 
large research program contemplating these interdisciplinary questions cannot entail jut a single aspect or 
method. Furthermore, dispersed studies helping to solve these puzzles should ideally be gathered under a 
conjoint effort.  
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other, by identifying with his supposed intentionality, the human no longer sees 
the animal as he usually does but, instead, sees it as that animal sees itself, that is, 
as a human, while a shaman is perceived, not as he usually sees himself, but as he 
wishes to be seen, that is, as an animal. 
 
Thus, a metamorphosis is the ultimate point in changing perspectives. In an 
animist ontology, shamans are those who, without losing their condition as subject, 
communicate and administer crossed perspectives.37 However, this all seems too far from 
the type of processes one should encounter while doing science, more precisely, “good” 
science - or does it not?  In the book “We have never been modern”, Latour argues that 
modernity never ceases to produce hybrids that are later purified into grand dichotomies 
such as nature and culture, humans and nonhumans.38,VI,Note39 More fragrantly, moderns 
do not allow these hybrids to be formally recognized out in the open, although they are 
produced by the very moderns who deny them (thus, we have never been modern, because 
we do not do what we preach).40 When hybrids are conceptualized by moderns, they 
appear as a simple mixture of two forms, that is, as a simple in-between, as intermediaries; 
however, this act denies hybrids their power as mediators, that is, as something that 
creates the entities to which they serve a mediating function.41  
Should science, then, be modern in the sense described? Latour suggests that, 
while the separation of nature and culture is important for experimentation on a large 
scale and, therefore, is not to be banished altogether, the proliferation of hybrids should 
not be clandestine but commonly agreed upon production.42 It is exactly at this point 
where Japanese scientific practices seem to show full force. When analyzing scientific 
practices in a Japanese laboratory specialized in the interaction between genetics and 
behavioral biology, Houdart comes to a surprising conclusion:  the mode of action of the 
leading figure in that Japanese laboratory is undeniably closer to that of Amerindian 
shamans than to the director of the French laboratory with whom the Japanese 
collaborate.43 The peculiarity of the laboratory analyzed by Houdart consists in the fact 
that the entities traditionally separated by dualistic thought (i.e., hybrids) are allowed to 
exist with full legitimacy, while the laboratory produces, nonetheless, internationally 
recognized science.44  
                                                 
VI N.B., modernity here is employed strictu sensu as two sets of practice, in other words, the work of 
“translation” (i.e., production of hybrids) and the work of “purification” (i.e., separation into different 
zones), (Latour 1993, 10).   
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 At this point, a word of caution regarding the crossing of animism, scientific 
practices and Japanese culture is in order. As a first remark, before conducting this 
ethnography, a Japanese anthropologist kindly issued a warning against anthropologists’ 
fetishism regarding Japanese animism. In addition, animism has been mobilized as part 
of a nationalist endeavor to distinguish Japanese specificity, setting this nation apart from 
the rest of the world. 45  Japanologists might recognize this contentious effort in 
determining Japanese identity as the so-called nihonjinron (日本人論), which entails a 
body of discourses espoused to greater or lesser extent by the population depending on 
the tenets it embodies (e.g., “Japanese “blood” is essential for mutual communication, 
mutual understanding, understanding of the culture and appearance as Japanese”).46 At 
last, on the other extreme lie the perils of treating Western thought as a monolith and, 
furthermore, of overestimating the effects of cultural influences, as exemplified by 
comments on Pamela Asquith’s work regarding Japanese primatology.47  
 Having said that, firstly, these issues do not undermine strategic analyses of 
animism  ̶  not as national discourse, but as an ontological practice, a position sustained 
by Jensen and Blok. 48  Secondly, even though Western modes of relationship with 
nonhuman entities vary greatly, the idiosyncrasies of practices should not hinder the 
observation and study of large-scale commonalities and should not deter scholars from 
employing analytical tools drawing on generalization even if, for that sake, the details of 
practices need to be abstracted.49 Finally, even if we refrain from a strong culturalist 
perspective where the modes of explanation consist in justifying that Japanese (or 
whatever ethnical group) do things as such just because they are Japanese, we should not 
throw the baby with the bath water, because, in fact, there might be social phenomena 
arising due to socio-historical specificities. In other words, Japanese are like anyone else, 
yet, they are like none.   
 When Houdart brings to the attention the similarities between the Japanese 
scientist and the Amerindian shaman regarding the act of managing perspectives,50 does 
that mean that the scientist is a shaman? In the reading proposed here, the answer is yes 
and no. Animism and naturalism, in the condition of socially learned modes of 
relationship with nonhuman entities, entail a series of social practices. A striking example 
is food consumption: in animist societies, this is expressed by the act of ritually 
desubjectifying animals before they are eaten to avoid falling ill as a result of cannibalism, 
given that animals are persons in potential.51 Likewise in naturalism, there has been a 
growing emphasis placed on the need for the welfare and humane treatment of animals in 
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large-scale dairy and meat production centers and subsequent calls for vegetarian and 
vegan-based diets.52 Granted that ontologies are whole bodies comprising sets of social 
practices, they seem to be, yet, more than that.  
 Ontologies comprise cognitive strategies that are socially learned and enhanced. 
In the process of relating to nonhuman animals and entering in a relationship with them, 
theory of mind is a crucial strategy. We humans, as a species, possess a full-fledged theory 
of mind in the sense that there is nothing a typically developing human from one corner 
of the world could do that another could not, and the fact that certain cognitive processes 
may have critical learning periods does not invalidate this overall human potential. 
However, the forms of attribution of mental states will acquire different social values; 
whereas a naturalist ontology will enforce a stricter attributional strategy, an animist 
ontology will privilege a more liberal, or even a perspectival one. Can the scientist, then, 
be a shaman? In the sense of deeper social practices foundational to animist ontologies   ̶ 
no. In the sense of cognitive strategies socially nourished and supported  ̶  yes.  
 As we have seen in the ethnographic episodes when experimenters were urged to 
“become chimpanzee”, a perspective-shift strategy was employed in order to prompt 
students to become more skilled experimenters. As argued, becoming chimpanzee means 
not only imitating certain chimpanzee characteristics but imagining the world as a 
chimpanzee (coming to an experiment under certain circumstances) would. Thus, a 
situated practice reaching at last a level two perspective taking in cognitive sciences term, 
that is, understanding that others see things from a different viewpoint and act according 
to these beliefs. Perhaps, this would suffice to make sense of the utterance “become 
chimpanzee”, yet, it seems that it does not capture the full dimension of the phenomenon. 
Another utterance hints this; “speak human to me”. Again, how could a homo sapiens not 
speak “human” to our own species? This is the point where sociocultural anthropology 
opens up our concepts for inspection by exploring the plurality of ways in which the 
relationship between humans and nonhuman animals is conceived.   
 As previously detailed, in animist ontologies the notion of metamorphosis as well 
as the danger of becoming an animal by diving too much into the animal’s perspective 
occur frequently. Mutatis mutandis, a researcher who, at a certain point, does not speak 
human to a human is likely a researcher that temporarily lost the sensitivity to the codes 
of the human social world as a function of becoming too sensitive to the animal 
perspective. In other words, instead of becoming chimpanzee to better communicate and 
interact with chimpanzees, a human may start acting like a chimpanzee toward humans, 
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or at least, being perceived as such in certain occasions to a greater or lesser extent. Lestel 
argues that processes of becoming like an animal are fundamental to our opening to 
animals as beings, and even more, they are vital to the quality of ethological studies.53 It 
seems that such perspective-shift is indeed a powerful tool to achieve a truly animal-
centric perspective so vital for ethology and related disciplines. However, a subtlety 
should be noticed. 
  The managing of crossed perspectives and the act of becoming another are two 
different processes. Recalling Kohn’s words about the perspectival viewpoint, “[t]alking 
to dogs is necessary but also dangerous; the Runa do not want to become dogs in the 
process”.54 This concern seems to hold true not only in ethnographies of animist societies 
but in the present ethnography as well. Thus, unlike the shaman, who can administer 
crossed perspectives without losing one own’s subjectivity,55 the “chimpified” researcher 
may not switch back when context calls. What shall be dubbed as the “chimpification” of 
a human in a scientific setting can be perceived as a cost by interlocutors. We could define 
this neologism, grosso modo, as the intention or the process of being able to shift into 
chimpanzees’ perspective on a personal level. In this sense, chimpification coincides with 
the ability to have an animal-centric perspective and is positively rated in the field. 
 However, strictu sensu, chimpification might be defined as the intention or the 
process of modifying one’s behavior to match other species-specific patterns, in this case, 
chimpanzees’. Whereas this is advantageous when dealing with this species, it is 
perceived as a disadvantage when dealing with humans. Yet, it should be noted that 
although the human use of chimpanzees’ social patterns with other humans is perceived 
as existent it remains fairly limited, whereas human use of chimpanzees’ social patterns 
with chimpanzees is extensive and supported. In other words, behaving in chimpanzees’ 
terms toward humans (or being perceived as doing so) is less common and negatively 
view, whereas behaving in chimpanzees’ terms toward chimpanzees is widespread and 
encouraged. In fact, in communities where humans and nonhuman animals share strong 
ties, power relations across species become fairly blurred. Consequently, the process of 
“chimpification” might extend not only to individuals but to social relations in general, 
as we shall see next.  
 “Come on; I’m human”. As an exclamation uttered in the chimpanzee section, this 
sentence, as the others already discussed, is not as self-evident as one might suppose. The 
context of this utterance is related to the power conferred to chimpanzees in the human-
chimpanzee community of PRI. On the one side, research personnel and keepers 
307
 
constitute the human part, on the other, the thirteen, now twelve chimpanzee living 
members, form the nonhuman animal counterpart. Yet, instead of regarding these groups 
as two separate and isolated poles, the approach followed here will focus on looking at 
their intersection, that is, at the interspecific level and then question how human-
chimpanzee relations might affect or shape the relationship within-groups, that is, at the 
intraspecific level; in other words, we departure from a human-chimpanzee perspective 
to human-human/chimpanzee-chimpanzee one.  
 The human-chimpanzee focus is well expressed by the concept of hybrid 
communities, in which, interests, affects and meaning are shared in a living space.56 
Lestel sustains that, in fact, hybrid communities turn animals into people.57 In the Primate 
Research Institute, personification acquires many forms and is conducted on many layers. 
Note, and this is important to stress, the term employed here is not anthropomorphization 
but personification. Personification may include anthropomorphization, however; 
personification has the potential to embody an animal-centric perspective, where the 
animal is understood in its own terms or, at least, where humans put considerable effort 
into such perspective-shift. Moreover, personification describes a particular phenomenon; 
it consists of the turning of nonhuman entities into legitimate social actors. An episode 
occurring during an experimental session in Matsuzawa’s laboratory supports and 
illustrates well the point of how chimpanzees are social actors to humans and how humans 
seem to be social actors to chimpanzees as well.  
 It was early morning, Ai’s session in Matsuzawa’s laboratory, and on that day 
Professor Matsuzawa was in Inuyama and came to the laboratory with visitors; three high 
school students and a past PRI experimenter. Unlike her usual, Ai was quite aroused 
during the session and paid constant attention to the sounds of the outdoor enclosures. 
The experiment of which I was in charge was the last one of that day’s session. The 
episode was recorded in video and is presented in a clip, which starts when Ai gets in the 
booth for this last experiment and ends when she leaves it (see Audiovisual Material  1);VII 
its details are summarized next, along with video frames of strategic moments (Video 
Frame 1). For reference, “Gabriela” refers to the author and experimenter and, for clarity, 
the episode is described in the third person. Video frames with reference beyond seconds 
were timestamped using the software ImageGrab. The additional digits represent frames, 
for example, 1m9s17frames (30 frames per second).  
                                                 
VII I thank Pedro Baptista da Silva for the editing of this video material.  
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 Chimpanzee Ai enters the booth; however, she moves around instead of starting 
the experiment right away as her usual. The experimenter calls Ai’s attention by saying 
the protocoled word and gesture for when a chimpanzee does not approach the objects, 
that is, “chōdai” followed by three knocks on the apparatus (“Aichan, chōdai”; little Ai, 
do it for me; 32s-36s). Ai is not responsive and, instead, starts pant-hooting showing 
piloerection (41s-46s). Ai continues to move around until she inserts the first object into 
the apparatus (1m2s). Her target for this session is yellow, and, therefore, she must receive 
a reward with every insertion of a yellow colored object. Her first insertion is a yellow 
rope, to which she receives a piece of apple and standardized verbal praise (“sō, sō, sō, 
sō, sō”; yes!; 1m5s). Holding the next object in her hand (yellow block), she pauses to 
listen to vocalizations coming from the outdoor enclosures (1m9s-1m14s) but quickly 
resumes her task, receiving food and verbal praise for delivering a target. As Ai’s next 
insertion (yellow cup) also matches her target (yellow), another food and verbal 
reinforcement follows; for the first time being tested under the color condition, Ai 
succeeds in a trial (i.e., the first three objects she chooses match her target).  
The remaining objects, belonging to other colors, are not targeted and, thus, must 
not be followed by praise and food reward. After having given the third object, Ai starts 
moving around the booth again (1m25s), dropping food rewards on the floor (the recorder 
captures faint outdoor vocalizations at 1m30s). Ai starts pant-hooting (1m32s-1m39s) and 
after she ends the long-distance call to conspecifics outdoors, she bears a grin-full-open,58 
revealing her teeth and gums (1m39s-1m40s). Ai starts stepping on the bench with a grin-
full-open (1m40s) and, while closing her mouth, she approaches Professor Hayashi, who 
observes from the experimenter’s upper left side (1m41s). Ai descends right away but 
does not resume the experiment. The experimenter calls Ai’s attention again (“Aichan, 
chōdai” [knocks three times]; little Ai, do it for me; 1m44s). Ai continues to move around 
the booth. The experimenter repeats the same request (2m) but Ai, once more, moves 
from one side to another. Matsuzawa points in the direction of the experimental apparatus 
and says in Japanese: ‘Ai, go, sit down!’ (“Ai, itte, suwatte!”; 2m10s). Ai seems to head 
to the apparatus when Matsuzawa adds; ‘that’s it!’ (“sō da!”; 2m11s), however, she turns 
away with pouted lips and then pant-hoots (2m12s-2m23s).  
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2m25s 
  
2m37s21frames 2m38s9frames 
  
2m38s15frames 2m38s19frames 
  
2m39s7frames 2m40s14frames 
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2m41s9frames 
  
2m42s12frames 2m44s16frames 
 
Video Frame 1 Ai and the use of social relations during experiment. From Audiovisual Material  1. 
Audiovisual Material  1 Ai and the use of social relations during experiment, 2015, 3m20s. By Daly. 
 
 
Matsuzawa points again in the direction of the apparatus and says in English; “Ai, 
sit!” (videoframe 2m25s). Ai starts moving and Matsuzawa exclaims “sō da!” (yes!; 
2m26s). Ai inserts green rope (2m32s). Then, her next choice is red rope, however, in this 
insertion, a peculiar event happens. Ai inserts the rope into the hole where the 
experimenter will receive the object (videoframe 2m37s21). The experimenter’s hand is 
positioned palm open to wait for the drop. Chimpanzee Ai lets go of the rope; most of the 
rope is on the experimenter’s side but a few centimeters remain in the chimpanzee’s size 
(videoframe 2m38s15). Within a second, the experimenter pulls the rope that was dropped 
by Ai (videoframe 2m38s19; 4 frames difference, 133 milliseconds). As a consequence, 
Ai inserts her hand into the hole, showing her upper, lower teeth and gums while 
producing a waa bark, 59  a vocalization given in agonistic contexts (videoframe 
2m39s7frames; 2m40s14frames).VIII,60 Matsuzawa warns the experimenter in Japanese: 
‘Putting the hand out is no-good, Gabriela’ (“te dashita, dame, Gaburiera”; videoframe 
2m41s9frames).  
                                                 
VIII  Alternatively, Ai’s vocalizations can be categorized as “scream” instead of “waa bark”. I thank 
Catherine Hobaiter for discussions on this video material.  However, any possible mis-readings are mine to 
bear.  
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Ai vocalizes again while walking bipedally in the direction where Matsuzawa 
(standing) and a technician (sitting) are (videoframe 2m42s12frames). Although not 
visible in the recording, from the experimenter’s front view it was possible to observe 
that Ai’s eye gaze was directed at Matsuzawa. Ai’s head stretching up toward Matsuzawa 
is slight but visible (at 2m42s-2m43s). Furthermore, while staring at Matsuzawa, 
chimpanzee Ai fumbled her nipples, a behavior conspicuous from the experimenter’s 
frontal perspective but also noticeable in the recording by her arms movement, although 
less clearly. “Fumble nipple” is a behavior observed in cases of anxiety when a dominant 
individual is close-by, and it acts as self-reassurance or self-stimulation.61  
When Ai is silent and still in bipedal position, Matsuzawa tells the experimenter 
in English: “It was completely wrong” (2m43s). As Matsuzawa is finishing his sentence, 
Ai starts turning around (videoframe 2m44s16frames) and then quickly resumes the 
experiment, picking up the next object (2m47s). Ai proceeds until the end; she inserts the 
last object (2m55s) and then silently shows a grin-full-open (2m56s) turning her full body 
180° (where humans are present) with grin face while quickly fumbling her nipple 
(2m57s). Ai moves around (2m59s). At last, the experimenter ends the session with the 
standardized word (“Aichan, erai!”; little Ai, good job!; 3m1s) and the food reward 
signaling the end of the session is given (pick up at 3m4s). By the end of the session there 
are no food rewards left in the booth.  
This episode was carefully detailed because it is a powerful experience in the life 
of a Pan-Homo hybrid community. We should start precising the context. Ai is a very 
experienced chimpanzee in the laboratory setting, she usually has a calm demeanor and, 
unlike Chloe, has no problems with coming to the laboratory in the absence of her son, 
Ayumu. Yet, that day she seemed particularly aroused about the social life in the outdoor 
enclosures, which is evidenced by her constant moving around and her pant-hoots, that 
is, long distance calls to other chimpanzees.  Professor Matsuzawa, who sometimes has 
to stay long periods absent due to travelling and fieldwork, was present, along with 
visitors. For several interlocutors, including myself as an experimenter, sessions where 
both professors and visitors are present introduce a change in the social dynamics of the 
experiment.  
In Matsuzawa’s laboratory, visitors appear a couple of times a month but 
approximately twice a year the laboratories are open to high-school student trips in the 
form of educational programs, the busiest time in terms of the number of visitors per 
session (approx. ten visitors was the maximum observed). The impact of visitors and its 
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affluence is an issue occasionally brought up among PRI experimenters regarding 
chimpanzees’ performance and anxiety, with no consensus found. For instance, a 
professor considered an increased number of visitors as a factor in a mild accident during 
a face-to-face experiment. However, in what concerns Ai, she is mostly curious of and 
seems to be well habituated to an occasional large number of people given that it is during 
her session that most visitors are brought in Matsuzawa’s laboratory. Yet, if there is no 
consensus on the impact that visitors have for chimpanzees in the laboratory life, 
interlocutors consider that the presence of visitors accompanied by the head of the 
laboratory change human-human social dynamics, although this is not an opinion shared 
by Professor Matsuzawa.  In this sense, visitors are outsiders in comparison to the habitual 
human-chimpanzee community.  
Now, considering the events described the first conspicuous point is the human 
authority. Humans are not all equal to chimpanzees  ̶  an observation that might sound 
obvious to primatologists and keepers. In this situation, the requests of a “low-ranking” 
experimenter, who has no long history of relationship with a given chimpanzee do not 
bear the same power than requests from an individual with whom she has a life-long 
relationship. The experimenter’s three requests were met with failure, whereas 
Matsuzawa’s rephrased request was readily met in a second. In Ai and Matsuzawa’s face-
to-face experiments during this ethnography, the only time Ai was observed completely 
ignoring Matsuzawa’s repeated requests was when she was interacting with visitors. True, 
human authority might not be the only issue at play regarding why a chimpanzee responds 
to a human; as Matsuzawa once explained to his students, one needs to call in the right 
timing, reading the context to maximize your chances of a response. In sum, the coupling 
of who speaks and at what time are factors to consider when addressing chimpanzees.  
The second noticeable point is, the recruitment of humans, in other words, to 
whom a chimpanzee turns when in distress. In order to understand this point, we shall 
first examine the exact behaviors on the part of the experimenter that set out Ai’s chain 
reaction. In this episode, the trigger for Ai’s heightened behavior was the pulling 
movement. In this experiment, the experimenter waits until the objects completely fall 
into the experimenter’s side, including the long-shaped rope segments. However, in this 
session, when Ai released the rope and most of it was in the experimenter’s side, the 
experimenter pulled the segment, instead of waiting for it to naturally fall. In terms of 
safety procedure, the experimenter made an important mistake. Ai had never shown 
agonistic behaviors toward the experimenter, this time being the first and only. Yet, as it 
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would later have been made clear, Ai is particularly sensitive to pulling movement, and 
although she had already let go of the object, due to her prior state she reacted with a full 
bare-teeth face and waa barks/screams while inserting her hand vigorously into the hole.  
At this moment, Matsuzawa warned the experimenter that putting the hand out 
was not good. In fact, a misunderstanding later clarified occurred; Professor Matsuzawa 
considered that that experimenter had forcefully taken the object from Ai, as in a tug of 
war style. If that was the case, first, this would be a severe breach of the safety protocol, 
given that, due to chimpanzee’s strength a serious accident could happen. After the 
session, Matsuzawa recollected how he witnessed chimpanzee Sarah breaking a student’s 
bones in the same way in Premack’s laboratory, back when he was a postdoctoral 
researcher. Secondly, incidents like that could jeopardize the future of the Ai Project, 
prompting one more reason to be extra cautious.  
Thirdly, a tug of war with Ai would mean a breach of the experimental protocol; 
a violation of the experiment’s principle of chimpanzees’ own free choice of objects, and 
thus, a mistake on a scientific level. At last, such a behavior toward a chimpanzee should 
not be acceptable and could be considered as a mistreatment. Misunderstandings cleared 
up after video analyses; the experimenter was still at fault for poor adherence to safety 
rules. This episode also made clear how adhering or breaching safety rules while dealing 
with chimpanzees could be a matter of a split-second mistake (in this case, an astonishing 
133 milliseconds).   
After having explored the trigger to Ai’s reaction, we can focus on how the 
chimpanzee dealt with humans in what, for her, was an agonistic situation. In the event 
involving the rope, first Ai acted toward the “aggressor”, that is, the experimenter. Right 
after, Ai vocalized while walking bipedally toward Matsuzawa, fumbling her nipples at 
the same time. Although it is difficult to ascertain what were the chimpanzee’s intentions, 
based on her behavior a hypothesis seems plausible; Ai was recruiting Matsuzawa in her 
defense in an agonistic context. First, the fact that she was walking toward, standing 
bipedally while slightly stretching her head and gazing at a standing Matsuzawa is an 
element. Second, Ai did not seek the other professor whom she previously sought before 
the incident happened, nor did she gaze at the technician sitting just next to Matsuzawa. 
Third, Ai was fumbling her nipples in his presence, likely for self-reassurance after the 
incident. In fact, it is usual that Ai would fumble her nipples when Matsuzawa is just 
about to get into the booth for a face-to-face encounter. According to Nishida and 
colleagues, this behavior has been observed when dominant individuals are nearby.62 
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Now, consider the intensity of Ai’s reaction. Before the incident, not only had she 
shown signs of arousal such as moving around but she had borne a full grin. It is not far-
fetched to assume she was dissatisfied. Inside the cabin, the experimenter’s lateral view 
is somewhat limited, contributing to an incomplete assessment of her previous facial 
expressions. Adding up to her dissatisfaction, the experimenter makes a move that she 
does not encounter in this experimental setting and which she usually displeases, to the 
ignorance of the experimenter. Ai, who, at the beginning of the morning was pressing her 
lips against the panel to prompt the experimenter’s “kiss” in return, is now showing her 
impressive grin, screaming and vigorously reaching the experimenter’s side, like never 
before. A heightened reaction toward the “aggressor” seems to be perfectly 
understandable, especially as a means of venting out present and previous frustration. Yet, 
afterward, she stands bipedally, seemingly to decrease the distance between her a standing 
Matsuzawa and vocalizes again while holding a stare. Would it be odd to be suspicious 
she was overreacting? Why did Ai turn to Matsuzawa, after all?  
Studies on chimpanzee social behaviors provide us with a bigger picture; captive 
chimpanzees that are victims of aggression by conspecifics solicit support from 
individuals that are more likely to back them up than the aggressor.63 Likewise, in the 
wild, investigations in chimpanzee vocalizations support that chimpanzees may 
exaggerate the level of aggression as communicated by their screams, when within the 
audience there is an individual who matches or surpasses the aggressor’s rank.64,65 These 
studies, however, were conducted analyzing Pan-Pan situations. The peculiarity of this 
case study lies in that it exemplifies in a detailed manner a dynamic well known, but little 
studied in primatology; the fact that primates mobilize humans not only to their own 
benefit and even to alter their interactions with conspecifics. Although human cooptation 
by chimpanzees is a topic that merits systematic studies, the phenomenon seems real, and 
it is possible that Ai was coopting Matsuzawa as a partner in what she considered to be 
an agonistic situation.IX,66 However, it is not clear whether this behavior was based on 
egocentric heuristics (I’ll turn to whom I know is my strongest ally) or whether it is also 
supported by a triadic awareness of relationships67 (I know human Matsuzawa is higher 
ranking than human aggressor Gabriela; I know Matsuzawa is more likely to support me 
than her). At any rate, if translated grosso modo in plain English; Ai seems to have 
snitched on the experimenter and it worked.  
                                                 
IX Hobaiter points out that a better indicator for recruitment would be the increase in scream while looking 
at Matsuzawa, although she considers that Ai is capable of recruiting the professor in other situations.  
315
 
This long case-study serves to support and illustrate how in the laboratory life 
experienced by humans and chimpanzees, chimpanzees are social actors for humans and, 
in turn, humans seem to be social actors for chimpanzees as well, in the sense that humans 
may be mobilized to alter interactions chimpanzees experience with others. Even if there 
is still an exciting and largely unexplored field of research regarding human-chimpanzee 
interaction, the existence of certain phenomena is highly supported by anecdotal accounts 
and case studies of this type: Chimpanzees are capable of recognizing idiosyncrasies 
among humans and act accordingly, they sustain differential relations with individual 
members of our species, and they seem to recruit those individuals to alter their social 
relations with others.  
Note, however, that chimpanzees interact with humans not in the sense of the use 
of an inanimate object (e.g., a tool) but in the sense of the previous history of relationship 
with a human with high emotional entanglement. If we were to talk about humans, the 
appropriate term for these processes would be personification. Overall, not only are 
chimpanzees persons for humans, or at least, treated as such, but a closer look at how 
chimpanzees interact with humans seems to support that humans are also persons for 
chimpanzees, even if chimpanzees might lack a formal, conceptual understanding of 
personhood, an issue that remains to be tested.  
Moreover, participant observation in the laboratory clearly supports that 
chimpanzees in PRI distinguish humans as social partners; in contrast to the automated 
computer apparatuses they work on daily, as a function of how they mobilize humans 
when the computer fails (even according to humans’ roles). This apparent distinction 
occurs even if these apparatuses show animacy (e.g., automatic feeder). Nonetheless, it is 
possible that different responses might be elicited with humanoid or chimpanzee-like 
robots (can a robot be considered a social partner for a chimpanzee?). The yet unexplored 
issue of how chimpanzees might conceptualize personhood, or what might constitute 
personhood in their terms is a full venue for collaborative research among the fields of 
philosophy, primatology and anthropology of life (the latter because the topic likely 
includes the perception of certain life processes). Now, we shall turn to the last point 
where the line between humans and chimpanzees is more complex than predetermined 
species boundaries. We shall investigate the meanings involving the life and death of a 
chimpanzee.   
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4.3 Life and Death of Nonhuman Persons 
 
 At the Primate Research Institute, the importance of chimpanzees’ life and the 
meanings of their death can be witnessed through a series of events. One of these 
moments has been previously explored through the narrative of chimpanzees’ birth and 
the process of learning to mother (see “building a community”); however, some points 
are yet to be addressed. We shall start with the most conspicuous one, that is, the 
celebration of chimpanzees’ birthday. In PRI, captive-born chimpanzees who have 
precise birth dates receive regular birthday parties in the laboratory or in the feeding area 
of the basement. These parties are events in which personnel prepare rare, highly 
enjoyable food for the birthday chimpanzee. The food items are healthy and non-
processed: the standard “cake” observed in 2015 consisted of a watermelon presented in 
a box and/or wrapped, along with additional treats provided. 
  
  
Photo  1 Mother Chloe gets most of Cleo’s birthday 
present, 2015. By Daly.  
 
Photo  2 Chloe uses the wrapping as napkin, 
2015. By Daly.  
  
Photo  3 Pal’s birthday is interesting also for 
humans, 2015. By Daly.  
Photo  4 Ai takes interest in the wrapping paper, 
2015. By Daly.  
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Photo  5 Mother Ai monopolizes Ayumu’s presente, 2015. By Daly.  
 
If occurring in one of the laboratories, these parties are squeezed into the 
experimental schedule. Chimpanzees will be called into the laboratory, as usual, and 
someone will place the birthday “present” or “cake” in the booth. In addition, some 
keepers and research personnel from other laboratories will gather. Interlocutors consider 
it a birthday celebration; however, the most exciting moment consists in watching the 
birthday chimpanzee’s behavior to a novel stimulus. Many bring their camcorders and 
cell phones to record the moment. There is an overall cheerful spirit because chimpanzees 
show interesting behaviors in such contexts.  
It is of particular amusement when a birthday chimpanzee comes with the mother, 
who, in these cases, is a higher-ranking individual and, consequently, will tend to 
monopolize the food. In 2015 this was Ayumu and Cleo’s fate, whose mothers took 
advantage of the situation (Photo  1, Photo  2 , Photo  4 and Photo  5). Personnel playfully 
discouraged the mothers and encouraged the offspring but to no avail. Pal, on the other 
hand, enjoyed her meal alone due to being previously separated from her mother’s group, 
therefore, coming to the experiments by herself (Photo  3). 
In Cleo’s birthday, personnel tried to prompt Cleo to go alone to the booth; 
however, once there, Cleo became too wary of the wrapping so finally the mother Chloe 
was allowed into the room and the daughter had to satisfy herself with her mother’s left-
overs.  When Cleo tried to approach the watermelon while Chloe was feasting on it, Chloe 
kept turning her back every time her daughter came closer. At a certain point, a foreign 
researcher sarcastically sang “happy birthday to Chloe”, given she was the only one really 
enjoying the present.  
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On Ayumu’s birthday (Audiovisual Material 2; Video Frame 2), personnel tried 
to separate the son and the mother without success; after having eaten Ayumu’s treats in 
the first booth, as soon as the door to the second booth opened, the mother Ai headed 
directly to the gift box. When the mother opened the box (29s), the son did not dare to 
grasp the food and, afterward, Ayumu could be seen occasionally scavenging for the 
leftovers (48s; 2m55s). During the whole process, people would frequently point (1m7s) 
and effusively root for Ayumu to do his best (“Ayumu, ganbarē!”). 
 
  
29s 48s 
  
1m7s 2m55s 
 
Video Frame 2 Ayumu’s birthday. From Audiovisual Material  2.  
 Audiovisual Material  2 Ayumu’s birthday, 2015, 3m11s. By Daly.  
 
Birthday parties sound irrevocably human and a sheer act of 
anthropomorphization given that nonhuman animals cannot grasp its true meaning; that 
is, the celebration of their lives. Still, we should perhaps approach the subject from a 
different perspective. First, such events serve as another means for the much striven 
enrichment, in the sense of a change in chimpanzees’ regular schedule and dietary routine. 
Thus, even if these celebrations do not denote the human concept of “birthday” to them, 
they do bear some meaning to chimpanzees. Secondly, we should take into account that 
personnel, who works under a demanding timetable, spend considerable time to craft and 
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be present at an event that might take up to one hour, depending on how far the group is 
willing to stimulate chimpanzees to own their own gifts.  
These are moments when personnel can observe chimpanzee behavior beyond the 
tight, standardized schedule of experiments and feeding. Nothing is at stake, no stress of 
data collection; just the humble pleasure of observing chimpanzees being chimpanzees 
for the sake of it; and not just any chimpanzees, our own familiar individuals. At last, 
even when formal birthday parties cannot be organized, keepers usually prepare healthy 
treats and food surprises for the birthday chimpanzee. In other words, in PRI, celebrations 
may be amusing for humans but the center spot is still them, not us.  
 
A case at the Japan 
Monkey Centre (JMC), which 
is just a fifteen-minute walk 
from PRI, may help to bring 
the hidden meaning of this 
activity into light. In 2015, at 
JMC, a one-year old siamang, 
Suika, 1  had a carefully 
prepared birthday party in his 
honor (Symphalangus 
syndactylus; i.e., a type of 
gibbon). Beyond being a 
museum and a research 
facility, JMC is also a zoo, so 
the announced event gathered 
many visitors. The birthday 
party was somehow similar to 
PRI’s but flashier, and 
vegetables were thoroughly arranged in a cake format with Suika’s name carved on it (in 
katakana スイカ; Photo  6). Before the event, visitors gathered next to the siamangs’ 
outdoor enclosure, which displayed a banner wishing Suika a happy birthday (Photo  7). 
Then, in the empty enclosure, a JMC employee gave a short presentation on siamangs; 
their natural behaviors, types of food eaten, and above all, information on Suika and his 
family group (Photo  8 and Photo  9). When the time came, the gate to the outdoor 
 
Photo  6 Suika’s birthday “cake”, JMC, 2015. By Daly. 
 
Photo  7 People start gathering for the little siamang’s birthday, 
JMC, 2015. By Daly. 
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enclosure opened and Suika and the others started to enjoy the meal, occasionally sharing 
food among themselves.   
 
Although the event appears 
as quite anthropomorphic, it is in 
contrast with former goals set by 
zoos in terms of visitors’ 
experience. Interestingly, a 
Japanese keeper at Yokohama zoo, 
program coordinator for gibbon 
species at the Japanese Association 
of Zoos and Aquariums, shared her 
frustration regarding some visitors’ 
expectations:2  
 
[Some in] the old generation come 
to the zoo and say:  
̶  I want the monkey to dance.  
̶  No, we do not do that.  
̶  But I have seen it on TV.   
or [they say] 
̶  I have seen it as a child.  
̶  We do not do that anymore, 
because we now understand that 
they are wild animals and we want 
them to behave the way they are 
supposed to behave.  
But not everyone understands… 
[They say] 
̶  That is not interesting, it is boring!  
 
What is noteworthy about the case at JMC is that the event consisted in watching 
siamangs’ behavior just like in PRI. Yet, in the JMC’s counterpart, due to the nature of 
this institution, contextual information on both the species and the story of that specific 
group was provided. This idiosyncrasy helps to make certain overlooked features explicit: 
a birthday party as such, beyond the logical goal of increasing the number of visitors, 
hopefully, does not only function as a short, enjoyable outdoor session educating the 
public on siamangs’ natural behaviors but it also, at the same time, anchors abstract 
information in real flesh and blood individuals. These individuals have names, family ties, 
 
Photo  8 Suika (center) and her family group, JMC, 2015. By Daly. 
 
 
Photo  9 Little siamang Suika, JMC, 2015. By Daly.  
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stories and they are sensory accessible to people while they watch their actions, their 
gestures, see they brachiate from one place to another, hear their vocalizations, and so on.  
These type of birthday celebrations are not based on animal performances where 
primates are obliged to comply with typically human behaviors like prolonged bipedalism, 
which may even alter animal morphology with considerable consequences such as 
human-like lumbar lordosis.3,4 It is true that the educational efficacy of such short public 
exposés could be subject to evaluations,5,6 however the crucial point of this argument 
remains unaltered. Are such events a simple matter of anthropomorphism? 
The fact that they are labelled birthday parties might be misleading; the 
phenomenon is of another level. In the examples discussed above, a human-centric 
perspective (or the “bambification” of animals7) does not take the center stage but rather 
the emphasis on what nonhuman primates naturally do, except that now species-specific 
behaviors have bodies, names and stories. When there is an attempt to address nonhuman 
primates by their own terms and when their individuality provides an anchor to concretely 
ground public awareness into something, or rather, “someone” people can see, then the 
process seems to be no other than personification.  
Their lives are being celebrated not only because of how human in their behaviors 
they are (and this might often be the case simply because, indeed, we share many 
similarities with other primates, not because we anthropomorphize); their lives are being 
celebrated also because of how nonhuman they are, because of their species specificities, 
because of their individual, meaningful stories. Whenever the attribution of emotions, 
individuality, history, stories and social agency is accompanied by an animalcentric 
perspective, that is, an attempt to understand the animal in the animals’ terms, then instead 
of anthropomorphism the phenomenon we encounter is personification, in other words, 
the makings of a person even if a nonhuman one. Next, we shall see how the level of 
personification chimpanzees undergo at PRI is profoundly reflected in the decisions 
regarding the life and death of specific members of the community.  
 In the Primate Research Institute, as of August 2017, there have been a total of 
three losses of chimpanzees’ lives: PRI’s first chimpanzee Reiko, whose life was 
described earlier in this ethnography; Piko, an infant who suffered from malformation, 
whose brief stay in the community was retraced through the difficulties her mother, Puchi, 
had in raising her; and, at last, Puchi who recently passed away. However, before 
unfolding Puchi’s story, we must explore the case of a severely disabled chimpanzee, 
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whose prognosis would have been of euthanasia. As readers might be acquainted with the 
chimpanzees by now, the chimpanzee in question is Reo.  
Reo is Reiko and Gon’s son; he was successfully reared by his mother and came 
to father Cleo.  His unfortunate incident started more than ten years ago. One morning 
during September 2006, the 24-year-old Reo was found immobile on the ground, 
completely paralyzed below the neck; his condition was discovered to resemble acute 
transverse myelitis in humans (i.e., an inflammation of the spinal cord).8,9 Hayashi and 
colleagues identified four phases in his recovery:10 In phase 0, during the first thirteen 
months, Reo mainly lied on his back whenever caretakers were absent; in phase I, 
between fourteen and seventeen months, an increase in the upright position occurred; 
during phase II, from eighteen to twenty nine months, he remained stable 50 to 70% of 
the time; and in phase III, from thirty to forty one months, his upright posture constantly 
exceeded 80%. 11  During the two initial months, young researchers, keepers and 
veterinarians organized round-the-clock care, but by December 2006, Reo had lost forty 
percent of his body weight and “looked very miserable” (Photo  10).12  Matsuzawa, 
however, explains the reasons to opt out of euthanasia in Reo’s case.13  
 
Given a similar situation in Europe and North America, euthanasia would most 
likely have been considered the correct course of action, due to the belief that it is 
not good for animals to experience pain and suffering. Other problems include the 
cost in terms of time of labor intensive care, along with chronic fatigue 
experienced by care staff, and the high financial cost of medication (no health 
insurance being provided for the care of chimpanzees). In truth, I heard hushed 
voices asking me, as the director of the institute at that time, ‘‘How long will you 
continue to take care of this chimpanzee?’’ However, not one of the volunteer 
carers even considered euthanasia as an option. This may, in part, be due to 
Japanese cultural and religious beliefs, rooted in Buddhism: we should kill no 
living creatures. However, the most important contributing factor was Reo’s 
demeanor. Even during the most difficult period, he never seemed to show signs 
of depression. 
 
Matsuzawa, then, details Reo’s disposition at that time.  
 
He would pretend to drink water, but hold it in his mouth. When a young person 
approached him to carry out care tasks, he would suddenly spray them with water. 
The carers were caught completely by surprise, and Reo smiled. In this sense, 
nothing had changed between before and after the onset of his illness. Despite the 
restriction in movement, he was fully ‘‘alive’’ and still ‘‘himself.’ 
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When Reo became strong enough to be a potential danger to caregivers, a 
veterinarian and a keeper who had developed stronger ties with the chimpanzee were able 
to conduct face-to-face physiotherapy sessions.14 During Reo’s face-to-face sessions, the 
two humans Reo accepted would enter the cage in his rehabilitation room and act as if in 
play: tickling, scratching, pushing, holding and grooming him in the back of his ears, his 
favorite spot. One person would initiate the play while the other would try to extend his 
legs, a movement that appeared to be painful for Reo. Nonetheless, due to play context, 
Reo gradually accepted the therapy.15 This can be observed in  Audiovisual Material  3 
and Video Frame 3.   
 
  
15s 1m 
  
1m10s 1m16s 
 
Video Frame 3 Reo’s face-to-face physiotherapy. From Audiovisual Material  3. 
Audiovisual Material  3 Reo’s face-to-face physiotherapy. 1m46s. By Nakamura in Miyabe-Nishiwaki 
et al. (2010).16 
 
In the video, the veterinarian (to the left) and the caretaker (to the right) enter the 
booth and Reo is seen showing a play face toward the caretaker (15s). The veterinarian 
manipulates Reo’s right foot and the caretaker cleans Reo’s ears and eyes with a cloth. 
The veterinarian, then, flexes Reo’s foot (1m), and the humans request from Reo that he 
extend his right foot by himself; they point, touch the location, say the husbandry word 
for foot/leg (“ashi”) along with ‘here’ (“kochi”), and place the palm of the hand open 
where Reo is supposed to stretch (1m10s). They insist as Reo tries to present his other 
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foot, presumably the one that does not hurt as much, given that this part extends more 
easily. When Reo meets the request, they verbally praise him (“sō, sō…”; “yoshi”) 
(1m16s). Reo receives a small treat for his achievement. The procedure is repeated with 
success, and the veterinarian exclaims ‘wonderful, right?!’ (“sugoi, ne”).   
At later stages, Reo could move around the room using hanging ropes and bars. 
In addition, he developed crutch-walking by using his arms as support and, also, bipedal 
walking supported by his hips, propelling himself through the movement of his torso and 
legs rather than the extended limbs.17 Because Reo had previously participated in several 
cognitive tasks, setting up experiments on his behalf was a strategy envisioned. 18 
Automated cognitive experiments requiring Reo to walk were set in place in order to 
promote the recovery of walking patterns to a point similar to abled chimpanzees and, 
thus, to enable a future full social reintegration .19  
 
  
Photo  10 Reo’s acute tetraparesis, 2006. 
Credit: Matsuzawa (2016, 292).20 
Photo  11 Reo continuing experiments, 2015.  
Courtesy of Nakamura Miho. 
 
Sakuraba and colleagues describe 
the procedures: 21  First, researchers 
developed easy cognitive tasks in 
comparison to his previous experiments. 
They placed the touch-panel where he 
would conduct the tasks in one extreme of 
the booth and the automatic feeder to 
reward his correct responses in another 
(200cm apart). Eventually, Reo started to 
“save” his rewards and move only after 
accumulating a series of treats. As a result, researchers had to increase the interval 
 
 
Photo  12 Pendesa (left) about to meet Reo, 2015.  
By Daly. 
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between each trial, a change that discouraged this behavior since he would have to wait 
much longer for the rewards. Later on, the tasks increased in difficulty and the sessions 
took place four hours a day in total, with an interval of fifteen seconds between trials. In 
its final stage, Reo participated in the tasks without needing human encouragement, being 
prompted only by the music signaling the start of the experiments. In sum, these 
experiments have aided his physical rehabilitation, given that his voluntary participation 
makes Reo walk distances he would not otherwise.22  
As for social contact, staff has arranged monthly visits from other chimpanzees. 
In the initial stages, Reiko, his mother, and following her death in 2013, Poppo, his half-
sister, visited Reo, although in the long run the personnel’s ultimate goal is full social 
reintegration.23 As of 2015, visits continued to be arranged, counting with the presence 
of other members as well, such as Chloe and Pendesa (Photo  12). Furthermore, Reo 
continued to participate in automated experiments, and, in addition, he participated in an 
object and color categorization task (Photo  11). Curiously, prior to his illness, Reo was 
rarely considered to be friendly toward humans, however, after intensive care, he started 
to show affiliative behaviors to some of the staff.24 In 2015, during this ethnography, Reo 
seemed to be friendly even with visitors and he was in company of humans several times 
a day for feeding and care but also for play.   
Reo’s case support the importance given to a chimpanzee’s “self”. The intensive 
care Reo underwent indeed put personnel at true hardship, and it has been noted by a 
professor at the Institute that Reo’s event was likely the most difficult time in PRI’s 
history to what regards chimpanzee personnel.  Yet, if “[e]uthanasia is not an option”, to 
quote Matsuzawa, 25  is because, primarily, Reo was still there; he was perceived as 
personality-wise, or rather, person-wise the same. He was immobile but he still retained 
his former spirit, his former mind. Despite the adversity and the suffering, to PRI 
personnel, there was something still there to be saved, or better, someone. Unfortunately, 
Puchi was his symmetrical opposite; whereas her body was “alive”, she was brain-dead. 
Nonetheless, instead of being euthanized, Puchi received the same treatment of human 
brain-dead patients, as we shall see next.  
 Puchi (Photo  13) was born is West Africa in 1966 and was one of PRI’s oldest 
chimpanzees, belonging to the first generation and arriving in the Institute after being 
kept as a pet for twelve years.26 Curiously, her name is, in fact, the Japanese pronunciation 
of the French word petit. Puchi mothered Popo, Pan and Pico and she had been housed in 
Gon’s group. Gon arrived in the Institute the same day she had and fathered her first two 
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daughters through artificial insemination.27 On the other hand, her youngest daughter, 
Pico, was fathered by Reo and, unfortunately, passed away in 2003 at the age of two due 
to malformations during gestation.28 Prior to Puchi’s death, Gon’s group was composed 
of Gon, Puchi, her daughter Popo and her granddaughter Pal.  
 
Even though at the top of her 51 years 
of age, she was an elder, her passing was 
sudden and not related to any immediately 
previous and noticeable disease. The handling 
of Puchi’s death is of particular interest 
regarding the symbolic boundaries between 
humans and chimpanzees and shall be explored 
based on internal documents directed to the 
members of the section of Language and 
Intelligence, that is, the section in charge of 
chimpanzees at PRI.29,30 Furthermore, personal 
communications with the members of the 
section have enriched this account.31 Several technical details in the following description 
were omitted for ease of reading; this is, thus, a summarized version of a lengthy medical 
procedure involving the events prior to Puchi’s death. 
 
March 15, 2017 
 
(8:30) When beginning breakfast feeding, a research assistant finds Puchi 
collapsed in one of the rooms in the basement. While the assistant reaches for help 
and compartments are being closed, Popo enters the room where her mother lies 
unconscious. Soon, other responsible personnel are warned about the situation.  
(9:20) Personnel visually inspect Puchi’s state, however, because Popo has 
refused to leave Puchi’s side, the mother cannot be retrieved and, thus, it is 
decided that the daughter has to be anesthetized.   
(10:38) As anesthetizing Popo takes time, Puchi can only be moved to the 
operating room after it is confirmed both chimpanzees are unconscious.   
(10:46) After emergency procedures, electrocardiogram monitoring starts and an 
oxygen mask is put on Puchi.  
(10:54) Puchi’s body temperature is falling; it is decided a computed tomography 
(CT) will be performed.  
(11:02) CT is conducted.  
(11:39) A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) starts. 
(11:42) MRI is performed a second time.  
(11:49) MRI is performed a third time.  
 
Photo  13 Puchi, 2015. By Daly.  
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(12:05) Puchi is breathing. 
(12:09) MRI is performed a fourth time.  
(12:14) MRI is performed a fifth time.  
(12:16) Puchi’s breathing is weak.  
(12:17) Puchi enters cardiac arrest and personnel intubate her.  
(12:19) Cardiac massage starts.  
(12:24) Cardiac massage is put on hold; Puchi’s heartbeat increases from 70 to 
110 beats per minute.  
(12:28) Cardiac massage is conducted.  
(12:57) Puchi’s heartbeat has been oscillating.  
(13:11) Puchi is connected to an automatic ventilator.  
(13:49) Puchi’s body temperature is 33.9°C. Heartbeat at 68 to 96. Pupillary reflex 
is absent.  
(14:07) Personnel are unsure whether Puchi’s feet slightly moved. Body 
temperature is 36.7°C.  
(14:34) Puchi is connected to a physiologic monitor.  
(15:45) Propfol stops (used in sedation).  
(15:52) Puchi’s feet move.  
(15:54) A respiratory stimulant is injected. Puchi’s breathing is performed 
manually through an artificial ventilator pump (“kokyūshudō ni” 呼吸手動に). 
(16:12) Enema is conducted for the first time (i.e., bowl cleansing to allow 
medical procedures).  
(18:28) Enema is conducted for the twenty-sixth time.  
(18:48) Puchi’s heartbeat is at 98, she shows signs of reflexes.  
(19:03) Puchi breathing has not been returning, automatic ventilation is put in 
place.    
(19:57) Night shift starts.  
(20:30) Puchi shows heart arrhythmia.  
 
 
March 16, 2017 
 
(3:53) Puchi’s legs move when touched. Pupils are dilated.  
(8:00) New shift starts. No change in Puchi’s overall condition.  
(8:30) No response from facial nerves and ears when poked.  
(8:55) Electroencephalography starts being prepared.  
(9:38) BIS output (bispectral index which monitors brain activity).  
(9:41) A policy meeting is conducted in the adjacent room (veterinarian staff and 
professors). As in the diagnosis of human brain death, it is determined that a 
second judgment should be made six hours after the first diagnosis (i.e., at 14h) 
and if brain death is confirmed, Puchi will be extubated and her heart will stop 
naturally. It is decided the body will be donated to the Great Ape Information 
Network (GAIN) for studies.  
(10:00) Ventilator pump is used. 
(10:24) Personnel call Puchi’s name.  
(11:55) Ventilator pump is used, Babinski reflex still occurs (plantar/foot reflex 
following stimulation).  
(12:14) A footage of Pal’s pant-hoot is played.  
(12:20) Ventilator pump is used.  
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(12:24) Some regions of Puchi’s face can be seen twitching, she is made to hear 
chimpanzee sounds.  
(13:47) When PRI’ first keeper touches Puchi’s back, her hair becomes ruffled.  
(13:49) Ventilator pump is used.  
(13:55) Puchi’s heart rate is at 100 and her temperature is 38.1°C.  
(14:01) The veterinarian confirms: pupil and corneal reflexes are absent; face and 
earholes do not respond to stimulation; laryngeal reflex is also absent, and so on.  
(14:05) Brain death is determined for the second time.  
(14:40) Electrocardiogram is being prepared, imaging starts.  
(14:57) Scanning.  
(15:07) Electrocardiogram and imaging ends.  
(15:17) Puchi’s pulse is at 108.  
(15:28) The use of diprivan (administered to slow down brain activity) and the 
ventilator pump are terminated.  
(15:29) Puchi is extubated. Her pulse is at 99. Members involved in chimpanzee 
research are gathered in the room. 
(15:38) Puchi’s pulse drops: 25, 15.  
(15:41) Puchi’s pulse is zero.  
(15:42) Puchi’s death is confirmed. Silent prayer.  
(15:46) Moving to the dissection room.  
(17:32) Craniotomy indicates severe subarachnoid hemorrhage; large clot of 
blood is found in the heart’s left ventricle.    
 
This unfortunate event is 
marked by a series of important 
moments, which reveal the 
meanings surrounding a 
chimpanzee’s death in PRI’s 
community. The first point is 
Popo’s reaction (Photo  14). Puchi 
and Popo were particularly close 
and, indeed, for about one hour 
personnel tried to convince Popo to leave the room before resorting to anesthesia, a 
procedure that can be stressful for chimpanzees as they need to be shot with a tranquilizer. 
Popo’s reaction was clear; the daughter did not want to leave her unconscious mother. 
After Puchi’s definite removal from Gon’s group, Popo and Pal were seen grooming at 
higher frequencies, yet, Gon was said to appear lonely. Luckily, approximately three 
months later, it was noted that the group seemed to be handling Puchi’s absence well. In 
fact, primate thanatology, a new area of research which studies primate responses to the 
death of group members is populated with case studies describing reactions similar to 
those observed in humans at the loss of a close person.32  
 
Photo  14 Popo, Puchi’s daughter, 2015. By Daly.  
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Paralleling Popo’s case, Anderson and colleagues describe a daughter’s reaction 
to her mother’s peaceful passing away in captivity: “Rosie remained near her mother’s 
body almost continuously throughout the night, on a part of the platform where she had 
never slept”.33 Indeed, depending on the context of the death, the array of attitudes toward 
the moribund or the deceased chimpanzee includes pre-death care, testing of signs of life, 
cleaning of the corpse, later avoidance of the place where death occurred, trouble sleeping, 
lethargy, and appetite loss.34,35 Furthermore, certain behaviors occurring in the wild, such 
as the carrying of naturally mummified infant bodies by their mothers is considered to be 
likely socially transmitted, as case studies in Bossou, Guinea support. 36  In sum, 
chimpanzees show signs of what in humans would be labelled as grieving.  
The second important moment of this tragic event is when PRI personnel gather 
to decide the appropriate actions to deal with Puchi’s condition. Facing the prospect of 
lack of improvement in Puchi’s overall state, instead of the commonplace option of 
euthanasia, researchers and veterinarians chose to follow the medical procedure for brain-
dead human patients in Japan. In fact, had euthanasia been conducted, personnel’s work 
would have diminished considerably. Instead, a procedure requiring intensive care was 
chosen based on people’s belief of how a chimpanzee’s life should end. Another 
significant point is the fact that during the two days Puchi was in treatment, she received 
the visit of all members of the section and the moments before the apparatus that kept her 
body working was stopped, a gathering of familiar humans was present to send her off.  
Had Puchi regained consciousness, one may wonder whether she would perhaps 
be able to make use of her body again, as there were no apparent damages of the sort that 
Reo suffered. However, unlike Reo, who was said to have kept his self in the face of a 
paralyzed body, Puchi was “not there” anymore; people even called her name and played 
a footage of a familiar chimpanzee’s voice in order to bring her back. Unlike in many 
Western languages where mind, heart and spirit appear as separate words, Japanese 
language may convey these strikingly powerful concepts through just a simple and unique 
word; kokoro (心).37 Whereas Reo’s kokoro was intact, Puchi’s had departed. Yet, it 
seems Puchi’s kokoro remained as a legacy as we shall see last.   
In a message to all Language and Intelligence members, Professor Tomonaga 
stressed how euthanasia was a procedure typical for ‘laboratory animals’ (“jikken dōbutsu” 
実験動物).38 In fact, at PRI, a ceremony in honor of the monkeys euthanized in invasive 
research is held each year.39 Researchers, keepers, assistants of all sections and even 
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administrative personnel gather for the service; the number of monkeys sacrificed is 
detailed and the purpose of the research is stated. In the end, each person stands in line to 
offer a flower and a silent prayer in front of a stone memorial and a carefully prepared 
altar.  
Chimpanzees, on the other hand, are not subjected to invasive research; 
chimpanzee personnel deal with their deaths in their own way. As a collective means of 
remembrance, a small memorial with photos accompanied by a short document retracing 
the chimpanzee’s life is prepared and strategically placed. It could be argued that, in 
Puchi’s case, euthanasia would not pose a moral problem given the prospect of non-
recovery, a circumstance markedly different from Reo’s. Yet, refraining from euthanasia 
was symbolic: it was meant to send the powerful message that chimpanzee Puchi was no 
laboratory animal. Even more, on the day of Puchi’s death, as the last passage of the email 
addressed to those involved in chimpanzee research at PRI, Tomonaga, who succeeded 
Matsuzawa after his retirement, voiced a strong statement: the “[d]eath of chimpanzee 
should be treated like human death. This must be the last message from Puchi.”40  
Despite the clarity of the statement, there are still nuances to be explored. In 
English, the wordplay “human being” and “being human” denote two distinct phenomena, 
as argued by Ingold: whereas the first concept refers to the biological reality of homo 
sapiens, the second translates human reality as social subjects, as persons.41 Likewise, 
Japanese language conveys such subtlety through different writing systems, where the 
same word might be written in different ways (i.e., katakana and kanji). In the Japanese 
version of Tomonaga’s passage, the new head of chimpanzee research at PRI employs 
the word “hito”, which appears as ‘human’ in his English translation of the message.  
However, in the sentence, the word hito is not written in katakana asヒト, form 
generally used when denoting humans as a species. Instead, the term hito assumes its 
kanji form 人. In this form, hito can be translated as ‘human’ but it has an additional 
translation, that is, ‘person’. As previously discussed, the same kanji (as nin and related 
flexions) is not only employed to count humans and, more exceptionally, chimpanzees 
under certain circumstances, but is also used as a marker of personhood, as it has been 
argued (e.g., as in Martian, kasējin 火星人). Such nuance disappears in the English 
translation of ‘human’ as opposed to the Japanese polysemy of hito ヒト(human species) 
331
 
and hito 人 (human person).I,Note 42 A chimpanzee’s death should be treated in the same 
way as that of a human person.  
Here, the vital point connecting chimpanzee and human death is personhood not 
humanity, even if chimpanzees are phylogenetically very close to human species. Puchi 
is not another laboratory animal that dies and, yet, her case does not seem to be perceived 
as the simple death of a biologically close specimen; the meaning supersedes the strict 
biological reading of an organism. The death lived and experienced is that of an individual 
in the quality of a person, even if such personhood stems in part from a biological reality.  
It is true that chimpanzees do share many characteristics with homo sapiens and, 
in general, humans tend to recognize personhood based on comparisons with human 
features, that is, based on an anthropocentric model of personhood. Nonetheless, 
chimpanzees possess their own idiosyncrasies that make them obviously not human, and 
it is the ensemble of how human and how nonhuman chimpanzees are that constitutes 
their personhood, because chimpanzees are persons like us but they are also persons in 
their own way. Such approach is likely to render fruitful the conceptualization of 
personhood not only of great apes but also of phylogenetically distant taxa, at the heart 
of scientific worldviews. This commitment should be the basis of an animalcentric model 
of personhood where animal personhood is conceived not as an incomplete human 
condition but in the animal’s own terms. This is a challenge for present and future 
generations to come.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
I Accordingly, note that when the procedure for human brain death is referred to in the text, the word 
employed is ningen, which more closely specifies a human than the word hito (‘brain-dead human patient’ 
“ningen no nōshi kanja”人間 の脳死患者) (Minamide and Nakamura 2012). The procedure had only been 
applied to humans so far.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
The gist of this work has been to unfold how humans and, potentially, chimpanzees set and 
blur boundaries between these two species. We have explored this boundary work through a wide 
variety of topics that structure human and chimpanzee lives together in a very specific laboratory 
setting where social relations between Pan and Homo are prioritized. On the one hand, this work 
has strived to analyze key aspects of the interspecies dynamics. On the other, it has aimed at 
pinpointing directions for future research. In other words, its ambition dwells on the fact that it not 
only seeks to provide answers but to unveil phenomena at the intersection of disciplinary 
boundaries, which are, therefore, worthy of a true interdisciplinary effort.  
Most of the issues dealt within this scope have not been thoroughly addressed in such 
fashion and, indeed, when it comes to reciprocal social learning between humans and chimpanzees 
much is yet unknown. Moreover, the role that artifacts and the material world play should be 
addressed in conjunction. Only a sound research program is capable of addressing the topic beyond 
the traditional human representations of animals offered by humanities and beyond the typical 
airtight hypothesis-testing offered by biology-oriented sciences. The research topic is of 
importance for a series of reasons.  
First, due to phylogenetic proximity between humans and chimpanzees, the subject is likely 
to provide significant insights into the potential flexibility of social learning in the Hominidae 
family. Secondly, it can offer us a clearer picture of the mechanisms through which modern 
humans and chimpanzees interact with each other, and how they take into account and transcend 
species-specific barriers while communicating and sustaining social interactions. At last, the 
inspection of how humans and chimpanzees coordinate their lives together, along with the physical 
world, certainly provides us material through which we are able to rethink and redefine our own 
conceptions of what constitutes social living and what constitutes science making. Now, we shall 
recapitulate the key points addressed in each chapter, putting them in perspective, before we 
address issues for future research.    
Chapter one: The first chapter is entitled “Chimpanzee Studies at the Primate Research 
Institute” and introduces the reader to the history of human-chimpanzee relations at PRI. We first 
accompany the story of PRI’s first chimpanzee, Reiko, before cognitive studies at PRI officially 
began. Before the beginning of the Ai Project, nearly forty years ago, chimpanzee husbandry was 
mainly characterized, on the one hand, by lack of conspecifics and, on the other, by interaction 
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with other primates along with face-to-face caretaking spanning beyond infancy. In contrast, the 
current husbandry recommendations stress conspecific grouping. In addition, in the eyes of the 
leading figure of the Ai Project, Professor Matsuzawa, the first studies with Reiko were marked 
by the absence of the notion of mind or cognition and, in such way, in Matsuzawa’s words, the 
chimpanzee seems to have been regarded as “a big black monkey…who is intelligent”.  
In the second part of the first chapter, we begin the section exploring why the chimpanzee 
is perceived as being particularly different from a monkey, that is, due to a differential motivation 
to interact with humans and the type of such interaction. Next, we place the Ai Project in the 
context of the great ape language research of the seventies, with the particularity that its aim has 
been to investigate the perceptual world of chimpanzees by means of symbolic media; instead of 
evaluating to what extent chimpanzees were capable of developing human-like language. Then, 
the logic of chimpanzee studies is explained as being grounded in our evolutionary proximity, 
which unveils the possibility that common traits shared between our species are, in fact, inherited 
from a common ancestor, that is, by homology. A caution note is added on the necessity of making 
some underlying assumptions of this field explicit in order to avoid the anthropological critique 
that the so-called “primitive” human populations would implicitly represent, in such studies, an 
intermediary mental stage between apes and humans imbued with a technological world.  
 At this point, it is proposed that primatology might be less committed to a general 
abstraction of cognitive processes across species (of the type operated by cognitive sciences) than 
it is committed to its medium, that is, the ecological, social, and perceptual reality of the primates 
it studies. Whereas both aspects are not mutually exclusive, primatology would greatly resemble, 
in such sense, the sociocultural anthropological effort of understanding “the native’s point of view”. 
However, species barriers between humans and nonhuman primates impose constraints to how this 
point of view is accessed. Then, we proceed to understand how chimpanzees’ perceptual world is 
tackled by the experimental setting at PRI.  
 Step-by-step, we retrace how the main subject of the Ai Project (i.e., chimpanzee Ai) 
learned to perform experiments. By operant conditioning, Ai learns the setup of the experiment, 
that is, the stages required to solve tasks. However, through a matching-to-sample paradigm, Ai is 
tested on a series of experiments addressing chimpanzees’ cognition. In sum, the coexistence of 
cognitive paradigms and of behaviorist practices, whose philosophy concedes minimal mental 
341
 
 
capacities to animals, is not contradictory per se due to the fact that shaping procedures are used 
as a means to end only.   
Moreover, by looking into Ai’s learning history, we tackle how chimpanzees are capable 
of transferring what they have learned to novel stimuli, and how they learn how to learn. Afterward, 
chimpanzees’ learning idiosyncrasies are discussed in terms of how the first three participants in 
PRI’s chimpanzee research, the infants Ai, Akira, and Mari, reacted to the same experimental 
procedure and apparatus. The section concludes with the issue of whether the laboratory is akin to 
school situations. At PRI, in chimpanzee research, the school analogy is put forward on purpose 
when addressing the public in order to avoid the association between laboratory work and invasive 
research. Furthermore, in experiments that require learning, research personnel appear truly 
invested in chimpanzees’ progress. Nonetheless, unlike the school context, researchers primarily 
teach to learn from chimpanzees and the type of relationship sustained is conceptualized more in 
terms of scientific partnership than in terms of a tutor-student relation.  
The third part of the first chapter approaches how the chimpanzee community expanded 
and it explores the interspecies social practices that supported this growth. We begin this section 
by addressing whether chimpanzees are “natural” mothers, comparing Reiko’s acceptance of her 
son Reo with Puchi’s difficulties in raising her offspring. We provide an overview of the existing 
hypotheses regarding how chimpanzees become successful mothers, and we point out that 
although research tends to support the importance of direct hands-on interactions, motherhood 
seems to be overdetermined by a number of factors. Then, by retracing Matsuzawa’s hand-rearing 
story of Puchi’s rejected infant, Pan, we pin down the lessons that PRI researchers learned and the 
shift in the research paradigm from year 2000 on, when three babies were born, namely, Ayumu, 
Ai’s son; Pal, Pan’s daughter; and Cleo, Chloe’s daughter. The three infants were successfully 
mother-reared, thus, from then on, “participant observation” was the research paradigm 
implemented, whereby, through unbarred face-to-face interactions, a researcher assesses the 
infants’ cognitive development with the help of the chimpanzee mothers, as in human child 
development studies.  
Next, we discover the techniques through which humans prepared Ai, Pan, and Chloe to 
be successful mothers. The program included teaching chimpanzees the correct body techniques 
toward the infants, given that newborn chimpanzees, unlike monkeys, need to be actively cradled. 
Thus, picking up, embracing, putting the infant in the correct position, and allowing suckling are 
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not necessarily evident steps for captive chimpanzee mothers. Right after, the context of Ayumu, 
Cleo, and Pal’s birth is explored. The highlights comprise (a) Ai’s untaught behaviors that enabled 
Ayumu to breath, and Matsuzawa’s imitation of cradling to Ai (b) Chloe’s training with a 
chimpanzee plush toy; her initially unsuccessful learning-to-mother; the strategy implemented to 
fix Chloe’s nonfunctional positioning for breastfeeding, and (c) Pan’s body positioning, which was 
more akin to human parenting and consonant with her hand-rearing history.  
In such experiences, “social learning” involved active teaching on the part of the humans, 
along with observational learning, learning by doing, and social facilitation on the part of the 
chimpanzees. After having considered the body techniques for mothering, which were supported 
by humans, we make the point that the constant cradling of a newborn is a species-specific feature 
of chimpanzees, and that the full support for breastfeeding is a common pattern in great apes. Thus, 
the techniques of the body learned are both ape and chimpanzee. In sum, species-specific patterns 
might require social learning in order to be developed, and such learning might be derived from 
conspecifics or from an allospecific group, in this case, humans who bear particular traditions (e.g., 
face-to-face interactions spanning beyond infancy).  
Diving into the more exploratory subject of whether humans become mothers to nonhuman 
apes, we investigate an episode in which a gorilla, who learned American sign language, refers to 
the death of his biological mother and labels the caretaker as his new mother instead. We briefly 
discuss attachment patterns across great apes. While leaving the issue open of whether and to 
which extent great apes conceive specific humans as fulfilling a role analogous to a chimpanzee 
mother, we pinpoint that humans do perceive themselves as fulfilling a parenting role to another 
species. The next point addresses whether there are differences between the former research 
paradigm, in which infant chimpanzees performed experiments without other conspecifics, and the 
new research paradigm, in which infants come to experiments with their mothers. We argue that, 
in the first case, the know-how for performing an experiment is “shaped” and, in the second, it is 
socially scaffolded by conspecifics. In this sense, juveniles are careful observers of the mothers.  
This point is made by retracing Ayumu’s story of how he first came to make use of the 
experimental apparatus while accompanying his mother during her daily computer tasks; little by 
little, Ayumu mastered the steps of the procedure. Qualitatively, this context differs from the way 
in which his mother learned her first computer task, whereby she would enter the booth alone and 
face the machine setting. Even if the setting is a laboratory, Ayumu’s case is more naturalistic than 
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his mother’s, because his grasping of an experimental procedure relied on the same type of social 
learning that chimpanzees use in the wild. In addition, by retracing social learning studies at PRI, 
which depict how mother-infant pairs were tested together, we point out to what extent the solution 
to an experimental task might be socially learned. Nonetheless, the subtle point is not that there is 
a vertical and horizontal transmission of knowledge among chimpanzees during experiments, but 
that infants tested in such social settings (as opposed to individual-testing protocols) ultimately 
learn how to be laboratory chimpanzees from their own community. In other words, the know-
how of an experimental setting introduced by humans is transferred to the next generation by 
chimpanzees themselves through chimpanzees’ typical social learning patterns.    
In addition, in the type of experiments where humans enter the booth with a mother-infant 
pair, it is likely that infant chimpanzees learn to give a social value to humans as a result of the 
triadic interaction in which the mother trusts the human with her infant. Then, we briefly illustrate 
this point through an examination of Ayumu’s social smiling toward a familiar human. We 
conclude the section with the outreach that chimpanzee research has to the greater public in terms 
of media appearances, scheduled visits to PRI and, in addition, the status that Ai and Ayumu 
acquired as ambassadors for chimpanzees in Japan.   
Chapter two: The second chapter is entitled “Physical Boundaries: The Architecture of 
Dangerous Social Interactions” and it introduces the readers to the present daily life at PRI by 
exploring how the infrastructure of chimpanzee research and interspecies social relations 
intermingle. We start by presenting one of the specificities of working with common chimpanzees, 
that is, the increased danger it entails in comparison to other great apes and to monkeys. Next, 
chimpanzees’ living area and the system through which chimpanzees come to the laboratory is 
presented.  
We tackle how space is socially organized and we pay particular attention to permeable 
interface areas for human-chimpanzee interaction; spaces where, by architectural design, both 
species may trespass physical borders while still being separated. Throughout the chapter, eight 
points are highlighted as being vital to the interspecific social organization of space, namely: (a) 
the architecture of interface areas (b) the physical structure of the apparatuses (c) the surroundings 
immediate to one’s body (d) the context of the activity being undertaken (e) chimpanzee behavior 
and individuals’ abilities (f) human-chimpanzee relationship on a dyadic basis (g) group dynamics 
among humans and chimpanzees (h) safe body techniques.  
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First, the general architecture of human and chimpanzee flow in the same space is described, 
such as the use of human exclusive spaces and chimpanzee spaces and the structural differences 
they comprise. In addition, the coordination of humans and chimpanzees in space is analyzed 
through the safety protocols set in place to move chimpanzees into the laboratory. Some past 
incidents are evoked in order to substantiate how safety assessment involves an ability to read the 
infrastructure and link it to certain types of actions that are either defined by protocol or by an 
evaluation of the context. Afterward, we approach the architecture that supports the feeding duty 
activities, one of the most potentially risky situations personnel encounter. We point out how the 
feeder apparatuses embody different risk levels according to its material design and chimpanzees’ 
frequency of approach.  
Then, we inspect how humans move safely through the basement area by paying attention 
to the surroundings of one’s body, to the context allowing or interdicting chimpanzees to roam in 
certain areas, and by taking into account chimpanzees’ reach within main human spaces. For this 
purpose, with the aid of measurements of the infrastructure, we concretely simulate how a human 
would position his or her own body when crossing the basement in different contexts. In order to 
approach how chimpanzees’ behavior and idiosyncrasies shape our risk assessment, the readers 
are invited to discover other infrastructures of chimpanzee research, more precisely, the 
architecture of Kumamoto Sanctuary, partner institution of PRI. This point is made explicit though 
ethnographical faux-pas while moving within a new architectural space and facing chimpanzees 
and bonobos’ unforeseen behaviors. As a result, body positioning in space changed as animal 
behavior unveiled new perceived affordances, that is, alternative usages of the surroundings by 
another species. At last, this time, inspecting PRI’s setting, it is argued that knowing chimpanzees’ 
individual abilities - not just general chimpanzee behavior - is tantamount to humans’ safe 
placement in space. 
Now, reaching the last three points laid down as vital to risk perception, we address human-
chimpanzee relationship and group dynamics. The perception of interlocutors capable of unbarred 
face-to-face interaction at PRI and Kumamoto Sanctuary indicates that time spent building up a 
good relationship with chimpanzees is key to enable physical proximity. However, it is pointed 
out that the context may change with the introduction of a third party due to dominance roles. In 
sum, in unbarred situations, the physical boundaries between humans and chimpanzees depend on 
the social idiosyncrasies of each dyad and group. At last, we address what constitutes safer body 
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techniques when dealing with captive chimpanzees and bonobos, that is, internalized ways of being 
and behaving in space. This is reflected into how distances are kept and felt and, to illustrate this 
point, a subjective assessment of three margins of safety in the laboratory is provided. Overall, 
safe locomotion in space is oriented by the act of reading in conjunction the architecture, the 
context and the inter/intraspecific social relations involved in each situation.  
The chapter approaches its end with an assessment of the physical boundaries in the wild. 
This section focusses on the specific context of the Japanese field station of Bossou, addressed by 
a short-term ethnographic work. Moreover, this part is complemented by a discussion of the 
literature on human-ape encounters. In the wild, the architectural features of captivity that, to some 
extent, guarantee human safety are absent. Thus, such context proves to be an interesting 
counterpoint. However, as different as they appear, similar issues arise. First, one needs to pay 
heed to an animal’s personal space to avoid surprise attacks, although the threshold depends upon 
context. Secondly, the configuration of bordering areas between the forest and heavily 
anthropogenic habitats seems to play a role in avoiding human-chimpanzee conflict (e.g., visibility, 
buffer zones, etc.). Thirdly, whenever physical barriers are envisaged, their materiality needs to be 
addressed (types of fencing, canals, biological barriers, etc.) because apes may intelligently detour 
them.  
Then, regarding the habituation of animals to humans, human-chimpanzee interaction 
needs to be considered on an individual and multiparty basis, especially because chimpanzees are 
capable of identifying humans. Some, like local guides, seem to sustain a differential relationship 
with chimpanzee groups. In addition, certain group compositions (e.g., women and children) 
appear to have increased chances of experiencing agonistic encounters with a certain parcel of 
chimpanzee population, namely, males. However, people’s attitudes and the absence or presence 
of controlled locomotion also contribute to how chimpanzees deal with the situation at hand (e.g., 
humans fleeing or screaming). In sum, who attacks, who is attacked, when, and the reactions to an 
encounter are vital points to the outcome of unbarred interspecies social interactions.  
Next, we explore how chimpanzees might possibly perceive highly anthropogenic areas in 
their habitats. It seems that chimpanzees consider such areas in terms of increased risk. The first 
example is how chimpanzees undertake crop-raiding. In the existing literature, this is examined in 
terms of anxiety indicators, where they eat the crops, and at what time they enter the human fields. 
We add that the relationship chimpanzees sustain with such activity may vary historically, and 
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may be dependent upon changing human-chimpanzee relations over time. For instance, in Bossou, 
there is an ancient practice which consists of leaving part of the harvest to chimpanzees, who are 
considered the local totem.  
The second example to draw attention to chimpanzees’ perception of human spaces is 
based on their behavior while crossing roads. Studies support that chimpanzees are not only 
individually vigilant when crossing high-speed traffic but that a protective socio-spatial 
organization takes place while crossing these roads, in order to guarantee the safety of more 
vulnerable chimpanzees. Thus, wild chimpanzees modify how they socially occupy spaces as a 
matter of the probability of interaction with humans and human-made threats, like automobiles. 
To ground this point concretely, we analyze one episode of road crossing in Bossou, which was 
recorded during a short-term fieldwork and analyzed systematically through video coding. The 
episode illustrates well the differential social organization in space; however, the analysis 
conducted proposes a simple way to take into account the presence of researchers when assessing 
chimpanzees’ danger perception. This analysis is a result of the assumption that the habituation 
level does not preclude increased attention to researchers, especially when danger is enhanced.  
We conclude the chapter discussing to what extent introducing the researchers’ presence as a factor 
in such studies is important to assess the nonhuman animals’ perception.  
Chapter three: After having addressed the dynamics of physical boundaries between 
humans and chimpanzees, we turn to the third chapter, “Experimental Boundaries: Testing and 
Being Tested by Chimpanzees”. In this chapter we address the fundamental elements at stake to 
conduct chimpanzee research at PRI, we investigate the meanings of experimenting with 
chimpanzees and how their abilities can decenter human perspective and, in addition, provide a 
feedback loop in experimental research. Several important features constitute the core of 
chimpanzee research at PRI. First, we should consider its holistic approach to chimpanzee care 
and research.  
This point is translated into the parallel effort of conducting experiments in the laboratory 
and fieldwork in the wild. Moreover, it is expressed by the increased participation of research 
personnel in duties traditionally allocated to keepers, and by the effort to understand chimpanzees 
as a whole; both in terms of how their wild behavior can be fostered in captivity and in terms of 
chimpanzees’ personal idiosyncrasies. Secondly, the other vital features structuring chimpanzee 
research at PRI are face-to-face caretaking practices, face-to-face experiments spanning beyond 
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chimpanzees’ early age, and personalized feeding. At last, mutual trust in contrast to positive 
reinforcement is evoked as being at the core of human-chimpanzee relationship.  
After having outlined PRI’s characteristics, we put them in perspective regarding other 
institutions in Japan and worldwide. The one to resemble PRI’s structure the most is its partnering 
institution, Kumamoto Sanctuary: As at PRI, strategic face-to-face caring of chimpanzees take 
place, and researchers participate in personalized and scatter feeding, although only during 
weekdays. However, as of 2015, at the Sanctuary, face-to-face practices were more intensive in 
terms of the number of humans and chimpanzees co-present in the same booth for experiments. 
The other Japanese institution that has sustained face-to-face practices beyond infancy is the now 
deactivated GARI. Nonetheless, this institution is viewed by interlocutors at PRI as the extreme 
case of human-chimpanzee interaction for its co-feeding and co-sleeping practices. Lastly, 
interlocutors at PRI stress how their institution should be differentiated from a zoo setting, where 
interspecies social relations are feeble.  
Next, by drawing on discrepant work experiences of a keeper worldwide, we signal how at 
other Western institutions, human-chimpanzee interaction is to be avoided, in order to allow 
animals to be animals. Yet, the interlocutor contends that the no-touch policy is also related to the 
fact that such institutions draw heavily on volunteering. In addition, a study in a Catalonian 
sanctuary supports that refraining from being too close to humans is viewed as important in other 
cultural and institutional contexts. In contrast, at PRI, as long as chimpanzees are able to express 
their species-specific repertoire with conspecifics, human interaction does not alter chimpanzees’ 
status as real chimpanzees. Rather than denying humans to be part of chimpanzees’ social ecology 
in captivity, the issue becomes how to administer the process.  
Afterward, by means of a questionnaire sent to particular interlocutors, we concretely 
address the specific point of face-to-face and feeding practices in some of the most reputable 
research institutions for chimpanzee research, namely, the Max-Planck Institute and the Leipzig 
Zoo in Germany, Saint Andrews University and the Edinburgh Zoo in Scotland, and the Yerkes 
National Primate Research Center in the United States. According to the interlocutors mobilized, 
in none of these institutions research personnel are officially relied upon for feeding duty, but they 
might occasionally join the activity. In addition, the feeding system is a mix of scattered and 
personalized, with the exception of the Edinburgh Zoo, reported to be mainly scattered. At last, no 
unbarred face-to-face interactions with adult chimpanzees are observed in these institutions.  
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Then, we proceed to remark how, despite these observations, unbarred face-to-face 
practices with apes seem not to be exclusive to the Japanese case. This is mainly because of their 
conspicuous presence in the ape language research of the seventies. However, we contend that, 
unlike bonobos and gorillas, the picture is not so clear when considering the age of common 
chimpanzees, as many programs ceased when chimpanzees reached maturity, or introduced 
physical barriers for interaction between species. Therefore, it seems that Japanese face-to-face 
practices take up the most extreme form of contact, that is, interaction during adulthood, when 
chimpanzees’ strength becomes a potential danger to humans.     
After having laid down these critical characteristics, we move on to tackle them concretely. 
An overview of personnel’s duties at PRI is provided and we point out the two most important 
overlaps in keepers and in research personnel’s duties, more specifically, the calling of 
chimpanzees and feeding duty. We then focus on assessing the importance of feeding duty, 
especially considering it as an activity in which (a) interspecies relations are tested on a dyadic 
basis and in which (b) the increased time spent with chimpanzees aids in building a good 
relationship with each individual. Furthermore, at PRI, all research personnel are required to 
engage in feeding. As a result of this vital role, we investigate feeding duty by means of a 
quantitative analysis of this practice conducted over four studies. The results show that, first, the 
philosophy of building up a good relationship with chimpanzees is reflected in additional twenty 
hours per month of interaction with chimpanzees in a feeding context, for post-docs, graduate 
students and research assistants, on the top of interaction hours during experiments.  
Secondly, in terms of engagement level assessed as a function of recruitment during 
weekends and holidays, no significant differences are found between professors and the post-doc, 
student, and assistant category. Concretely, these two categories spend on average the same 
amount of time with chimpanzees during weekends and holidays (approx. 7h/month) and spend 
nearly the same amount of leave days on duty (25% of the total months present at the Institute). 
At last, although a direct comparison with keepers’ interaction hours during feeding was not 
possible, an alternative design revealed that, at PRI, research personnel not only are expected to 
engage in feeding, but they take up also the biggest share of this role in comparison to keepers. 
Whereas post-docs, students, and assistants occupy most of the feeding duty slots, the role which 
professors and keepers play in this practice in terms of recruitment seems surprisingly similar. We 
point out that interlocutors regard in high esteem the feeding duty as means to building up and 
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maintaining a good relationship with chimpanzees, which in turn, helps the smooth carrying out 
of experiments. Yet, the intensity of the feeding duty is a factor called into question by many due 
to the fact that research personnel bears other responsibilities that only they can take upon in 
comparison to keepers.  
After exploring PRI’s structuring practices, we investigate the points emphasized by social 
actors when introducing their activities to third parties. We analyze PRI’s most viewed 
promotional video, which features what is likely the most famous experiment of PRI’s chimpanzee 
research, namely, the experiment on symbolic representation and working memory in chimpanzees. 
The video highlights many of the important points perceived by interlocutors, such as, simulation 
of nature, trust, voluntary participation of chimpanzees, objectivity of the experimental interface, 
and chimpanzees as outgroup to understand human mind. However, the strongest message of the 
video is how chimpanzees’ abilities might “decenter” humans’ perception of our own abilities. We 
then tackle the issue by diving deep into the above-mentioned experiment and analyzing the 
controversies surrounding the study.  
In this study, one the chimpanzee participants, Ayumu, Ai’s son, outperformed humans in 
a memory task involving the processing of the ordinal aspect of numbers. Although the study 
gained an enormous attention, other researchers attempted to replicate Ayumu’s performance in 
humans. They contended that because humans and chimpanzees in the study received a different 
amount of sessions, if humans were given the same amount of sessions that Ayumu underwent, 
they could match the chimpanzee’s acclaimed performance. However, when scrutinizing the 
studies, it is possible to observe that the authors did not exactly match the sessions, but introduced 
an increased, unequal number of trials to obtain Ayumu’s results and, yet, claimed that human and 
chimpanzee performances were equal (Ayumu’s 900 trials “advantage” of the original study vs 
human 15,350 trials of training in the critics’ study). In addition, we argue that because the task 
mobilizes not only memory but human invented symbols, humans who are life-long trained in 
advanced math are already at advantage. Thus, in this case, by keeping the number of sessions 
unequal, we are indeed making interspecies comparisons more equal.  
In the next segment, we address the dynamics of face-to-face experiments, by analyzing 
the activities that Ai and Matsuzawa undertake in such conditions. We substantiate this point by 
analyzing sections of videos of their interactions recorded during the ethnography. The first 
activities we tackle are stacking blocks and nesting cups. These take place as single trials of 
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previously conducted experiments, which traditionally address object manipulation and child 
cognitive development. Taking this lead, we introduce the concept that an action may be supported 
by different cognitive strategies that comprise a differential load, and that a hierarchical 
complexity exists in terms of the sequential codes an individual has to fathom when organizing 
action (e.g., pot method vs subassembly method).  
The next activities described of face-to-face are painting, photo taking, health check, 
husbandry training, play, and grooming. Special attention is given to how humans convey 
information to chimpanzees. This occurs not only through commonly used husbandry words in 
Japanese and in English, but also through gestural communication such as pointing, or through 
specific gestures created to signify a command. In addition, Matsuzawa makes use of Japanese 
sign language when interacting with Ai. Overall, by ethnographic observations, we remark the 
powerfulness of multimodal communication for chimpanzees’ understanding. Following, we 
consider some idiosyncratic elements in interspecies form of play and grooming, such as Ai’s 
apparent self-control to adjust strength in interaction and Ai’s buttoning and unbuttoning activity, 
which is perceived by Matsuzawa as a form of grooming a naked ape. All the activities outlined, 
are next grounded in concrete descriptive cases of ethnographic videos. Conspicuously, in the 
video pertaining to health check, we observe Ai’s first training for blood draw, in which no positive 
reinforcement through food is used.  
After having explored the practices structuring chimpanzee research and care at PRI and 
some of its most important experiment types, we proceed to accompany, in a first-person account, 
the conception, implementation, and challenges of an experiment. In this section, we accompany 
the trajectory of the author of this manuscript from being an anthropologist in the laboratory, to 
becoming an experimenter in the same laboratory. First, this part retraces the double-bind setting 
created from having to navigate through disciplines with different research paradigms. In parallel, 
it explains step by step how the experiment was proposed, conceived, its rationale, and the 
preparations for its set up. Unlike automated experiments where chimpanzees interact mainly with 
a computer during the performance, the experiment in question was semi face-to-face in nature, 
that is, it required social interaction with chimpanzees during the trials but in a mediated form 
through an apparatus.   
By concretely addressing the challenges in its implementation, like assessing chimpanzees’ 
view, camera perspective, design of the apparatus, and so on, we go through the hard issue of the 
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status of the “social” in an experiment with chimpanzees. Unlike observational studies of the 
situated cognition type, the experiment requires the control of social elements to keep the 
conditions equal. We also retrace the formal steps for becoming an experimenter and couple it 
with the reflection of what it means to become an experimenter in this particular setting. Through 
ethnographic experiences, the debate on the ethics of doing research with animals in captivity is 
brought up, along with the contrast between invasive and non-invasive studies with chimpanzees 
and monkeys.  
The second part of this ethnographic account deals with how social relations become a part 
of the experiment. This leads us back to the importance of spending time with chimpanzees in 
order to build up a good relationship with them, which concretely, translated into going through 
an extensive feeding training, accompanying others feeding chimpanzees. The other component 
of this aspect was the need for a training phase, not only to make chimpanzees understand how the 
experiment works but to ingrain the experimenter as part of the experimental setting. In other 
words, to make chimpanzees accept the experimenter as their experimenter, and not only as a 
regular observer in the laboratory.  
The third part of the account focuses on how chimpanzees provoke a constant feedback 
loop in the experimental protocol. For this purpose, we go through the failures of the experiment 
instead of its successes. We assess how chimpanzees reacted differently to the protocol when 
comparing the training phase and the test phase. We show how the failure to comply with the 
protocol was, in fact, a result of intelligent behavior that had not been foreseen. We concretely 
exemplify this point through the video analysis of a session that forced the experimental procedure 
to be changed. In this session with chimpanzee Pan, she showed agonistic behaviors toward the 
experimenter as a result of failing to comply with what was required by protocol. The event is 
scrutinized and several aspects are pinpointed, yet, one of the most important facets of the case 
consists in the role that interspecies communication play and in the problem of the indeterminacy 
of translation. In addition, the experimental protocol had opened a path for non-positive 
interspecies social relations, and after all factors were considered, we were forced to re-elaborate 
our procedure.  
Next, we consider how our new protocol would be again put to test by chimpanzees, this 
time, by Pendesa. Pendesa was the most proficient chimpanzee of this experiment in object and 
color categorization. However, in what proved to be the most difficult condition for chimpanzees 
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(i.e., the color target), Pendesa, unable to discover the correct result, resorted to a new strategy 
which counted upon fishing for the positive verbal feedback of the experimenter before making 
her final choice (i.e., dropping the item to the experimenter’s side).  Yet, this time, without even 
foreseeing the emergence of her testing behavior, the protocol hindered her efforts, given that the 
positive feedback was only given after items were dropped, never before. An analysis of the items 
she chose during this testing behavior reveals that she was likely making informed guesses based 
on her experience with previous targets.  
We conclude the chapter retracing the lessons learned from the training of the new 
experimenter who would continue the work. This process confirmed to what extent, first, the semi 
face-to-face experiment is embodied into the experimenters’ actions which, at the same time, are 
kinesthetically coordinated with chimpanzees. Secondly, it reiterated how a personalized 
interspecies social relation is vital: Even though the successor was already a regular experimenter 
for computer experiments, she had yet to become part of this singular experimental setting through 
a relationship training with chimpanzees. At last, we remark how the experimental effort to 
understand chimpanzees’ point of view can be considered, by analogy, akin to the anthropological 
endeavor of understanding natives in their own terms.  
Chapter four: The last chapter of the manuscript is entitled “Symbolic Boundaries: The 
Subtle Line between Humans and Chimpanzees”. This section deals - not with the differences in 
symbol comprehension between humans and chimpanzees - but with the investigation of subtle 
epiphenomena anchored in and revealing of deeper social experiences. We start the journey with 
the first-person recollection of a Japanese lesson in which the ethnographer discovered that the 
linguistic practices she had borrowed from the Institute, were perceived as strange for outsiders. 
 Japanese language has a different system to count being in comparison to Germanic and 
Latin languages. This difference is expressed by the use of numerical classifiers, also known as 
counters. There are approximately one hundred-fifty counters in Japanese and the criteria to 
employ a certain counter instead of another is derived from the qualities of the noun to which it 
refers, for instance, animacy, size, and so on. Thus, instead of stating a number and then a noun 
(e.g., 7 humans), we are obliged to add the appropriate counter as in “7 (counter for humans) 
humans”. Because the counter refers to the attributes of the noun, not to the measure, it is regarded 
as a tool for categorizing beings. We then explore the grammatical numeral classifiers for primates: 
for humans (nin), for large primates like chimpanzees (tō), and for small primates (hiki). Following, 
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we argue and substantiate that nin is, in fact, a marker of personhood and, in addition, we remark 
that, at PRI, research personnel employ the counters for humans to refer to chimpanzees.  
For interlocutors at PRI, the perceived similarities that justify such linguistic practice are 
based on cognitive complexity and phylogenetic proximity. In fact, such reasons are akin to the 
argument mobilized by a broader international movement which seeks to change the legal rights 
of nonhuman apes to the status of nonhuman persons (e.g., the Great Ape Project and the 
Nonhuman Rights Project). In other words, in the scientific milieu, the attribution of personhood 
follows the premises of naturalism, a mode of relating to nonhuman beings that stresses biological 
commonalities while, at the same time, putting emphasis on human-like cognitive capacities. Next, 
we unfold three linguistic studies conducted to assess the linguistic practices of research personnel 
at PRI.  
In Linguistic Study 1, we investigate which counter Japanese native speakers employ to 
refer to chimpanzees in the laboratory. As a result, 85% of the interlocutors responded to employ 
the counter for humans, whereas the remaining make use of the counter for large animals and for 
individuals. In Linguistic Study 2, because the counter for individual (i.e., kotai) is considered as 
being the most appropriate in scientific communication, we address its usages when publishing in 
Japanese. We observe that the more technical publications become, the more authors adhere to 
“individual”; the more publications are accessible to the public, the more authors make use of the 
human classifier. In addition to this study, we point out other forms of emphasis on chimpanzees’ 
agency through Japanese words in psychology writings.   
In Linguistic Study 3, we address how Japanese researchers refer to chimpanzees in other 
languages. We consider how the word participant, in contrast to test subject, is an indicator of 
agency. Then, we observe that the publishing guidelines of the American Psychological 
Association, which dictates the publishing style in psychology, enforces the use of the pronoun 
“who” for humans and “that/which” for nonhumans. By screening the most recent publications of 
PRI researchers, we conclude that 75% of the articles refer to chimpanzees as participants instead 
of subjects, while 25% employ subject, yet, followed by the pronoun “who” instead of 
“which/that”. Complementing this study, we investigate several other publications of collaborators 
and non-collaborators to PRI. In those, the uses of participant and subject for nonhuman animals 
does not seem to be stabilized, regardless of the species. Nonetheless, the increasing presence of 
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the relative pronoun “who” suggests that there might be a major trend towards emphasizing the 
agency of nonhuman animals in non-invasive cognitive research.  
Next, we detail the reasons why the perception of agency in paired English words 
(participant/subject) might not be the same as in different Japanese counters (counter for 
human/individual), where the Japanese case appears to indicate a stronger contrast. In addition, 
given that PRI counts on Korean and Chinese researchers working with chimpanzees, we inspect 
these two other classifier languages. We point out that Korean native speakers who address 
chimpanzees in Japanese by the counter for humans, do not generalize this use to their native 
language, employing the appropriate counter for animals in Korean when referring to chimpanzees. 
 Whereas for Mandarin, we observe that, if this language has specific counters for animals 
it also presents a single classifier that is both a general and a human marker (gè). By pragmatics, 
this counter is used for very “un-human” animals (i.e., as a general classifier) and for very “human-
like” animals (i.e., as a human marker). Therefore, first, the same boundary work which separates 
how we linguistically address humans and other animals exists in other classifier languages, and 
secondly, extrapolating common classifier usage might require stronger beliefs when a counter has 
higher item-specificity to humans, such as the case of Japanese.  
To conclude the linguistic discussion, we emphasize that familiarity per se cannot justify 
the crossing of linguistic boundaries because researchers place such usages in the context of the 
broader chimpanzee category, not only of familiar individuals. We then take this lead to evoke the 
distinction between anthropocentric anthropomorphism, in which animals are apprehended in the 
terms of how human they can be, and animalcentric anthropomorphism, in which a considerable 
effort is placed at understanding animals in their own terms. Next, we call for a second difference; 
that between anthropomorphism and personification, understood in the sense of how other types 
of beings become social actors one to another.  
We address the topic of social “becomings” between species based on selected 
ethnographic episodes. The first one describes a teaching context, namely, when experimenters 
had to become chimpanzees in order to be better scientists. “Becoming chimpanzee”, in this sense, 
surpasses the sheer imitation of chimpanzees’ perceived qualities from which humans can profit 
through reenactment. Rather, it constitutes the effort of seeing the world as a certain chimpanzee 
experiences it in a given context. Following, we approach the issue of shifting perspectives from 
two different disciplinary backgrounds, namely, cognitive sciences and social anthropology.  
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In cognitive sciences, theory of mind is referred to as the attribution of mental states to 
others and, in this conception, it exists a multiplicity of views of a single world. However, in other 
modes of conceptualizing nonhuman animals, as Amerindian animism and perspectivism, animals 
are perceived as sharing human qualities and, in its most extreme view, as identifying themselves 
as humans. Thus, in such case, humanity is, in fact, a marker of personhood. In the perspectivist 
corollary of animism, there are multiple worlds to a single point of view. Following, we discuss 
the points to gain in addressing the traditional cognitive sciences’ perspective and the socio-
anthropological one in conjunction.  
By taking up another philosophical and socio-anthropological argument, the one of 
metamorphosis, we address the issue of the “chimpification” of humans who work with 
chimpanzees. First, we explore the Amerindian the endeavor of taking up the perspective of an 
animal, while, at the same time avoiding the risk of becoming one due to a complete shift in 
perspective. Arguing along these lines, we reconnect with the idea that as a matter of working 
intensively with a given species, certain characteristics of this privileged other are imbued into our 
own behaviors. We argue that chimpification is composed of two levels. The first one is the 
intention or the process of being able to shift into chimpanzees’ perspective on a personal level, 
which is positively rated by interlocutors. The second is the intention or the process of modifying 
one’s behavior to match the other’s species-specific patterns; whereas this is perceived as being 
advantageous when directed toward chimpanzees, it is perceived as a hindrance when dealing with 
humans (thus, the utterance “speak human to me!”).  
A third aspect of the chimpification process is observed when chimpanzees acquire 
considerable power in human-chimpanzee relationships. We hint this phenomenon by exploring a 
troubled experimental session conducted by the ethnographer. In the session, a chimpanzee 
appears to mobilize a “higher-ranking” observer after an action conducted by the experimenter 
triggered a heightened reaction from the same chimpanzee. If humans are capable of treating 
chimpanzees as legitimate social actors, we indicate the importance and necessity to pursue studies 
on what would constitute persons for chimpanzees or what would a person be in chimpanzees’ 
own terms. Heading toward the end of the chapter, we approach the meanings surrounding 
chimpanzees’ life and death as perceived by PRI personnel.  
First, we inspect the celebration of chimpanzees’ birthdays. While comparing it with the 
birthday celebration of a gibbon in Japan Monkey Centre, we argue that instead of reading such 
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events as an act of sheer anthropocentric anthropomorphism, these events may be subject to a 
different reading; personification processes. We indicate a shift in the rationale of animal viewing; 
from animal performances of human-like activities to focus on natural behaviors and information 
on individuals’ stories and history. Unlike the celebration of human behaviors, this move opens up 
space to recognize animal specificity on both the species and individual level. We conclude that 
whenever the attribution of emotions, individuality, history, stories, and social agency is 
accompanied by an animalcentric perspective, that is, an attempt to understand the animal in the 
animal’s terms, then, instead of anthropomorphism the phenomenon we encounter is 
personification, in other words, the makings of a person - even if a nonhuman one. 
Next, we inspect to what extent personification is taken up at PRI. The second topic on 
chimpanzees’ life and death addresses the debate surrounding the euthanasia of a severely disabled 
chimpanzee, Reo, who suffered from sudden tetraplegia as a result of an inflammation of the spinal 
cord. Yet, because Reo kept his “self” and was still fully alive despite his movement restrictions, 
PRI personnel consider that euthanasia was not an option. His partial rehabilitation occurred 
through face-to-face physiotherapy and an experimental setting in which Reo walked a certain 
distance to receive the food rewards for the trials.  
The third case brought to light is the symmetric opposite of Reo’s. Puchi, one of PRI’s 
eldest chimpanzee, was found one day lying unconscious on the floor. Here, we accompany the 
events surrounding her medical treatment, the response of Puchi’s daughter and, how, after Puchi’s 
brain-death was diagnosed, personnel chose to follow the same procedure used for human brain-
dead patients. This call was based on their belief that Puchi could not be treated as a laboratory 
animal; for interlocutors, Puchi’s last message consisted in affirming that a chimpanzee’s death 
should be treated like human death.  
Yet, a subtlety is to be noted.  When this message was conveyed in written form in Japanese, 
the word “human” did not appear in its connotation of human species (i.e., in katakana), but in its 
the connotation as human person (i.e., in kanji). Thus, beyond phylogenetic proximity, this 
chimpanzee’s death is experienced not in the quality of a biological specimen, but in the quality 
of a person. We conclude the section with the importance of committing to animalcentric 
perspectives on personhood, whereby animal personhood is conceived not as an incomplete human 
condition but in the animal’s own terms. 
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 General conclusion: There are four major topics which appear as a result of each chapter 
and that are, in addition, recurrent across all of them. They emerge from a plural analysis of how 
humans and chimpanzee construct social relations at the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto 
University. These are:  
 
 
• Interspecies socialization  
• Embodiment of interspecies relations in space 
• Interspecies social relations in scientific settings  
• Animalcentric perspectives on personhood  
 
  For each of these topics, the etho-ethnographic work supports a general conclusion. 
Regarding the first point, we support that social learning between species occurs in a fluid manner, 
maintained by multiple relationship histories and learning mechanisms. In addition, the technical 
and material world scaffolds the construal of such relationships by constraining or allowing certain 
interactions to occur. Although we wish to dwell on a robust understanding of ideas and concepts 
instead of terminological details, we should notice that the word employed to highlight this 
leitmotif is socialization, not sociality nor social learning. Even though socialization entails both, 
their usages point at different focusses and methodologies.  
Sociality more strongly refers to the evolutionary pressures; its incrementation, pro-
sociality, is generally regarded at a species level; then, social learning hints more specifically at 
psychological processes. Socialization, which is traditionally employed in social sciences, shifts 
our focus to the process of how individuals internalize that which is from others in a given recurrent 
context. Overall, although not mutually exclusive, socialization is more holistic than the other 
terms commonly used by other disciplines, thus, unfolding debates not only at species level but on 
idiosyncratic constructions of the self, along with related issues.  
Now, assessing the second point, we support that interspecies relations, especially 
dangerous one, unfold particularly mindful of space and the surrounding material world. Therefore, 
interspecies social relations are embodied in space and through space. First, each social relation 
between a human and a chimpanzee will generate a specific body technique and social organization 
of space. Interspecies social interaction is subjected to how humans and chimpanzees own spaces 
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taking each other into consideration and to how these spaces are customized. Secondly, according 
to how the material world and space are construed, certain interactions are enabled or hindered. In 
this mediation, relationships develop and are put to test so that the architecture of such spaces plays 
a considerable role in how humans and chimpanzee unfold relations.  
 Regarding the third point, we support the importance of the specificity of interspecies 
social relations and its inscription into the experimental setting. In other words, the personalized 
relationship between the experimenter and the chimpanzee participant needs to be introduced in 
the experimental setting and be put to test. In addition, chimpanzees provide a feedback loop in 
the experiment either by means of using alternative ways to circumvent the experimental protocol 
or by outsmarting it. At last, it should be noted that this point not only reflects epistemological 
considerations but it can be considered a fairly technical issue worthy of addressing when reporting 
an experiment. Nonetheless, it remains largely cast aside in technical publications.  
 When considering the fourth point, we support that anthropomorphization and 
personification are different processes and that the social phenomena observed in chimpanzee 
research at the Primate Research Institute owes more to personification processes than to 
anthropomorphization. Moreover, we signal that the conceptualization and constitution of 
nonhuman animals as persons would benefit from the development of animalcentric perspectives 
in which considerable interdisciplinary effort is put into understanding an animal in his or her own 
terms, instead of carving nonhumans out as an incomplete vision of humanness.  
 Prospects: Given that an interdisciplinary approach to human-chimpanzee social relations 
is still incipient, research desiderata abound. In each of these above-mentioned axes there are 
several questions to be addressed in an interdisciplinary fashion, which have been pinpointed 
throughout the manuscript. However, in this general conclusion we must highlight that a similar 
approach making use of plural methods should be taken to explore human-chimpanzee relationship 
in other research institutions throughout the world as well as the sensitive human-chimpanzee 
encounters in the wild. In addition, a systematic, standardized approach to human-chimpanzee 
interaction in several sites has the potential to render a comparative endeavor fruitful and sound.  
Likely, the most important legacy of this manuscript is not the questions that it was capable 
to answer but those that it was not; not the phenomena that it explained, but those that it was 
capable to bring to life. The reason for this statement lies in the belief that it is crucial to foster an 
interdisciplinary research program which tackles at its core how to move beyond human 
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representations of animals (commonly mobilized by humanities) and air-tight hypothesis testing 
(traditionally employed by biology-oriented sciences). Anthropology of primatology and 
ethnoprimatology are able to address many of human-animal relationship issues in a competent 
manner, but not in the most interdisciplinary way they could, which limits the potential of 
questions and phenomena we can make emerge. Note that, by interdisciplinarity, we refer not to 
bridges between related disciplines such as history and philosophy or genetics and cognitive 
psychology, because each of these sets embraces common overall paradigms upon which the 
different disciplines can agree. Here, we refer to the true schism between biology-oriented sciences 
and humanities in terms of researchers’ academic backgrounds and beliefs.  
This endeavor, though substantial, is promising. It has the potential to create true boundary 
objects that are robust enough to accommodate disciplinary emphases and sensibilities, yet, 
maintain integrity across disciplines; as a sort of lingua franca spoken with different accents. When 
considering primatology and ethnoprimatology, we are yet to fully develop ways to fathom what 
humanities group under the name of “meaning”. What does it mean for a primate to be in 
interaction with humans, with conspecifics and with the environment? How do primates make 
sense of the world beyond explanations traditionally foreseen by biology-oriented sciences? What 
are their practices of “othering” and the makings of a “self”?  How do primates make sense of life 
processes? What does it mean to be a chimpanzee for a chimpanzee, or even, what does it mean to 
be a chimpanzee of a particular community with a particular history of relationships? How can 
these questions be answered without assuming human cognitive “machinery”? Do we dispose of 
a methodology that is phenomenologically sensitive but empirically grounded in animal behavior? 
Are any of such “chimpanzee meanings” relatable to “human meanings”? In other words, although 
the concerned fields have increasingly advanced toward this range of investigation, a deeper 
conceptual work is still required.  
Mutatis mutandis, when considering anthropology and related subfields such as 
anthropology of nature, anthropology of life and anthropology of primate studies, at an interspecies 
level, an approach grounded in animal behavior offers the possibility of unveiling a completely 
different perspective than human conceptualizations of nature and of life processes offer; both 
sides being, nonetheless, intrinsically intertwined. However, to accomplish this goal, an expertise 
on the animals in question is required. Moreover, because standard methodologies relying on 
verbal accounts will greatly fail to address nonhuman perspective, humanities would profit from 
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being able to mobilize methodological tools typically employed in the study of animal behavior 
and cognition and, in turn, re-signify them.  
With a keen eye on the usages and misusages of the quantitative, but setting any 
methodological insularity aside, humanities should fully claim this realm. The main reason for it 
resides in the fact that, although qualitative studies can be systematic, quantitative studies better 
capture patterns of behavior and interactions, especially in the case of non-verbal beings. 
Patterning is crucial to fathom the meaning of actions. Instead of adopting a defensive position 
toward typical objects of other sciences, position better understood in the context of a reputation 
and funding drain toward natural and biological sciences, humanities would largely gain from 
developing the expertise required to operationalize such objects and methods. Deep conceptual 
understanding of an object (or subject) does not equal competency in mobilizing the tools an object 
provides. This is vital in order to re-elaborate these tools under the light of values that are crucial 
to a given academic culture, or perhaps, in order to cultivate new values along the way.  
At last, we should consider the role of Science and Technology Studies (STS) in such 
adventure. STS, as a meta-analysis of science, has an important role to play in the founding of new 
sciences. First and foremost, it has long pointed out that interdisciplinarity is but a pretty, fund-
catching word, achievable in practice with much difficulty. The second point, however, bring us 
closer to solutions; by studying such paradigms and making them explicit, the ultimate values at 
stake for actors become clear enough to allow the problematization of one’s own socialization into 
an academic culture. The third point brings us to what perhaps could be considered the rewards 
for STS scholars working in related topics to venture in such endeavor: the science of complex 
socio-cognitive beings cannot be produced without considering the feedback loop of these same 
beings in science making. Therefore, when considering anthropology in general, the same 
argument applies. Only an exploration grounded in an expertise of animal behavior on an empirical 
level is capable of revealing the animal perspective of what we humans call science making. 
Whereas seeds have been planted, this is a project yet to mature.  
Overall, these crossings point at the need to legitimize new developments in each of these 
fields, and to legitimize fields in the eyes of neighboring disciplines. Legitimation in the sense 
employed here means a common exploration of the world. In this process, the conceptual and 
methodological developments in one discipline go hand in hand with that of the significant others. 
The process of creating disciplinary significant others is not straightforward for there is a 
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difference between talking about a field, or looking at it; and making science in conjunction with 
this field. In the end, this is a skill perhaps better developed when submitting researchers through 
somewhat painful double bind experiences where one must fully take into account two valid modus 
operandi that appear irreconcilable. There is no arguing from an “outside”, only arguing from a 
“within”. Except that, in this case, the within is the way out of the double bind, which must be 
created.  
 Ultimately, the blurring of the boundaries between disciplines will lead us to legitimize 
some uncanny, eerie arrangements popping up everywhere, namely, a primatology of human 
beings instead of human species; a sociocultural anthropology of nonhuman primates; and an 
animalcentric Science and Technology Studies. Concretely, we need a vision and we need goals. 
While goals are tangible steps measurable and achievable, a vision is an intangible ideal carried 
out generation after generation. As for our goals, ideally, we should strengthen and multiply 
creative collaborative networks to be able to produce new scientific objects and address existing 
ones. As a second step, it is imperative to form a new generation of researchers under two different 
(sometimes competing) traditions and provide training and access to multiple methodologies. 
Thirdly, it is important to strengthen and multiply institutional venues (courses, conferences, 
bilateral programs, double certifications, training, publishing venues, outreach venues, centers and 
so on).  
 Following, we shall confront the most difficult task, that is, harnessing funding from local 
institutions and major funding agencies for long-term programs (e.g., ERC grants of the European 
Union). At last, we should grow a support system to groom current and next generations and foster 
talent, in particular, by implementing affirmative actions to support students of vulnerable 
backgrounds (i.e., attending to gender, economic position, ethnicity, and so on). In such way, we 
may promote a better access to science as a profession and, at the same time, enrich science making 
with different social experiences. These are goals that can only be reached in the long run, likely, 
in many decades, yet, co-joint efforts will potentialize the result.  
However, as a kick off action supporting this plan, I would like to point out the creation of 
the first encyclopedia on cross-cultural human-chimpanzee social interaction. The encyclopedia is 
intended to be released as an applied audio-visual methodological guide to study interspecies 
socialization. This funded project, to be pursued in the coming years, will be conducted by the 
author in collaboration with Dr. Catherine Hobaiter and colleagues. Hopefully, the output will be 
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a resource for researchers of various disciplines to mobilize tools and concepts from different 
disciplines to tailor their own research projects in interspecies related topics.  
Empirically, this work will be the result of a comparative research conducted at different 
institutions studying captive chimpanzees around the world. Methodologically speaking, the 
project integrates and re-elaborates multiple methods, making use of multi-sited ethnography, 
participant observation, surveys, interviews, visual methods, interaction-time comparisons, 
ethological observations, microanalysis of behavior, focal and scan sampling, compilation of 
activity budgets and, at last, quasi-experiments of human-chimpanzee interaction to support the 
observational work. Further in the future, a similar project should envisage wild settings. Year by 
year, we expect to produce and bring together worldwide clusters of researchers in primatology, 
sociocultural anthropology and STS around the topic of interspecies socialization (i.e., 
Homo→Pan, Pan→Homo, Homo x Pan); as a first step.  
Although ambitious, this endeavor will not be conducted individually but as a collective 
enterprise based on perceived common goals; to which an individual can serve only as a catalyst. 
In practice, Pan-Homo social relationships constitute a privileged object in the understanding of 
the radical otherness, of natures-cultures, and of evolution. However, such an object may perhaps 
be only fully grasped through a vision that goes beyond the object per se. That is, the vision that 
we should profoundly re-conceptualize the ways in which we make science.  
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Appendix 
 
Great Ape Information Network 
Chimpanzees’ Registration Number 
 
 
Chimpanzee 
 
 
GAIN Nr 
 
Subspecies 
 
Name origin and pronunciation 
Ai 0434 P.t. verus Means ‘Love’ in Japanese 
Pronounced “eye” in English 
Akira 0435 P.t. verus  
 
Ayumu 0608 P. t. verus Means ‘to walk’ in Japanese 
Pronounced “eye-you-moo” 
Chloe 0441 
(EAZA Nr 11892) 
P. t. verus Typical French name written as Chloé 
Called “Kuroe” in Japanese 
Cleo 0609 P. t. verus Called “Kureo” in Japanese 
Also called by her nickname “Coo” 
Gon 0437 P. t. verus  
 
Mari 0274 P.t. verus  
 
Pal 0611 P.t. verus Pal as in English 
Pronounced “Paru” in Japanese 
Pan 0440 P.t. verus 
 
Pronounced ‘pun’ in English 
Pendesa 0095 Hybrid 
 
Means ‘lovely’ in Swahili 
Pico † 0662 P.t. verus 
 
Pronounced “pee-coo” 
Popo 0438 
 
P.t. verus From tanpopo meaning ‘dandelion’ in Japanese 
Puchi † 0436 P.t. verus Japanese pronunciation of petit 
Pronounced “poo-chee” 
Reiko † 0432 
 
P.t. verus From reichōrui meaning ‘primate’ in Japanese 
Reo 0439 P.t. verus  
 
 
Source: GAIN database https://shigen.nig.ac.jp/gain/ 
 
 
Obs: By tradition, the offspring’s name begins with the first letter of the mother’s name 
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Glossary and Acronyms 
 
GENERAL TERMS 
 
AFFILIATIVE: Relative to the strengthening of bonds between individuals 
 
AGONISTIC: Related to fighting (e.g., aggression or conciliation) 
 
ALLOPATRIC: Occurring in separate geographical areas (cf. sympatric) 
 
CONSPECIFIC: Belonging to the same species  
 
EPISTEMOLOGY: Theory of knowledge 
 
HUSBANDRY: Care, management and breeding of nonhuman animals 
 
INTERSPECIFIC: Between species 
 
INTRASPECIFIC: Within species 
 
ONTOGENETIC/ONTOGENY: Related to the development of an organism (cf. ontology) 
 
ONTOLOGY: Socially learned modes of relationship with nonhuman entities (cf. ontogeny) 
 
PANT-HOOT: Chimpanzees’ long distance, contact call (see Nishida et al. 2010) 
 
PARADIGM: A set of theories and methods but also values and worldview in science (sensu 
Kuhn 1970) 
 
PHYLOGENETIC: Related to the evolutionary history of an organism 
 
SYMPATRIC: Occurring in overlapping geographical areas (cf. allopatric) 
 
TAXON/ TAXA (pl.): Group of organisms 
 
 
TAXONOMY 
 
 
GREAT APES: Humans, chimpanzees (Africa), bonobos (Africa), gorillas (Africa) and 
orangutans (Asia) 
 
LESSER APES: Gibbons (Asia) 
 
NEW WORLD MONKEYS: Occupy mostly tropical regions of the American continent  
(e.g., capuchins and marmosets) 
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OLD WORLD MONKEYS: Occupy mostly Africa, South and East Asia  
(e.g., baboons and macaques) 
 
SP:  species  
 
SPP:  plural of species  
 
SSPP: subspecies  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
 
 
CENTER FOR HUMAN EVOLUTION MODELING RESEARCH: Center responsible for 
keepers and veterinary personnel; In Japanese, jinrui shinka moderu kenkyū sentā人類進化モデ
ル研究センター (cf. Language and Intelligence) 
 
KEEPERS: Caretakers mainly responsible for chimpanzees’ care (cf. research personnel) 
 
KUPRI: Kyoto University - Primate Research Institute (i.e., PRI); In Japanese, Kyōto Daigaku 
Rēchōrui Kenkyūjyo 京都大学霊長類研究所 
 
PERSONNEL: Refers to all those involved in chimpanzee research and care 
 
PRI: Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University (i.e., KUPRI) 
 
RESEARCH PERSONNEL: Professors, post-docs, graduate students and research assistants 
(cf. keepers) 
 
SECTION OF LANGUAGE AND INTELLIGENCE: Section at PRI responsible for 
chimpanzee research; formed of professors, students and technicians. In Japanese, shikō gengō 
bunya 思考言語分野 (cf. center)  
 
 
LANGUAGE 
 
SAN: Used after a person’s surname as an honorific in Japanese, it translates as Mr., Mrs., Miss 
or Ms. 
 
SENPAI: Refers to one’s senior in a professional category (e.g., senior student) 
SENSEI/ SENSĒ: Used after a person’s surname as an honorific in Japanese, it generally means 
professor, teacher or master 
366
References 
 
Addessi, Elsa, Alessandra Mancini, Lara Crescimbene, Camillo Padoa-Schioppa, and Elisabetta 
Visalberghi. “Preference Transitivity and Symbolic Representation in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus 
Apella).” PloS One 3, no. 6 (January 2008): e2414. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002414. 
Alcayna-Stevens, Lys. “Habituating Field Scientists.” Social Studies of Science 46, no. 6 (2016): 
833–53. doi:10.1177/0306312716669251. 
———. “Inalienable Worlds: Inter-Species Relations, Perspectives and ‘Doublethink’ in a 
Catalonian Chimpanzee Sanctuary.” Cambridge Anthropology 30, no. 2 (2012): 82–100. 
doi:10.3167/ca.2012.300206. 
———. “In the Shadow of Man: An Exploration of Pan-Human Perspectives in a Catalonian 
Chimpanzee Sanctuary.” The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology 28, no. 1 (2008): 1–33. 
Allen, Colin, and Marc Bekoff. Species of Mind. The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive 
Ethology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997. 
Anderson, James R. “A Primatological Perspective on Death.” American Journal of Primatology 
73, no. 5 (2011): 410–14. doi:10.1002/ajp.20922. 
Anderson, James R., Alasdair Gillies, and Louise C. Lock. “Pan Thanatology.” Current Biology 
20, no. 8 (2010): 349–51. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2010.02.010. 
APA. Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association. 6th ed. Washington DC: 
American Psychology Association, 2010. 
Asano, Toshio, Tetsuya Kojima, Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Kisou Kubota, and Kiyoko Murofushi. 
“Object and Color Naming in Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes).” Proceedings of the Japan 
Academy. Series B: Physical and Biological Sciences 58 (1982): 118–22. doi:10.2183/pjab.58.118. 
Asano, Toshio, and Kyonori Kumazaki. “Chinpanjī ni Okeru Tentō o Yobi Shōtō Operanto [Self 
Initiated Regulation of the Room Light by a Chimpanzee].” The Annual of Animal Psychology 25 
(1975): 35–42. [Title translated by the authors] 
Asquith, Pamela. “Of Bonds and Boundaries: What Is the Modern Role of Anthropomorphism in 
Primatological Studies?” American Journal of Primatology 73, no. 3 (2011): 238–44. 
doi:10.1002/ajp.20832.  
———. “Negotiating Science: Internationalization and Japanese Primatology.” In Primate 
Encounters. Models of Science, Gender and Society., edited by Shirley Strum and Linda M. 
Fedigan, 165–83. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000. 
———. “Some Aspects of Anthropomorphism in the Terminology and Philosophy Underlying 
Western and Japanese Studies of the Social Behaviour of Non-Human Primates [Thesis]” 
University of Oxford, 1981. 
Bailey, Jarrod, and Katy Taylor. “Non-Human Primates in Neuroscience Research: The Case 
Against Its Scientific Necessity.” ATLA 44 (2016): 43–69. 
367
Ban, Simone D., Christophe Boesch, Antoine N’Guessan, Eliezer Kouakou N’Goran, Antoine 
Tako, and Karline R.L. Janmaat. “Taï Chimpanzees Change Their Travel Direction for Rare 
Feeding Trees Providing Fatty Fruits.” Animal Behaviour 118 (2016): 135–47. 
doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.05.014. 
Bard, Kim A. “Primate Parenting.” In Handbook of Parenting. Volume 2. Biology and Ecology of 
Parenting, edited by Marc H. Bornstein, 2nd ed., 99–140. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2002. 
Bard, Kim A, Masako Myowa-Yamakoshi, Masaki Tomonaga, Masayuki Tanaka, Alan Costall, 
and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Group Differences in the Mutual Gaze of Chimpanzees (Pan 
Troglodytes).” Developmental Psychology 41, no. 4 (2005): 616–24. doi:10.1037/0012-
1649.41.4.616. 
Barrows, Edward M. Animal Behavior Desk Reference. A Dictionary of Animal Behavior, 
Ecology and Evolution. 3rd ed. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011. 
Bateson, Gregory. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, 
Evolution, and Epistemology. San Francisco: University of Chicago Press, 1972. 
Bauman, John E. “Observations on the Strength of the Chimpanzee and Its Implications.” 
American Society of Mammalogists 7, no. 1 (1926): 1–9. 
———. “The Strength of the Chimpanzee and Orang.” The Scientific Monthly 16, no. 4 (1923): 
432–39. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 
Becker, Clemens, Zjef Pereboom, Frands Carlsen, and Frank Rietkerk. EAZA Great Ape TAG 
Annual Report 2007-2008. European Association of Zoos and Aquaria. 
http://eaza.portal.isis.org/about/Pages/Key%20Documents.aspx, 2007. 
Beran, Michael J. “Chimpanzee Cognitive Control.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 
24, no. 5 (2015): 352–357. doi:10.1177/0963721415593897. 
Berque, Augustin. Le Sauvage et L’artifice. Les Japonais Devant la Nature [The Wilderness and 
the Artifice. When Japanese Meeet Nature]. Paris: Gallimard, 1986. [Title translated by Daly] 
Biro, Dora. “Chimpanzee Mothers Carry the Mummified Remains of Their Dead Infants: Three 
Case Reports from Bossou.” In The Chimpanzees of Bossou and Nimba, edited by Tetsuro 
Matsuzawa, Yukimaru Sugiyama, and Tatyana Humle, 241–50. Tokyo: Springer, 2011. 
Blough, Donald S. “Experiments in Animal Psychophysics.” Scientific American 205 (1961): 
113–22. 
Boesch, Christophe. “Is Culture a Golden Barrier between Human and Chimpanzee?” 
Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews 12, no. 2 (April 7, 2003): 82–91. 
doi:10.1002/evan.10106. 
368
Bryson-Morrison, Nicola, Joseph Tzanopoulos, Tetsuro Matsuzawa, and Tatyana Humle. 
“Activity and Habitat Use of Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes Verus) in the Anthropogenic 
Landscape of Bossou, Guinea, West Africa.” International Journal of Primatology 38, no. 2 (2017): 
282–302. doi:10.1007/s10764-016-9947-4. 
Call, Josep, and Michael Tomasello. “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years 
Later.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12, no. 5 (2008): 187–92. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010. 
Callon, Michel. “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation. Domestication of the Scallops and 
the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay.” In The Science Studies Reader, edited by Mario Biagioli, 67–
83. Routledge, 1999. 
Campbell, M. W., and F. B. M. de Waal. “Chimpanzees Empathize with Group Mates and Humans, 
but Not with Baboons or Unfamiliar Chimpanzees.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences 281, no. 1782 (2014): 1–6. doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.0013. 
Carr, Neil, and Scott Cohen. “The Public Face of Zoos: Images of Entertainment, Education and 
Conservation.” Anthrozoos 24, no. 2 (2011): 175–89. doi:10.2752/175303711X12998632257620. 
Carvalho, Susana, Yumi Yamanashi, Gen Yamakoshi, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Bird in the Hand : 
Bossou Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes) Capture West African Wood-Owls (Ciccaba Woodfordi) 
but Not to Eat.” Pan Africa News 17, no. 1 (2010): 6–9. 
Castro, Eduardo Viveiros de. “O Nativo Relativo.” Mana 8, no. 1 (2002): 113–48. [For translation, 
see Castro 2013] 
———. “Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation.” Tipití: Journal 
of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America 2, no. 1 (2004): 3–22. 
Castro, Eduardo Viveiros De. “Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism.” Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute 4 (1998): 469–88. 
———. “Os Pronomes Cosmológicos e o Perspectivismo Ameríndio.” Mana 2, no. 2 (1996): 115–
44. [For translation, see Castro 1998] 
———. “The Relative Native. Translated by Julia Sauma and Martin Holbraad.” HAU: Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory 3, no. 3 (2013): 469–502. 
Cavalieri, Paola, and Peter Singer, eds. The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 
CBC. “Ayumu no O-Yome-San Kōho Kureo no Oitachi wa to wa? [How Was the Upbringing of 
Cleo, Ayumu’s Bride Candidate?].” Chubu Nippon Broadcasting. TV program, 11m26. Aired July 
5, 2013. http://hicbc.com/tv/movie/archive/pri-bride/, 2013. [Title translated by Daly] 
———. “Chinpanjī Ai. CBC Terebi de no Ākaibu [Chimpanzee Ai. In the CBC TV Archives].” 
http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ai/ja/news/cbc.html, 2017. [Title translated by Daly] 
Chalmers, Iain. “People Are ‘Participants’ in Research. Further Suggestions for Other Terms to 
Describe ‘Participants’ Are Needed.” British Medical Journal 318, no. 7191 (1999): 1141. 
369
Cibot, Marie, Sarah Bortolamiol, Andrew Seguya, and Sabrina Krief. “Chimpanzees Facing a 
Dangerous Situation: A High-Traffic Asphalted Road in the Sebitoli Area of Kibale National Park, 
Uganda.” American Journal of Primatology 77, no. 8 (2015): 890–900. doi:10.1002/ajp.22417. 
CITES. Appendices I, II and III. Accessed February 7, 2017, 
https://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php, 2017. 
———. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 
Accessed February 7, 2017, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php, 1973. 
———. “List of Contracting Parties.” Accessed February 3, 2017, 
https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php, 2017. 
Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58, no. I (1998): 7–19. 
Coe, Jon C. “Design and Perception: Making the Zoo Experience Real.” Zoo Biology 4, no. 2 
(1985): 197–208. doi:10.1002/zoo.1430040211. 
Coleman, Kristine, and Peter J Pierre. “Assessing Anxiety in Nonhuman Primates.” Institute for 
Laboratory Animal Research Journal 55, no. 2 (2014): 333–46. doi:10.1093/ilar/ilu019. 
Cook, Peter, and Margaret Wilson. “Do Young Chimpanzees Have Extraordinary Working 
Memory?” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 17, no. 4 (2010): 599–600. 
doi:10.3758/PBR.17.4.599. 
Cook, S., and Geoffrey R. Hosey. “Interaction Sequences between Chimpanzees and Human 
Visitors at the Zoo.” Zoo Biology 14, no. 5 (1995): 431–40. doi:10.1002/zoo.1430140505. 
Cowan, Nelson. “What Are the Differences between Long-Term, Short-Term, and Working 
Memory?” Progress in Brain Research 169 (2008): 323–38. doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(07)00020-
9. 
Dahl, Christoph D., Malte J. Rasch, Masaki Tomonaga, and Ikuma Adachi. “Developmental 
Processes in Face Perception.” Scientific Reports 3, no. 1044 (2013): 1–6. doi:10.1038/srep01044. 
Daly Bezerra de Melo, Gabriela. “Nature and Culture Intertwined or Redefined? On the Challenges 
of Cultural Primatology and Sociocultural Anthropology.” Revue de Primatologie, no. 4 (2012): 
http://primatologie.revues.org/1020. doi:10.4000/primatologie.1020. 
Deely, John. “Semiotics and Jakob von Uexküll’s Concept of Umwelt,” 2004. 
DeLoache, Judy S. “Becoming Symbol-Minded.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, no. 2 (2004): 
66–70. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.004. 
Descola, Philippe. “All Too Human (Still): A Comment on Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think.” 
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4, no. 2 (2014): 267–73. doi:10.14318/hau4.2.015. 
———. Beyond Nature and Culture. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
———. Par-Delà Nature et Culture. Paris: Gallimard, 2005. [For translation, see Descola 2014] 
370
Despret, Vinciane. Que Diraient les Animaux, Si... on Leur Posait les Bonnes Questions? [What 
Would Animals Tell Us if We Asked Them Better Questions?] Paris: La Découverte, 2014. [Title 
translated by Daly] 
———. “The Becomings of Subjectivity in Animal Worlds.” Subjectivity 23, no. 1 (2008): 123–
139. doi:10.1057/sub.2008.15. 
Diogo, Rui, Julia L Molnar, and Bernard Wood. “Bonobo Anatomy Reveals Stasis and Mosaicism 
in Chimpanzee Evolution, and Supports Bonobos as the Most Appropriate Extant Model for the 
Common Ancestor of Chimpanzees and Humans.” Scientific Reports 608 (2017): 1–8. 
doi:10.1038/s41598-017-00548-3. 
EAZA. EAZA Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria. 
European Association of Zoos and Aquaria. 
http://eaza.portal.isis.org/about/Pages/Key%20Documents.aspx, 2014. 
“Ecosofia. Shizen to Ningen o Tsunagumono [Ecosophia. Culture in Nature: Nature in Culture]” 
5 (2000). [Title translated by the publisher] 
Ely, John J., Brent Dye, William I. Frels, Jo Fritz, Pascal Gagneux, Henry H. Khun, William M. 
Switzer, and D. Rick Lee. “Subspecies Composition and Founder Contribution of the Captive U.S. 
Chimpanzee (Pan Troglodytes) Population.” American Journal of Primatology 67 (2005): 223–41. 
doi:10.1002/ajp.20179. 
Fairbanks, Lynn. “The Nurture Assumptions: Things Your Mother Never Told You. [Abstract].” 
American Journal of Primatology 51, no. Supplement I (2000): 23. 
Fausto, Carlos. “Feasting on People: Eating Animals and Humans in Amazonia.” Current 
Anthropology 48, no. 4 (2007): 497–530. doi:10.1086/518298 
Fragaszy, Dorothy. “Making Space for Traditions.” Evolutionary Anthropology 12, no. 2 (2003): 
61–70. doi:10.1002/evan.10104. 
Frankowsky, Maximilian, and Dan Ke. “Humanness and Classifiers in Mandarin Chinese.” 
Language and Cognitive Science 2, no. 1 (2016): 55−67. doi:10.17923/LCS201602003. 
Freeman, Hani D., and Stephen R. Ross. “The Impact of Atypical Early Histories on Pet or 
Performer Chimpanzees.” PeerJ 2 (2014): 1–16. doi:10.7717/peerj.579. 
Freivalds, Rūsiņš. “Learning by Eliminating.” In Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning, edited 
by Norbert M. Seel, 1825–26. New York: Springer, 2012. 
Fuentes, Agustin. “Ethnoprimatology and the Anthropology of the Human-Primate Interface.” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 41, no. 1 (2012): 101–17. doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-092611-
145808. 
Futagi, Yasuyuki, Yasuhisa Toribe, and Yasuhiro Suzuki. “The Grasp Reflex and Moro Reflex in 
Infants: Hierarchy of Primitive Reflex Responses.” International Journal of Pediatrics, 2012, 1–
10. doi:10.1155/2012/191562. 
371
GAIN. Great Ape Information Network. Accessed February 4, 2017, 
https://shigen.nig.ac.jp/gain/index.jsp. 
Gardner, Beatrix T., and R. Allen Gardner. “Signs of Intelligence in Cross-Fostered Chimpanzees.” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 308, no. 1135 (1985): 
159–76. doi:10.1098/rstb.1985.0017. 
Gardner, R. Allen, and Beatrice T. Gardner. “Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee.” Science 
165, no. 3894 (1969): 664–72. 
Gibson, James J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. New York, Hove: Psychology 
Press, 1986. 
Giere, Ronald N. “Discussion Note: Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures.” Philosophy of 
Science 69, no. 4 (2002): 637–44. 
Gieryn, Thomas F. “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains 
and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists.” American Sociological Review 48, no. 6 
(1983): 781–95. 
Gil, David. “The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Numeral Classifiers.” Leipzig: Max 
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Accessed July 17, 2017. 
http://wals.info/chapter/55, 2013. 
Gilbert, Daniel T., Gary King, Stephen Pettigrew, and Timothy D. Wilson. “Comment on 
‘Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science’.” Science 351, no. 6277 (2016): 1037. 
doi:10.1126/science.aad7243. 
Glasersfeld, Ernst von. “Linguistic Communication: Theory and Definition.” In Language 
Learning by a Chimpanzee. The LANA Project., edited by Duane M. Rumbaugh, 55–71. New 
York, San Franscisco, London, 1977. 
Gonder, Mary Katherine, Sabrina Locatelli, Lora Ghobrial, Matthew W. Mitchell, Joseph T. 
Kujawski, Felix J. Lankester, Caro-Beth Stewart, and Sarah A. Tishkoff. “Evidence from 
Cameroon Reveals Differences in the Genetic Structure and Histories of Chimpanzee Populations.” 
PNAS 108, no. 12 (2011): 4766–71. doi:10.1073/pnas.1015422108. 
Goodall, Jane. “Foreword.” In Cognitive Development in Chimpanzees, edited by Tetsuro 
Matsuzawa, Masaki Tomonaga, and Masayuki Tanaka, v–vi. Tokyo: Springer, 2006. 
Greenfield, Patricia Marks, Karen Nelson, and Elliot Saltzman. “The Development of Rulebound 
Strategies for Manipulating Seriated Cups: A Parallel between Action and Grammar.” Cognitive 
Psychology 3, no. 2 (1972): 291–310. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90009-6. 
Gron, Kurt. “Primate Factsheets: Japanese Macaque (Macaca Fuscata) Taxonomy, Morphology, 
& Ecology.” National Primate Research Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
http://pin.primate.wisc.edu/factsheets/entry/japanese_macaque, 2007. 
372
Haddad, William A., Ryan R. Reisinger, Tristan Scott Martha, and P. J. Nico De Bruyn. “Multiple 
Occurrences of King Penguin (Aptenodytes Patagonicus) Sexual Harassment by Antarctic Fur 
Seals (Arctocephalus Gazella).” Polar Biology 38, no. 5 (2015): 741–746. doi:10.1007/s00300-
014-1618-3. 
Haraway, Donna Jeanne. Primate Visions. Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science. London: Routledge, 1989. 
Hare, Brian, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. “Do Chimpanzees Know What Conspecifics 
Know?” Animal Behaviour 61, no. 1 (2001): 139–51. doi:10.1006/anbe.2000.1518. 
Hayakawa, Takashi, Tohru Sugawara, Yasuhiro Go, Toshifumi Udono, Hirohisa Hirai, and Hiroo 
Imai. “Eco-Geographical Diversification of Bitter Taste Receptor Genes (TAS2Rs) among 
Subspecies of Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes).” PLoS One 7, no. 8 (2012): 1–10. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0043277. 
Hayashi, Misato. “A New Notation System of Object Manipulation in the Nesting-Cup Task for 
Chimpanzees and Humans.” Cortex, no. 23 (2007): 308–18. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70457-
X 
Hayashi, Misato, Yoko Sakuraba, Shohei Watanabe, Akihisa Kaneko, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. 
“Behavioral Recovery from Tetraparesis in a Captive Chimpanzee.” Primates 54, no. 3 (2013): 
237–43. doi:10.1007/s10329-013-0358-2. 
Hayashi, Misato, Hideko Takeshita, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Cognitive Development in Apes 
and Humans Assessed by Object Manipulation.” In Cognitive Development in Chimpanzees, 
edited by Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Masaki Tomonaga, and Masayuki Tanaka, 395–410. Tokyo: 
Springer, 2006. 
Heath, Martin. “The Training of Cynomolgus Monkeys and How the Human/animal Relationship 
Improves with Environmental and Mental Enrichment.” Animal Technology 40 (1989): 11–22. 
Hegedus, Chris, and Donn Alan Pennebaker. Unlocking the Cage. United States: 1h31m. 
Pennebaker Hegedus Films, 2016. 
Hilliard, Julia. “Monkey B Virus.” In Human Herpesviruses: Biology, Therapy, and 
Immunoprophylaxis, edited by Ann Arvin, Gabriella Campadelli-Fiume, Edward Mocarski, 
Patrick S. Moore, Bernard Roizman, Richard Whitley, and Koichi Yamanishi, 1031–42. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Hillix, William A., and Duane M. Rumbaugh. Animal Bodies, Human Minds. Ape, Dolphin, and 
Parrot Language Skills. New York: Springer, 2004. 
Hirasaki, Eishi, Naomichi Ogihara, Yuzuru Hamada, Hiroo Kumakura, and Masato Nakatsukasa. 
“Do Highly Trained Monkeys Walk like Humans? A Kinematic Study of Bipedal Locomotion in 
Bipedally Trained Japanese Macaques.” Journal of Human Evolution 46, no. 6 (2004): 739–50. 
doi:10.1016/j.jhevol.2004.04.004. 
373
Hirata, Satoshi. “Chimpanzee Learning and Transmission of Tool Use to Fish for Honey.” In 
Cognitive Development in Chimpanzees, edited by Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Masaki Tomonaga, and 
Masayuki Tanaka, 201–13. Tokyo: Sprinnger, 2006. 
Hirata, Satoshi, Hirohisa Hirai, Etsuko Nogami, Naruki Morimura, and Toshifumi Udono. 
“Chimpanzee Down Syndrome: A Case Study of Trisomy 22 in a Captive Chimpanzee.” Primates 
58, no. 2 (2017): 267–73. doi:10.1007/s10329-017-0597-8. 
Hirata, Satoshi, and Yuu Mizuno. “Animal Toying.” In The Chimpanzees of Bossou and Nimba, 
edited by Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Tatyana Humle, and Yukimaru Sugiyama, 137–41. Tokyo: Springer, 
2011. 
Hirata, Satoshi, Kunio Watanabe, and Masao Kawai. “‘Sweet Potato Washing’ revisited.” In 
Primate Origins of Human Cognition and Behavior, edited by Tetsuro Matsuzawa, 487–508. Hong 
Kong: Springer, 2008. 
Hirata, Satoshi, Gen Yamakoshi, Shiho Fujita, Gaku Ohashi, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Capturing 
and Toying with Hyraxes (Dendrohyrax Dorsalis) by Wild Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes) at 
Bossou, Guinea.” American Journal of Primatology 53 (2001): 93–97. 
Hobaiter, Catherine, Liran Samuni, Caroline Mullins, Walter John Akankwasa, and Klaus 
Zuberbühler. “Variation in Hunting Behaviour in Neighbouring Chimpanzee Communities in the 
Budongo Forest, Uganda.” PLoS One 12, no. 6 (2017): 1–17. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0178065. 
Hockings, Kimberley, and Tatyana Humle. Best Pratice Guidelines for the Prevention and 
Mitigation of Conflict between Human and Great Apes. Gland: IUCN/SSC/Primate Specialist 
Group (PSG), 2009. 
Hockings, Kimberley J. “Behavioral Flexibility and Division of Roles in Chimpanzee Road-
Crossing.” In The Chimpanzees of Bossou and Nimba, edited by Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Tatyana 
Humle, and Yukimaru Sugiyama, 221–29. Tokyo: Springer, 2011. 
Hockings, Kimberley J., James R. Anderson, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Road Crossing in 
Chimpanzees: A Risky Business.” Current Biology 16, no. 17 (2006): 668–70. 
Hockings, Kimberley J., and Claudia Sousa. “Human-Chimpanzee Sympatry and Interactions in 
Cantanhez National Park, Guinea-Bissau: Current Research and Future Directions.” Primate 
Conservation 26, no. 1 (2013): 57–65. doi:10.1896/052.026.0104. 
Hockings, Kimberley J., Gen Yamakoshi, Asami Kabasawa, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Attacks on 
Local Persons by Chimpanzees in Bossou, Republic of Guinea: Long-Term Perspectives.” 
American Journal of Primatology 72, no. 10 (2010): 887–96. doi:10.1002/ajp.20784. 
Hopkins, William D., Jamie L Russell, and Jennifer A. Schaeffer. “The Neural and Cognitive 
Correlates of Aimed Throwing in Chimpanzees: A Magnetic Resonance Image and Behavioural 
Study on a Unique Form of Social Tool Use.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 
367 (2012): 37–47. doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0195. 
374
Hoppitt, William J. E., Gillian R. Brown, Rachel Kendal, Luke Rendell, Alex Thornton, Mike M. 
Webster, and Kevin N. Laland. “Lessons from Animal Teaching.” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 
23, no. 9 (2008): 486–93. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2008.05.008. 
Hornborg, Alf. “Animism, Fetishism, and Objectivism as Strategies for Knowing (or Not 
Knowing) the World.” Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 71, no. 1 (2006): 21–32. 
doi:10.1080/00141840600603129. 
Houdart, Sophie. La Cours des Miracles. Ethnologie d’un Laboratoire Japonais [The Court of 
Miracles. Ethnology of a Japanese Laboratory]. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2007. [Title translated by 
Daly] 
Hutchins, Edwin. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995. 
———. “Cognitive Artifacts.” In The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, edited by 
Robert Wilson and Frank Keil, 126–128. Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
———. “The Distributed Cognition Perspective on Human Interaction.” In Roots of Human 
Sociality. Culture, Cognition and Interaction, edited by Stephen Levinson and Nicholas Enfield, 
375–398. Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006. 
———. “The Role of Cultural Practices in the Emergence of Modern Human Intelligence.” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 363, no. 
1499 (2008): 2011–19. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0003. 
Hvilsom, Christina, Peter Frandsen, Claus Børsting, Frands Carlsen, Bettina Sallé, Bo Thisted 
Simonsen, and Hans Redlef Siegismund. “Understanding Geographic Origins and History of 
Admixture among Chimpanzees in European Zoos, with Implications for Future Breeding 
Programmes.” Heredity 110 (2013): 586–93. doi:10.1038/hdy.2013.9. 
IJzendoorn, Marinus H van, Kim A Bard, Marian J Bakermans-Kranenburg, and Krisztina Ivan. 
“Enhancement of Attachment and Cognitive Development of Young Nursery-Reared 
Chimpanzees in Responsive Versus Standard Care.” Developmental Psychobiology 51, no. 2 
(2008): 173–85. doi:10.1002/dev.20356. 
Illif, Susan A. “An Additional ‘R’: Remembering the Animals.” Institute for Laboratory Animal 
Research Journal 43, no. 1 (2002): 38–47. 
Ingold, Tim. “Humanity and Animality.” In A Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology, edited 
by Tim Ingold, 1994. 
Inoue, Sana, and Tetsuro Matsuzawa. “Working Memory of Numerals in Chimpanzees.” Current 
Biology 17, no. 23 (2007): 1004–5. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.10.027. 
Izar, Patricia, Michele P Verderane, Elisabetta Visalberghi, Eduardo B. Ottoni, Marino Gomes De 
Oliveira, Jeanne Shirley, and Dorothy Fragaszy. “Cross-Genus Adoption of a Marmoset 
(Callithrix Jacchus) by Wild Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus Libidinosus): Case Report.” American 
Journal of Primatology 68, no. 7 (2006): 692–700. doi:10.1002/ajp.20259. 
375
Jensen, Casper Bruun, and Anders Blok. “Techno-Animism in Japan: Shinto Cosmograms, Actor-
Network Theory, and the Enabling Powers of Non-Human Agencies.” Theory, Culture & Society 
30, no. 2 (2013): 84–115. 
John, Gurdon. “Open Letter. Primate Research Is Crucial If We Are to Find Cures for Diseases 
like Parkinson’s.” The guardian. Retrieved September 23, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/13/primate-research-is-crucial-if-we-are-to-find-
cures-for-diseases-like-parkinsons, 2016. 
Johnson, Christine M., and San Diego. “Observing Cognitive Complexity in Primates and 
Cetaceans.” International Journal 23 (2010): 587–624. doi:10.1016/j.jebdp.2005.01.020. 
“Kagaku [Science Journal KAGAKU].” 78, no. 6 (2008). [Title translated by the publisher] 
Kakinuma, Miki. “Development of Captive Chimpanzees at Tama Zoological Park: 15 Years of 
Observation with Focus on Mother-Infant Relationship.” The Japanese Journal of Animal 
Psychology 66, no. 1 (2016): 39–45. doi:10.2502/janip.66.1.9. 
Kakinuma, Miki, Hitoshi Hatakeyama, Asami Tsuchida, and Kayoko Uemura. “Shiikuka 
Chinpanjī No Kosodate Kon’nan : Jinkō Hoiku Wa Kaihi Kanō Ka [Difficulties Chimpanzee 
Mothers under Captivities Face in Providing Maternal Care: Early Maternal Separation or Social 
Deprivation Are Not the Only Reason].” Bulletin of the Nippon Veterinary and Life Science 
University 56 (2007): 28–35. [Title translated by the authors] 
Kalland, Arne, and Pamela Asquith. “Japanese Perceptions of Nature. Ideals and Illusions.” In 
Japanese Images of Nature. Cultural Perspectives., edited by Pamela Asquith and Arne Kalland, 
1–35. Richmon Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997. 
Kawai, Masao. “Newly-Acquired Pre-Cultural Behavior of the Natural Troop of Japanese 
Monkeys on Koshima Islet.” Primates 6, no. 1 (1965): 1–30. 
King, Barbara J. “Towards an Ethnography of African Great Apes.” Social Anthropology 12, no. 
2 (2004): 195–207. doi:10.1017/S096402820400028X. 
Kirksey, S. Eben, and S. Helmreich. “The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnography.” Cultural 
Anthropology 25, no. 4 (2010): 545–76. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2010.01069.x. 
Knorr Cetina, Karin. Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Köhler, Wolfgang. Intelligenzprüfungen and Menschenaffen. Mit einem Anhang zur Psychologie 
des Schimpansen [The Mentality of Apes]. 3rd ed. Berlin: Springer, 1973. [Title translated by the 
publisher] 
Kohn, Eduardo. How Forests Think. Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2013. 
376
Kret, Mariska E., and Masaki Tomonaga. “Getting to the Bottom of Face Processing. Species-
Specific Inversion Effects for Faces and Behinds in Humans and Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes).” 
PloS One 11 (2016): 1–13. doi:10.7910/DVN/Z82LIO.Funding. 
Krief, Sabrina, Marie Cibot, Sarah Bortolamiol, Andrew Seguya, Jean-Michel Krief, and Shelly 
Masi. “Wild Chimpanzees on the Edge: Nocturnal Activities in Croplands.” PloS One 9, no. 10 
(2014): 1–11. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109925. 
Krupenye, Christopher, Fumihiro Kano, Satoshi Hirata, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello. 
“Great Apes Anticipate That Other Individuals Will Act according to False Beliefs.” Science 354, 
no. 6308 (2016): 110–13. doi:10.1126/science.aaf8110. 
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1970. 
Kupferberg, Aleksandra, Stefan Glasauer, and Judith M. Burkart. “Do Robots Have Goals? How 
Agent Cues Influence Action Understanding in Non-Human Primates.” Behavioural Brain 
Research 246 (2013): 47–54. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2013.01.047. 
KUPRI. “Ai and Her Friends. Website.” http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ai/index.html#intro, 2017. 
———. KUPRI Guidelines for Care and Use of Nonhuman Primates. Version 3. Kyoto University 
Primate Research Institute. https://www.pri.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/research/sisin2010/Guidelines_for_Care_and_Use_of_Nonhuman_Primates20100609.pdf, 
2010. 
———. “Puchi Chiryō Kiroku. Puchi’s Medical Treatment Record. [Internal Document].,” 2017. 
[Title translated by KUPRI; document in Japanese] 
———. “Puchi Hajimete no Kosodate: Piko o Puchi ni Modosu made [Puchi’s First Child Rearing: 
Until Returning Piko to Puchi].” Video, 2m31. Kyoto University Primate Research Institute, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqYlOcJjsmQ, 2015. [Title translated by Daly] 
———. “Reiko Extends Her Hand to Pal after Ayumu Hits Pal.” Filmed December 11, 2005. 
Video, 11s. Kyoto University Primate Research Institute, s.v. “Pal”, 
http://shigen.nig.ac.jp/pgdb2/images.html, 2005. 
———. “Section of Language and Intelligence. Website.” http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/langint/, 
2017. 
———. “Symbolic Representation and Working Memory in Chimpanzees.” Video, 4m50s. 
http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ai/ja/member-gallery/Ayumu-video.html, 2013. 
———. “The Chimpanzees in Bossou.” 
http://www.greencorridor.info/en/chimp/profile/relationship.html, 2017. 
———. “The Members Living in the P.R.I.” Kyoto University Primate Research Institute. 
http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ai/en/friends/index.html, 2017. 
377
Laland, Kevin, Jeremy Kendal, and Rachel Kendal. “Animal Culture: Problems and Solutions.” In 
The Question of Animal Culture, edited by Kevin Laland and Bennett Galef, 174–97. Cambridge 
and London: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Laland, Kevin N., and Bennett G. Galef, eds. The Question of Animal Culture. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Laland, Kevin N., John Odling-Smee, and Marcus W. Feldman. “Niche Construction, Biological 
Evolution, and Cultural Change.” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23, no. 1 (2000): 131–46. 
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00002417 
Lang, Kristina Cawthon. “Primate Factsheets: Common Marmoset (Callithrix Jacchus) Taxonomy, 
Morphology, & Ecology.” National Primate Research Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
http://pin.primate.wisc.edu/factsheets/entry/common_marmoset, 2005. 
———. “Primate Factsheets: Gorilla (Gorilla) Taxonomy, Morphology, & Ecology.” National 
Primate Research Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
http://pin.primate.wisc.edu/factsheets/entry/gorilla, 2005. 
Langlitz, Nicolas. “Synthetic Primatology: What Humans and Chimpanzees Do in a Japanese 
Laboratory and the African Field.” The British Society for the History of Science: Themes, no. 2, 
2017, 1–25. doi:10.1017/bjt.2017.4. 
Latour, Bruno. “A Dialog About a New Meaning of Symmetric Anthropology. (Bruno Latour 
Interviewed by Carolina Miranda).” In Comparative Metaphysics - Ontology after Anthropology, 
edited by Pierre Charbonnier, Gildas Salmon, and Peter Skafish, 327–45. London: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2017. 
———. “On Interobjectivity.” Mind, Culture and Activity 3 (1996): 228–45. 
———. “Perspectivism: ‘Type’ or ‘bomb’?” Anthropology Today 25, no. 12 (2009): 1–2. 
———. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Latour, Bruno, and Shirley Strum. “Human Social Origins: Oh Please, Tell Us Another Story.” 
Journal of Social and Biological Systems 9, no. 2 (1986): 169–87. doi:10.1016/0140-
1750(86)90027-8. 
Leavens, David A., Kim A. Bard, and William D. Hopkins. “The Mismeasure of Ape Social 
Cognition.” Animal Cognition Epub ahead of print (August 4, 2017): 1–18. doi:10.1007/s10071-
017-1119-1. 
Leblan, Vincent. “Les Rendez-Vous Manqués de L’ethnologie et de La Primatologie de Terrain 
(1960-2010) [The Missed Encounters between Ethnology and Field Primatology. 1960-2010].” 
Revue de Primatologie 3 (2011): 10.4000/primatologie.808. [Title translated by Daly] 
Leeuwen, Edwin J.C. van, Innocent Chitalu Mulenga, Mark D. Bodamer, and Katherine A. Cronin. 
“Chimpanzees’ Responses to the Dead Body of a 9-Year-Old Group Member.” American Journal 
of Primatology 78, no. 9 (2016): 914–22. doi:10.1002/ajp.22560. 
378
Lestel, Dominique. L’Animal Est l’Avenir de l’Homme [Animals Are the Future of Man Kind]. 
Paris: Fayard, 2010. [Title translated by Daly] 
———. L’animal Singulier [The Singular Animal]. Paris: Seuil, 2004. [Title translated by Daly] 
———. Les Origines Animales de La Culture [The Animal Origins of Culture]. Paris: Flammarion, 
2003. [Title translated by Daly] 
———. Paroles de Singes. L’Impossible Dialogue Homme-Primate [Ape Words. The Impossible 
Dialogue between Humans and Primates]. Paris: La Découverte, 1995. [Title translated by Daly] 
Lestel, Dominique, Florence Brunois, and Florence Gaunet. “Etho-Ethnology and Ethno-
Ethology.” Social Science Information 45, no. 2 (2006): 155–77. doi:10.1177/0539018406063633. 
Liebal, Katja, Bridget M. Waller, Anne M. Burrows, and Katie E Slocombe. Primate 
Communication. A Multimodal Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Louchart, Frédéric. “La Quête de L’âme: Statut et Étude Des Orangs‑outans Du Kalimantan 
Central (Indonésie) [The Soul Quest: The Status and Study of the Orangutans of Central 
Kalimantan, Indonesia].” Journal Des Anthropologues 100–101 (2005): 291–316. [Title translated 
by Daly] 
Lutz, Corrine K., and Melinda A. Novak. “Environmental Enrichment for Nonhuman Primates: 
Theory and Application.” Institute for Laboratory Animal Research Journal 46 (2005): 178–91. 
Magnotti, John F., Adam M. Goodman, and Jeffrey S. Katz. “Matching to Sample Experimental 
Paradigm.” In Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning, edited by Norbert M. Seel, 2104–7. New 
York: Springer, 2012. 
Malone, N., a. H. Wade, a. Fuentes, E. P. Riley, M. Remis, and C. J. Robinson. “Ethnoprimatology: 
Critical Interdisciplinarity and Multispecies Approaches in Anthropology.” Critique of 
Anthropology 34, no. 1 (2014): 8–29. doi:10.1177/0308275X13510188. 
Manabe, Kazufumi, and Harumi Befu. “Japanese Cultural Identity. An Empirical Investigation of 
Nihonjinron.” Contemporary Japan 4, no. 1 (1993): 89–102. 
Mano, Miho. “Compositional Mechanisms of Japanese Numeral Classifiers.” In 26th Pacific Asia 
Conference on Language, Information and Computation, 620–25, 2012. 
Manuel, Marc de, Martin Kuhlwilm, Peter Frandsen, Vitor C Sousa, Tariq Desai, Javier Prado-
Martinez, Jessica Hernandez-Rodriguez, et al. “Chimpanzee Genomic Diversity Reveals Ancient 
Admixture with Bonobos.” Science 354, no. 6311 (2016): 477–81. doi: 10.1126/science.aag2602 
Marsh, James. “Project Nim.” Documentary, 93m. BBC Films, Passion Pictures 70 and Red Box 
Films, 2011. 
Matsumoto, Takuya, Noriko Itoh, Sana Inoue, and Michio Nakamura. “An Observation of a 
Severely Disabled Infant Chimpanzee in the Wild and Her Interactions with Her Mother.” Primates 
57, no. 1 (2015): 3-7. doi:10.1007/s10329-015-0499-6. 
379
Matsumoto, Yo. “Order of Acquisition in the Lexicon: Implications from Japanese Numeral 
Classifiers.” In Children’s Language. Volume 6., edited by Keith E. Nelson and Anne Van Kleeck, 
229–60, 1987. 
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro. “Affidavit of Tetsuro Matsuzawa. State of New York, Supreme Court, Count 
of Niagara. The Nonhuman Rights Project on Behalf of Kiko.,” 2013. 
———. “Ai Project: A Retrospective of 25 Years Research on Chimpanzee Intelligence.” In 
Animal Bodies, Human Minds. Ape, Dolphin, and Parrot Language Skills., edited by William A. 
Hillix and Duane Rumbaugh, 201–11. New York: Springer, 2004. 
———. Ai to Ayumu. Haha to Ko no 700 Nichi [Ai and the Baby: An Essay on Our Evolutionary 
Neighbors]. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2002. [Translated by the author] 
———. Chinpanjī wa Chinpanjin. Ai to Afurika no Nakamatachi [Chimpanzees, Chimpanzee 
Beings. Our Friends: Ai and the African Chimpanzees]. Iwanami Shoten, 1995. [Title translated 
by Daly] 
———. “Essay on Evolutionary Neighbors. A Quiet Baby.” http://langint.pri.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/ai/en/gallery/900_2001-04-00.html, 2001. 
———. “Essay on Evolutionary Neighbors. Ai Gives Birth.” http://langint.pri.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/ai/en/gallery/898_2001-04-00.html, 2001. 
———. “Essay on Evolutionary Neighbors. Chloe and Cleo’s First Year.” http://langint.pri.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/ai/en/gallery/909_2001-04-00.html, 2001. 
———. “Essay on Evolutionary Neighbors. Letters and Gifts Warmly Received.” 
http://langint.pri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ai/en/gallery/904_2001-04-00.html, 2001. 
———. “Euthanasia Is Not an Option: 10 Years’ Care of a Chimpanzee with Acute Tetraparesis.” 
Primates 57, no. 3 (2016): 291–93. doi:10.1007/s10329-016-0548-9. 
———. “Evolutionary Origins of the Human Mother-Infant Relationship.” In Cognitive 
Development in Chimpanzees, edited by Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Masaki Tomonaga, and Masayuki 
Tanaka, 127–41. Tokyo: Springer, 2006. 
———. “Jokro: The Death of an Infant Chimpanzee.” Documentary, 19m. Kyoto University 
Primate Research Institute. http://www.greencorridor.info/en/videos/jokro/, 2003. 
———. NHK Ningen Kōza: Shinka no Rinjin Chinpanji. Ai to Ayumu to Nakamatachi [NHK 
Course on Humans: Our Evolutionary Neighbors, Chimpanzees. Ai, Ayumu and Friends]. Tokyo: 
Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2002. [Title translated by Daly] 
———. ed. Ningen to wa Nani ka. Chinpanjī Kenkyū kara Mietekita Koto [What Is Human? What 
Has Been Rendered Visible from Chimpanzee Research]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010. [Title 
translated by Daly] 
380
———. “Primate Foundations of Human Intelligence: A View of Tool Use in Nonhuman Primates 
and Fossil Hominins.” In Primate Origins of Human Cognition and Behavior, 3–25. Tokyo: 
Springer, 2001. 
———. Sōzō Suru Chikara. Chinpanjī ga Oshietekureta Ningen no Kokoro [The Power of 
Imagination. Human Mind Taught by Chimpanzees]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011. [Title 
translated by Daly] 
———. “Symbolic Representation of Number in Chimpanzees.” Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology 19, no.1 (2009): 92-98. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.04.007. 
———. “The Ai Project: Historical and Ecological Contexts.” Animal Cognition 6, no. 4 
(December 2003): 199–211. doi:10.1007/s10071-003-0199-2. 
———. “The Chimpanzee Mind: In Search of the Evolutionary Roots of the Human Mind.” 
Animal Cognition 12 Supplement 1 (2009): S1-9. doi:10.1007/s10071-009-0277-1. 
———. “The Death of an Infant Chimpanzee at Bossou, Guinea.” Pan Africa News 4, no. 1 
(1997): 4–6. 
———. “Use of Numbers by a Chimpanzee.” Nature 315 (1985): 57–59. doi:10.1038/315057a0. 
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro, Dora Biro, Tatyana Humle, Noriko Inoue-Nakamura, Rikako Tonooka, and 
Gen Yamakoshi. “The Emergence of Culture in Wild Chimpanzees: Education by Master-
Apprenticeship.” In Primate Origins of Human Cognition and Behavior, edited by Tetsuro 
Matsuzawa. Hong Kong, 2008. 
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro, Shozo Kojima, and Shoichi Shinohara. “Editorial: A Brief Note on the 
Background of the Study of Cognition and Behavior of Chimpanzees by Japanese Researchers.” 
Japanese Psychological Research 39, no. 3 (1997): 133–39. 
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro, and William C Mcgrew. “Kinji Imanishi and 60 Years of Japanese 
Primatology.” Current Biology 18, no. 14 (2008): 587–91. 
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro, Masaki Tomonaga, and Masayuki Tanaka, eds. Cognitive Development in 
Chimpanzees. Tokyo: Springer, 2006. 
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro, and Masayuki Yabuuchi. Kotoba o Oboeta Chinpanjī [“A Chimpanzee 
Learned Language”]. Tokyo: Fukuinkan Shoten, 1985. [Title translated by the authors] 
Mauss, Marcel. “Les Techniques du Corps.” Journal de Psychologie 32, no. 3–4 (1936): 365–386 
[Eversion (2002) : 1–23. Accessible under  
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/mauss_marcel/socio_et_anthropo/6_Techniques_corps/Tech
niques_corps.html]. 
McCann, Colleen, Hannah Buchanan-Smith, Lisa Jones-Engel, Kay Farmer, Mark Prescott, 
Helena Fitch-Snyder, and Sylvia Taylor. IPS International Guidelines for the Acquisition, Care 
and Breeding of Nonhuman Primates. 2nd ed. International Primatological Society. 
http://www.internationalprimatologicalsociety.org/policy.cfm, 2007. 
381
McGinn, Colin. “Apes, Humans, Aliens, Vampires and Robots.” In The Great Ape Project: 
Equality Beyond Humanity, edited by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, 146–51. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994. 
McGrew, William C. Chimpanzee Material Culture. Implications for Human Evolution. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
———. The Cultured Chimpanzee. Reflections on Cultural Primatology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
McLennan, Matthew R., and Kimberley J. Hockings. “The Aggressive Apes? Causes and Contexts 
of Great Ape Attacks on Local Persons.” In Problematic Wildlife, edited by Francesco M. Angelici, 
373–94. Cham, Heidelberg, New Yok, Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2016.  
Mesoudi, Alex, Andrew Whiten, and Kevin N N Laland. “Towards a Unified Science of Cultural 
Evolution.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29, no. 4 (2006): 329–47. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X06009083. 
Mikkelsen, Tarjei S., LaDeana W. Hillier, Evan E. Eichler, Michael C. Zody, David B. Jaffe, 
Shiaw-Pyng Yang, Wolfgang Enard, et al. “Initial Sequence of the Chimpanzee Genome and 
Comparison with the Human Genome.” Nature 437 (2005): 69–87. doi:10.1038/nature04072. 
Miller, George A. “The Cognitive Revolution: A Historical Perspective.” Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 7, no. 3 (2003): 141–44. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00029-9 
Milton, Joseph. “Chimps Give Birth like Humans.” Nature News, April 19, 2011. 
doi:10.1038/news.2011.247. 
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French Summary 
 
 
French Translation Required by the Transdisciplinary Graduate School in 
Humanities and Sciences of École Normale Supérieure 
 
Terrains et méthode 
 
Nous avons élaboré ce travail à partir d’un terrain de quatorze mois au Primate Research 
Institute de l’Université de Kyoto (KUPRI). Ce séjour s’est déroulé entre le 1er octobre 2014 et le 
15 décembre 2015. Le KUPRI est situé dans la ville d’Inuyama, au sein de la préfecture d’Aichi. 
L’objet de cette ethnographie fut d’étudier la vie quotidienne au sein du laboratoire dirigé par le 
professeur Matsuzawa Tetsuro, l’un des représentants les plus éminents de la recherche sur les 
chimpanzés au Japon et dans le monde. En outre, cette recherche ayant une ambition comparative, 
nous nous appuyons sur une ethnographie dite multi-sites, à travers laquelle des points précis sont 
explorés à partir de données récoltées sur plusieurs lieux au cours de séjours plus brefs.  
Nous avons en effet visité tous les laboratoires du PRI consacrés à la recherche sur les 
chimpanzés. De plus, nous avons séjourné dans d’autres centres de recherche en primatologie, 
parmi lesquels (cf. figure 1 ; section en anglais) : le centre Onobora du KUPRI, consacré à la 
reproduction de macaques en semi-liberté ; l’écurie du KUPRI consacrée à la recherche en 
cognition ; le sanctuaire Kumamoto dans la préfecture de Kumamoto, qui accueille chimpanzés et 
bonobos ; le Japan Monkey Centre à Inuyama et le Zoo de Kyoto, où se trouvent des représentants 
de plusieurs espèces ; le zoo d’Higashiyama à Nagoya, dans la préfecture d’Aichi ; l’île de 
Kôjima/Koshima à Miyazaki, où se trouvent des macaques japonais ; Cape Toi dans la préfecture 
de Miyazaki, où se trouvent des chevaux en liberté ; Shodoshima dans la préfecture de Kagawa, 
où se trouvent des macaques ; Yakushima dans la prefecture de Kagoshima qui accueille des 
macaques japonais et des cerfs Sika. Dans les zoos de Kyoto et d’Higashiyama se trouvent des 
ordinateurs semblables à ceux utilisés au sein du PRI afin de conduire des expériences avec des 
chimpanzés et des représentants d’autres espèces. C’est également le cas de l’écurie du KUPRI, 
où les expériences en sciences cognitives sont menées sur des chevaux.  
 Enfin, nous avons séjourné trois semaines en République de Guinée entre juin et juillet 
2016. Le centre de recherche japonais de Bossou a été l’un des sites privilégiés pour l’étude de la 
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culture chimpanzée en milieu naturel. L’activité de ce centre a commencé sous la direction du 
professeur Sugiyama Yukimaru, auquel a succédé le professeur Matsuzawa - raison pour laquelle 
nous l’avons inclus dans cette étude comparative. En outre, afin d’enrichir notre ethnographie, 
nous avons participé à la conférence « Chimpanzees in Context » (Understanding Chimpanzees 
IV), qui a lieu tous les dix ans, ainsi qu’à la réunion de la Société Internationale de Primatologie, 
qui a lieu deux fois par an, en 2016 aux Etats-Unis. L’institution qui a accueilli cette réunion, le 
Lincoln Park Zoo, met en œuvre un dispositif assisté par ordinateur très semblable à celui utilisé 
par le KUPRI pour mesurer les capacités cognitives des grands singes ainsi que des macaques 
japonais. Ce zoo propose en outre des sessions ouvertes au public.   
  Ainsi qu’il est d’usage en ethnologie, ce travail a reposé sur des questionnaires, des 
entretiens semi-directifs, des communications personnelles et sur une observation participante de 
longue durée dans un seul centre de recherche, le KUPRI. Nous avons joint à cela l’approche plus 
récente de l’ethnographie multi-sites, qui use de méthodes similaires, mais avec l’ambition 
d’analyser la manière dont des problématiques soulevées lors de notre ethnographie de longue 
durée peuvent émerger en d’autres localités. Des éléments de la Théorie de l’Acteur-Réseau 
(ANT), mobilisée au sein des Science and technology studies ainsi que les controverses entourant 
les usages de cette grille d’analyse, ont constitué une ressource méthodologique supplémentaire.  
 En accord avec les pratiques de l’analyse de conversations et les études ethno-
méthodologiques, ainsi qu’avec les pratiques de l’éthologie, nous avons mis en œuvre des études 
comportementales minutieuses, réalisées à partir d’enregistrements vidéos, afin d’analyser des 
interactions image après image, ou sur des périodes espacées de deux secondes (© Solomon Coder; 
© ImageGrab). En ce qui concerne ce type de descriptions, nous en avons réduit l’extension dans 
le but d’en rendre la lecture plus aisée et nous avons choisi de ne faire apparaître qu’un résumé de 
leurs aspects les plus significatifs. Dans les cas où nous avons voulu coder les vidéos, c’est-à-dire 
en catégoriser les différentes étapes, nous avons opté pour des découpages par séquences de deux 
secondes. Dans les rares cas où il a été nécessaire d’analyser les interactions en présence à l’échelle 
de la milliseconde, nous avons opté pour l’analyse image par image.  
 Nous n’avons pas utilisé la notation habituellement présente dans l’analyse de 
conversation, en raison de la difficulté pour un lecteur non averti de les déchiffrer et donc de 
comprendre le déroulement des interactions. Concernant les pratiques ayant cours en éthologie, 
nous avons élaboré un compromis entre trois types de description : celles en termes de structure 
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(c’est-à-dire de posture et de mouvements), celles en termes de conséquences (c’est-à-dire 
présentant les résultats de l’action en fonction de catégories) et celles en termes de relations 
spatiales (où il s’agit de savoir vers quoi ou vers qui l’action est orientée). À chaque fois que la 
signification d’un comportement s’avérait difficile à saisir, nous avons privilégié une approche par 
la structure ou la spatialité. Nous avons cependant accompagné notre manuscrit des vidéos 
correspondantes afin de laisser la possibilité au lecteur d’élaborer ses propres interprétations des 
comportements observés.  
 De plus, nous avons utilisé ©SPSS 24 dans le cas des études pour lesquelles un traitement 
statistique des données pouvait être mis en œuvre. Cette recherche comporte en effet un certain 
nombre d’analyses quantitatives, en plus des descriptions ethnographiques, dont les protocoles et 
les méthodes de collecte de données seront explicités en détail chaque fois qu’il y sera fait 
référence. Nous nous contenterons donc ici de remarques générales sur la méthodologie employée.  
 Enfin, un dernier outil méthodologique, que nous employons tout au long de ce travail, est 
le récit à la 1ère personne, qui renvoie à l’expérience singulière de se trouver dans la position 
d’expérimentateur, là où l’anthropologue conduit lui-même l’étude des relations entre chimpanzés 
et humains. Ainsi, il s’agissait non seulement d’une immersion dans un champ où les questions de 
sécurité sont cruciales et où l’art de se tenir dans certaines limites spatiales s’apprend, mais aussi 
d’une réflexion incarnée sur les points de convergence et l’existence d’idiosyncrasies entre 
différentes disciplines, dans le but d’élaborer un programme de recherche commun.  
 En conclusion, nous devons avertir le lecteur que ce manuscrit visant à être compris, nous 
avons cherché autant que possible à éviter l’usage d’une écriture assimilable à un jargon 
disciplinaire et nous avons privilégié en tout point la clarté du propos. La raison en est qu’il 
s’adresse à des lecteurs provenant de diverses disciplines, et ne partageant donc pas la même 
culture universitaire. Il se peut donc qu’aux yeux de certains spécialistes, certains passages 
puissent paraître simplistes, répétitifs ou trop expliqués, tandis que d’autre leur apparaîtront plus 
difficile à saisir. Nous avons tenté de faire le lien entre différents styles d’écriture académique, du 
champ littéraire au champ scientifique, afin d’atteindre à un objectif pédagogique et permettre à 
des praticiens de différentes disciplines de s’emparer de cette recherche. De plus, cette thèse a 
privilégié autant que possible la nouveauté du matériel ethnographique en lieu et place de longues 
élaborations théoriques. En d’autres termes, nous avons usé de l’analyse théorique avec 
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pragmatisme, dans le but d’ouvrir la voie à une discussion de questions d’ordre général ; non parce 
qu’elle constitue une fin en soi.  
   L’objectif visé par cette recherche ayant été de présenter des réflexions qui puissent 
circuler entre les différentes disciplines, et non de confronter des auteurs, le lecteur devra s’attendre 
à ce que certains canons de la bibliographie disciplinaire n’aient pas la place centrale qui aurait dû 
leur revenir. Cependant, si nous voulons réellement établir des ponts entre les disciplines, là où les 
ressources d’une seule sont insuffisantes au traitement de certaines problématiques, nous devons 
user de procédés capables de rendre compte de concepts ou d’idées centrales selon une approche 
pluraliste. Curieusement, cette tâche ressemble précisément à la manière dont l’usage des multiples 
modalités de la communication permet l’élaboration de significations pour des esprits (ou des 
disciplines) reposant sur l’idiosyncrasie.   
 
Conclusion  
 
L’enjeu de ce travail était de démontrer comment les humains et, potentiellement, les 
chimpanzés fixent et brouillent les frontières entre leurs deux espèces. Nous avons exploré la 
manière dont fonctionne cette frontière au travers des problématiques très diverses qui structurent 
la cohabitation des humains et des chimpanzés dans un contexte de laboratoire très spécifique, où 
les relations sociales entre Pan et Homo sont la priorité. Il s’agissait d’une part d’analyser les 
aspects principaux de cette dynamique inter-espèces. D’autre part, nous avons souhaité indiquer 
des voies possibles pour de futures recherches. L’ambition de cette thèse a été non seulement 
d’apporter des réponses mais également de mettre en évidence des phénomènes à l’intersection 
des frontières disciplinaires, qui réclament ainsi un véritable effort d’interdisciplinarité.  
La plupart des problématiques que nous avons abordées dans ce cadre n’avaient pas été 
rigoureusement traitées de cette manière auparavant, et beaucoup de questions restent en suspens 
lorsque l’on s’intéresse à l’apprentissage social réciproque inter-espèces entre humains et 
chimpanzés. En outre, il faudrait également s’intéresser au rôle joué par les artefacts et le monde 
matériel. Seul un programme de recherche exigeant serait en mesure d’aborder ce sujet, en 
dépassant à la fois les représentations anthropocentriques des animaux qui caractérisent les 
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humanités et les hypothèses restreintes proposées par les sciences du vivant. Quant à nous, nous 
considérons qu’un tel programme est primordial pour un certain nombre de raisons.  
D’abord, en raison de la proximité phylogénétique entre humains et chimpanzés, ce type 
de recherche pourrait nous permettre d’acquérir une meilleure connaissance de la flexibilité 
potentielle de l’apprentissage social chez les hominidés. Deuxièmement, elle nous permettrait 
d’avoir une vision plus claire des mécanismes d’après lesquels humains et chimpanzés 
interagissent, communiquent et entretiennent des relations sociales, en tenant bien sûr compte des 
contraintes indépassables propres à leurs espèces respectives. Enfin, l’examen de la manière dont 
humains et chimpanzés ajustent leurs modes de vie, en tenant compte du monde matériel qui les 
entourent, constitue un matériau nécessaire à la pensée et à la compréhension de ce qui tient à la 
coexistence des membres des deux espèces et de ce qui tient à la pratique de la science. Nous allons 
maintenant récapituler les acquis de chacun des chapitres, afin de les mettre en perspective avant 
d’adresser les problématiques que nous pensons utiles à toute recherche future.  
Chapitre 1 : Le premier chapitre, intitulé « Etudes des chimpanzés à l’Institut de Recherche 
sur les Primates », présente au lecteur l’histoire des relations entre humains et chimpanzés au PRI. 
Dans la première section, nous retraçons l’histoire de Reiko, première femelle chimpanzée 
résidente au PRI, présente avant même que les études sur la cognition des chimpanzés n’y 
démarrent officiellement. Avant le commencement du projet Ai, il y a une quarantaine d'années, 
la gestion des chimpanzés y était caractérisée par l’absence de congénères, par des interactions 
avec d’autres primates, et par des soins en contact direct même auprès de chimpanzés adultes. 
Aujourd’hui, on y souligne au contraire la nécessité de maintenir les individus au milieu de leurs 
congénères. En outre, aux yeux du Professeur Matsuzawa, qui dirige le projet Ai, les premières 
études menées sur Reiko était marquées par l’absence de toute notion d’esprit (mind) ou de 
cognition, le chimpanzé étant assimilé à un « grand singe noir… qui se trouve être intelligent ».  
Dans la seconde partie de ce premier chapitre, nous commençons par explorer les raisons 
pour lesquelles les chimpanzés sont perçus comme étant différents des autres singes, 
principalement du fait qu’ils démontrent plus d’intérêt à interagir avec les humains et en raison du 
type d’interactions auxquelles ils participent. Nous replaçons ensuite le projet Ai dans le contexte 
des recherches sur le langage des grands singes qui se sont développées dans les années 1970. Le 
projet Ai avait la particularité de tenter de saisir le monde perceptuel des chimpanzés en usant de 
moyens symboliques, au lieu de chercher à savoir dans quelle mesure les chimpanzés étaient 
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capables d’adopter un langage similaire à celui des humains. La logique des études sur les 
chimpanzés telles qu’elles sont menées au PRI repose en effet sur leur proximité phylogénétique 
vis-à-vis des humains, qui implique la possibilité que des traits communs partagés entre nos 
espèces soient hérités d’un ancêtre commun, selon un principe homologique. Il nous a fallu ajouter 
à cela une remarque de précaution sur la nécessité de rendre explicite les présupposés sous-jacents 
à une telle interprétation de l’évolution, dans le but d’éviter la critique anthropologique selon 
laquelle de telles hypothèses pourraient en venir à suggérer que des populations humaines 
« primitives » puissent représenter un état intermédiaire entre des humains évoluant dans un 
monde technologique et des grands singes.  
Nous faisons alors l’hypothèse que la primatologie s’engage moins dans des hypothèses 
abstraites et générales sur la cognition qui seraient valables quelle que soit l’espèce concernée 
(telles que les formulent les science cognitives) que dans son un medium spécifique, c’est-à-dire 
dans la réalité écologique, sociale et perceptuelle des primates auxquels elle s’intéresse. Tandis 
que ces deux attitudes ne s’excluent pas totalement, la primatologie demanderait toutefois le même 
effort de compréhension que celui qui vise à comprendre « le point de vue de l’autochtone ». Il 
faut noter cependant que les barrières qui subsistent entre espèces, entre primates humains et 
primates non humains, imposent des limitations à l’accès à ce point de vue. Nous abordons ensuite 
la manière dont le dispositif expérimental du PRI traite concrètement le monde des chimpanzés.  
Nous rappelons ainsi, étape par étape, que le principal sujet du projet Ai, Ai le chimpanzé 
femelle, a appris à réaliser les tâches demandées au cours des expériences. Par le conditionnement 
opérant, Ai s’est familiarisée petit à petit avec le dispositif de l’expérience, c’est-à-dire avec les 
étapes requises pour la résolution des tâches.   
Néanmoins, suivant un principe d’identification d’échantillons, Ai a également été le sujet 
d’une série d’expériences sur la cognition des chimpanzés. En réalité, que coexistent des 
paradigmes cognitifs, sous-jacents aux expériences ainsi menées, et des pratiques behavioristes, 
qui concèdent le minimum aux animaux en termes de capacités mentales, n’apparaît pas ici comme 
une contradiction en soi, dans la mesure où les protocoles qui consistent à former Ai à l’utilisation 
du dispositif ne sont utilisés que de manière pragmatique, comme moyens en vue d’une fin.  
De plus, en nous intéressant à l’histoire de l’apprentissage d’Ai, nous nous interrogeons 
sur la capacité des chimpanzés à transposer ce qu’il viennent d’apprendre à des stimuli inédits,  
c’est-à-dire sur leur capacité d’apprendre à apprendre. Nous analysons ensuite les habitudes 
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d’apprentissage propres aux chimpanzés, à travers la manière dont de jeunes chimpanzés - Ai, 
Akira, et Mari, les trois premiers participants aux recherches du PRI - ont réagi aux mêmes 
protocoles expérimentaux et aux mêmes dispositifs. Nous concluons cette partie par la 
comparaison du contexte du laboratoire avec celui d’une école. Au PRI en effet, les chercheurs ont 
recouru à cette comparaison lorsqu’il s’adresse au public, afin d’éviter toute suggestion de 
recherche invasive, dont le soupçon pèse sur les expériences menées en laboratoire. Dans les 
expériences qui requièrent de l’apprentissage, les chercheurs apparaissent réellement investis dans 
les progrès des chimpanzés. Néanmoins, à la différence d’un contexte scolaire, les chercheurs 
enseignent aux chimpanzés afin d’en apprendre davantage sur ces derniers, et la relation entre les 
membres des deux espèces y est conçue davantage comme un partenariat scientifique que comme 
un rapport de maître à élève.  
La troisième partie du premier chapitre aborde la manière dont s’est constituée la 
communauté des chimpanzés résidant au PRI et les pratiques sociales inter-espèces qui ont soutenu 
sa croissance. Nous commençons pour nous demander si les chimpanzés femelles qui y sont 
présentes sont des mères naturelles, en comparant la relation de Reiko à son fils Reo, aux difficultés 
de Puchi à élever sa progéniture. Nous parcourons les hypothèses existantes sur la manière dont 
les chimpanzés deviennent des mères accomplies ; bien que la recherche tende à souligner 
l’importance des interactions directes pour apprendre de telles capacités, la maternité chez les 
chimpanzés semble surdéterminée par un certain nombre de variables. En retraçant l’histoire de 
Puchi et du nouveau-né qu’elle a rejetée, Pan, racontée de première main par Matsuzawa, nous 
rappelons les leçons apprises par les chercheurs du PRI et le changement de paradigme dans leur 
méthodologie survenue dans l’année 2000, lors de la naissance de trois chimpanzés : Ayumu, le 
fils d’Ai, Pal, la fille de Pan, et Cleo, la fille de Chloe. Après qu’ils sont parvenus à faire que les 
mères élèvent ces trois nouveau-nés, les chercheurs ont adopté le principe de « l’observation 
participante », selon lequel un chercheur évalue en contact direct avec la mère et l’enfant le 
développement cognitif du jeune chimpanzé, dans les mêmes conditions que pour les études qui 
concernent le développement des enfants humains.  
Nous explorons ensuite les techniques à travers lesquels les humains s’occupaient d’Ai, 
Pan et Chloé afin qu’elles soient de bonnes mères. Le programme consistait en effet à apprendre 
aux chimpanzés les techniques du corps à adopter vis-à-vis de leur progéniture étant donné que les 
chimpanzés nouveau-nés, à la différence des autres singes, ont besoin d’être tenu en permanence. 
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Ainsi, soulever l’enfant, le prendre dans ses bras, le mettre dans une bonne position et permettre 
la tétée ne sont pas des étapes évidentes pour des mères chimpanzés captives. Nous détaillons 
ensuite le contexte de la naissance d’Ayumu, Cleo et Pal. Nous insistons notamment sur un 
comportement qui n’a pas été enseigné à Ai, et qui a permis à la jeune mère de réanimer son fils 
Ayumu, sur la manière dont Matsuzawa enseigne par le mime le geste de bercer son enfant à Ai, 
sur la préparation de Chloe à la maternité à l’aide de chimpanzés en peluche, sur les échecs dans 
son apprentissage de la maternité et sur la stratégie mise en place pour corriger sa position 
incorrecte pour l’allaitement, et sur la posture de Pan qui s’apparente davantage à une posture 
humaine, ce qui est cohérent la manière dont elle-même a été élevée.  
Dans ces expériences, l’apprentissage social a consisté en un enseignement actif de la part 
des humains, ainsi qu’en un apprentissage par l’observation, un apprentissage par la pratique, et 
une facilitation sociale de la part des chimpanzés en question. Après nous être intéressés aux 
techniques du corps dans l’apprentissage de la maternité assisté par des humains, nous abordons 
le fait que le portage permanent du nouveau-né est un trait spécifique aux chimpanzés, tandis que 
le maintien de l’enfant pendant l’allaitement est partagé par tous les grands singes. Ainsi ces 
techniques du corps apprises sont à la fois le fait des grands singes et des chimpanzés seulement. 
Les schèmes comportementaux propres à chaque espèce requièrent un apprentissage social pour 
être développés, et la source d’un tel apprentissage peut être trouvée soit chez des congénères de 
la même espèce ou chez un groupe d’une autre espèce, dans ce cas précis des humains, qui en 
déploient des formes particulières (c’est par exemple le cas des interactions en face-à-face qui se 
prolongent au-delà de la toute petite enfance).  
Nous posons alors une question plus spéculative : les humains peuvent-ils devenir des 
mères pour les grands singes ? Pour y répondre, nous nous intéressons à un épisode dans lequel un 
gorille ayant appris la langue des signes américaines évoque la mort de sa mère biologique et se 
réfère à son éducatrice humaine comme à une nouvelle mère de substitution. Nous abordons alors 
la question de l’attachement chez les grands singes. Alors que reste en suspens la question de 
savoir dans quelle mesure les grands singes perçoivent certains humains comme jouant un rôle 
analogue à celui d’une mère, il arrive cependant que les humains se voient remplir un rôle parental 
à l’égard de membres d’une autre espèce. Nous abordons ensuite les différences entre l’ancien 
paradigme de recherche dans lesquels de jeunes chimpanzés participaient à des expériences sans 
la présence d’autres membres de leur espèce, et la nouvelle méthodologie, au sein duquel ils sont 
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accompagnés de leurs mères. Le savoir-faire que nécessite la réalisation d’une telle expérience est 
dans le premier cas informé de l’extérieur, tandis que dans le second cas, il est élaboré à partir 
d’une interaction sociale avec d’autres membres du groupe. Les jeunes sont en effet des 
observateurs attentifs de leurs mères.  
Nous proposons cette interprétation après avoir retracé l’histoire d’Ayumu et de son usage 
du dispositif expérimental pendant les moments où il accompagne tous les jours sa mère, Ai, dans 
l’accomplissement de ses tâches sur ordinateur. Petit à petit, Ayumu finit par maîtriser les étapes 
de la procédure. Le cas d’Ayumu diffère de celui sa mère, qui a elle-même appris à réaliser ces 
tâches en entrant seul dans la cabine où se trouve l’ordinateur. Le cas d’Ayumu est ainsi plus 
proche de la « nature », bien qu’il s’agisse de l’espace du laboratoire, car son apprentissage du 
protocole expérimental repose sur le même type d’apprentissage social que celui que les 
chimpanzés mettent en œuvre lorsqu’ils sont à l’état sauvage. De plus, en convoquant des études 
sur l’apprentissage social qui décrivent comment des couples mères-enfants ont été soumis à des 
tests ensemble au PRI, nous montrons que la solution à une tâche expérimentale peut être apprise 
socialement. Néanmoins, le plus intéressant n’est pas qu’il y ait des transmissions horizontales ou 
verticales de savoir entre chimpanzés pendant les expériences, mais que de jeunes chimpanzés 
soumis à des tests dans des cadres sociaux, par opposition aux protocoles conçus pour des individus 
isolés, apprennent de leur congénères à se comporter comme des chimpanzés de laboratoire. Ainsi, 
le savoir-faire nécessaire à l’effectuation d’un protocole expérimental introduit par les humains se 
transmet à la génération suivante par les chimpanzés eux-mêmes, à travers des modes 
d’apprentissage social qui leur sont propres.  
 De plus, dans les expériences au cours desquelles des humains se trouve dans la même 
cabine qu’un couple chimpanzé mère-enfant, il est fort probable que les jeunes chimpanzés 
apprennent à attribuer une valeur sociale aux humains du fait de cette interaction triadique, au 
cours de laquelle la mère fait confiance à l’humain en présence de son enfant. Nous illustrons ceci 
par l’exemple des sourires de sociabilité (social smiling) qu’Ayumu adresse à un humain qui lui 
est familier. Nous concluons dans cette section par l’examen de l’impact de cette recherche sur le 
public, particulièrement à travers les interventions dans les médias, les visites organisées au PRI, 
et le statut de véritables ambassadeurs des chimpanzés au Japon acquis par Ai et Ayumu.  
Chapitre 2 : Le second chapitre s’intitule « Frontières physiques : l’architecture des 
interactions sociales dangereuses » et présente au lecteur le déroulement de la vie quotidienne au 
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PRI à travers l’exploration de ses infrastructures, qui allient préoccupations scientifiques et 
attention aux relations inter-espèces. Il s’agit de souligner un trait particulier de la recherche sur 
des chimpanzés, c’est-à-dire le danger qu’ils présentent pour les humains, par comparaison à 
d’autres grands singes ou de plus petits primates. Nous présentons ensuite l’aire de vie des 
chimpanzés et le système qui leur permet de se rendre au laboratoire.  
Nous abordons ainsi l’organisation sociale de l’espace et attirons l’attention du lecteur sur 
les interfaces perméables qui permettent les interactions entre humain et chimpanzés, et dans 
lesquelles le design architectural permet aux deux espèces de dépasser certaines frontières 
physiques tout en étant maintenues séparées. Tout au long de ce chapitre nous soulignons huit 
facteurs cruciaux de l’organisation de l’espace (a) l’architecture des zones de contact (b) la 
structure physique des dispositifs (c) l’entourage immédiat des corps (d) le contexte des activités 
(e) les comportements et les caractéristiques des chimpanzés (f) les relations interpersonnelles 
entre un humain et un chimpanzé particulier (g) les dynamiques de groupe entre humains et 
chimpanzés (h) les techniques corporelles permettant de se protéger.  
D’abord il s’agit de décrire l’architecture générale des espaces accueillant des flux 
d’humains et de chimpanzés, l’usage exclusif de certains espaces par l’une ou l’autre espèce ainsi 
que les différences structurelles qui les caractérisent. De plus, nous analysons la coordination des 
humains et des chimpanzés dans l’espace au travers de l’examen des protocoles de sureté mis en 
place pour permettre les déplacements des chimpanzés dans le labo. Nous évoquons également des 
incidents passés, dans le but de montrer que l’évaluation de sa propre sécurité nécessite de savoir 
lire une infrastructure et de la lier à certaines actions qui sont soit dictées par un protocole soit le 
résultat d’une évaluation du contexte. Ensuite, nous nous intéressons à l’architecture qui permet le 
nourrissage quotidien des chimpanzés, l’une des situations où le risque est le plus élevé. Nous 
montrons comment ce dispositif répond à différents niveaux de risque d’après sa conception 
matérielle et la fréquence des approches des chimpanzés.  
Nous procédons ensuite à l’examen des déplacements des humains dans l’espace du sous-
sol, de la manière dont ils assurent leur sécurité en prêtant attention à leur environnement direct, 
du dispositif qui permet ou non aux chimpanzés de s’aventurer dans certaines zones et de la portée 
des gestes des chimpanzés au sein de certains espaces humains. À cette fin et à l’aide de mesures 
des infrastructures, nous simulons le positionnement d’un humain qui traverse le sous-sol dans ces 
différents contextes. Dans le but d’aborder le comportement des chimpanzés et la manière dont 
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leur particularités individuelles transforme notre évaluation du risque, les lecteurs sont amenés à 
découvrir d’autres infrastructures liées à la recherche sur les chimpanzés, en particulier celle du 
sanctuaire Kumamoto, institution partenaire du PRI. Nous illustrons notre propos par le récit d’un 
« faux-pas ethnographique » alors que nous nous déplacions dans cet espace nouveau et que nous 
avons dû faire face à des comportements inédits de la part de chimpanzés communs et de bonobos. 
Ainsi, le positionnement de notre corps dans l’espace s’est trouvé modifié, tandis que le 
comportement des animaux nous révélait de nouvelles affordances perçues, nous dévoilant là un 
usage alternatif de l’environnement par une autre espèce. Enfin, revenant aux installations du PRI, 
nous montrons que la connaissance des capacités individuelles de chaque chimpanzé et non pas 
simplement de leur comportement d’espèce, est essentielle à l’adoption par l’humain d’un 
positionnement dans l’espace qui garantisse sa sécurité.   
Concernant les trois derniers aspects vitaux pour la juste perception du risque, il s’agit 
maintenant de considérer les relations entre humains et chimpanzés, ainsi que les dynamiques de 
groupes. D’après nos interlocuteurs, parmi ceux capables d’interactions directes avec des 
chimpanzés adultes au PRI et au Sanctuaire Kumamoto, le temps passé à construire une bonne 
relation est essentiel pour qu’une telle proximité physique soit possible. Il faut cependant noter 
que ce contexte peut changer avec l’introduction d’un tiers et l’échange des rôles dominants. En 
fait, dans de telles situations, les frontières physiques entre humains et chimpanzés dépendent des 
particularités sociales de chacun au sein de la relation dyadique et au sein de leur groupe. Enfin, 
nous revenons sur l’acquisition de techniques corporelles sûres vis-à-vis de chimpanzés et bonobos 
maintenus en captivité, c’est- à-dire des conceptions internalisées qui dicte des manières d’être et 
de se comporter dans l’espace. On en trouve une illustration dans le maintien et le ressenti des 
distances; pour exemplifier ceci, nous utilisons une évaluation subjective de trois seuils de sécurité 
à l’intérieur du laboratoire. Ainsi le déplacement protégé dans l’espace dépend-t-il la capacité à 
lire ensemble une architecture, un contexte et l’état des relations sociales inter et intra-spécifiques 
impliquées dans chaque situation.  
Ce chapitre se conclut avec une comparaison de ces frontières physiques avec celles que 
l’on rencontre à l’état sauvage. Il se focalise sur le contexte spécifique de la station japonaise de 
Bossou, cas abordé par un travail ethnographique de courte durée et complété par une discussion 
de la littérature scientifique sur les rencontres entre humains et grands singes. Dans un 
environnement naturel, les structures architecturales qui caractérise la captivité et qui garantissent 
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dans une certaine mesure la sécurité humaine sont absentes. Ainsi, les arrangements entre espèces 
que l’on y observe sont un contre-exemple intéressant dans le cadre de notre étude. Cependant, si 
différent que ces contextes puissent paraître, des problématiques similaires s’imposent. Tout 
d’abord, il s’agit de tenir compte de l’espace personnel d’un animal afin d’éviter des attaques 
surprises, bien que le seuil d’approche soit dépendant du contexte. Deuxièmement, la configuration 
des zones limites entre forêts et habitations humaines (par exemple les zones de visibilités, les 
zones tampons etc.) joue un rôle dans l’évitement des conflits entre humains et chimpanzés. Enfin, 
chaque fois que des barrières physiques sont considérées, leur matérialité doit être attentivement 
analysée (type de grillages, canaux, barrières biologiques etc.) car les singes peuvent toujours les 
détourner habilement.  
Ensuite, concernant l’habituation des animaux vis-à-vis des humains, les interactions entre 
humains et chimpanzés doivent être abordées de manière individuelle comme multipartite, 
particulièrement parce que les chimpanzés sont capables d’identifier les humains. Certains 
humains, comme les guides locaux, ont l’air d’entretenir une relation particulière avec certains 
groupes de chimpanzés. En outre, certaines compositions de groupe (par ex., ceux qui comprennent 
exclusivement des femmes et des enfants) semblent favoriser les rencontres agonistiques avec 
certains membres de la population des chimpanzés, en particulier les mâles. Les comportements 
individuels et l’existence ou non de déplacements contrôlés contribueront aussi à la manière dont 
les chimpanzés vont agir dans un contexte donné (par ex., face à des humains qui s’enfuient ou 
poussent des hurlements). En résumé, qui attaque, qui est attaqué, quand, et comment réagissent 
les uns et les autres, sont des dimensions vitales qui déterminent le résultat de ces rencontres inter-
espèces en l’absence de barrières.  
Nous explorons ensuite la manière dont les chimpanzés pourraient percevoir les zones 
fortement anthropisés se situant sur leur habitat naturel. Il semble que les chimpanzés perçoivent 
le risque accru que constituent ces zones. Le premier exemple concerne les raids des chimpanzés 
sur les récoltes. Nous analysons cette activité en fonction d’indicateur d’anxiété, du lieu où ils 
mangent les récoltes et à quel moment ils pénètrent dans les champs. La relation des chimpanzés 
à une telle activité présente également des variations historiques, qui dépendent de l’évolution des 
relations entre les humains et les chimpanzés. C’était notamment le cas de cette pratique ancienne 
à Bossou qui consistait à laisser une partie des récoltes aux chimpanzés, considérés comme un 
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totem. Le second exemple, qui attire notre attention sur la perception que semblent avoir les 
chimpanzés de l’espace humain, est le comportement qu’ils adoptent en traversant les routes.  
Les études montrent que les chimpanzés ne sont pas vigilants qu’à leur échelle individuelle 
en traversant des routes fréquentées, mais qu’une organisation socio-spatiale visant à protéger 
l’ensemble du groupe se met alors en place dans le but de garantir la sécurité des plus vulnérables. 
Ainsi les chimpanzés sauvages modifient leur positionnement vis-à-vis des uns et des autres en 
fonction de la probabilité d’une interaction avec des humains ou en fonction de menaces 
anthropogéniques dont les voitures en mouvement sont un exemple. Pour illustrer concrètement 
ce point, nous analysons une séquence vidéo dans laquelle des chimpanzés traversent une route, 
que nous avons enregistrée lors de notre séjour à Bossou et que nous avons systématiquement 
analysée à travers son codage. Cet épisode illustre bien l’organisation spatiale en fonction du statut 
des individus du groupe ; cependant, notre analyse propose une méthode simple pour tenir compte 
de la présence des chercheurs au moment d’évaluer la perception du danger chez les chimpanzés. 
En effet, nous prenons pour l’hypothèse que le degré d’habituation des chimpanzés vis-à-vis des 
chercheurs qui les observe n’exclut pas que les premiers prêtent davantage attention à ces derniers, 
surtout lorsqu’il y a imminence du danger. Nous concluons ce chapitre avec des préconisations 
concernant l’introduction de la présence des chercheurs comme variable afin d’évaluer 
correctement la perception des animaux non humains. 
Chapitre 3 : Après avoir traité de la dynamique des limites physiques entre les humains et 
les chimpanzés, nous passons au troisièmes chapitre, « Frontières expérimentales : mettre à 
l’épreuve et être mis à l’épreuve par des chimpanzés ». Dans ce chapitre, nous considérons les 
éléments fondamentaux en jeu dans la recherche sur les chimpanzés au PRI. Il s’agit de s’interroger 
sur ce que signifie réellement que de faire des expériences avec des chimpanzés. Leurs aptitudes 
peuvent en effet décentrer la perspective humaine et fournir un feedback à la recherche 
expérimentale. Il faut maintenant souligner plusieurs aspects qui caractérisent la recherche sur les 
chimpanzés telle qu’elle est menée au PRI, et en particulier l’approche holistique qui englobe soin 
et protocole de recherche.  
Cela se traduit d’abord par l’effort conjoint qui consiste à mener à la fois des expériences 
en laboratoire et des observations sur le terrain, à Bossou. Il s’agit en effet de comprendre les 
chimpanzés de ce point de vue global et interpréter leur comportement en captivité comme une 
expression de leur comportement à l’état sauvage, tout en incluant dans cette compréhension leurs 
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histoires personnelles. Nous soulignons aussi la participation accrue des chercheurs à des tâches 
traditionnellement attribuées à des soigneurs. De plus, la dispense de soins en contact direct avec 
les chimpanzés adultes, les expériences menées elles aussi en contact direct et l’adaptation de 
l’activité de nourrissage à chaque individu sont des aspects cruciaux de la recherche au PRI. Enfin, 
ces recherches se fondent davantage sur la confiance mutuelle que sur un renforcement positif par 
un système de récompense. On touche là au cœur de la relation qui s’établit entre humains et 
chimpanzés.  
Après avoir souligné ces caractéristiques, propres au PRI, nous les mettons en perspective 
avec les pratiques d’autres institutions au Japon et dans le monde. C’est le sanctuaire Kumamoto, 
institution partenaire du PRI, qui adopte les pratiques les plus ressemblantes. Comme au PRI, une 
stratégie de soins en contact direct avec les chimpanzés a été mise en place, et les chercheurs 
participent aux activités de nourrissage personnalisé comme général durant la semaine. Il faut noter 
qu’en 2015, les pratiques qui s’établissaient en contact direct avec les animaux étaient plus 
intensives, en termes du nombre d’humains et de chimpanzés présents dans le même espace dédié 
aux expériences. Le GARI, institution désormais disparue, avait également mis en place des 
pratiques qui supposaient l’interaction sans barrières avec des chimpanzés adultes. Cette institution 
est cependant perçue par nos interlocuteurs au PRI comme un cas extrême dans les relations entre 
humains et chimpanzés, à cause de ses pratiques de nourrissage et de couchage en commun. Ces 
derniers soulignent également leur différence avec les pratiques des zoos, où les relations inter-
espèces sont rares.  
À partir des expériences éclectiques d’un soigneur ayant travaillé dans plusieurs 
institutions dans le monde, nous montrons qu’au sein des institutions occidentales, les interactions 
humains-chimpanzés sont soigneusement évitées dans le but de laisser l’animal être un animal. 
Cependant, notre interlocuteur concède que cette politique de non approche est aussi liée au fait 
que ces institutions font largement appel à des bénévoles. De plus, une étude menée dans un 
sanctuaire catalan montre que le refus de la proximité inter-espèces est important dans d’autres 
contextes institutionnels et culturels. Au PRI, au contraire, tant que les chimpanzés sont capables 
d’exprimer les spécificités de leur répertoire comportementale auprès de leurs congénères, les 
interactions avec les humains ne sont pas perçues comme capables d’altérer leur statut de vrais 
chimpanzés. Plutôt que de dénier aux humains la capacité de faire partie de l’écologie sociale des 
chimpanzés en captivité, il s’agit davantage de s’interroger sur la bonne manière de le faire.  
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À l’aide d’un questionnaire que nous avons envoyé à des interlocuteurs de différentes 
institutions, nous rendons compte de la manière dont les pratiques en interaction directe avec les 
chimpanzés et les activités nourrissage se déroulent au sein de ces centres les plus réputés en 
matière de recherche sur les chimpanzés : l’institut Max Planck et le zoo de Leipzig en Allemagne, 
l’Université Saint-Andrews et le zoo d’Edimbourg en Ecosse, et le Centre National de Recherche 
sur les Primates Yerkes, aux Etats-Unis. Selon nos interlocuteurs, aucune de ces institutions ne fait 
officiellement appel aux chercheurs pour nourrir les chimpanzés, mais ceux-ci peuvent néanmoins 
participer à ces activités. Le système de nourrissage est à la fois général et personnalisé, à 
l’exception du zoo d’Edimbourg, où il est principalement uniformisé. Enfin, il n’y a dans aucune 
de ces institutions d’interaction directe avec des chimpanzés adultes.   
Nous faisons ensuite remarquer qu’en dépit de ces observations, les pratiques d’interaction 
directe sans barrières physiques avec des grands singes ne se limitent pas au cas japonais. Ceci 
notamment parce qu’elles avaient cours dans les recherches sur le langage des grands singes telles 
qu’elles se sont déroulées dans les années 70. Cependant il faut noter que, au contraire des bonobos 
et des gorilles, il n’est pas évident que ce fut le cas pour les chimpanzés commun au delà d’un 
certain âge, étant donné que de nombreux programmes se sont arrêtés lorsque les sujets avaient 
atteint leur maturité ou introduisaient des barrières physiques lors des interactions entre espèces. 
Ainsi, il semble que ce soit au Japon que les pratiques en contact direct prennent leur forme la plus 
radicale, c’est-à-dire au travers d’interactions durant l’âge adulte, quand la fore des chimpanzés 
devient un danger potentiel pour les humains.  
Après avoir esquissé ces traits généraux, nous allons maintenant les aborder concrètement. 
Nous présentons ainsi un aperçu des tâches quotidiennes au PRI et montrons que deux types de 
tâches incombent à la fois aux soigneurs et aux chercheurs: appeler les chimpanzés et les nourrir. 
Nous nous évaluons ensuite l’importance de la tâche de nourrissage, dès lors qu’il s’agit d’une 
activité dans laquelle les relations inter-espèces s’expriment de manière interpersonnelle, et où 
passer plus de temps avec les chimpanzés permet de construire une bonne relation avec chaque 
individu. Ainsi, au PRI, tous les chercheurs sont incités à participer au nourrissage. Étant donné 
l’importance de cette activité, nous explorons le nourrissage au moyen d’une analyse au cours de 
quatre études différentes. Nous montrons par ce biais que le désir de construire une bonne relation 
avec des chimpanzés se reflètent dans les vingt heures supplémentaires par mois que les doctorants, 
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post-doctorants et assistants de recherche passent à interagir avec les chimpanzés dans un contexte 
de nourrissage, en plus des heures passées à interagir avec eux dans le contexte des expériences.  
Deuxièmement, si l’on évalue leur investissement en fonction de l’effectuation de ces 
tâches durant les week-ends ou les vacances, on ne trouve aucun écart significatif entre les 
professeurs et les post-doctorants, les étudiants ou les assistants. Concrètement, ces trois dernières 
catégories passent en moyenne la même durée avec les chimpanzés pendant les vacances et les 
weekends (environ 7h/mois) et à peu près le même nombre de jours de congés affairés à ces tâches 
(25% du nombre total des mois passés à l’Institut). Enfin, bien que nous n’ayons pas pu mener une 
comparaison avec les interactions entre soigneurs et chimpanzés pendant le nourrissage, nous 
avons pu établir que les chercheurs du PRI ne sont pas seulement fortement incités à participer au 
nourrissage, mais qu’ils sont parfois plus actifs dans ce rôle que les soigneurs. Tandis que les post-
docs, les étudiants et les assistants de recherche sont ceux qui s’engagent le plus dans cette tâche, 
le temps qu’y est dévolu par les professeurs et les soigneurs est curieusement très semblable. Nous 
montrons que nos interlocuteurs tiennent en effet en haute estime les activités de nourrissage, et 
qu’ils les voient comme un moyen de construire et d’entretenir une bonne relation avec les 
chimpanzés, ce qui en retour permet le bon déroulement des expériences. Cependant, l’intensité 
de ces tâches de nourrissage est remise en cause par beaucoup, étant donné que les chercheurs ont 
aussi des responsabilités qui ne peuvent incomber qu’à eux, et non aux soigneurs.  
Après avoir exploré les pratiques propres au PRI, nous nous interrogeons sur la manière 
dont ses membres présentent leurs activités au public. Nous analysons la vidéo de présentation la 
plus vue, qui présente l’expérience la plus célèbre menée au PRI, sur la représentation symbolique 
et le fonctionnement de la mémoire à court terme chez les chimpanzés. La vidéo montre nombre 
des aspects fondamentaux soulignés par nos interlocuteurs tels que l’imitation de la nature, la 
confiance, la participation volontaire des chimpanzés, l’objectivité de l’interface expérimentale et 
les chimpanzés comme perspective extérieure sur l’esprit humain. Le message le plus significatif 
de cette vidéo est que les capacités mentales des chimpanzés puissent décentrer du point de vue 
qu’ont les humains de leurs propres capacités. Nous abordons ensuite cette question en nous 
plongeant dans ces expériences et en analysant les controverses qui leur sont liées.  
Dans cette étude, un des participants, le chimpanzé Ayumu, fils d’Ai, fait mieux que les 
humains dans une tâche de mémoire impliquant de ranger dans l’ordre des numéros ordinaux. 
L’étude ayant bénéficié d’une attention soutenue, d’autres chercheurs ont tenté de répliquer chez 
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des humains les performances d’Ayumu. Leur argument était que les humains et les chimpanzés 
de cette étude ne recevaient pas le même nombre de sessions d’entraînement, et que si les humains 
participaient au même nombre de sessions qu’Ayumu, ils seraient en mesure d’atteindre les mêmes 
performances. Néanmoins, en lisant attentivement ces études, on peut observer que les auteurs 
n’ont pas vraiment fait correspondre la quantité de sessions mais on introduit un nombre accru 
d’essais pour obtenir les mêmes résultats. Ils ont pourtant affirmé que les performances étaient les 
mêmes (Ayumu avait accompli 900 essais dans l’étude originale, à comparer aux 15 350 essais 
accomplis dans l’étude critique). En outre, nous ajoutons que parce que la tâche mobilise non 
seulement la mémoire mais aussi une symbolique typiquement humaine, les humains, qui ont de 
ce fait un entraînement à vie, dispose déjà d’un avantage sur le chimpanzé. Ainsi, dans ce cas 
précis, en conservant le nombre de sessions entre chimpanzés et humains inégal, on rend en fait la 
comparaison inter-espèce plus juste.  
Dans la partie suivante, nous nous intéressons aux dynamiques des expériences menée en 
contact direct avec les chimpanzés, en analysant les activités qu’Ai et Matsuzawa accomplissent 
dans ces conditions. Nous analysons ainsi des extraits vidéo de leurs interactions, que nous avons 
enregistrés durant notre ethnographie. Les premières activités que nous abordons consistent pour 
les chimpanzés à empiler des blocs d’une part, et des tasses d’autre part.  
Il s’agit d’essais à partir d’expériences simples déjà menées auparavant, qui permettent 
l’étude de la manipulation d’objet et du développement cognitif des enfants. Nous expliquons ainsi 
qu’une tâche peut-être résolue par des stratégies cognitives différentes, dont chacune va mettre en 
jeu des capacités mentales plus ou moins grandes. Il existe ainsi une hiérarchie dans la complexité 
des solutions qui peuvent être proposées par le chimpanzé, au sens où celles-ci peuvent se déployer 
en séquences d’actions dont l’individu doit saisir l’ordre de réalisation afin de réaliser correctement 
la tâche demandée (pour illustrer ceci, nous donnons l’exemple de deux méthodes différentes, pot 
method et subassembly method). 
Les activités menées en contact direct que nous nous attachons à décrire ensuite sont la 
peinture, la prise de photographies, les bilans de santé, le dressage, le jeu et l’épouillage. Nous 
portons une attention toute particulière à la manière dont les humains transmettent des informations 
aux chimpanzés. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’employer des consignes verbales en japonais ou en 
anglais, mais aussi de passer par la communication non verbale comme pointer du doigt ou 
signifier une demande par un geste. En outre, Matsuzawa utilise la langue des signes japonaise 
406
 
lorsqu’il interagit avec Ai. A travers nos observations ethnographiques, il ressort que la 
communication multimodale est la plus puissante pour aboutir à une compréhension de la part des 
chimpanzés. Suivant cette logique, nous nous intéressons à certains traits individuels qui 
apparaissent dans les jeux ou les épouillages inter-espèces, comme la maîtrise de soi que démontre 
Ai lorsqu’elle ajuste sa force à l’interaction ou son habitude de boutonner et déboutonner les 
vêtements, que Matsuzawa interprète comme une forme d’épouillage appliqué à un primate dénué 
de poils. Toutes les activités ainsi décrites sont ensuite accompagnées d’études de cas à partir de 
vidéos ethnographiques. Dans l’enregistrement d’un bilan de santé, nous observons ainsi le 
premier entrainement d’Ai au prélèvement de son sang, au cours duquel aucun renforcement 
positif par le don de friandises n’a été utilisé.  
Après avoir exploré les pratiques guidant la recherche et les soins au PRI ainsi que 
quelques-unes des expériences les plus significatives, nous présentons, à travers un récit à la 
première personne, la conception, la mise en œuvre et les défis liés à la conduite d’une expérience 
au laboratoire. Dans cette section, nous rendons compte de notre parcours en tant qu’anthropologue 
évoluant dans le laboratoire jusqu’à devenir expérimentatrice. Il s’agit de revenir sur cette situation 
qui présente double contrainte, puisque nous avons eu à naviguer entre des disciplines dotées de 
paradigmes de recherche distincts. En parallèle, nous expliquons étape par étape la manière dont 
l’expérience a été proposée et conçue, sa logique et la préparation de sa mise en œuvre. Au 
contraire des expériences automatisées où les chimpanzés interagissent surtout avec un ordinateur 
au cours de leur performance, l’expérience dont il est question a consisté en un contact semi-direct, 
c’est à dire qu’elle requérait une interaction sociale avec les chimpanzés durant le test, mais 
toujours au travers d’un dispositif matériel.  
En nous interrogeant concrètement sur les défis que présente l’évaluation du point de vue 
du chimpanzé, la perspective de la caméra, le design du dispositif etc., nous abordons la 
problématique complexe du statut de la relation interpersonnelle dans une expérience menée avec 
des chimpanzés. À la différence des études observationnelles qui examinent la cognition située, 
cette expérience requiert de garder l’élément social sous contrôle afin de rester dans les mêmes 
conditions. Nous rappelons les étapes requises pour devenir un expérimentateur et nous y joignons 
des réflexions sur ce que cela signifie pour nous dans ce contexte particulier. Au travers de notre 
expérience ethnographique, nous soulevons le débat sur l’éthique de la recherche menée sur les 
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animaux en captivité, ainsi que les différences entre des études invasives et non-invasives menées 
sur des chimpanzés et des singes. 
La deuxième partie de ce récit ethnographique montre comment les relations inter-espèces 
finissent par faire elle-même partie de l’expérience. Cela nous renvoie à l’importance de passer du 
temps avec les chimpanzés pour construire une bonne relation avec eux, ce qui se traduit 
concrètement par un entraînement au nourrissage en compagnie d’autres chimpanzés. Une autre 
composante est le besoin d’une période d’entraînement, non seulement pour permettre au 
chimpanzé de comprendre comment l’expérience fonctionne mais aussi de lui permettre d’intégrer 
la présence de l’expérimentateur comme faisant partie du dispositif expérimental. En d’autres 
termes, il s’agit de faire accepter auprès des chimpanzés l’expérimentateur en tant 
qu’expérimentateur et non en tant qu’observateur régulier du laboratoire.  
La troisième partie de ce récit se concentre sur la capacité des chimpanzés à fournir un 
feed-back sur le protocole expérimental. À cette fin, nous évoquons davantage les échecs de 
l’expérience plutôt que ses réussites. Nous évaluerons comment les chimpanzés réagissent 
différemment au protocole lorsque l’on compare la phase d’entraînement et la phase de 
l’expérience elle-même. Nous montrons que l’échec de certains chimpanzés dans l’adaptation au 
protocole expérimental est en réalité le résultat d’un comportement intelligent que l’on n’avait pas 
prévu au moment de sa conception. Nous illustrons cette remarque par une analyse de la vidéo 
d’une session qui nous a contraint à la modification dudit protocole. Dans cette session avec Pan, 
cette dernière montre des comportements agonistiques vis-à-vis de l’expérimentateur après avoir 
échoué à effectuer ce que demandait le protocole. Ce moment est analysé et nous en relevons 
plusieurs aspects dont le plus important est le rôle joué par la communication inter-espèce et le 
problème de l’indéterminé de la traduction. En outre, le protocole expérimental donné lieu à des 
relations inter-espèces chargées de négativité ; après en avoir reconsidéré toutes les variables, nous 
avons dû repenser le protocole.  
Nous analysons ainsi la manière dont notre nouveau protocole allait être mis à l’épreuve 
par les chimpanzés, cette fois en la personne de Pendesa. Pendesa était le chimpanzé le plus 
performant dans cette expérience qui consistait à catégoriser des objets et des couleurs. Cependant, 
dans ce qui constitue la tâche la plus difficile pour des chimpanzés (c’est-à-dire cibler des couleurs), 
Pendesa, incapable d’aboutir au résultat correct, a eu recours à une nouvelle stratégie qui reposait 
sur la recherche d’un encouragement de la part de l’expérimentateur avant de faire son choix final 
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(c’est-à-dire relâcher l’entité [item] du côté de l’expérimentateur). Pourtant, cette fois, sans prévoir 
l’émergence de son comportement qui visait à « tester » l’expérimentateur, le protocole rendait 
inutile ses efforts étant donné que le feedback positif n’était donné qu’une fois l’entité (item) lâchée, 
jamais avant. Une analyse des entités choisies durant ce comportement de test révèle qu’elle faisait 
probablement des suppositions basées sur son expérience avec les cibles adoptées auparavant.  
Nous concluons ce chapitre par un rappel des leçons apprises de la formation d’une 
nouvelle expérimentatrice qui devait poursuive ce travail. Ce processus a confirmé que 
l’expérience en contact semi-direct s’incarne dans le corps et les actions de l’expérimentateur, qui 
sont coordonnés de manière kinesthésique avec ceux des chimpanzés. Deuxièmement, cela nous a 
permis de confirmer que la préexistence d’une relation interpersonnelle entre l’humain et le 
chimpanzé est vitale pour le succès du protocole. Bien que notre successeuse fût déjà une 
expérimentatrice habituelle pour les expériences menées sur ordinateur, elle devait devenir une 
partie de ce dispositif singulier, au travers d’un entraînement à la relation au chimpanzé. Nous 
avons pu ainsi conclure que l’effort des expérimentateurs pour comprendre le point de vue des 
chimpanzés peut être saisi plus adéquatement par analogie à l’effort de l’anthropologue pour 
comprendre les autochtones de la même manière qu’ils se comprennent eux-mêmes.   
Chapitre 4 : Le dernier chapitre du manuscrit s’intitule « Frontières symboliques : la limite 
subtile entre humains et chimpanzés ». Cette partie ne traite pas de la différence entre les humains 
et les chimpanzés dans la compréhension des symboles mais se concentre sur un épiphénomène 
subtil, ancré dans des expériences sociales plus profondes et de ce fait, capable de nous révéler ces 
dernières. Nous commençons cette partie par le récit à la première personne d’un cours de japonais, 
où l’ethnographe que nous sommes découvre qu’un usage linguistique acquis au sein de l’Institut 
est en réalité étrange aux yeux de personnes extérieures.  
La langue japonaise présente un système de dénombrement qui diffère de celui des langues 
germaniques ou latines. Cette différence consiste en l’usage de classificateurs numériques, suffixes 
placés entre le nombre et l'objet du comptage, et connus sous le nom de compteurs. Il y a environ 
150 compteurs en japonais et le critère pour choisir celui que l’on emploie dépend de la 
caractéristique du nom sur lequel le comptage porte, par exemple s’il s’agit d’un animé, sa taille 
etc. Ainsi, au lieu de juxtaposer un nombre et un nom (par exemple, 7 humains), on intercale le 
compteur approprié, comme par exemple « 7 (compteurs propre à l’humain) humains ». Parce que 
le compteur renvoie à des attributs du nom, et non à la mesure elle-même, il s’agit d’un outil qui 
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sert à catégoriser des êtres. Nous explorons ainsi les compteurs propres aux primates : pour les 
humains, nin, pour les grands primates tels les chimpanzés, tō, et pour les petits primates, hiki. 
Nous défendons et illustrons l’idée que nin signale en effet une personne, et faisons remarquer 
qu’au PRI, les chercheurs emploient le compteur propre aux humains lorsqu’ils se réfèrent aux 
chimpanzés.  
Pour nos interlocuteurs du PRI, les ressemblances perçues qui justifient cet usage 
linguistique reposent sur la complexité cognitive et la proximité phylogénétique. En fait, ces 
arguments sont semblables à ceux qui sont mobilisés par un réseau international plus large militant 
pour la transformation et l’attribution aux primates non humains d’un statut juridique de personne 
non-humaine (on citera par exemple le Great Ape Project et le Nonhuman Rights Projects). En 
d’autres termes, dans le milieu scientifique, l’attribution du statut de « personne » suit les 
prémisses du naturalisme - une manière de se rapporter aux non-humains qui en soulignent les 
traits biologiques partagés avec les humains et les capacités cognitives semblables à celles des 
humains. Nous développons ensuite trois études linguistiques conduites dans le but d’évaluer les 
usages linguistiques des chercheurs au PRI.  
Dans la première étude linguistique, nous cherchons à identifier le compteur que les 
locuteurs dont le japonais est la langue maternelle emploient lorsqu’ils se réfèrent aux chimpanzés 
du laboratoire. Cette étude rapporte que 85% des répondants ont dit utiliser le compteur propre 
aux humains, le reste des sondés employant celui destiné aux grands animaux et aux individus. 
Dans la seconde étude linguistique, dès lors que le compteur destiné aux individus (i.e., kotai) est 
considéré comme le mieux adapté à la communication scientifique, nous rendons compte de son 
usage dans des publications japonaises. Nous observons que plus les publications sont techniques, 
plus les auteurs usent de ce suffixe propre aux individus ; tandis que plus les publications sont 
accessibles au public, plus les auteurs usent du classificateur destiné aux humains. En plus de cette 
étude, nous donnons l’exemple d’autres formes d’insistance sur l’agentivité (agency) des 
chimpanzés à travers les termes japonais employés dans les écrits de psychologie.  
Dans la troisième étude linguistique, nous nous intéressons à la manière dont les chercheurs 
japonais désignent les chimpanzés dans d’autres langues que la leur. Nous observons ainsi que le 
terme « participant », en lieu et place de « test subject », est un marqueur d’agentivité 
(agency). Nous indiquons que les recommandations de l’American Psychological Association, qui 
édicte les normes de publication en psychologie, préconise l’usage du pronom “who” pour les 
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humains et du pronom “that/which” pour les non-humains. En passant en revue les publications 
les plus récentes des chercheurs du PRI, nous montrons que 75% de ces articles désignent les 
chimpanzés en usant du terme de « participant »  au lieu de « subjects » tandis que 25% usent du 
terme de subject, mais le font cependant suivre du pronom “who” au lieu de “which/that”. Pour 
compléter cette étude, nous examinons plusieurs publications, dont les auteurs sont des 
collaborateurs ou non du PRI. Dans celles-ci, l’usage des termes de participant et de subject pour 
désigner des animaux non-humains ne semble pas s’être stabilisé, quelle que soit l’espèce 
considérée. Néanmoins, la présence croissante du pronom relatif “who” semble indiquer qu’il y a 
peut-être là une tendance accrue à reconnaître l’agentivité de l’animal non-humain dans le cadre 
des recherches non invasives sur la cognition.  
Ensuite, nous détaillons les raisons pour lesquelles la perception de l’agentivité qui 
s’exprime dans les emplois du couple de termes anglais « participant/subject » ne sera pas 
nécessairement assimilable à l’usage de compteurs distincts en japonais (par exemple du compteur 
pour l’humain ou pour l’individu), dès lors que le cas japonais semble indiquer une plus forte 
différence dans la connotation de ces compteurs. En outre, étant donné que le PRI comprend des 
chercheurs coréens et chinois parmi ceux travaillant avec les chimpanzés, nous analysons les 
usages des classificateurs dans ces deux autres langues. Nous montrons que les locuteurs coréens 
qui emploient le compteur de l’humain pour désigner les chimpanzés n’étendent pas cet usage à 
leur langue d’origine, usant alors du compteur destiné aux animaux lorsqu’ils désignent des 
chimpanzés en coréen. 
 Quant au mandarin, nous observons que si ce langage présente des compteurs spécifiques 
pour les animaux, il présente aussi un classificateur unique qui est à la fois un marqueur humain 
et un marqueur général (gè). En pratique, ce compteur est utilisé pour des animaux très différents 
des humains (lorsqu’il est employé comme un classificateur général) et pour des animaux très 
similaires aux humains (lorsqu’il est employé comme un marqueur humain). Ainsi, le même travail 
des frontières qui distingue nos manières de traiter linguistiquement les humains et les autres 
animaux existe dans d’autres langues usant de classificateurs ; de plus, étendre l’usage des 
classificateurs commun requiert des croyances plus fortes lorsque le compteur présente une 
spécificité plus grande vis-à-vis de l’humain comme c’est le cas en japonais.  
Pour conclure cette discussion linguistique, nous soulignons que la familiarité ne peut 
suffire à justifier la transgression des frontières linguistiques dès lors que les chercheurs situent 
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ces usages dans le contexte plus large de la catégorie du chimpanzé et non dans celui de l’individu 
familier. Il nous faut ainsi évoquer la distinction entre un anthropomorphisme anthropocentriste, 
dans lequel les animaux sont appréhendés en termes de leur capacité à se comporter comme des 
humains, et un anthropomorphisme zoocentrée, dans lequel existe un effort considérable pour 
comprendre les animaux dans leurs propres termes. Nous établissons ensuite une seconde 
différence, celle qui existe entre l’anthropomorphisme et la personnification, processus par lequel 
d’autres êtres vivants deviennent des acteurs sociaux les uns envers les autres.  
Nous abordons les devenirs sociaux entre espèces sur la base de quelques passages 
ethnographiques choisis. Le premier décrit une expérience d’enseignement, au cours de laquelle 
les expérimentateurs ont dû devenir des chimpanzés pour être de meilleurs scientifiques. « Devenir 
chimpanzé », en ce sens, va au-delà de la simple imitation des caractéristiques que l’on perçoit des 
chimpanzés et dont les humains peuvent tirer partie en les incarnant à leur tour. Cela consiste 
davantage en un effort pour voir le monde comme un chimpanzé particulier en ferait l’expérience 
dans un contexte donné. Nous abordons ensuite la problématique du changement de perspective 
depuis deux disciplines, les sciences cognitives et l’anthropologie sociale.  
Dans les sciences cognitives, la théorie de l’esprit désigne l’attribution d’états mentaux aux 
autres. Selon cette conception, il existe une multiplicité de points de vue sur un monde unique. 
Dans d’autres manières de concevoir les animaux non humains, par exemple l’animisme 
amérindiens et le perspectivisme, les animaux sont perçus comme partageant des qualités 
humaines, et dans les cas les plus radicaux, comme s’identifiant eux-mêmes comme des humains. 
Ainsi, dans de tels cas, l’humanité est de fait un marqueur de la notion de personne. Dans le 
corollaire perspectiviste de l’animisme, il y a des mondes multiples qui s’offrent à un point de vue 
unique. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à ce que l’on aurait à gagner au traitement conjoint de la 
perspective traditionnelle des sciences cognitives et de la perspective socio-anthropologique.   
Reprenant un thème philosophique et socio-anthropologique, celui de la métamorphose, 
nous approchons la question de « chimpanzéification » des humains qui travaillent avec des 
chimpanzés. D’abord, nous explorons le processus par lequel les amérindiens adoptent la 
perspective de l’animal tandis qu’ils évitent en même temps le risque d’en devenir un en changeant 
complètement de perspective. Suivant ces hypothèses, nous rappelons qu’en travaillant 
intensivement avec une espèce donnée, certaines caractéristiques de cet Autre privilégié 
imprègnent nos propres comportements. Nous défendons l’idée que la chimpanzéification est 
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caractérisée par deux niveaux. Le premier est l’intention ou le processus par lequel nous sommes 
capables d’adopter la perspective du chimpanzé à une échelle personnelle ; il est évalué de manière 
positive par nos interlocuteurs. Le second est l’intention ou le processus par lequel nous modifions 
nos comportements dans le but de les faire correspondre aux schémas comportementaux de l’autre 
espèce ; tandis que ce dernier est perçu comme un avantage lorsqu’on le dirige envers les 
chimpanzés, il est vu comme un obstacle lorsqu’on s’adresse à des humains (d’où l’expression 
“speak human to me!”).  
On observe un troisième aspect du processus de chimpanzéification lorsque les chimpanzés 
disposent d’un pouvoir considérable dans leur relation avec les humains. Nous éclairons ce 
phénomène en analysant une session expérimentale difficile que nous avons conduite. Dans cette 
session, le chimpanzé cherche à mobiliser un observateur de plus haut rang après qu’une action 
conduite par l’expérimentatrice a provoqué une réaction intense de la part de ce même chimpanzé. 
Si les humains sont capables de traiter les chimpanzés comme des acteurs sociaux valables, nous 
soulignons alors l’importance et la nécessité de poursuivre les recherches sur ce qui, pour un 
chimpanzé, constitue une personne ou sur ce que serait une personne dans les termes du chimpanzé 
lui-même. Nous acheminant vers la fin de ce chapitre, nous nous intéressons à la signification de 
la vie et de la mort des chimpanzés auprès des membres du PRI.  
Tout d’abord, nous examinons la manière dont sont fêtés les anniversaires des chimpanzés. 
En la comparant avec l’anniversaire d’un gibbon au Centre des Singes du Japon (Japan Monkey 
Centre), nous soulevons l’hypothèse selon laquelle, au lieu de lire ces événements comme la 
démonstration d’un anthropocentrisme anthropocentré, nous pouvons les interpréter comme 
faisant partie d’un processus de personnification. Nous indiquons un changement d’attitude vis-à-
vis d’un animal : d’une attention à ses performances dans la réalisation d’activités similaires à 
celles des humains, à un intérêt pour ses comportements naturels et pour les histoires et les 
anecdotes individuelles. Au contraire de la célébration de comportements humains, cette tendance 
ouvre un espace de reconnaissance de la spécificité de l’animal à l’échelle de l’espèce comme à 
celle de l’individu. Nous concluons qu’à chaque fois que l’attribution d’émotions, d’une 
individualité, d’histoires, d’anecdotes, et d’agentivité sociale est accompagnée d’une perspective 
zoocentrée, c’est à-dire d’un effort pour comprendre l’animal dans ses propres termes, alors nous 
entrons dans la personnification - dans des processus de fabrication de la personne, fût-elle non 
humaine - et non dans l’anthropomorphisme.  
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Ensuite, nous examinons dans quelle mesure la personnification est mise en œuvre au PRI. 
La seconde problématique touchant à la vie et à la mort des chimpanzés concerne le débat sur 
l’euthanasie d’un chimpanzé gravement handicapé, Reo, qui a subitement souffert d’une 
tétraplégie après une inflammation de la moelle épinière. Cependant, dans la mesure où Reo 
conservait sa personnalité et était tout à fait vivant en dépit des restrictions de sa mobilité, les 
membres du PRI ont exclu la possibilité de l’euthanasie. Son rétablissement partiel a été obtenu 
par une physiothérapie en contact direct et un protocole expérimental dans lequel Reo devait 
marcher pendant une certaine distance avant de recevoir la récompense alimentaire suite à ses 
essais.  
Le troisième exemple que nous mettons en lumière est le symétrique inverse du cas de Reo. 
On a retrouvé un jour Puchi, l’un des chimpanzés les plus âgés du PRI, allongée sur le sol, 
inconsciente. De là, nous accompagnons le déroulé de son traitement médical, la réaction de la 
fille de Puchi et la manière dont, après que la mort cérébrale a été diagnostiquée, le personnel a 
choisi de suivre les mêmes protocoles que pour un patient humain atteint de mort cérébrale. Cette 
décision était fondée sur la croyance selon laquelle Puchi ne pouvait pas être traitée comme un 
animal de laboratoire. Pour nos interlocuteurs, le dernier message de Puchi a consisté en 
l’affirmation que la mort d’un chimpanzé devrait être traitée de la même manière que la mort d’un 
humain.  
Cependant, nous devons faire remarquer une subtilité. Quand ce message a été transmis en 
japonais à l’écrit, le mot « humain » n’apparaissait pas dans sa connotation d’espèce humaine (i.e., 
qui s’écrit alors en katakana), mais dans sa connotation de personne humaine (i.e., à travers un 
kanji). Ainsi, au-delà de la proximité phylogénétique, on a fait l’expérience de la mort de ce 
chimpanzé non comme celle d’un spécimen biologique, mais en sa qualité de personne. Nous 
concluons donc à la nécessité de s’engager dans des perspectives zoocentrées sur la notion de 
personne, où un animal en tant que personne se conçoit non comme un humain incomplet mais 
dans les termes propres à l’animal lui-même.  
 Conclusion générale : Il y a quatre thématiques principales, dont chacune est mise en 
évidence dans un chapitre mais qui les traversent tous. Elles émergent d’une analyse pluraliste de 
la manière dont les humains et les chimpanzés construisent des relations sociales au sein de 
l’Institut de Recherche sur les Primates de l’Université de Kyoto. Ces thématiques sont les 
suivantes :  
414
 
 
• La socialisation inter-espèce 
• L’incarnation de ces relations dans l’espace 
• Les relations inter-espèces dans le contexte scientifique 
• Les perspectives zoocentrées sur la notion de « personne »  
 
  Pour chacune de ces thématiques, ce travail étho-ethnographique présente une conclusion 
générale. Concernant la première, nous soutenons que l’apprentissage social entre espèces se 
déroule de manière fluide, et qu’il est entretenu par des histoires relationnelles multiples ainsi que 
par des mécanismes d’apprentissage. En outre, le monde matériel et technique structure 
l’élaboration de ces relations en contraignant ou en encourageant certaines interactions. Bien que 
nous souhaitons aboutir à une compréhension solide des idées et des concepts plutôt que nous 
attarder sur des détails terminologiques, nous devons remarquer que le terme employé pour 
souligner ce leitmotiv est celui de socialisation et non de socialité ou d’apprentissage social. Bien 
que la socialisation englobe ces deux derniers termes, leurs usages font signe vers d’autres aspects 
centraux et d’autres méthodologies.  
La socialité désigne davantage les pressions due à l’Evolution : son déploiement est 
considéré à l’échelle de l’espèce ; l’apprentissage social cible davantage un processus 
psychologique. La socialisation, traditionnellement employée dans les sciences sociales, concerne 
le processus par lequel des individus internalisent ce qui leur vient des autres dans une situation 
récurrente. Bien que l’usage de l’un n’exclut pas les autres, la socialisation se trouve refléter une 
approche plus holiste que les termes précédents, plus souvent utilisés au sein d’autres disciplines ; 
ainsi ce terme situe la discussion non pas du seul point de vue de l’espèce mais au niveau de la 
construction idiosyncrasique du soi, et des enjeux qui lui sont liés.  
Quant au second point, nous défendons l’idée que les relations inter-espèces, 
particulièrement lorsqu’elles présentent un danger, incite à être davantage conscient et attentif à 
l’espace et au monde matériel environnant. C’est ainsi que les relations inter-espèces s’incarnent 
dans l’espace et à travers lui. D’abord, toute relation entre un humain et un chimpanzé génère des 
techniques corporelles particulières et une organisation sociale de l’espace. Les interactions inter-
espèces sont soumises à la manière dont humains et chimpanzés prennent possession de l’espace 
en tenant compte les uns des autres, et la manière dont ces espaces y sont adaptés. Deuxièmement, 
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selon la manière dont le monde matériel et l’espace sont conçus, certaines interactions deviennent 
possibles, et d’autres sont au contraire empêchées. À travers cette médiation, les relations se 
déploient et sont mises à l’épreuve de telle sorte que l’architecture de ces espaces joue un rôle 
considérable quant à la manière dont les humains et les chimpanzés développent leurs relations.  
 Concernant ce troisième point, nous affirmons l’importance des relations inter-spécifiques 
et de leur inscription dans le protocole expérimental. En d’autres termes, la relation personnalisée 
entre un expérimentateur et le chimpanzé participant doit être introduite dans le protocole 
expérimental et mise à l’épreuve. En outre, les chimpanzés fournissent un feedback lors de 
l’expérience, parce qu’ils usent de moyens détournés soit pour contourner le protocole 
expérimental ou soit pour le dépasser par leur intelligence. Enfin nous devons faire remarquer que 
cet aspect ne renvoie pas seulement à des considérations épistémologiques mais que l’on peut le 
voir comme une question technique qu’il vaut la peine de prendre en compte au moment de faire 
le bilan d’une expérience. Il reste que cet aspect demeure largement ignoré dans les publications 
techniques.  
 En considérant le quatrième point, nous soutenons que l’anthropomorphisation et la 
personnification sont des processus distincts et que les phénomènes sociaux observés dans la 
recherche sur les chimpanzés du PRI doivent davantage à des processus de personnification qu’à 
une anthropomorphisation. De plus, nous signalons que la conception et la constitution des 
animaux non humains comme étant des personnes bénéficierait d’un développement des 
perspectives zoocentrées dans lesquelles un effort interdisciplinaire intense est généré pour 
comprendre un animal dans ses propres termes, au lieu de faire des non humains une version 
incomplète de l’humanité.  
Perspectives et Hypothèses pour l’avenir : Etant donné que l’approche interdisciplinaire 
des relations entre humains et chimpanzés n’en est encore qu’à ses débuts, les orientations 
souhaitables pour la recherche future sont nombreuses. Dans chacun des axes susmentionnés, il 
nous faut considérer plusieurs problématiques dans une perspective interdisciplinaire, telles 
qu’elles ont été formulées tout au long de cette recherche. Cependant, à l’occasion de cette 
conclusion générale, nous devons souligner qu’une approche similaire, usant de ressources 
méthodologiques plurielles, devrait être mise en œuvre pour l’exploration des relations entre 
humains et chimpanzés dans d’autres institutions de recherche dans le monde, aussi bien que pour 
l’étude des rencontres entre humains et chimpanzés dans un milieu naturel. En outre, une approche 
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systématique et standardisée des interactions sur différents sites, aurait la capacité de rendre cette 
ambition comparative fructueuse et véritablement intéressante.  
L’apport le plus important de cette recherche ne réside sans doute pas dans les questions 
auxquelles elle a été capable de répondre mais dans celles qui demeurent en suspens – non pas 
dans les phénomènes qu’elle a su expliquer mais dans ceux qu’elle a pu dévoiler aux yeux du 
lecteur. La raison en est que nous croyons crucial d’encourager un programme de recherche 
interdisciplinaire qui pourra réellement envisager d’aller au-delà des représentations humaines des 
animaux (traditionnellement mobilisées par les humanités) et des hypothèses scientifiques 
restreintes (dont usent traditionnellement les sciences de la vie). L’anthropologie de la 
primatologie et l’ethnoprimatologie sont capables de traiter nombre d’aspects de la relation 
humain-animal, et ceci de manière tout à fait compétente, mais pas d’une manière véritablement 
interdisciplinaire, ce qui limite le nombre de questions et de phénomènes pouvant émerger de ces 
travaux. Par interdisciplinarité, nous ne nous référons pas à des ponts entre des disciplines déjà 
proches comme c’est le cas de l’histoire et de la philosophie, ou de la génétique et de la psychologie 
cognitive, dès lors que chacune de ces paires comprend des paradigmes communs sur lesquelles 
différentes disciplines peuvent s’accorder. Nous nous référons ici à ces véritables ruptures qui 
existent entre les sciences de la vie et les humanités, en termes de formation comme de croyances.  
Cette tentative, bien qu’ambitieuse, nous semble prometteuse. Il y aurait là la possibilité 
de créer des objets assez robustes, qui puissent s’adapter aux intentions et aux sensibilités 
disciplinaires tout en maintenant leur intégrité au fil des approches disciplinaires différentes - 
comme une sorte de lingua franca parlée avec différents accents. S’agissant de la primatologie et 
de l’ethnoprimatologie, nous devons encore développer une meilleure compréhension de ce que 
les humanités regroupent sous la notion de « signification ». Que signifie pour un primate d’être 
en interaction avec des humains, avec des congénères ou avec leur environnement ? Comment les 
primates donnent-ils un sens au monde au-delà de ce que peuvent en dire les sciences de la vie ? 
Quelles sont leurs pratiques en termes d’attribution de l’altérité et de fabrications de soi ? Quel 
sens les primates donnent-ils aux processus vitaux ? Que veut dire être un chimpanzé pour un 
chimpanzé, ou encore, que signifie d’être un chimpanzé d’une communauté particulière avec une 
histoire particulière touchant à ses relations sociales ? Comment répondre à ces questions sans 
mobiliser la « machine » cognitive humaine ? Disposons-nous d’une méthodologie qui puisse être 
sensible à la phénoménologie mais qui demeure ancrée empiriquement dans le comportement 
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animal ? Existe-t-il certains aspects dans ces significations propres aux chimpanzés qui les relient 
aux significations humaines ? Ainsi, bien que les disciplines considérées aient connu des avancées 
dans ces questionnements, nous avons encore besoin d’un travail conceptuel plus profond. 
Mutatis mutandis, en regardant du côté de l’anthropologie et des sous-disciplines qui lui 
sont liés comme l’anthropologie de la nature, l’anthropologie de la vie et les études sur les primates, 
une approche des relations inter-espèces ancrée dans le comportement animal offre la possibilité 
de dévoiler une perspective différente de celle qu’offre la conceptualisation humaine de la nature 
et des processus vitaux, les deux aspects étant bien entendu entremêlés. Cependant, pour accomplir 
ce but, une expertise sur les animaux dont il est question est nécessaire. De plus, parce que les 
méthodologies reposant sur les récits oraux échouent à rendre compte de la perspective non 
humaines, les humanités gagneraient à mobiliser des outils méthodologiques habituellement 
employés dans l’étude du comportement animal et de la cognition et, en retour, à leur redonner du 
sens.  
En gardant un œil attentif sur les usages et mésusages des données quantitatives, mais en 
mettant de côté une tendance à l’insularité méthodologique, les humanités devraient revendiquer 
de s’aventurer dans un tel domaine. La raison principale en est que bien que les études qualitatives 
puissent être systématiques, les études quantitatives rendent mieux compte des phénomènes 
comportementaux et interactionnels structurant surtout lorsqu’il s’agit d’échanges non verbaux. 
Rendre compte de ces modèles est crucial pour bien saisir la signification de ces actions. Au lieu 
d’adopter une position défensive envers les objets propres aux autres sciences, position que l’on 
comprend mieux dans un contexte où les sciences naturelles et biologiques attirent davantage 
d’attention et de fonds, les humanités pourraient bénéficier du développement d’une expertise 
capable de rendre opérationnels de telles méthodes et objets. La compréhension profonde, 
conceptuelle, d’un objet ou d’un sujet ne signifie pas que l’on a toutes les compétences nécessaires 
à la mobilisation des outils qu’il fournit. Or ceci nous semble crucial afin de ré-élaborer ces outils 
à la lumière des valeurs qui sont fondamentales pour une culture universitaire donné, ou peut-être 
dans pour en cultiver de nouvelles.   
Enfin, nous devons reconsidérer le rôle des études des sciences (Science and technology 
studies, STS) dans une telle aventure. Les STS, qui sont une méta-analyse de la science, ont un 
rôle important à jouer dans l’élaboration de nouvelles sciences. L’on a en effet souvent souligné 
que l’interdisciplinarité était un mot attrayant et séduisant, surtout lorsqu’il s’agit d’obtenir des 
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financements, mais que l’on atteignait en pratique avec beaucoup de difficulté. La remarque 
suivante nous mènera sans doute au plus proche d’une solution : en étudiant leurs paradigmes et 
en les rendant explicites, les enjeux pour les acteurs deviennent assez évidents pour autoriser la 
problématisation de nos propres processus de socialisation au sein d’une culture universitaire. 
Enfin, considérons le fait suivant comme une récompense pour les chercheurs des STS travaillant 
sur des sujets connexes et qui oseraient s’aventurer dans une telle entreprise : la science qui 
s’attache à la compréhension d’êtres aux capacités socio-cognitives complexes ne peut être 
produite sans tenir compte des feedbacks que ces êtres nous fournissent au moment même où nous 
faisons de la science. Ainsi, concernant l’anthropologie, les mêmes arguments s’appliquent : seule 
une exploration ancrée dans une expertise empirique sur le comportement animal est capable de 
révéler la perspective animale sur ce à quoi nous donnons le nom de science en action. Tandis que 
de premières voies ont été tracées, cette direction n’en est encore qu’à ses débuts.  
Ces traversées montrent la nécessité de légitimer de nouveaux développements dans 
chacune de ses disciplines aux yeux des disciplines connexes. La légitimation signifie ici une 
exploration en commun du monde. Au cours de ce processus, les développements conceptuels et 
méthodologiques dans une des disciplines vont de paire avec ceux des disciplines compagnes. Ce 
processus de création de compagnonnage disciplinaire n’est pas évident, dès lors qu’il y a une 
différence entre parler d’une discipline et l’observer, et produire des avancées scientifiques en 
coopération avec ce champ. C’est une compétence que l’on développe sans doute mieux en 
soumettant les chercheurs à des situations parfois douloureuses de double contrainte, où l’on doit 
prendre en compte deux modus operandi valides qui apparaissent en même temps irréconciliables. 
Il ne s’agit alors pas d’argumenter depuis l’extérieur mais seulement à partir du dedans. Sauf que 
le dedans consiste ici à trouver la sortie de la double contrainte, c’est-à-dire à inventer une solution 
à l’aporie disciplinaire.  
           Enfin, le brouillage des frontières entre les disciplines nous conduit à promouvoir 
des assemblages étranges, incommodes, qui émergent déjà de toute part): une primatologie des 
êtres humains plutôt que de l’espèce humaine, une anthropologie socio-culturelles des primates  
non humains, et des STS zoocentrées. Nous avons besoin d’une vision et d’objectifs concrets. 
Tandis que les objectifs sont des étapes tangibles, mesurables et atteignables, une vision est un 
idéal intangible, transmis de génération en génération. Concernant nos buts, nous devons 
idéalement renforcer et multiplier des réseaux collaboratifs créatifs afin de produire de nouveaux 
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objets scientifiques et d’aborder ceux qui existent avec plus d’efficacité. Deuxièmement, il est 
impératif de former une nouvelle génération de chercheurs qui maîtrisent ces deux traditions 
différentes (et parfois opposées), et de leur proposer un accès et un entraînement à de multiples 
méthodologies. Troisièmement, il est important de renforcer et multiplier les lieux de rencontres 
institutionnels (cours, conférences, programmes bilatéraux, certifications doubles, ateliers, lieux 
de publication, lieux de communication avec le public, centres, etc.).  
 Nous devrons ensuite nous confronter à la tâche la plus difficile, c’est-à-dire lever des 
fonds auprès d’institutions locales et d’organismes de financement pour promouvoir des 
programmes sur le long terme (à l’instar des bourses ERC de l’Union Européenne). Enfin, nous 
devons faire émerger un système qui puisse soutenir et cultiver les générations actuelles et futures, 
encourager les talents, en particulier au travers de la mise en place de stratégies de discrimination 
positive pour soutenir les étudiants venant des milieux les plus vulnérables (en prêtant attention au 
genre, à la situation économique, à l’origine ethnique etc.). Ainsi, nous pourrions encourager un 
meilleur accès à la science comme profession et en enrichir les pratiques en les nourrissant de 
différentes expériences sociales. Ce sont des buts qui ne peuvent être atteint que sur le long terme, 
sans doute dans plusieurs décennies, mais il est permis de penser que des efforts conjoints 
pourraient aboutir à un tel résultat. 
Dans l’immédiat, pour initier ce projet, je souhaite mener à bien la création de la première 
encyclopédie des interactions interculturelles entre humains et chimpanzés. Cette encyclopédie 
sera conçue comme un guide pratique et méthodologique audio-visuel destiné à l’étude de la 
socialisation inter-espèce. Ce projet est d’ores-et-déjà financé, et sera engagé dans l’année. Il sera 
mené par l’auteur de ces lignes en collaboration avec le docteur Catherine Hobaiter et ses 
collègues. Nous espérons que cette recherche produira une ressource pour les chercheurs de 
différentes disciplines, qui mobilisera des outils et des concepts pluridisciplinaires qu’ils pourront 
adapter à leur propre sujet de recherche lorsque celui-ci est lié aux relations inter-espèces.    
Empiriquement, ce travail sera le résultat d’une recherche comparative conduite au sein de 
différentes institutions étudiant les chimpanzés dans le monde. D’un point de vue méthodologique, 
le projet intègre et retravaille de multiples méthodes, faisant usage de l’ethnographie multi-site, de 
l’observation participante, d’enquêtes, d’entretiens, de méthodes d’analyse visuelle, de 
comparaisons de la durée des interactions, d’observations éthologiques, de micro-analyses 
comportementales, d’échantillonnages de séquences précis ou globaux, de compilations des 
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allocations temporelles des activités des animaux et enfin de quasi-expériences d’interaction entre 
humains et chimpanzés dans le but de renforcer les observations réaliser. À l’avenir, un projet 
similaire pourrait être élaboré dans un environnement naturel. Année après année, nous espérons 
créer un réseau mondial de chercheurs en primatologie, en anthropologie socio-culturelle et en STS 
autour de la question de la socialisation inter-espèce (Homo→Pan, Pan→Homo, Homo x Pan). 
Bien qu’ambitieuse, cette tentative ne sera pas menée individuellement mais comme une 
entreprise collective fondée sur l’appréhension de visées communes, dans laquelle les ambitions 
individuelles ne sont qu’un catalyseur. En pratique, les relations sociales entre Pan et Homo sont 
un objet privilégié pour comprendre l’altérité radicale, les natures-cultures et les trajectoires de 
l’Évolution. Néanmoins, un tel objet ne pourra sans doute être complètement saisi qu’à travers une 
vision qui aille au-delà de l’objet en soi, et qui se donne pour tâche d’élaborer à nouveaux frais 
nos manières de faire de la science.   
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Abstract 
 
 
How do humans and chimpanzees set and blur boundaries between species when 
interacting with each other? This is the leitmotif of this etho-ethnography at the 
intersection of social anthropology, social studies of science and primatology. 
This endeavor is based on long-term fieldwork conducted in a cognitive sciences 
laboratory in Japan, which teaches chimpanzees language-like skills as means 
to understand their perceptual world. However, in this laboratory setting, the 
human-chimpanzee relationship is a vital part of the research philosophy and 
both species constitute a hybrid community of affections, social relationships, 
and scientific partnering. As a comparative effort, a short-term multi-sited 
ethnography was conducted following the theme across institutions in Japan of 
zoo, sanctuary and field-site type, in addition to the Japanese field station for 
the study of chimpanzee culture, in Bossou, Africa. Moreover, this work draws 
on the experience of becoming, at the same time, an experimenter in the targeted 
laboratory. The result is multifold. We shall explore first, the history as well as 
the caretaking and research practices in chimpanzee studies at the Primate 
Research Institute of Kyoto University (KUPRI). Then, we shall investigate the 
dynamics of physical boundaries in dangerous interspecies social interactions; 
the experimental boundaries of testing and being tested by chimpanzees; and the 
symbolic boundaries concerning human and nonhuman personhood. As a result, 
four major points are brought to light in a renewed perspective, namely (a) 
interspecies socialization (b) the embodiment of interspecies social relations in 
space (c) interspecies social relations in scientific settings (d) animalcentric 
perspectives on personhood. We conclude with the hopes and prospects for a 
fruitful dialogue across disciplines. Overall, the differential endeavor of this 
work consists in mobilizing concepts and tools from both primatology and social 
sciences to propose a more symmetric analysis of the human-animal 
relationship.  
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